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TARKA-SAMGRAHA  
OF  
ANNAMBHATTA

WITH THE AUTHOR'S OWN DIPIKĀ, AND  
GOVARDHANA'S NYĀYA-BODHINI

EDITED WITH CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES  
BY THE LATE  
YASHWANT VASUDEV ATHALYE, M. A., LL. B.

TOGETHER WITH  
INTRODUCTION AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT  
BY  
MAHADEV RAJARAM BODAS, M. A., LL. B.,  
Vakil, High Court, Bombay

REVISED AND ENLARGED

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1930

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
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Nyaya philosophy



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the end as Appendix C. The Index at the end is a new feature added in this edition.

The Introduction required very few alterations. Where new facts have been brought out by later reserachces additional foot-notes have been inserted at the proper places. The discovery of unknown Jain and Buddhistic literature in India as well as in Tibet and China by the researches of distinguished scholars like Dr. Sarat Chandra Das and Mahā-mahopādhyāya Satīsa Chandra Vidyabhushana is likely to throw new light on many dark spots in the history of Indian philosophy, and many of our current notions are also likely to be altered. All speculations on this subject must therefore be accepted as only provisional at present. It would be a very interesting and instructive study to trace the gradual development of many philosophical problems, such as the atomic theory, the identity of cause and effect, the Nyāya syllogism, and the notion of *Abhāva*. But until fuller materials are available, it will be worse than useless to indulge in idle guesses. It is now fully recognized that Indian philosophical systems are not the creations of individual promulgators, but organic growths from out of various currents of thoughts germinating through ages and collected in the Brāhmaṇas, the Āranyakas and the more ancient Smṛtis and Purāṇas. A critical and comparative study of these philosophies will assuredly reveal the lines of this growth as well as its reaction on the religious development of the Hindus. It is to be hoped that Indian scholars will devote greater attention to the study of this aspect of Indian Philosophy.

Bombay,  
30th September 1918 }

M. R. BODAS

## Extract from the Preface to the First Edition

( Dated March 1897 )

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A few words as regards the explanatory and critical notes appended to this edition will suffice. The chief aim in writing these annotations was to make them as exhaustive as the limited scope of a book mainly intended for students would permit. The notes will not appear disproportionate to the text, if the difficulty of the subject as well as the want of a proper guide to these systems are taken into account. The notes are designed to give the student a tolerably complete and accurate idea of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems as a whole; and hence many topics, although omitted or only cursorily glanced at in *Annambhāṭṭa*'s work, have been discussed in the notes, because they form essential ingredients of the systems. Manuals like the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dipikā* are to be studied only as stepping stones to the knowledge of a great and intricate science; and the notes have been written with a view to facilitate the further progress of the student as much as possible.

An attempt has been made in the *Introduction* prefixed to this edition to trace the gradual development of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature from the age of the *Sūtras* upto the latest period. A historical sketch like this is sure to give the students a better notion of these systems than any amount of study of isolated works. The attempt is of course only tentative, but it at least opens a vast field for inquiry which may be profitably pursued in future. It was at first intended to discuss some of the more important doctrines of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems in the *Introduction*, especially with reference to their evolution and bearing on the general course of thought in India. The task, however, was found to be too vast for such a work as the present and the plan had to be abandoned for want of space: but a few hints of the kind will be found in the notes in their proper places.

It will not be proper to conclude this preface without briefly explaining the circumstances under which this work is published. The present edition of *Tarka-Saṅgraha* with commentaries and notes was undertaken by the late Mr. Y. V. Athalye more than twelve years ago and it was an ambition of his life to devote all his leisure time to the writing of the notes so as to make them really exhaustive and useful, not only to students in Indian Colleges, but also to advanced scholars. He saw that in order to popularise the study of *Nyāya* it was necessary to clear the many disputed points that beset the path of a conscientious student and to place the cardinal doctrines of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy in their true light. No man was better fitted for such a work than Mr. Athalye, whose profound scholarship and legal acumen enabled him at once to unravel the intricacies of the *Nyāya* logic. Pressure of official and other business, however, hardly left him any time to complete a task upon which he had set his heart. The work had to be constantly put aside, and consequently much labour and time were wasted in these interruptions; while latterly ill health made him more and more unable to bear the strain of a continuous effort. In spite of these difficulties he hoped to bring out this edition at an early date, and would have done so had not premature and almost sudden death carried him off at a time when he was most wanted. He had however left ample materials behind him, which required only a final revision and arrangement to make the book acceptable to the public; and so it was resolved to publish it as a posthumous work.....

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## Introduction.

### *A Historical Survey of Indian Logic.*<sup>1</sup>

"THE foundation of logic as a Science," says Ueberweg, "is a work of the Greek mind, which, equally removed from the hardness of the Northern and the softness of the Oriental, harmoniously united power and impressibility."<sup>2</sup> The supple mind of the Oriental is said to be wanting in the mental grip and measure required for strictly scientific thinking. Ueberweg, when he laid down the above proposition, was not wholly ignorant of the existence of *Nyāya* philosophy, but his knowledge of it seems to have been very meagre. Had he known some of the standard works of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, he would not have passed such a sweeping remark about the incapacity of the Oriental mind to develop a rigorous science like Logic. The same ignorance has led many eminent writers to belittle Indian philosophies in general or, where striking coincidences are discovered between Greek and Indian speculations, to assume a Grecian importation of philosophical ideas into India at some ancient time. Thus Niebuhr unhesitatingly asserts that the close similarity between Indian and Greek philosophies cannot be explained "except by the intercourse which the Indians had with the Graeco-Macedonic kings of Bactria."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, there are writers like Gorres who as positively declare that the Greeks borrowed their first elements of philosophy from the Hindus. Max Müller is probably nearer the truth in saying that both Greek and Indian philosophies were autochthonic, and that neither of the two nations borrowed their thoughts from the other.<sup>4</sup> As the human mind is alike everywhere, it is quite possible that philosophers in both India and Greece unconsciously adopted the same mode

1 This paper was read by me at a meeting of the Bōmbay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society on the 24th September 1896 and is published in the Journal of the B. B. R. A. Society, Vol. XIX p. 306.

2 Dr. F. Ueberweg : *System of Logic* p. 19.

3 Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, Appendix p. 285.

4 Thomson's *Laws of Thought*, Appendix p. 285.

of reasoning and arrived at similar results quite independently. A closer study of Indian philosophical literature is already producing a conviction among European scholars that it is tolerably indigenous and self-consistent, and that it does not need the supposition of a foreign influence to explain any portion of it. It should also be noticed that notwithstanding many coincidences between the Indian and the Grecian currents of philosophical thought there are several features in each so peculiar as to make any inter-communion between them highly improbable. The fact, for instance, that Indian Logic retained a close similarity to Pre-Aristotelian Dialectics up to a very late time is a legitimate ground for believing that the influence of Aristotle's works was never felt in India. Besides, as a history of Indian philosophy is still unwritten, and will probably remain so for years to come, it is advisable for every student to keep an open mind on the subject. Preconceived theories, however ingenious or plausible, are more likely to mislead than help such investigations. We shall therefore assume, until the contrary is indubitably proved, that Indian philosophy, including Indian logic, is a home-grown product, created by the natural genius of the people and capable of historical treatment.

That it is possible to write a history of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* philosophies will be readily admitted; but a history of philosophy, such as it ought to be, presupposes a good many things, which may not find universal acceptance. It assumes, for instance, that the Indian systems of philosophy were gradually evolved out of a few broad principles by a succession of writers and under particular circumstances. The idea that philosophical speculations in India were the spontaneous brain-creations of a few mystic Brahmins, dreaming high thoughts in lonely forests and totally unaffected by the passing events of the world, must be discarded once for all. There is no reason why philosophy in India should have followed a different course from what it did in Greece and other civilized countries. Systems of philosophy are as much liable to be influenced by past and contemporary events as any other branch of science or literature; and Indian

philosophy should be no exception to the rule. But the task of writing such a history is beset with innumerable difficulties. The chief of these is the absence of any reliable historical data which might serve us as landmarks in the ocean of Sanskrit literature. Not only are the dates of the principal writers and their works unknown, but even the existence of some of them as historical personages is doubted. Many of these works, again, are not available for reference,<sup>1</sup> while of those that are printed or can be procured in Ms. only a few have yet been critically studied. European scholars are still too much engrossed in their Vedic and antiquarian researches to devote serious attention to a systematic study of Indian philosophies ; while as to native Pandits, however learned the very notion of a history of philosophy is foreign to their minds. There are works in Sanskrit, like the *Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha* of *Mūḍhavācārya* and the *Saṅgīt-Darśana-Samuccaya* of *Haribhadra Sūri*, which profess to treat of all current systems of philosophy ; but the historical view is totally absent in them. There the systems are arranged either according to their religious character or according to the predilections of the author. In modern times, scholars like Colebrooke, Weber, Hall and Bannerjee have made some valuable contributions, but many of their opinions and criticisms are now antiquated and stand in need of revision in the light of further researches. A good deal has also been added to our knowledge of the Buddhistic literature, but even there the attention of scholars has not yet been sufficiently directed to its philosophical portion. It is not possible, therefore, under these circumstances, to do more than throw out a few hints which, while dispelling some of the prevalent errors on the subject, will serve as a basis for future inquiries in the same direction. The following pages will not have been written in vain if this aim is even partially achieved.

The value of a history of philosophy will be appreciated by those who know how much our knowledge of Greek

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1 Most of the writings of eminent Buddhist logicians like *Dīhnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* are now available only in Chinese and Tibetan translations, their Sanskrit originals having been apparently lost. See Sadajiro Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*.

philosophy has been deepened by the accounts left by Plato, Xenophon and Thucydides. Systems of philosophy as well as individual doctrines are never the products of personal caprice or of mere accident; they are evolved out of a long chain of antecedent causes. They are in fact the tangible manifestations of various latent forces which mould the character and history of the nation. There could have been no Aristotle without a Plato or a Socrates, and no Socrates without the Sophists. A knowledge of this sequence is therefore essential to a true appreciation of every system and every doctrine, an isolated study of them being either insufficient or misleading. Besides, theories and schools are often the work not of one individual or of one age, but of a succession of thinkers who fashion and refashion them, as it were, until they become worthy of general acceptance. Such seems to have been the case with doctrines of God, of causality and of creation, in India as well as in Greece. The true aim of a history of philosophy may be explained in the words of Zeller:—

"The systems of philosophy, however peculiar and self-dependent they may be, thus appear as the members of a larger historical inter-connection; in respect to this alone can they be perfectly understood; the further we follow it the more the individuals become united to a whole of historical development, and the problem arises not merely of explaining this whole by means of the particulars conditioning it, but likewise of explaining these moments by one another and consequently the individual by the whole."<sup>1</sup>

A history of Indian philosophy, such as would fulfil this purpose, is not of course possible in the present rudimentary state of Indian chronology. Still even a crude attempt of that kind will give truer insight into each system or each doctrine than can be got by a study of isolated works. The need of such a connected view of philosophy is all the greater in the case of systems like the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* whose real merits

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<sup>1</sup> Zeller; *Outline of Greek philosophy*, p. 3.

lie hidden under a heavy load of scholastic surplusage. They have not the halo of religion and mysticism which makes the *Vedānta* and the other theological systems so attractive to students of Hindu philosophy, while the scholastic subtleties of the most modern *Nyāya* writers, such as *Śiromati* and *Gudādhara*, inspire positive terror in untrained minds. If the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, therefore, are to be popularized and their value to be recognized, it is necessary to divest them of their excrescences. A large mass of rubbish is to be found in the works of modern *Naiyāyikas*, and the task of extracting the pure ore out of it is very difficult; but it is worth performing. The process of sifting and cleaning will have to be repeated several times before we can really understand some of the profoundest conceptions that are interwoven in these systems. Philosophy is the stronghold of Hinduism, and the system of *Nyāya* forms as it were the back-bone of Hindu philosophy. Every other system accepts the fundamental principles of *Nyāya* logic, while even where there are differences, the dissentients often borrow the very arguments and phraseology of the *Nyāya* for their own purpose. A study of the *Nyāya* as well as *Vaiśeṣika* system is therefore a necessary step to a popular understanding of most of the systems. It forms as it were an introduction to the general study of philosophy, and hence no scholar who would seek the truth in the latter can afford to neglect them.

Among the numerous systems of philosophy that have been evolved in India during the last three thousand years, the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* occupy a unique position, both on account of their cardinal doctrines and of the mass of learning that has accumulated around them. A general view of these doctrines will not, therefore, be out of place in a sketch like this. *Nyāya*, which is the more compact and perhaps also the more modern of the two, is much more a system of dialectics than one of philosophy. The aphorisms of *Gotama* and the works founded on them treat no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions occasionally, but

they come in rather as digressions than as inseparable parts of the system. The *Vaiśeṣika*, on the other hand, is essentially a system of metaphysics with a disquisition on logic skilfully dovetailed into it by later writers. It is these peculiarities which have earned them the name of logical systems and which distinguish them from each other as well as from other systems of Indian philosophy. These peculiarities must be carefully noted, for inattention to them has led many to misunderstand the true scope and function of these systems.<sup>1</sup>

*Gotama* begins by enumerating 16 topics, which have been erroneously called *padārthas*.<sup>2</sup> These topics are not a classification of all sublunary things or categories. They look like headings of so many chapters in a treatise on logic. Of these the first nine, viz. प्रमाण, प्रमेय, संशय, प्रयोजन, वृद्धान्त, सिद्धान्त, अवयव, तर्क, and निर्णय, constitute what may be called logic proper, while the last seven may be collectively termed illegitimate or false logic. प्रमाण includes the four proofs, *Perception*, *Inference*, *Comparison* and *Word*;<sup>3</sup> while प्रमेय comprises all objects which are known by means of those proofs, viz., soul, body, organ, material qualities, cognition, mind, effort, fault, death, fruition, pain and salvation.<sup>4</sup> These multifarious things have obviously nothing in common except the capacity of being known by one or other of the above proofs; and *Gotama* accordingly treats of them only in that light. He rarely troubles himself about the nature or form of these things, or of their production and destruction, as *Kapāda*, for instance, does. This is the reason why *Gotama's* definitions of soul, cognition, mind, etc., only tell us how they are known, but say nothing as to what kind of things they are. *Gotama's* theory of knowledge is essentially material. *Perception* is a physical process consisting in the contact of organs with their appropriate objects;<sup>5</sup> while *Inference*, which is threefold,

1 Logic in Sanskrit is designated by various names, such as *Nyāya*, *Hetu-Vidyā*, *Hetu-Sāstra*, *Ānvikṣiki*, *Pramāṇa-Sāstra*, *Tattva-Sāstra*, *Tarka-Vidyā*, *Vādārtha* and *Phakkikā-Sāstra*. Some of these names are found in works of 4th and 5th centuries B. C.

2 G. S. I, 1, 1.

3 G. S. I, 1, 3.

4 G. S. I, 1, 9.

5 G. S. I, 1, 4.

springs from *Perception*.<sup>1</sup> *Comparison* and *Word* are of course exceptional cases, and may be called imperfect inferences. Having thus dealt with the chief ingredients of knowledge, namely, the proof and its object, *Gotama* describes several accessories to knowledge, viz., doubt, aim, instance or precedent, general truths, premises, hypothetical reasoning and conclusion. Doubt and aim as incentives to every inquiry are necessary to knowledge. Precedents and general truths form the material, while premises and hypothetical reasoning are the instruments of acquiring fresh knowledge. Conclusion is the final and combined product of all these things.<sup>2</sup> The seven topics forming the second group have a negative function in logic, namely, of preventing erroneous knowledge. By exposing errors they teach us how to avoid them. They are rather like weapons for destroying the enemy's fortress than tools to build one's own. Continued argument (वाद), sophistry (जल्प), wrangling (वितण्डा), fallacies (हेत्वाभास), quibbling (छल), far-fetched analogies (जाति), and opponent's errors (निश्चयस्थान)—all these are useful where the object is to vanquish an opponent or to gain a temporary triumph; but they do not legitimately belong to the province of logic. *Gotama's* treatise may therefore be appropriately called the theory and practice of controversy rather than a science of logic. It resembles in this respect the dialectical work of Zeno who founded the sophistic dialectics in Greece.

The system, however, underwent considerable modifications in later times. The sixteen *padārthas* were practically ignored, and the theory of the four proofs absorbed almost the whole attention of later *Naiyāyikas*. The philosophical views of *Gotama* mostly came out in the digressions which are numerous in his work. They are generally introduced by way of illustrations to his method; and yet his followers have accepted these views as cardinal principles and built a regular system of philosophy upon them. The most cha-

1 G. S. I., 1, 5.

2 See for definitions of these, G. S. I, 1, 23-32, 40, 41.

racteristic of these doctrines are the non-eternity of sound,<sup>1</sup> the agency of God,<sup>2</sup> the theory of atoms,<sup>3</sup> the production of effects,<sup>4</sup> and its corollary, the reality of our knowledge. From the fragmentary discussions on these points contained in *Gotama's* work the modern *Nyāyikas* have evolved elaborate theories which have made the system what it is. The radical and realistic tendency of these later doctrines came at every step into conflict with the more orthodox views of the two *Mimāṃsās*.

The system of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is even more radical than the *Nyāya*. As a system of philosophy, the *Vaiśeṣika* is more symmetrical and also more uncompromising. Its enumeration of the six categories,<sup>5</sup> with the seventh *Abhāva* added afterwards, is a complete analysis of all existing things. These categories again are not enumerated for a special purpose only, like the 16 *padārthas* of *Gotama*; but they resolve the entire universe, as it were, not excepting even the Almighty Creator, into so many classes. *Kaṇāda's* categories resemble in this respect those of Aristotle. *Gotama* treats of knowledge only, but *Kaṇāda* deals with the wider phenomena of existence. The first three categories, Substance, Quality, and Motion, have a real objective existence and so form one group designated अर्थ by *Kaṇāda*.<sup>6</sup> The next three, Generality, Particularity, and Intimate Union, are products of our conception and may be called metaphysical categories, while the last one, Negation, appears to have been added afterwards for dialectical purposes. The nine substances comprise all corporeal and incorporeal things, and the twenty-four qualities exhaust all the properties that can reside in substance. तुलि is a quality of the Soul, and the whole theory of knowledge therefore consists in the production of this quality in its substratum, the Soul. The process by which the cognition of an external object is produced in the Soul is something like printing or stamping on some soft material. Mind is the movable joint between the Soul and the various organs which carry those impressions from ex-

1 G. S. II, 3, 13-40.

2 G. S. IV, 1, 19-21.

3 G. S. IV, 2, 4-25.

4 G. S. IV, 1, 22-54.

5 V. S. I, 4.

6 V. S. VIII, 2, 3.

ternal objects. Logic as a science of knowledge falls under वैशेषिक, and is so treated in all *Vaiśeṣika* treatises. *Vaiśeṣikas* recognize only the first two of the four proofs mentioned by *Gotama*,<sup>1</sup> and they differ from the *Naiyāyikas* on some other points also. What specially distinguishes the *Vaiśeṣikas*, however, is their remarkable power of analysis; and their system may for that reason be appropriately called analytical philosophy. They divide and subdivide each class of things, and dissect every notion into its minutest components. No doubt the process of analysis is sometimes carried to an extreme where it ends into fruitless distinctions, but its influence on philosophical speculations in general must have been enormous. It is this feature of the *Vaiśeṣika* system that has made it the source of all liberal thought in Indian philosophy. None are so unrestrained in their speculations, and none are such powerful critics of time-worn prejudices as the followers of *Kanāda*. No wonder then that they were looked upon with distrust by the orthodox school, and were labelled *Ardha-Vainuśikas* (Semi-Buddhists) by their opponents.<sup>2</sup> The *Vaiśeṣikas* never declared any open revolt against orthodox faith, nor is there any reason for supposing that *Kanāda* or his immediate followers were atheists; but the tendency of their doctrine was none the less unmistakable. As the devout Lord Bacon produced a Hume and a Voltaire in Europe, so the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines must have led ultimately to many a heresy in India, such as those of the *Bauddhas* and the *Jainas*.

A remarkable feature of both the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems, as in fact of all the Indian systems of philosophy, is the religious motive which underlies them. Religion is the incentive to all these speculations, and religion is also the test of their truth and utility. Salvation is the goal which both *Kanāda* and *Gotama* promise the people as the reward of a thorough knowledge of their respective sys-

1 B. P. Ben. ed p. 213.

2 Saṅkarācārya - *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* II. 2. 18.

tems.<sup>1</sup> Amidst all the differences one idea appears to be common to all the ancient Indian systems, namely, that knowledge is the door and the only door to salvation. Opinions only differ as to what things are worth knowing. Consequently the bitterest controversies have raged among these rivals as to what things ought to be known for the speedy attainment of salvation. These controversies usually take the form of attacks on the rival classifications of categories as being either defective or superfluous or illogical. Another effect of the religious character of these systems is the discussion of many apparently irrelevant topics which have made them look somewhat heterogeneous and unsystematic. The many digressions in the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* as well as their followers are easily understood if we look to the bearing which those topics have upon the end and aim of philosophy. Take for instance the controversy about non-eternity of sound.<sup>2</sup> What has the eternity of sound to do with logic? An inference would be just as right or wrong whether the words conveying it are eternal or not. But the question of the eternity of sound is vitally connected with the infallibility of the *Vedas* which are final authority in all matters of doubt; and all orthodox systems, therefore, must have their say on the point. We thus find that questions of the most diverse character are discussed wherever the context leads to them while others more closely related to the subject are neglected. Each system has consequently become a mixture, as it were, of the fragments of several sciences such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, and theology. This is not however a weakness as some superficial critics have supposed. It arises from the very conception of a *Darśana*, and could never have been avoided by those who in these systems sought to provide a complete guide, as it were, to the road to salvation. Indian philosophy is not singular in this respect. Everywhere philosophy grows out of religious instincts. The sense of dependence on supernatural powers and a desire to conciliate them were the first incentives

1 G.S. I, I, 1; V.S., I, 1, 4.

2 G.S. II, 2, 13.

which led men at a very early period to think of their religious well-being. "Philosophy," says Zeller, "just begins when man experiences and acts upon the necessity of explaining phenomena by means of natural causes."<sup>1</sup> The *Rgveda*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads* abound in passages showing how in India this feeling grew in intensity until it became the ruling passion of the Brahmins. Salvation was the sole purpose of life, and knowledge of the universe was the means to it. The ancient *Upaniṣads* were the repositories of the speculations which rose like bubbles out of this fermentation of thought, and which appear to have ultimately crystallized into the various systems of philosophy.<sup>2</sup> In Greece philosophy tended to become more and more ethical and worldly; in India it could never free itself from its religious setting. This is the reason why in spite of additions and modifications Indian *Darśanas* never lost their original character completely. A history of each of these systems is therefore a history of its gradual evolution within certain limits, while its relations outside of them remained practically unchanged.

The period before the rise of Buddhism is almost a blank page. We know nothing of it except that a large amount of free speculation must have been stored up at that time in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*. The only system which dates prior to Buddhism is the *Sāṅkhya*, and possibly the *Vaiśeṣika* also; but all the other *Darśanas* are presumably of a post-Buddhistic origin, at least in the form in which we possess them. In fact the very notion of a system seems to be post-Buddhistic. The severe conflict between Buddhism and Brahmanism which stirred men's minds in the century after Buddha's death must have compelled both the parties to systematize the doctrines and express them in a compact methodical form.

1 Zeller; *Outline of Greek Philosophy*, p. 6.

2 See my paper entitled "A Brief Survey of the *Upaniṣads*" J. B. B. R. A. Society, Vol. XXII. p. 67.

The same cause or causes which led the Buddhists to collect their ethical and philosophical teachings in their *suttas* during the period which elapsed between the first and the second Council must have also induced their Brahman rivals to compose similar works for the defence of Vedic orthodoxy. The two collections of aphorisms belonging to the Prior and the Posterior *Mimāṃsās* and known by the names of *Jaimini* and *Budarāyaṇa* respectively have a strong controversial flavour about them, and appear to be the first products of this reaction against Buddhism. The aphorisms of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* could not have been of any prior date, and as we do not know of any *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* works older than these *Sūtras*, the history of those systems may safely be said to begin in the 5th or the 4th century before Christ.

Roughly speaking, the literature of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems extends over a period of 22 centuries, that is, from about the 4th century B. C. till very recent times, of which the last two hundred years, not being distinguished by any original works, may be left out of account. The history may be divided into three periods: the first from about 400 B. C. to 500 A. D., the second from thence to 1300 A. D., and the third after that till the end of the last century. The only known representatives of the first period are the two collections of aphorisms going under the name of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* respectively, and perhaps the scholium of *Fraśastapāda* also; but there must have existed other works now lost. The second period is pre-eminently distinguished by a series of commentaries on these *Sūtras* beginning with *Vātsyāyana* and comprising several works of acknowledged authority. The third period saw the introduction of independent treatises and commentaries on them which at last dwindle down into short manuals like *Tarka-Samgraha* and *Tarka-Kaumudi*. These three periods also mark three successive stages in the development of the two systems. The first may be called the age of the formation of doctrines in the *Sūtra*; the second that of their elaboration by commentators; and the third that of their systematization by writers of special treatises. The

first is characterised by great originality and freshness, the second by a fulness of details and the third by scholastic subtlety ultimately leading to decadence. These divisions may sometimes overlap, for we have treatises like *Tārkarakshā* and *Sapta-padārthī* before the 14th century, so we have commentaries on the *Sūtras*, like Śāṅkara Miśra's *Upaskāra*, and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, written afterwards. This does not however affect our general conclusion that the writings of the 14th century and onwards are in marked contrast with those of the preceding age. The exact duration of these periods may have varied a little in the case of the two systems, but the order is the same. The mutual relation of these two systems, however, appears to have changed at different times. During the first period they seem to have been two different systems, independent in origin but treating of the same topics and often borrowing from each other. *Vātsyāyana* regards them as supplementary.<sup>1</sup> In the second period, however, they become somewhat antagonistic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of the alliance of the *Vaiśeṣikas* with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems, and we come across many works, like the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* for instance, in which the authors have attempted to select the best portions of each and construct from these fragments a harmonious system of their own. This is a curious phenomenon, no doubt, and we do not yet sufficiently know the causes which brought about these successive changes in the attitude of the exponents of these two systems towards each other; but the fact is important in as much as it must have been a powerful factor in moulding both of them. At any rate it accounts for the difficulty, which every student meets with at the threshold, whether to regard these systems as really supplementary or antagonistic to each other. They are spoken of as both, and yet no Sanskrit writer seems to have perceived the inconsistency of doing so. The only explanation that can at present be suggested is that the

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<sup>1</sup> *Vāt.* on G. S. I., 1, 4.

twins after quarrelling for some time reunited under the influence of a reaction.

Having premised so much we may proceed to consider the three periods in order ; and the first thing we shall have to do is of course to fix the age of the *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda*. They are the recognized basis of the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems, and they are, so far as we know, the oldest works on those systems. Not that they were the first of their kind ; perhaps they were preceded by cruder attempts of the same sort that have perished ; perhaps the present works are improved editions of older ones. For all practical purposes, however, the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* may be taken as the starting points for the two systems. Now before advertiring to the evidence that exists for determining the dates of these two *Sūtras* it is necessary to notice one or two misconceptions that would otherwise hinder our task. The first of these is the confusion that is often made between the system and the *Sūtra* work expounding it ; and the second is a similar want of distinction between the system as a whole and the particular doctrines composing it. The three things, *i.e.*, *Gotama's* work, the *Nyāya*-system, and the individual doctrines embodied in it, are quite distinct, and ought not to be confounded with one another. They may for aught we know have originated at different times, and no inference can therefore be safely drawn as to the probable date of the one from any ascertained fact relating to the other. The fact for instance that some of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines are controverted in *Bādarāyana's* *Brahma-Sūtras*<sup>1</sup> has been made the ground for inferring that *Kaṇāda's* *Sūtras* were composed prior to those of *Bādarāyana*, and yet there are cogent reasons for believing that they were of a much later origin. We must therefore suppose that the doctrines controverted in *Brahma-Sūtras* existed prior to their incorporation into a regular system as set out in *Kaṇāda's* work. Similarly many of the arguments as to the relative priority of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are based on assumptions made from some doctrines of the one being cited or refuted by the other. Such argu-

<sup>1</sup> *Brahma-Sūtras*, II, 2, 11, *et seq.*

ments however are misleading and often produce confusion. The *Nyāya* doctrine of अस्त्कार्यवाद must have existed before the rise of Buddhism and even before the formation of the *Sāṅkhya* system, the oldest works of which controvert it. Does it follow therefore that *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* preceded both the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Bauddhas*? And if so, how are we to account for the fact that several doctrines of the *Sāṅkhyas* as well as the *Bauddhas* are in their turn quoted in the *Sūtras* of both these authors? Here is a dilemma which can only be solved by supposing that the doctrine of अस्त्कार्यवाद and many others like it subsequently adopted by the *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* must have formed topics of hot discussion long before the *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* were composed. In like manner, even supposing that the system as such existed at or before a particular date it will not be right to argue that *Kaṇāda's Sūtras* also must have existed at that time.<sup>1</sup> Nor should it be supposed that the whole system as conceived later is to be found in these works. Many doctrines now looked upon as cardinal principles of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy, are conspicuous by their absence in *Kaṇāda's* work, such as, for instance, *Abhāva* as a seventh category, the last seven qualities, and the doctrine of *Viṣeṣa*.<sup>2</sup> This much however is certain, that when the *Sūtras* were composed the two systems had assumed a definite form which was never to be substantially changed. There are important gaps that were filled up afterwards; but the skeleton is there and it is the skeleton that gives shape to the body. The process may have been something like this. First bold thinkers started theories of their own on the burning questions of the day, and then these theories after much discussion crystallized into specific doctrines such as those of अस्त्कार्य, समवाय and others. The ancient *Upaniṣads* abound in passages in which we find such definite principles being actually worked out of a mass of general speculations. The next step is for some eminent

<sup>1</sup> Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I., p. 354, Cowell's note.

<sup>2</sup> V. S. I., 1, 4; I., 1, 6; I., 2, 3.

teacher to adopt and develop some of these doctrines and form a school which might in time grow up into a system. The difference between a school and a system is that of degree. A school adopts a theory about a particular phenomenon, while a system aims at explaining consistently the whole order of nature by reducing several of these theories into harmony. *Audulomi*, *Kāśakṛtsna*, *Būdari* and many others whose names occur in the philosophical *Sūtras*, seem to have been founders of the schools which preceded the regular systems. The system when thus formed required an authoritative exposition, and many must have been the failures of inferior persons, before a master mind like *Gotama* or *Kaṇāda* could produce a work that would live into futurity. The present *Sūtras* of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* must, therefore, be regarded as representing the end rather than the commencement of this evolutionary process. They did not originate the systems, they only stereotyped them, by giving them as it were a body and shape. Besides, it is probable that the fashion of propounding philosophical systems in the form of *Sūtras*, if not the systems themselves, came into vogue after the rise of *Buddhism*. The ethical teachings of *Gautama Buddha* were expressed in the shape of pithy sentences which were easy to remember and possessed a certain attraction for the popular mind. The Brahmans, probably with a desire to beat their rivals with their own weapons, composed *Sūtras* on their own philosophical systems modelled on the Buddhistic *suttas*, and possessing in some cases literary finish of a very high order. The necessity of meeting their opponents in controversies which became frequent from this time compelled the orthodox philosophers to put their cardinal doctrines in a definite shape; and this they did by expressing them in an incisive and dogmatic form so as to produce immediate conviction. The uncompromising tone and rigid logic of these post-Buddhistic *Sūtras* are in strong contrast with the loose reasoning and poetical imagery which abound in earlier philosophical books, such as the *Upaniṣads*. While morality was the stronghold of the Buddhists, philosophy was their weakest point in these early times;

naturally the shrewd Brahmans cultivated this latter branch with the greater vigour in order to outshine their rivals. The *Sūtras* of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa* must have been composed with some such object in view; and the example, once set, was of course followed by other teachers belonging to the orthodox party.

It is difficult to determine the chronological order of the several systems of philosophy, and the attempts hitherto made have not been very successful. The *Sāṃkhya* system and many of the doctrines of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, if not the whole of their system, are most probably Pre-Buddhistic. The *Vaiśeṣika* system pre-supposes the *Sāṃkhya*, and there is evidence to show that the *Vaiśeṣika* not only preceded Buddhism and Jainism, but directly contributed to the rise of those sects, many of their peculiar dogmas being closely allied to *Vaiśeṣika* theories. The Buddhistic doctrines of total annihilation, for instance, is only a further and an inevitable development of the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine of अस्तकार्यवाद; while the categories or *Padārthas* of the latter find their counterpart in the five *Astikāyas* or essences of the *Jainas*. The atomic theory moreover is largely adopted by the *Jainas*, and even enters into their legendary mythology. The epithet *Ardha-Vaiśeṣikas* or Semi-Buddhists, contemptuously bestowed upon the *Vaiśeṣika* by Śāmkarācārya,<sup>1</sup> concealed a historical truth, if the *Vaiśeṣikas* as suggested above were the half-hearted precursors who by their materialistic speculations paved the way for the extreme radicalism of *Gautama Buddha*. The *Vaiśeṣika* school is specifically named in the sacred texts of the *Jainas* and also in the *Lalita-Vistūra*.<sup>2</sup> Several of their doctrines are refuted in *Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtras*, and it is possible that they may have existed then in some systematic form. As to the other systems, the two *Mīmāṃsās* appear to have come immediately after the rise of Buddhism and before the advent of the *Nyāya* and the *Yoga*. Neither

1 See foot-note *supra*.

2 *Welch: History of Indian Literature*, p. 226, foot-note.

*Bādarāyaṇa* nor *Jaimini* refers to any peculiar *Nyāya* doctrine, while the few aphorisms in *Bādarāyaṇa's* work which mention *Yoga* look like interpolations. It will be shown presently that *Gotama* himself borrows from *Bādarāyaṇa's* work.<sup>1</sup>

Looking to the *Sūtras*, however, the two *Mimāṃsā* collections appear to be the oldest of them, while the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* come next in succession. The date of *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*, who quote each other and might have been contemporaries, is not yet settled. They are certainly aware of the Buddhistic sect, many of whose doctrines they quote and refute.<sup>2</sup> The two *Mimāṃsā Sūtras* therefore could not have been composed before the 6th century B. C. They may for the present be assigned to the 5th or the earlier part of the 4th century B. C. The *Sūtras* of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* must be still later productions, as will appear from a comparison of them with the *Brahma-Sūtras*. The opening *sūtras* of both *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* appear to recognize the *Vedāntic* doctrine of knowledge being the means to salvation; while throughout their works whenever they treat of soul, salvation, pain, knowledge, and such other topics, their language seems to be strongly tinged with *Vedāntic* notions. The phraseology is often the same, and in several places even direct references to the *Brahma-Sūtras* may be detected in these works. For example the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras*, अनिय इति विशेषतः प्रतिवेदभावः and अविद्या<sup>3</sup> appear to be answers to *Bādarāyaṇa's* objections to the eternity of atoms<sup>4</sup>; while the *Sūtra* अद्वितीयत्वात् गमिष्य<sup>5</sup> is evidently aimed at the *Vedāntic* view explained in the four preceding *sūtras*, that the Soul is to be known only through *Śruti*.<sup>6</sup> Similarly V. S. IV, 2, 2-3 controvert the *Vedāntin's* view that our body is formed by

1 Garbe holds that *Vaiśeṣika* was prior to *Nyāya*: *Vide. Die Sankhya Philosophie*, p. 116.

2 *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 2, 18, et seq; *Mimāṃsā Sūtra* 1, 2, 33; see also Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I, p. 354.

3 V. S. IV, 1, 4-5.

5 V. S. III, 2, 9.

4 *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 2, 14-15.

6 Cf. also G. S. III, I, 28-30.

the union of five or three elements.<sup>1</sup> Again many of the terms used by *Kaṇāda* such as अविद्या, लिङ्, प्रत्यगात्मा, and व्याख्यात, appear to be borrowed from *Būdarāyana*. The same holds good of *Gotama*. In several places he propounds views very similar to well-known *Vedāntic* doctrines<sup>2</sup>; while a comparison of G. S. III, 2, 14 with *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 1, 24 will show that *Gotama* borrows even illustrations and arguments from *Būdarāyana*.<sup>3</sup> G. S. 11, 1, 61-67<sup>4</sup> would likewise show that *Gotama* was also posterior to *Jaimini*. It may be argued that the borrowing may have been on the other side, or that the particular *sūtras* may be later additions. But we must in such cases judge by the whole tone and drift of the authors. While in all the cases noted above the topics form essential parts of the two *Mimāṃsa* systems, they come only incidentally in the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama*. We can, therefore, confidently assert that the works of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda*, as we have them at present, cannot be older than the 4th century B. C.

The question as to the relative priority of these two systems *per se* is beset with many difficulties. Opinions have been advanced on both sides. *Candrakānta Tarkālambikāra*, in the preface to his edition of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, strongly contends for the priority of *Vaiśeṣika* system, while others maintain the opposite view.<sup>5</sup> Goldstücker calls the *Vaiśeṣika* only a branch of the *Nyāya* without deciding their relative priority; while Weber is undecided on the point. Much of the confusion, however, on this point can be avoided by making a distinction, as already noted, between the *Vaiśeṣika* system and the *Vaisesika Sūtras*. There are strong grounds for believing, as Mr. *Tarkālambikāra* contends, that the *Vaiśeṣika* system preceded *Gotama's* and yet the *Sūtras* of *Kaṇāda*, or at least many of them, may be of a

<sup>1</sup> *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 2, 21-22.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. G. S. IV, 1, 64.

<sup>3</sup> क्षीरविनाशो कारणानुपलब्धिवदध्युतन्तिवच्च तदृत्पत्तिः । *Gotama-Sūtra*; उपसंहार-दर्शनालेति चेन्न क्षीरवादि । *Brahma-Sūtra*.

<sup>4</sup> विघ्नर्थशादनुवादमयचनविनियोगात् G. S. II, 1, 61.

<sup>5</sup> Bhīmācārya : *Nyāya-Kos'a*, Intro., p. 2-3, note.

<sup>6</sup> Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 153.

<sup>7</sup> Weber : *History of Indian Literature*, p. 245.

later date. The fact that, while *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines are noticed in *Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-Sūtras*, *Gotama's* system is not even once alluded to, shows that some *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines at least were promulgated not only before *Gotama* but even before the composition of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. *Vātsyāyana's* remark that omissions in *Gotama's* work are to be supplied from the cognate system of the *Vaiśeṣikas* may likewise be taken to imply that that system existed before *Gotama's* time<sup>1</sup>; while the latter's reference to a प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त<sup>2</sup> by which he probably means doctrines taught by some allied school such as the *Vaiśeṣikas* would support such an inference. The posteriority of *Gotama* may also be inferred from the fact that many topics summarily disposed of or imperfectly discussed by *Kaṇāda* are fully treated by him, as for instance, inference, fallacies, eternity of sound, and the nature of soul. It is true that some of these arguments would also prove that *Kaṇāda's sūtras* were anterior to *Gotama's* work, and it is possible that a collection of *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* was known to *Gotama*. But we must also take account of the fact that several *sūtras* in the present collection of *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms appear to be suggested by *Gotama's* work.

V. S. III, 2, 4,<sup>3</sup> for instance, is clearly an amplification of G. S. I, 1, 10.<sup>4</sup> V. S. III, 1, 17<sup>5</sup> again gives an illustration of the अनैकान्तिक fallacy, although the name, strange to say, is nowhere explained throughout *Kaṇāda's* work. The word is, however, used by *Gotama* as a definition of सत्यभिचार, and it is possible that the author of the *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* borrowed it from him, and wrongly used it as the name of the fallacy. These *Sūtras*, therefore, if

1 *Vāt.* on G. S. I, 1, 4.

2 G. S. I, 1, 29.

3 प्राणायाननिमयोन्मदजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकागः सुखदृश्वेच्छाद्वयप्रयत्नाश्रित्मनो लिङ्गानि *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*.

4 इच्छाद्वयप्रयत्नसुखदृश्वज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति। *Gotama-Sūtra*

5. यस्माद्विषणी तस्माद्विग्निं चानेकान्तिकस्योदाहरणम्।

6. अनैकान्तिकः सत्यभिचारः G. S. I, 2, 46.

not the whole work of *Kaṇāda*, must have been composed after Gotama's work was published. Now there are good reasons for suspecting that *Kaṇāda*'s work, as we have it at present, contains a large number of aphorisms which have been either modified or added in after times. A comparison of *Kaṇāda*'s *sūtras*, as found in our printed editions, with the *Bhāṣya* of *Praśastapāda* shows that many of the *sūtras* are not explained by the scholiast and were probably unknown to him.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, all these suspicious aphorisms relate to topics that look like having been suggested afterwards. The practice of making such interpolations in ancient works is not uncommon in Indian literature. The *Sāṃkhya-Sūtras* are notoriously modern productions, though ascribed to an ancient *Rishi*; and even the *Brahma Sūtras* of *Bādarāyana* lie under the suspicion of being tampered with. The loose and unsystematic arrangement of the *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms must have considerably facilitated the task of an interpolator, while such liberties could not have been easily taken with the more compact and finished production of *Gotama*.<sup>2</sup>

The most reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing facts is that, although we can say nothing definite about an original collection of *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms, the present work of that name is comparatively modern. We have no materials at present to fix its probable age. *Kaṇāda* is a mythical personage and is variously styled *Kāśyapa*, *Kaṇabhaṭṭa* or *Kaṇabhuk*. The latter

1 See the excellent conspectus showing the *sūtras* corresponding to each section of *Praśastapāda*'s scholium, prefixed to the Benares Edition of that work.

2 Mahāmahopādhyāya Satischandra Vidyabhushan thinks that only the 1st book of *Nyāya-Sūtras* was composed by *Akṣapāda*, while the 2nd, 3rd and 4th books bear marks of different hands. The later books contain passages from *Laukiavatāra Sūtra* of *Yogacāra* Buddhistic school, the *Mādhyamika Sūtra* of *Nāgārjuna* and *Sataka* of *Āryadeva*, all composed about 300 A.D. *Vātsyāyana* is said to have collected all the later additions together. See Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume p. 161.

3 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 200; V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 160-1; *Trikaṇḍa-Śeṣa*.

two appellations are, of course, paraphrases of *Kaṇāda*, which literally means "an eater of seeds or atoms."<sup>1</sup> The name is said to be derived from his having lived upon pick-ed-up grain-seeds while practising austerities; more probably it is a derisive appellation invented by antagonists for his atomic theory. The system is also called *Aulūkya Darśana*,<sup>2</sup> and a pretty old tradition is told that God Mahādeva pleased by the austerities of the sage *Kaṇāda* appeared to him in the guise of an owl and revealed the system which the latter subsequently embodied in the *Sūtras*.<sup>3</sup> A Rsi named *Ulūka* is mentioned in the *Māhābhārata*, but nothing can be said as to what connection he had with the *Vaiśeṣika* system. The name *Aulūkya* is, however, considerably old, being mentioned by *Udyotakāra* and *Kumārila*. The name *Vaiśeṣika* occurs even in the scholium of *Prasastapāda*, who also refers to the tradition about God Mahādeva just mentioned.<sup>4</sup> *Vāyu-Purāṇa* makes *Akṣapāda Kaṇāda* and *Ulūka* sons of *Vyāsa*,<sup>5</sup> but no reliance can be placed on such an authority.

It has been already shown that the present collection of *Vaiśeṣika* aphorisms is posterior to the 4th century B. C., and the references to it contained in *Vātsyāyana's* commentary on *Gotama's* work prove that it must have existed before the 5th century A. D. *Vātsyāyana* mentions it as समानतन्त्र, enumerates the six categories<sup>6</sup> and actually quotes one aphorism of *Kaṇāda*.<sup>7</sup>

1 Sugiura on the authority of a Chinese work *Isiki Jutsuki* says he was called rice-eater because he used to go out and eat rice obtained from women, while he was called *Ulūka*, because he lived in a mountain and was very ugly. Vide Sugiura's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan* p. 14.

2 Sarv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 110.

3 Bhīmācārya: *Nyāya-Koṣa*, Intro p. 2.

4 *Nyāya-Vārtika*, Bibl. Ind. p. 168; *Tantra-Vārtika* I., 1, 4.

5 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 234.

6 See the verse quoted in P. B. Ben. ed. Intro p. 10.

7 अस्त्वयद्विषये कर्मसामान्यविशेषसम्बाधाः प्रमेयम् । तद्देवेन चाऽपरितद्वयेयम् । *Vāt.* on G. S. I., 1, 9.

8 यस्माद्विषयाणी तरमादश इति (V. S. III., 1. 16) किमनुमानमिति चेत् सन्तानोपषत्ति-रूपपादितः शब्दसंतानः etc. | *Vāt* on G. S. II, 2, 36.

This is the utmost that we can say with certainty about the age of *Kanāda*'s work. The date of *Praśastapāda*, the earliest scholiast of *Kanāda*, is equally uncertain. He cannot be the same as the *Rishi Praśasta* mentioned in the *Pravirādhyāya* of *Baudhāyana-Sūtra*, for *Baudhāyana-Sutra* being composed before the 4th century B. C.,<sup>1</sup> *Praśastapāda* and *a fortiori Kanāda* would have to be placed long before that time. *Praśastapāda* has also been identified with *Gotama*, the author of *Nyāya-Sūtras*,<sup>2</sup> but it seems to be a mistake. So no inference as to the age of the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* can be drawn from the date of the commentator. The six categories as well as the proofs are mentioned in the medical work of *Caraka*, who has been identified with *Patañjali*, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*.<sup>3</sup> But even if this identity is correct, the original work of *Caraka* having been subsequently recast and enlarged by *Dṛḍhabala*, particular passages from it cannot be relied upon for historical purposes.

Happily we can obtain better results in the case of *Gotama*'s work. That it is posterior to the rise of Buddhism is evident on its face, for Buddhistic doctrines are expressly mentioned therein.<sup>4</sup> It is also, as has been already shown, later than the latter part of the fifth century B. C., the time of *Bādarāyaṇa*'s *Brahma-Sūtras* which, while refuting *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines, make no mention of the cognate school of *Naiyāyikas*. Goldstücker says that both *Kātyāyana* and *Pāṇini* knew of the *Nyāya Sūtras*.<sup>5</sup> Now *Patañjali* is said to have written his great work about 140 B. C.<sup>6</sup>; but *Kātyāyana*'s date is not so certain. According to a story told in *Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara*, *Kātyāyana* was a pupil of *Upavarṣa* and a minister of king *Nanda* who reigned about 350 B. C.<sup>7</sup> Goldstücker makes light of the authority of

1 Bühler : Sacred Laws (S. B. E. Series) Part I *Āpastamba*, Intro. p. XXII. 2 Bhīmacārya : *Nyāya Koṣa* 1stro. p. 2.

3 *Parama-Laghu-Mañjuṣā*. A verse said to be from *Yogabija* calls *Patañjali*, a writer on three sciences, grammar, medicine, and *Yoga*.

4 G. S. III, 2, 11-13. 5 Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 157. 6 Ibid. p. 234

7 *Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara* 1, 5; Max Müller : *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, p. 240.

*Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara*, but it is hard to believe that such a story could have got currency without some sort of foundation. If the story is true, the *Nyāya-Sūtras* would have to be placed before 353 B.C. *Kātyāyana's* date is now generally taken to be about the middle of the 4th century B.C.<sup>1</sup>; and so *Gotama* will have to be placed before that time. There is another fact which confirms this conclusion. *Śabara Svāmin*, the scholiast on *Jaimini's Sūtras*, often quotes an ancient author whom he calls *Bhagavān Upavarṣa*, and who must have, therefore, lived a long time before him. This *Upavarṣa* is said to have written commentaries on both the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*.<sup>2</sup> If he be the same as the reputed teacher of *Kātyāyana* above mentioned, he must have lived in the first part of the 4th century B.C.<sup>3</sup> Now a passage quoted by *Śabara Svāmin* from the commentary of this *Upavarṣa*<sup>4</sup> shows that he was intimately acquainted with *Gotama's* system and largely adopted its doctrines. *Gotama's* work must, therefore, have been composed before the 3rd century B.C., that is, it belongs to the 4th century B.C.<sup>5</sup>

There is another piece of evidence, which, though apparently conflicting with the above conclusion, really supports it. *Apastamba*, the author of the *Dharma-Sūtra*, knew both the *Pūrva* and the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* systems, but not the *Nyāya*.<sup>6</sup> It is true that *Apastamba* in two passages of

1 Eggeling's *Satapatha-Brahmaṇa* (S. B. E. Series) Intro. p. 30.

2 Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I. p. 357.

3 Another story in Somadeva-Bhaṭṭa's *Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara* makes him live in Pāṭaliputra during the reign of Nanda, i. e. about 350 B.C; but no reliance can be placed on the chronological data furnished by this book in the absence of other evidence.

4 *Sābara-Bhāṣya Bibl. Ind.* p. 10; for an English translation of the passage see Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I. p. 328.

5 This conclusion will not be affected by any date that may be assigned to Pāṇini. Goldstücker places Pāṇini long before the rise of Buddhism and holds that he did not know Gotama's work. Pāṇini mentions the word यज्ञ but only in the sense of a syllogism or rather a thesis, such as those in Jaimini's work. See Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, p. 152.

6 Bühler: *Sacred Laws* (S. B. E. Series) Part I *Apastamba*, Intro. p. xxvii.

his work uses the word न्याय and न्यायवित् respectively<sup>1</sup>; but there he clearly refers to *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā*, and not to the system of *Gotama*. Nor is this use of the word uncommon in ancient writings. The fact that the word न्याय, which was subsequently monopolized by the followers of *Gotama*, is applied by Āpastamba to the system of *Jaumini*, shows that at his time *Gotama's* system was either unknown, or at least so new as not to have attained any wide celebrity. Āpastamba according to Bühler must have lived before the third century B. C. and even 150, or 200 years earlier;<sup>2</sup> but his knowledge of the two *Mimāṃsā's* shows that he could not have lived long before 400 B. C. *Gotama's* work must therefore be assigned to the end of the 5th or the beginning of the 4th century B. C.

It is needless to state after this that our *Gotama* is quite different from *Gotama* the author of a *Dharma Sūtra*, who preceded *Baudhāyana* and was a *fortiori* prior to *Āpastamba*<sup>3</sup>; nor has he anything to do with the mythical sage of that name mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* as the son of *Utathya* and the husband of *Ahilyā*. Nothing is known about the personality of our author, and it is even doubtful whether his real name was *Gotama* or *Gautama*. Being a Brahman he could not have belonged to the race from which the founder of Buddhism sprang. He is also called *Akṣapāda* or *Akṣacaraṇa*, but the origin of the name is not known. Some have conjectured that the epithet was a nick-name given to *Gotama* for his peculiar theory of sensual perception, and means one who stands or walks upon organs of sense (अङ्ग); but there is no authority for this. At any rate the author, whoever he may be, possessed great originality and a grasp of general principles that enabled him to systematize the science of logic for the first time. He cannot, however, be said to have founded it, for logical rules seem to have prevailed even before his time. *Manu* proclaims the need of reason for a correct understanding of the sacred law<sup>4</sup>, while

1 Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra II, 4, 8, 13; and II, 6, 14, 13.

2 Bühler : *Sacred Laws* (S. B. E. Series) Part I, Āpastamba, Intro. p. xliii.

3. *Ibid.* p. xx and lv.

4 *Manu-Smṛti* xii, 106.

*Bādarāyana* goes to the other extreme of declaring the utter futility of our reasoning power to discover truth.<sup>1</sup> Besides, it is quite obvious that, unless the art of reasoning had been practised for a long time previous, and had been considerably developed, neither the philosophical speculations in the *Upanisads* nor the rise of heretical sects, such as the *Cārvākas*, *Bauddhas* and *Jainas*, could have been possible. What then did *Gotama* achieve? What is his place in the history of Indian logic? This is an interesting question, and would, if satisfactorily answered, throw a flood of light on the early history of Indian philosophy.

*Gotama* was certainly not the pioneer. The very fact that he has evolved a logical system complete and well knit in all essential respects would lead us to suspect that he must have used materials left by his predecessors and profited by their errors. This is not a mere inference however, for *Vātsyāyana* in his Commentary on G. S. I, 1, 52 actually tells us that there was a school of *Naiyāyikas* who required ten premises in a syllogism, and that *Gotama* reduced their number to five.<sup>2</sup> This is quite probable, for Indian systematists always favour brevity, and even *Gotama*'s five premises were subsequently reduced by others to three. *Gotama*, therefore, must have been preceded by other labourers in the same field whose works have been eclipsed by his superior treatise. External evidence would lead us even a step further. The two passages from *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, referred to above, show that the word न्याय was formerly applied to *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā*. Similarly passages are also found in many ancient *Smṛtis* and also some modern works in which the same word or its derivatives are used in connection with *Jaimini*'s system. So late a writer as *Mādhabācārya* calls his epitome of *Jaimini*'s work न्यायमालाविस्तर, while many other *Mimāṃsā* works have न्याय as part of their title. The various theses propounded in *Jaimini*'s work are called *Nyāyas*, and even *Pāṇini* uses the word

1 *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 1, 11.

2 *Vāt.* on G. S. I, 33.

in a similar sense.<sup>1</sup> How then are we to explain the fact that a word so generally used by the *Mimāṃsakas* came afterwards to designate the rival and totally dissimilar system of *Gotama*. As a general rule we find that when a new school arises it coins its own phraseology to distinguish itself from its predecessors. In this case, however, the followers of *Gotama* appropriated an old word, and that word stuck to them so fast as to become afterwards their exclusive property. The explanation, it seems, lies in the fact that the science of logic which afterwards developed into a separate system was originally the child of *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā*.

Analogy of other arts and sciences points to the same conclusion. All sciences in India appear to have sprung out of sacrificial necessities. Astronomy was founded on the rules by which Vedic *Rsis* ascertained the correct time for performing periodical sacrifices, from the movements of heavenly bodies. While medicine had its germ in the analysis of the properties of *Soma* plant and other sacrificial substances, music was first cultivated by the *Udgātr* priest for singing his *Sāman* hymns, and a knowledge of agriculture and geometry was found to be essential in constructing the sacrificial pandal and the *Vedi*. It is probable, therefore, that the art of reasoning also originated in some requirement of the all-important sacrifice. Such requirements were mainly two, the correct interpretation of Vedic texts on which the due performance of the sacrifices depended, and victory in the philosophical and other discussions which were usually held in the intervals of sacrifice. It was a special function of the *Brahman* priest to give decision on any disputed points that might arise in the course of a sacrifice, and this he could not have done unless he was a master of ratiocination. Such decisions, which may be likened to the chairman's rulings in a modern assembly, are scattered through the ancient *Brāhmaṇas*, and are collected together as so many *Nyāyas* in the ancient *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā* aphorisms of *Jaimini*. The philosophical disquisitions were collected in the various

<sup>1</sup> Pāṇini's *Sūtra* III, 2, 122.

*Upaniṣads* and produced the system of *Uttara-Mimāṃsā*. *Jaimini* lays down many rules of exegesis which seem to be the direct progenitors of the logical rules of *Gotama*. The various tests for instance illustrated in the third chapter of *Jaimini's* attempt to determine whether a rite or a *Vedic* direction is principal or auxiliary are only so many varieties of inference. The लिङ्ग so often mentioned by *Jaimini* must have suggested the हेतु and अपदेश of *Gotama* and *Kanāda* respectively. We may therefore suppose that it is the *Mimāṃsakas* who, first prompted by exegetical necessity, developed sundry rules of logic which they illustrated by means of what they called *Nyāyas* or theses. When therefore *Manu* or *Āpastamba* speaks of तर्क or न्याय we must understand by the term these rules of inference as applied to *Vedic* interpretation. The utility of these rules for other purposes, founded as they mainly are on the broad basis of common sense, could not but have been perceived very soon and naturally taken advantage of. This secularization so to say of these exegetical rules of *Pūrva-Mimāṃsā* gave birth to a science which was at first known by the name of आन्वीक्षिकी. It probably got its modern appellation of *Nyāya*, when *Gotama* raised it into a philosophical system by including in his treatise disquisition on sundry metaphysical topics, such as the origin of knowledge, eternity of sound, nature of proof and the agency of God. If this hypothesis is correct, we can form a tolerably clear idea of the task *Gotama* set before himself and which he has performed so admirably. From a bundle of experimental rules which were known only as a secular art called आन्वीक्षिकी and said by some to be subsidiary to अथर्ववेद *Gotama* evolved a system which at once became the rival of the two *Mimāṃsās* and which from thence forward exercised a strong sway over generations of Indian Pandits. *Gotama* can very well be compared in this respect with Aristotle or Immanuel Kant. Nay in one sense his influence has been even greater; for Kant and Aristotle failed to supplant their predecessors completely, while *Gotama* constructed a new system, as it were, which eclipsed all previous attempts and which has from his time become the sole standard for posterity.

The work of Gotama differs in many respects from that of *Kaṇāda*. While the former is methodical and details a system of logic practically complete, the latter discloses no consistent aim and no arrangements of parts. It has the appearance of a loose bundle of critical notes on the principal philosophical topics of the day. This fact raises a doubt as to whether *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms were ever the real basis of the *Vaiśeṣika* system as we find it now. The oldest exponent of the complete system as described in all modern *Vaiśeṣika* works is *Praśastapāda*, and he may, for aught we know, be its real founder also. The supposition is not so improbable as it might appear at first sight. Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later *Vaiśeṣikas* from the *Naiyāyikas* and other schools are to be found in *Praśastapāda's* work and are conspicuously absent in *Kaṇāda's* *Sūtras*. The doctrines about द्वित्र, पाकजोत्पत्ति, विभागजाविभाग, and several others, which are regarded as peculiarities of the *Vaiśeṣika* system, are not even touched upon in *Kaṇāda's* aphorisms, although they are pretty fairly discussed in *Praśastapāda's* *Bhāṣya*. The seven categories on which the whole *Vaiśeṣika* system is based are probably an afterthought; and even the doctrine of विशेष which according to some gave the name to the system appears to be a later development. *Kaṇāda* restricts the word अर्थ ( categories properly so called ) to three things only, द्रव्यगुण and कर्म;<sup>1</sup> *Prasastapāda* enlarges the number to six, and some later author added अभाव.<sup>2</sup>

It is true that the aphorism धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमायानं पदार्थानं साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यमयं तत्त्वज्ञानाद्यः श्रेयस-सिद्धिः<sup>3</sup> enumerates the six categories; but this aphorism is most probably a later interpolation. It is inordinately long, unlike other aphorisms of *Kaṇāda*, and contains a number of distinct propositions that would

1 अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु । V. S. VIII, 2, 3.

2 Several MSS. of *Prasastapāda's* *Bhāṣya* end with the colophon  
इति प्रशस्तपादविरचितं द्रव्यादिष्टपदार्थमध्यं समाप्तम्.

3 V. S. I, 1, 4.

have sufficed for half a dozen *Sūtras*. Besides it is very awkwardly worded if not positively ungrammatical. A comparison of this aphorism with the opening passage of *Praśastapāda*'s scholium leaves hardly any doubt about its spuriousness. *Praśastapāda*'s passage runs thus:—  
 द्रव्यगुणकर्मतामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पृष्ठां पदार्थानां साधन्यवैधर्म्यतत्त्वज्ञानं  
 निःशेयसहेतुः । तत्त्ववरचादनभियुक्ताद्वार्मदिव ॥<sup>1</sup>

Now one of these two passages must be an adaptation of the other. According to *Kiranāvali* this passage of *Praśastapāda* explains only the first three *sutras* of *Kaṇāda*, which implies that the fourth *sūtra* quoted above was unknown to the scholiast. Hence if *Kiranāvali* is to be believed, the aphorism must be the later of the two. *Śridhara*, the author of *Nyāya-Kandali*, speaks to the same effect. In introducing the last sentence he says that it was added to remove any apparent inconsistency between the preceding sentence and *Kaṇāda*'s second aphorism यतोऽभ्युदयनिःशेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः । The inconsistency is that while according to the scholiast knowledge of categories is the means of निःशेयस, *Kaṇāda* speaks of it as resulting from धर्म; and this inconsistency is removed by the scholiast by adding that the knowledge of categories itself springs from धर्म as revealed in divine commandments. So according to *Śridhara* this last clause is an addition of the scholiast intended to remove the apparent inconsistency, and yet it is summed up in the opening words of the fourth *Sutra*, धर्मविशेषप्रसूतात्. Either these words or the whole aphorism must therefore have been suggested by *Fraśastapāda*'s passage. If the aphorism, as it stands now, had existed before, there would have been no सूतविरोध and therefore no necessity for *Praśastapāda*'s additional clause तत्त्ववरचादनभियुक्ताद्वार्मदिव. We must, therefore, suppose that the aphorism was added by some later writer in order to supply what appeared to him an oversight of *Kaṇāda*. Besides, the fact that there should have been even the suspicion of a contradiction between the enumeration of six categories and *Kaṇāda*'s second *sūtra* proves that the six

categories were not thought of by *Kaṇāda* and were for the first time mentioned by his scholiast, *Praśastapāda*. We must, therefore, construe the aphorism अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणः<sup>1</sup> as implying that *Kaṇāda* mentioned only three categories to which the scholiast added three more, while the seventh was added still later.<sup>2</sup> If any doubt is felt on the point, a critical examination of the aphorisms which are supposed to define सामान्य and विशेष will dispel it. These aphorisms speak of विशेष as well as of सामान्य in a way quite different from the later conceptions of the two categories. Aphorisms सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्धपेक्षम् and अन्यत्रान्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः are especially significant. The first shows that *Kaṇāda* used the word विशेष as a relative term opposed to सामान्य, meaning that the notions of *genus* and *differentia* are always relative, and that the same property may be a *genus* with respect to one class, and a *differentia* with respect to another class of things. घटत्व, for instance, is a *genus* as including all jars under one class, and a *differentia* as distinguishing all jars from other substances, as cloth and men. The second aphorism shows that *Kaṇāda* distinguishes *ultimate difference* of things from other *differentiae* by giving to the former the special name of अन्यविशेष. It is these *ultimate differences* that are denoted by the later *Vaiśeṣikas* by the category विशेष; and the fact that *Kaṇāda* regards them only as one species of *differentia* shows that he did not include them in a separate category having absolute and not merely relative existence. The conclusion is irresistible that the अन्यविशेष, which were at first only one kind of *differentia*, were afterwards developed into an independent category. The notions of सामान्य and समवाय can also be shown to have originated in the same way.<sup>3</sup>

It will be thus seen that, unlike *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika* was never given out to the world as a cut and dry system. It was gradually evolved as the ever-flowing stream of controversy

suggested new points or disclosed the faults of old ones. *Praśastapāda* thus occupies a somewhat intermediate position between *Kaṇāda* and his later commentators. He is sufficiently removed in time from *Kaṇāda* to call him a *muni* and a disciple of *Maheśvara*,<sup>1</sup> while he himself is regarded almost as a semi-mythical personage by later writers. His age cannot, however, be ascertained even approximately. The earliest known commentary on *Praśastapāda*'s work is that of Śridhara who gives his own date as 991 A.D. He must also have preceded Śaṅkarācārya who seems to quote from him several times. The opinion ascribed by Śaṅkarācārya to the *Kaṇāda* school are all found in *Praśastapāda*'s work<sup>2</sup>. Śricarana, in his commentary on Śāriraka-Bhāṣya called *Prakatārtha*, says that a particular view criticised by Śaṅkara belongs to the older school of *Vaiśeṣikas* though opposed to that contained in *Rāvaṇas Bhāṣya*. The view referred to is propounded by *Praśastapāda* who must therefore be older than *Rāvana*.<sup>3</sup> This *Bhāṣya* of *Rāvana* which may be a commentary either on *Kaṇāda*'s *Sūtras* or *Praśastapāda*'s own work, is not available, nor is its date known. *Udayana*'s *Kiraṇāvalī* is, however, said to have been based upon it.<sup>4</sup> If this *Rāvana* is the same as the reputed author of a commentary on *Ṛgveda*, he appears to have been a very ancient author, and *Praśastapāda* must be still older. Moreover, if *Praśastapāda* was, as suggested above, the first to enumerate the six categories, he must have preceded Vātsyāyana who mentions them.<sup>5</sup> Nothing more definite can be said on the point for the present, and we must, therefore, leave *Praśastapāda*'s date too as one of the uncertainties of Indian chronology.

1 P. B. Ben. ed. pp. 1 and 329.

2 Cf. the passages in Śāriraka-Bhāṣya (Anandashram ed. pp. 514-5, and p. 519) with the passages in P. B. Ben ed. p. 48 and p. 328 respectively.

3 *Praśastapāda* has also been referred to as प्रशस्तचरण, and प्रशस्तदेव and some even identify him with Gotama. See *Vindhyesvari-prasāda*'s Intro. to *Vaiśeṣika Dars'ana* (Bibl. Ind. ed.).

4 P. B. Ben ed. Intro. p. 12 note.

5 Vāt. on G. S.I, 1, 9.

6 If *Caraka*, the writer on medicine, is correctly identified with *Patañjali*, *Praśastapāda* must be anterior to him. See p. XXXI *supra*.

The age of commentaries proper begins with *Vātsyāyana*, otherwise known as *Pakṣila-Svāmin*, whose commentary on *Gotama*'s work is the oldest known work of the kind we now possess.<sup>1</sup> *Vātsyāyana* must have lived about the end of 5th century A. D. for he preceded the well-known Buddhist teacher *Dīnnāga* who is said to have lived in the early part of the 6th century.<sup>2</sup> *Dīnnāga* was succeeded by the celebrated author of *Udyota* who is mentioned by *Subandhu* writing in the 7th century.<sup>3</sup> *Udyotakāra* is said to have written his work to dispel the errors of *Dīnnāga* and others, and *Vācaspati* in his *Tikā* adds that his principal object was to defend *Vātsyāyana* against the attacks of *Dīnnāga*.<sup>4</sup>

According to the Jain *Śloka-Vārtika*, *Udyotakāra* was in his turn answered by *Dharmakīrti*.<sup>5</sup> Now *Dharmakīrti* is known to have lived in the first half of the 7th century;<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Was *Vātsyāyana* a Buddhist? Some have supposed him to be so because his work does not begin with a prayer to any of the Hindu deities. But the epithet *Svāmin* as well as the fact that the Buddhist writer *Dīnnāga* controverts his views should leave no doubt about his orthodoxy. He was also called *Dramila* (*Dravida*?) or *Pakṣilasvāmin*. He was a native of *Conjeeveram* and lived about A. D. 400, i. e. a century before *Dīnnāga* and *Vasubandhu*. See S. C. Vidyabhūṣan's *Indian Logic, Medieval School*, pp. 68-72.

<sup>2</sup> Max Müller, *India, What can it teach us?* 1st ed. p. 320. *Dīnnāga* is said to have introduced the universal proposition व्याप्ति into the Indian syllogism for the first time.

<sup>3</sup> *Vāsavadattā* (Calc. ed. p. 235) has न्यायस्थितिमिवोद्योतकरस्वरूपम्। See also Dr. Hall's Preface to his edition of that work. *Udyotakāra* was called *Bhāradvāja* and lived at *Thaneshwar* near *Delhi*. He was a preceptor of the *Pāśupata* sect.

<sup>4</sup> See quotation at P. B. Ben. ed. Intro. p. 10. *Udyotakāra* himself says:—

बद्धपादः प्रवरो मुरीनां शमाय शास्त्रं जगतो जगाद् ।

कृतार्किकाङ्गाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

Also see Weber, *Zeitschr. D. M. G.* XXII. 727, and Colebrook *Miscellaneous Essays* Vol. I p. 282, Cowell's note.

<sup>5</sup> J. B. B. A. S. Vol XVIII. p. 229.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 90. Dr. Satiscandra Vidyabhūṣan thinks that *Dharmakīrti* and *Udyotakāra* were contemporaries and flourished about 633 A. D. See *Indian Logic, Medieval School*, p. 105, and *Bhaudarkar Memorial Volume*, p. 164.

*Dīnnāga* and *Udyotakāra* therefore must have belonged to the 6th, and *Vātsyāyana* at the latest to the end of the 5th century. *Vātsyāyana* is not, however, the earliest scholiast on *Gotama's Sūtras*. The alternative interpretations of G. S. I. 1, 5, given by him show that the traditional meaning was obscured at his time, and that several writers before him had interpreted the *Sūtras* in different ways. The interval between *Gotama* and *Vātsyāyana* is considerable and could not have passed without producing some notable writers; yet no relics of the period appear to have been left behind. Either the Scythian inroads which ravaged the country from the 1st century B. C. to the 4th century A. D. must have swept away all literary records of the period or some unknown cause must have lulled philosophical activity for the time.

After *Udyotakāra* there seems to have occurred another long gap in the succession of orthodox *Nyāya* writers until the end of 10th century, when a revival took place under the influence of the author of न्यायकन्दली which is the earliest known commentary on *Prasatapāda's Brāhmaṇa*. Śridhara wrote at least three other works named अद्यपसिद्धि, तत्त्वबोध, and तत्त्वसंवादिनी. The absence of any eminent *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* writer between *Udyotakāra* and Śridhara makes it highly probable that the tradition was broken in the interval. This interregnum so to say is the more inexplicable as the period was one of intense intellectual activity. Controversies between the Brahmins as represented by the *Mimāṃsakas* and *Vedāntins* on the one hand and the Buddhists and the Jains on the other occupy almost the whole of this period; and it is strange that the followers of *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* did not freely enter into the fray. *Vātsyāyana* and *Udyotakāra* set the ball of controversy rolling, but no *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* writer seems to have taken up the cudgels on their behalf immediately after *Dharmakirti's* strictures. The task of answering the great Buddhistic writer was left to *Mimāṃsakas* like *Kumārila*, *Śāṅkarācārya* and *Mandana*, who were by no means favourable either to the *Nyāya* or to the *Vaiśeṣika* system. *Dharmottara* defended *Dharmakirti* against the criticisms of *Kumārila* and *Mandana*, and we again

find Śrīdhara, a *Nyāyika*, answering *Dharmottara*. Though the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems had thus no spokesman of their own during this interregnum, the individual doctrines inculcated by them were not a bit neglected. They were fully handled by the rival disputants as if they had by that time become the common property of all schools. The *Mimāṃsakas* strongly controverted the doctrine of non-eternity of sound, and the *Vedāntins* criticized the atomic theory. The *Prabhūkaras* started novel views about *Samavāya*, while all the schools fought over the proper number and nature of proofs. The answer to these criticisms came partly from the Buddhists and the Jainas and partly from the later *Nyāya* writers. The fact seems to be that at this time the *Nyāya* and much more the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines, despite smaller differences, found their strongest supporters among the Buddhists and the Jainas, many of whose tenets closely resembled the peculiar doctrines of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The *Nyāya-Bindu*, for instance, which can now be safely ascribed to *Dharmakīrti*,<sup>1</sup> is a purely *Vaiśeṣika* treatise while the *Pramāṇa-Samucchaya* of *Dinnāga* and *Dharmakīrti's Vārtikas* on it must also have been largely indebted to previous *Vaiśeṣika* works. This must also be the reason why *Vaiśeṣikas* were at this time looked upon almost as heretics.<sup>2</sup>

The alliance of the *Vaiśeṣikas* with the Buddhists and the evident tendency of many of their theories towards atheism and materialism alarmed the orthodox writers of the *Mimāṃsā* and *Vedānta* schools who at once consigned them to the purgatory of non-believers. *Śaṅkarācārya* calls them *Ardha-Vaināśikas* (Semi-Buddhists), while *Kumārila* brackets them with *Sākyas* as heretics who are frightened

1 JBBRAS. Vol. XXX p. 47. and S. C. Vidyabhusana's *Indian Logic, Mediæval School* p. 109.

2 For a detailed account of Jaina and Buddhist Logicians, see Dr. Satiscandra Vidyabhusana's *Indian Logic, Mediæval School* and for Chinese and Japanese writers see Sugita's *Hindu Philosophy as preserved in China and Japan*.

out of their wits by the advent of the faithful *Mimāṁsakas*. And yet a glance at *Praśastapāda*'s *Bhāṣya* will show that the *Vaiśeṣikas* were at least as orthodox and as decidedly anti-Buddhistic as either the *Mimāṁsakas* or the *Vedāntins*. *Praśastapāda* begins with a prayer to God and concludes by ascribing the origin of the world as well as of the *Vaiśeṣika* system to Maheśvara. He accepts the authority of *Śruti* and occasionally controverts the views of the Buddhists. The notion of *Vaiśeṣikas* being heretical probably originated in the din of controversy between the Buddhists and the *Mimāṁsakas*, and the prejudice thus created stuck to them for a long time afterwards. The system of *Nyāya*, however, seems to have escaped the stigma of heresy, probably owing to its comparative neglect in this period. The controversies of this period mainly raged round metaphysical and theological questions which were monopolized by the *Vaiśeṣika*, while the purely logical part of *Gotama*'s system did not provoke much opposition. Only one doctrine of the *Nyāyāyikas* was made the subject of controversy, namely the theory of a personal Creator of the universe. This doctrine was strongly advocated by the sect of *Pāśupatas*, and various sub-sections of *Bhūgavatas*. These theistic Schools probably derived their inspiration from *Gotama*'s work, but they very soon became distinct religious sects.<sup>1</sup> On the whole it appears that, although there is a lack of special *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* works in this period, the various doctrines laid down by *Gotama* and *Kaṇāda* were fully threshed out and underwent additions and alterations which were not even dreamt of by previous writers.

The interregnum from *Udyotakāra*'s time to the end of the 10th century may have been produced by various causes which cannot be known at present; nor can we say for certain how the subsequent revival was brought about. Perhaps learned men at this time were too much occupied with religious and sectarian disputes to attend to the drier subtleties of logic. The fact, however, cannot be denied, for while none of the known works of *Nyāya* or *Vaiśeṣika* proper can be

<sup>1</sup> Max Müller: History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. p. 48.

assigned to the interval between the 7th and the 10th centuries, the succeeding age is marked by such an inrush of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* writers as more than atoned for the inactivity of the previous period. The most notable productions of this later age are a series of commentaries on the works of *Praśastapāda* and *Vātsyāyana* who had then come to be looked upon as ancient authorities to be explained and enlarged with reverence, rather than criticized or corrected by abler successors. In this later period boldness and originality of thought dwindle in proportion to an increase of scholastic subtlety. The range of topics is limited, but each is treated with a greater fullness and ingenuity. There is a distinct tendency towards scholasticism, which afterwards assumed such abnormal proportions in the Nuddea school, but the change was not completed till four centuries later. It may be described as an age of transition from the genuine philosophy of mediæval India to the scholastic verbiage of modern times; and it is a striking fact that this age nearly coincides with the growth of scholasticism in mediæval Europe. It is not a little remarkable that the history of Indian logic bears in this respect a close analogy to the progress of thought in Europe. If *Gotama* lived about the same time as Aristotle, *Vātsyāyana* was probably the contemporary of Boethius and the Revivalists; while the modern *Ācāryas*, such as Śrīdhara, Vācaspati and Udayana flourished in the same age which produced Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in the West. Are we then to suppose that human mind in India as well as in Europe passed successively through the same phases of philosophic development and nearly at the same rate of progress? The question is difficult to answer, but the coincidences are none the less interesting.

The first writer of this age of revival was Śrīdhara who wrote his *Nyāya-Kandali* in 991 A. D.<sup>1</sup> Śrīdhara

<sup>1</sup> See P. B. Ben. ed. p. 331. The colophon contains the line, अधिकदशो-तरनवशतशाकावे न्यायकन्दली रचिता । which gives Śaka 913 i. e. 991 A. D. as the date of the composition of the work. Bhandarkar (Report on Search of Sk. MSS. for 1883-4 p. 314) reads the line as अधिकदशोन्त, which gives the date Śaka 910 or 988 A. D., but this must be a mistake, for the word आधिक is inexplicable without दश.

takes great pains to refute the opinions of *Kumārila* and *Sureśvara* alias *Mandana* on the one hand as well as *Dharmottara* on the other, a fact which seems to show that Śridhara was the first eminent *Nyāya* writer after them. Rājaśekhara, a Jain commentator on *Nyāya-Kandalī*<sup>1</sup> mentions three other commentaries on *Praśastapāda*'s *Bhāṣya*, besides Śridhara's work, viz., the *Vyōmavatī* of Śivācārya, the *Kiranāvalī* of *Udayana* and the *Lilāvatī* of Śri Vatsa or *Vallabha*, all of which were written after Śridhara's work but before the end of the 13th century. The chronological order of these writers may be fixed as Śridhara, *Vallabha*, *Udayana*, and *Śivāditya*. All of them came to be looked upon as eminent authorities and honoured with the title of *Acārya*. Each of them was distinguished for some new conception, or original treatment of old topics. The works of *Vallabha* and *Śivāditya* are not yet available so as to enable us to form any definite opinion about them, but their views are frequently quoted and criticized in later works. *Udayana*'s *Kiranāvalī* was probably left unfinished by the author, as all the MSS. hitherto available contain only the chapters on द्रव्य and जूत. Śridhara lived as stated above at the end of the tenth century. He was followed by *Vācaspati Miśra* in the 11th century, who wrote commentaries on all the principal philosophy systems, and whose works have been deservedly held in the highest estimation by the succeeding generations.<sup>2</sup> *Vācaspati*, the author of *Bhāmatī* and *Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī*, wrote an equally able commentary on the *Vārtikas* of *Udyotakāra*, called *Vārtika-Tātparya-Tikā* and this *Tikā* of *Vācaspati* became the text of another commentary, *Tātparya-Pariśuddhi* by *Uddyana*.<sup>3</sup>

1 P. B. Ben. ed. Intro. p. 19.

2 See the opening passage of *Tarka-Dīpikā*—p. 1, and Note thereon; p. 72 infra.

3 J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. XVIII. p. 90. Cowell in the preface to his translation of *Kusumāñjali* tries to prove that *Vācaspati* lived in the 10th century; but his view cannot be accepted as *Vācaspati* quotes राजवाचिक of King Bhoja who reigned in A. D. 993. Satiscandra Vidya-bhūṣana also places *Vācaspati* in 976 A. D. when he is said to have composed his *Nyāya-sūci-nibandha*.

4 Bhandarkar. Report on search of Sk. MSS. for 1883-4, p. 81.

*Udayanācārya*, the author of *Kiraṇāvalī* and *Parīṣuddhi* lived, therefore, some time after *Vācaspati*, and may be assigned to the end of the 12th century.<sup>1</sup> *Udayana* is the greatest *Naiyāyika* writer of this age. He combines in himself the two-fold character of an eminent dialectician and a religious revivalist, and has consequently become the centre of a number of traditions which have perhaps little foundation in fact. A story, for instance, is told of his having once made a pilgrimage to the temple of Jagannath, where he found the temple-door shut against him. On this the irate *Naiyāyika* addressed the following couplet to the Deity :—

ऐश्वर्यमद्मनोऽसि मामवज्राय वर्तसे ।  
उपस्थितेषु बौद्धेषु मदधीना तत्र स्थितिः ॥<sup>2</sup>

"Infatuated with omnipotence as thou art, thou treatest me with contempt; but ( remember ) when the heretics approach, thy very existence depends upon me."

This irreverent apostrophe was probably founded on the fact that *Udayana* wrote two well-known treatises to prove the existence of God and to refute the atheistical objections of the *Bauddhas* and other heretics. These treatises respectively known as *Kusumāñjali* and *Bauddha-dhikkāra*, though small, prove *Udayana* to be a very acute and powerful writer. *Udayana* is said to have carried on a vigorous crusade against the *Bauddhas* and the *Jainas*; and if Monier Williams is right in assigning the complete decay of Buddhism in India to the beginning of the thirteenth century,<sup>3</sup> *Udayana* must have taken a leading part in giving the death-blow. At any rate the great prominence given in all the later works to ईश्वरकारणवाद or the doctrine of a personal Creator of the Universe may be ascribed to *Udayana's* influence. It is

1 Cowell's Preface to his translation of *Kusumāñjali*, p x; J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. XVIII. p. 89, 90. Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣana places him about 984 A. D. on the authority of a verse in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. Vide *Bhandarkar Memorial Volume* p. 165.

2 Nehemiah Gore's *Rational Refutation of Hindu philosophy* translated by F. Hall, p. 6, note. 3 Monier Williams: *Buddhism*, p. 170.

highly probable that *Udayana*'s works gave a strong impetus to the *Śaiva*, *Vaiṣṇava* and other theistic sects which arose in large numbers at this time. *Naiyāyikas* amongst all the Indian systematists were from henceforward the strongest supporters of monotheism, and the Nuddea School in later times produced one of the greatest leaders of a modern theistic movement, viz., *Caitanya* of Bengal.

Tradition ascribes to *Udayana* the first conception of the idea of uniting the two sister systems of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* into one harmonious whole. *Udayana*'s extant works do not however support this theory, although it is not improbable that he threw out hints to that effect, which led some later writer to make the experiment. The earliest known work in which the two systems are found actually combined, as in many later works, is the *Sapta-Padārthī* of *Śivāditya Miśra*,<sup>1</sup> and it is possible that he was the first to put the idea into practice. *Śivāditya* is also the first writer to mention *Abhāva* as the seventh category and to introduce a systematic discussion of logical questions. *Sapta-Padārthī* may, therefore, be regarded as the model of all such later manuals as *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, *Tarka-Kaumudi* and *Tarkāmr̥ita*.

As to *Vallabhāchārya* his exact date is uncertain, but he appears to have preceded the author of *Sapta-Padārthī* if not also *Udayana*. This seems probable from the mention of *Nyāya-Lilāvatī* in a Canarese poem named *Darśana-sāra* written by a contemporary poet in praise of King *Singhana* of the Yādava dynasty of Devagiri, who reigned from A. D. 1210 to 1247. *Darśanasāra* also mentions *Udayana*

1 A MS. of *Jinavardhana*'s commentary on *Sapta-Padārthī* is in the Deccan College Library. This *Jinavardhana* lived in Saṁvat 1471. Peterson mentions a MS. of सप्तपदार्थावृत्ति named मितभाषिणी by *Mādhava-Sarasvatī*, as dated Saṁvat 1405. See Report of the Search of Sankrit MSS. for 1896 p. 24. Also Bhandarkar's Report for 1882-83 p. 25. Prof. Ghate mentions a third Commentary पदार्थचन्द्रिका by *Sesānanta*. Prof. Ghate places *Udayana* in 984 A. D. and *Gangeśa* in the 11th Century, and *Śivāditya* between the two. J. B. B. R. A. Society XXIII p. 34.

2 Bhandarkar, *Early History of the Dekkan*, p. 82.

and some other writers;<sup>1</sup> but nothing further can be said about it until the work is available to the public. It is superfluous perhaps to remark that this *Vallabha*, the author of *Nyāya-Līlāvati*, was quite a different personage from the great Vaiśnavite reformer of that name who flourished in the 15th century.<sup>2</sup>

A host of smaller writers such as *Varadarāja* and *Mallinātha* may be mentioned as belonging to this second period, but they do not seem to have left any lasting mark on subsequent literature. The period may be roughly said to have closed about the beginning of the 14th century. It is marked by a great activity in the beginning and at the end, with an intervening blank which lasted for about 3 centuries and which sharply divides the older from the later school of writers. The conflict of opinions between the *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Naiyāyikas* as well as the differences between the ancient and the modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*, which are so frequently discussed in modern works, seem to have originated in this period: and it was perhaps the growth of these minute differences that created at the end of this period a reaction in favour of amalgamating the two systems. This attempt at amalgamation, however, produced an effect exactly contrary to what was intended, for it stereotyped the differences instead of removing them. We find that in this period almost all the principal doctrines were evolved and the details were worked out, on which the dialecticians of the third period were exclusively to spend their scholastic ingenuity and produce volumes after volumes without making any real progress. With *Udayana* and *Śivāditya* we lose sight of writers who deserve

1. I am indebted for this information to my friend Mr. K. B Pathak formerly of the Deccan College. He saw a Canarese Ms. of दर्शनसार in the library of Brahma-Suri Sāstri of Sravana Belgole in Mysore territory. It is not known when the book was written, but the author appears to have been a cotemporary of सिङ्गवण.

2. Another writer Jayanta wrote *Nyāya-Maṇjari* an independent Commentary on *Nyāya-Sūtras*. He was a native of Kashmir and lived in the 11th century. He quotes Vācaspati and refutes Buddhists.

to be called *Ācāryas*, as having aimed at originality and written epoch-making books. The class of *Ācāryas*, or masters, was henceforward to give place to that of mere *Upādhyāyas* or ordinary pundits. The race of giants was to be succeeded by a remarkably versatile and disputatious troop of dwarfs. Philosophy lost its freshness as well as its charm, and gradually degenerated into a bundle of endless controversies.

The end of the 14th century saw the commencement of the third period of *Nyāya* literature; and *Gaṅgeśa*, or *Gaṅgeśopādhyāya*, the author of *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* may be said to be its oracle. He founded a new school of text-writers and commentators who afterwards came to be known as the Nuddea school owing to their having chiefly flourished in the tols of Nuddea or Navadwipa in Lower Bengal. The distinguishing features of the writers of the school were their overwhelming pride, an abnormal development of the critical faculty, and a total disinclination to go out of the narrow grooves of traditional doctrines. The original *Sūtras* and the scholia on them recede into background, while *Gaṅgeśa*'s work itself becomes the centre of a mass of literature unparalleled in any other country or age. Here we see at one and the same time scholasticism at its climax and true philosophy at its lowest depth. We might wade through volumes of controversial jargon without coming across a single flash of deep thought or real insight into the nature of things. Mere conventionalities and distinctions without a difference are the weapons in this wordy warfare, with which one disputant tries to defend his thesis or to vanquish a rival. It may be doubted if either the writer or the reader is made a whit the wiser by all this labour.

All the writers of this school are not however equally faulty in this respect. The earlier ones especially show a considerable freedom of thought which is quite refreshing. The most notable of this kind is *Gaṅgeśopādhyāya*, the founder of the Nuddea school, whose exact date is not known, but who probably lived about the end of the 14th century. *Gaṅgeśa* quotes *Vācaspati*, while his son *Vardha-*

māna wrote commentaries on *Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī* and *Vallabha's Līlāvatī*. *Gāṅgeśa* must have therefore lived after the 12th century. *Gāṅgeśa* was followed by two writers of note, *Jayadeva* and *Vāsudeva*. According to Burnell *Jayadeva*, otherwise known as *Pakṣadhara Miśra*, wrote his *Manyā-loka*, a commentary on *Gāṅgeśa's Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* about 5 centuries ago, that is, about the middle of the 14th century, but this is highly improbable.<sup>1</sup> *Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma*, a fellow student of *Jayadeva* and the author of a commentary on *Gāṅgeśa's* work, had four pupils of whom the first *Gaurāṅga*, popularly known as *Caitanya*, the celebrated religious reformer in Bengal, was born about 1485 A. D.<sup>2</sup> Both *Sārvabhauma* and *Jayadeva* must, therefore, have lived in the latter part of the 15th century, and *Gāṅgeśa* at least a generation or two earlier. *Jayadeva* is said to have studied *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* with his uncle *Harimiśra*, which shows that *Gāṅgeśa's* work was already a standard book in the first half of the 15th century. We shall not be wrong therefore in placing *Gāṅgeśa* in the latter part of the 14th century at the latest.<sup>3</sup>

*Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma* must have been a remarkable man, for all of his pupils distinguished themselves in dif-

1 Burnell, Catalogue of Tanjor MSS. Vol. II., p. 117. *Jayadeva* was noted for his intellectual powers. He got the nickname पश्चवर for having mastered a difficult book in a fortnight. He is probably the same as the author of प्रसन्नरागव but is different from the poet who composed गतिगोचरित्. *Ragbunātha Siromāṇi* is said to have been his pupil for some time.

2 Cowell ( Colebrook's *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I., p. 281 ) gives the date of *Caitanya's* birth as 1489 ; but see Bose's *History of Hindu Civilization*, Vol. I. p. 43. *Caitanya* died in A. D. 1527. Vindhya-śvariprasād quotes a verse current among Nuddea Pundits शाके मुनियोमयूगान्दुगण्ये युष्ये तियो फालुनपौर्णमास्याम् । बैलोक्यभाग्योदयपुण्यकीर्तिर्देवः शनीनन्दन आविगसीत् ! Here the word युग may mean two or four and so will give either Śaka 1207 or 1407 as the date of *Gourāṅga's* birth. See Intro. to *Vais'ēṣika Dars'ana* ( Bibl. Ind. ed. ) p. 32.

3 Prof. Ghate places *Gāṅgeśa* in the 11th century on the authority of a Ms. of *Jayadeva's Āloka* transcribed in Lakṣmāna Saṁvat 159 corresponding to A. D. 1267. See JBBRAS. XXIII p. 93 and Vindhya-śvariprasād's Intro. to *Vais'ēṣika Dars'ana* ( Bibl. Ind. ) p. 82.

ferent fields. The first, *Caitanya*, founded a *Vaiṣṇava* sect which soon spread over the whole province of Bengal and revolutionized as it were the religious life of the people. The fact is noteworthy that the greatest exponent of the doctrine of faith in modern times received his early training in the dialectics of *Nyāya* philosophy. The devout mind of *Caitanya* must have no doubt recoiled from the scholastic subtleties of *Gaṅgeśa*, but they could not have failed to influence many of his views. *Vāsudeva*'s second pupil *Raghunātha*, otherwise known as *Tarka-Śiromāṇi* or simple *Śiromāṇi*, wrote *Didhiti*, the best commentary on *Gaṅgeśa*'s *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, and is acknowledged to be the highest authority among the modern *Naiyāyikas*. The third was *Raghunandana*, the lawyer and the author of a commentary on *Jīmūta-vāhana*'s *Dāya-vibhāga*, and is now held to be the best current authority on the Bengal School of Hindu law. The fourth, *Kṛṣṇananda*, also wrote works on charms and other kindred subjects. All these writers being contemporaries of *Caitanya* must have flourished in the beginning of the 16th century. *Raghunātha Śiromāṇi* wrote besides *Didhiti* commentaries on *Udayana*'s works and a few other treatises, one of which is *Padārtha-Khaṇḍana* or a refutation of *Vaiśeṣika* categories. He was succeeded by a series of commentators whose sole ambition seems to have been to make the *Didhiti* as unintelligible and terrible to the student as possible. *Raghunātha*'s immediate successors were *Mathurānātha*, *Harītāma Tarkālambakāra* and *Jagadīśa*, who were followed by their respective pupils, *Raghudeva* and *Gadādhara*. *Gadādhara* may be called the prince of Indian schoolmen, and in him the modern *Nyāya* dialectics reached its climax. He was such a thorough-going *Naiyāyika* that when asked to think of the prime cause of the universe on his death-bed, instead of contemplating God he is said to have repeated the words पीलवः पीलवः पीलवः ; ( atoms atoms, atoms ) ! His sixty-four treatises or *Vādas* as they are called on as many topics noticed in *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi* form a continuous commentary on *Śiromāṇi*'s *Didhiti* and *Jayadeva*'s *Āloka*; but several of them are not

<sup>1</sup> Bhimācārya : *Nyāya-Koṣa*, Intro. p. 6.

yet available. *Gadādhara* having come about two generations after *Raghunātha* must be assigned to the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. He was thus nearly contemporaneous with Lord Bacon whose denunciations of scholasticism may be most appositely illustrated by extracts from *Gadādhara*'s writings. Akbar's was an augustan age in India, and scholars like *Gadādhara* found a congenial atmosphere in the peaceful times of the great and enlightened Mogul ; but Akbar's death put an end to all dreams of a revival of letters. The wars and anarchy of the next two centuries afforded little scope for the cultivation of philosophy, and we accordingly find that even scholastic *Nyāya* could not flourish after *Gadādhara*.

The generation next after *Gadādhara* is represented by two writers standing on a somewhat lower level but equally famous. These were Śaṅkara Miśra, the author of *Upaskāra*, a commentary on *Kaṇāda*'s *Sūtras*, and Viśvanātha who wrote *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* and *Gotama-Sūtra-Vṛtti* which is a commentary on *Gotama*'s aphorisms. Śaṅkara Miśra was a pupil of *Raghudeva*, the fellow student of *Gadādhara*. There is some doubt as to the date of Viśvanātha, but he most probably belonged to this age.<sup>1</sup>

It is remarkable that the *Sūtras* of both *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* should have attracted the attention of commentators at about the same time. Śaṅkara-Miśra and Viśvanātha who respectively commented upon the works of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* greatly resembled each other and were probably contemporaries. A kind of reaction against the excesses of *Gadādhara* seems to have led these writers to seek the fresher fountains of the *Sūtras*. Another sign of this reaction was the production of manuals adapted to the understanding of the beginners and explaining the latest ideas in the simplest language. The *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda*, the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*

<sup>1</sup> Rudrabhaṭṭa, brother of Viśvanātha, wrote a commentary on *Raghunātha*'s *Dīḍhiti*, called *Raudrī*. MSS. of two of Rudrabhaṭṭa's works are mentioned by Aufrecht (Catalogus Catalogorum) as dated 1640 and 1657 respectively.

and the *Tarkāmṛta* are instances of this class of books, which must have come as a relief to those students of *Nyāya* who were hitherto lost in the mazes of *Pañca-Lakṣaṇī* and *Daśa-Lakṣaṇī*. In course of time these manuals too were overloaded with commentaries, but fortunately the commentaries on them, except perhaps two, never became as popular as the originals. The two exceptions are *Viśvanātha's Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* and *Annambhāṭṭa's Tarka-Dipikā* which being written by the authors of the original works are more like larger editions of those texts than mere explanatory glosses. These manuals proved very handy and useful to students, but they also marked the lowest watermark of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems. Henceforward all originality was dead and the writers chiefly aimed at explaining the ideas of their predecessors instead of expounding their own. The *Upādhyāyas* were now succeeded by writers whose high-sounding names were in strange contrast with the worth of their productions. *Kroḍas* or annotations became plentiful, but original thinking was dead and gone completely. Even these are now rare, and the once famous class of *Naiyāyikas* is in danger of being extinct for ever.

The preceding resumé of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature brings out, it is hoped, at least the one fact that that literature is as capable of a historical treatment as any other class of writings. It is the story of a gradual development of two philosophical systems which, springing out of a few elementary notions, attained their present proportions after many vicissitudes and in the course of several centuries. There must have been during this time considerable additions and alterations in the fundamental doctrines as conceived by the founders of the systems. The original nucleus was comparatively small, but the accretions and out-growths seem to have assumed in time quite large proportions. What an amount of earnest thought and labour must have been devoted to this work of elaborating complete systems out of a few primary principles! It was a process of evolution brought about partly by the natural law of growth and partly by the mutual action and reaction of the several systems of Indian philosophy. In the beginning the chief rivals of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems were the *Sāṃkhyas*, whose

theory of the anti-production reality of effects was diametrically opposed to the *Naiyāyika* doctrine of non-existent effect. Later they encounter the more formidable critics of the *Mimāṃsā* and *Vedānta* schools who differed from them in so many particulars that a severe conflict between the rivals was inevitable. The *Mimāṃsakas* affirmed the eternity of sound, while the *Naiyāyikas* denied it. The first enumerated six proofs, the *Naiyāyikas* four, and the *Vaiśeṣikas* only two. The *Naiyāyika* assumed a personal Creator, the *Vedāntins* an impersonal *Brahmān*, while the *Mimāṃsakas* could recognize nothing but the eternal Vedas. Again the *Vedāntins* derived all creation from one universal spirit, while the *Naiyāyikas* from hard minute atoms. The former were indeed *par excellence*, the latter out and out realists. The doctrine of the former always tended towards mysticism and idealism, those of the latter towards materialism and disbelief. It was natural that systems so widely divergent should into conflict with each other. The long-continued controversies between these rivals systematically influenced the of all of them. While the *Vedāntins* incorporated much logic of the *Naiyāyikas* into their works, the latter did not disdain to borrow many of the theological views of the former. It would be absurd therefore to expect that any systems as propounded in modern works would agree in all respects with the views of the ancient authors. The *Naiyāyikas* themselves recognize this fact by contrasting the necessary the views of the moderns with those of the ancients. It is also noteworthy that there is no sharp line dividing the ancient and the modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*. Some of the terms are applied to the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Naiyāyikas* respectively; sometimes to older authors like *Vācaspati* and *Prasastapāda*, as opposed to the later ones of the *Vaiśeṣika* school; and occasionally even in that school author of *Dīdhiti* as dissenting from *Gangeśa*. As a student of the last, the student may compare the two definitions, one insisting upon the qualification व्यापारवा, the other making proximity to the effect the sole test.

tion.<sup>1</sup> The line dividing the ancients and the moderns has thus continuously moved forward and forward, thereby showing that the *Naiyāyikas* themselves acknowledged a progressive development of their philosophy. It ought to be an interesting study to mark the successive stages of this development, and discover the causes that may have led to them. The time may come when a deeper knowledge of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* literature will enable us to solve this problem.

The foregoing observations have been mostly based on material obtainable from the literature of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems themselves; but works belonging to other philosophical systems as well as the vast literary treasures produced in ancient and mediæval India will, if properly examined, yield still more important data for a history of Indian philosophy. A comparison of Greek logic with the logic of the *Nyāya* must also be very instructive. Such a comparison will not only show how similar ideas and modes of thought occurred almost simultaneously and in the same historical order to thinkers in two such distant countries as India and Greece, but it may also throw new light on some of the dark chapters in the history of Indian Logic. Space will not, however, permit me to enter into these interesting inquiries at present; and I must content myself with noting only one important fact which cannot be decently passed over in such a sketch as this. I, of course, refer to the striking resemblance which the syllogistic method of the *Nyāya* bears to the Pre-Aristotelian dialectics in Greece. Zeno the Eleatic was the founder of this latter, and Zeno must have been a contemporary of *Gotama*, or of at least some of his immediate predecessors.<sup>2</sup> Zeno's work, which is divided into three parts — upon consequences, upon the interrogatory method of disputation, and upon sophistical problems respectively — has many points of similarity with that of *Gotama*, while the interrogatory method, cultivated by Zeno's fol-

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of these two views, see Notes on Sec. 37, pp. 186-90, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> Whateley; *Elements of Logic*, p. 3.

lowers, the sophists, and brought to perfection in Plato's Dialogues, was almost identical with the syllogistic process of the *Naiyāyikas*. The essence of this method consisted in driving an opponent to a point where he was either totally silenced or the absurdity of his position became self-evident. So far as the *Naiyāyikas* were concerned this was not an accidental feature, for they have laid down a special rule that no premise in a syllogism can proceed without having a previous आवाहन or doubt, presumably started by an opponent in the controversy. Take the stock-example, "Mountain is fiery." "Why?" "Because it has smoke." "What then?" "Wherever there is smoke, etc.," and so on, every premise being a reply to some previous question, assumed until the imaginary querist has no more questions to ask. This is exactly the way Socrates used to argue with his real interrogators, or Euclid proved his theorems of geometry. Obviously this method is better suited for controversy than for purely didactic reasoning; and consequently we find that Indian thinkers who came after the *Naiyāyikas* such as the *Buddhas* and the *Vedāntins* modified it to a considerable extent just as Aristotle did in Greece.<sup>1</sup> The tripartite syllogism of Aristotle was nothing more than a readjustment of the ancient dialectical syllogism, although Aristotle himself made too much of it and expected from it results which it was incapable of producing. Similarly those who claim superiority for the Aristotelian over the five-membered syllogism of the *Naiyāyikas* forget that both are mere instruments or mechanical aids for thinking, and as such cannot by themselves furnish an absolute guarantee for truth. Both have their peculiar merits as well as drawbacks, and consequently both must be judged from their proper standpoints. Aristotle distinguished between the dialectic and the apodictic, i. e. the old and the new or his own syllogism, by asserting that the former proceeded from mere belief or an assumed hypothesis while the latter was based on scientific

1. Colebrooke thinks that the three-membered syllogism of the later *Vedānta* was borrowed from the Greeks, but this is mere guess. See *Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol. I., p. 356.

truth. There is much force in this distinction, and it may to some extent apply to the five-membered syllogism also. But Aristotle's criticisms can no longer be accepted without reservation even with respect to doctrines intimately known to him. Much less can he be accepted as a safe guide in adjudging the merits of Indian logic.

It will not be proper to conclude this introductory sketch without noticing one more objection that is often advanced against the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems, namely that their heterogeneous character detracts considerably from their value as systems of pure logic. Indian logicians, say these objectors, have by their frequent digressions on metaphysical and other topics, such as the categories, the sources of knowledge and the theory of atoms, been led into treating the strictly logical questions either perfunctorily or in a wrong manner altogether. On a closer consideration, however, this heterogeneity of the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems will be found to have been inevitable. The narrow conception of logic as being only a theory and art of proof and nothing more is no longer tenable. Modern investigations, such as those of Kant, Ueberweg and others, show that the purely logical questions are inseparably connected with others comprehended in the wider province of metaphysics. The best answer to the above objection can therefore be given in the words of an eminent modern writer :—

" Start as we may," says Prof. Adamson, " in popular current distinctions, no sooner do logical problems present themselves than it becomes apparent that, for adequate treatment of them, reference to the principles of ultimate philosophy is requisite; and logic, as the systematic handling of such problems, ceases to be an independent discipline and becomes a subordinate special branch of general philosophy."<sup>1</sup>

And again the same writer remarks :—

" Any criticism of a general conception of logic or special application thereof which does not rest upon criticism

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Adamson in his Art. *Logic* in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed. Vol. XIV p. 781.

of the theory of knowledge implied in it must be inept and useless. It will also have become apparent that a general classification of logical schools as opposed to the reference of these to ultimate distinctions of philosophical theory is impossible."<sup>1</sup>

The *Naiyāyikas* seem to have arrived at the same conclusion at an early period, and faced "it boldly by embodying their views on all cognate and interdependent questions in a fairly consistent system. *Gotama* and *Kanāda* were not therefore such fools in mixing logical and metaphysical topics in their works as some of their modern critics would believe them to be. Logic is no longer regarded as a theory of proof only; it is a theory of knowledge in general, and as such treats of many psychological and metaphysical topics which do not fall within the domain of the narrower science. Looked at from this standpoint *Gotama*'s conception of his subject will be found to be remarkably accurate and just. Let us first understand him; and there will be then time enough to pick holes in his monumental work.<sup>2</sup>

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1. See Encyclopaedia Britanica, 9th ed. Vol. XIV, p. 799.

2. Max Müller in noticing my Brief Survey of Indian logic remarks at p. 476 of his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy "But unfortunately that period in the historical development of the Nyāya which is of the greatest interest to ourselves, namely that which preceded the composition of the Nyāya-Sūtras, had by him (i.e. myself) also to be left a blank, for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyāya before Gotama." It should be remembered, however, that Nyāya was recognised as a separate system only after Gotama and that all traces before him must be sought in the general philosophical literature such as the *Upaniṣads*.

## Annambhatta and his works.

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*Annambhatta*, the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dipikā*, shares the fate of many Sanskrit writers of being known only in his works. The name itself looks anomalous, and is either a contraction of *Ananta Bhatta* or a sanskritized form of the Canarese name *Anna Bhatta*. Little do we know about him, and that little mostly consists of traditions which cannot be accepted as true without the strongest corroboration. Mr. R. B. Godbole, in his 'Dictionary of Modern History of India', gives a detailed account of our author without however mentioning the source of his information. According to him, *Annambhatta* was a Tailang Brahman by birth and resided in a village named *Garikapāda*, formerly in the possession of Nizam Ali. He lived in the 15th century at the time of the Chalukyas, studied *Nyāya* at *Kaundinyapura* or Kondu Vidu for 12 years and became a famous *Naiyāyika*. He established a College for teaching *Nyāya* in his native town where he instructed his pupils in a graduated series of *Nyāya* works consisting of *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, *Tarka-Dipikā*, *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* and *Gadādhara*. He had many children none of whom survived him, and is said to have travelled out of his village only once in his life when he visited the shrine of Mallikārjuna at the advanced age of 55. From this it would appear that *Annambhatta* was posterior to both *Gadādhara* and *Viśvanātha*, which is very probable; but then he could not have lived in the 15th century as stated by Mr. Godbole. It has been shown elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> that *Gadādhara* must have flourished in the latter part of the 16th century and *Viśvanātha* one generation later. Obviously *Annambhatta* who taught the works of these writers could not have lived before the beginning of the 17th

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1. R. B. Godbole: भरतखंडाचा ऐतिहासिक कोश p. 10,

2. See *Introduction* p. LIII Supra.

century. Another of Mr. Godbole's statements, viz. that *Annambhātta* travelled only once in his life, is contradicted by a tradition embodied in a well-known couplet that has passed into a proverb, काशीगमनमात्रेण नालंभद्वायते द्विजः meaning that a man does not become a great scholar like *Annambhātta* simply by going to Benares. If the verse refers to the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, he must have visited and studied at Benares. The proverb would also show that he became famous for his learning at a very early period, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that his works became very popular and have been in use as elementary text-books in all parts of India. No reliance can therefore be placed on Mr. Godbole's account, and in the absence of any other authentic source of information we are left to such meagre data as are supplied by the writings of *Annambhātta* himself.

Apart from such vague traditions, we can unhesitatingly say that *Annambhātta* is comparatively a modern writer. He belonged to the class of manual writers, who mostly flourished after the 16th century and whose chief aim was to simplify the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them, and bringing them within the comprehension of beginners. The *terminus ad quo* of our author may for the present be fixed at about 1600 A. D., the time when *Gadādhara* flourished. *Annambhātta* rarely refers to any previous writer or work that might enable us to fix his age accurately. He however notes the controversy about व्यापाख्य व्याख्य, first started by *Raghunātha*, the author of *Didhīti*<sup>1</sup>; while in another passage of the *Dipikā*, he seems to quote directly from the *Didhīti*, for the sentence प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्य etc., which occurs at the bottom of p. 62 *infra* and which is misread in many MSS. of *Dipikā*, appears to have been taken from a corresponding passage in the *Didhīti*.<sup>2</sup> It has been shown elsewhere that *Raghunātha Śiromāni*, the author of *Didhīti*, lived in the first quarter of the 16th century.<sup>3</sup> The *Didhīti* must have been written about 1520 A. D. and *Annambhātta* neces-

1 Page LIII *supra*.

2 See Note 5 under Sect 80 p. 371, *infra*.

3 See *Introduction* p. LII *supra*.

sarily came after it. *Gadādhara* came two generations after *Raghunātha*; with whose grand pupil *Raghudeva* he was contemporary. *Gadādhara* therefore lived about the end of the 16th century, either in *Mithilā* or *Nuddea*; and if it be true that *Annambhaṭṭa* taught his works in his own college in the far-off town of *Kaunḍinya-pura*, some time must have elapsed between *Gadādhara* and *Annambhaṭṭa* to allow the fame of the former's works to reach the Southernmost province of India. The story of *Annambhaṭṭa* teaching *Gadādhara*'s work in his College derives support from another tradition, according to which the *Tarka-Dīpikā* was specially composed for the use of those who could not understand *Gadādhara*'s larger work and came to be called वालगदाधरी on account of its being an epitome of the erudite commentary of the great schoolman. It may be therefore fairly presumed that *Annambhaṭṭa* lived some time after *Gadādhara* i.e. after 1600 A.D. If *Viśvanātha*, the author of the *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* also preceded him, this terminus will have to be shifted still further. *Viśvanātha* and his brother *Rudrabhaṭṭa*, who wrote a commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, lived most probably in the first quarter of the 17th century,<sup>1</sup> and *Annambhaṭṭa* could not have lived earlier.

The terminus ad quod of our author may be fixed at 1700 A. D. The *Tarka-Samgraha* must have become a standard work, and a difficult one also in the latter part of the 18th century, since Śrīkrṣṇa Dhūrjaṭi wrote his commentary called *Siddhānta-Candrodaya* about that time for the instruction of Kūjasīmha, son of King Gajasiṃha, who flourished in 1774 A. D. The *Tarka-Candrikā* by Vaidyanātha Gudgil seems to be an earlier commentary on the *Tarka-Samgraha*, for a Ms. of it in the Deccan College Library gives, as the date of its composition, Śaka 1644 i.e. 1722 A. D. This Vaidyanātha is probably identical with Tatsat Vaidyanātha, the pupil of Nāgeśa and the author of a commentary on his *Udyota*. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa is known to have been invited to a grand sacrifice in 1714 by Savai Jayasiṃha, and his pupil Vaidyanātha may therefore

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<sup>1</sup> See Introduction p. LIII. *supra*.

have written his commentaries in the next decade. Obviously *Annambhāṭṭa* must have lived before this time. The evidence of MSS. of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* is conclusive on the point. Stein mentions a Ms. of T. S. dated 1740 A. D. and another of T. D. dated 1735 A. D.<sup>1</sup> The oldest known Ms. however of these two works is the one now in the possession of Dr. Jacobi of Bonn and marked J in the present edition. It is dated Śaka 1634 i.e. 1712 A. D. As this Ms. contains several corrections and marginal additions, it will not be wrong to assume that the two works were written several years before they were copied. Hence we can safely place *Annambhāṭṭa* before the beginning of the 18th century. The period from A. D. 1625 to A. D. 1700 is neither too long nor too short to cover one lifetime, and if we can place *Annambhāṭṭa* between these two *termini* the result ought to be regarded as pretty satisfactory under the present circumstances. Besides, if Mr. Godbole's statement that *Annambhāṭṭa* visited *Mallikārjuna* temple at the age of 55 has any foundation, he must have lived upto an advanced age and may, for aught we know, have covered the whole of the period above indicated.

All attempts to push *Annambhāṭṭa*'s date before the first quarter of the 17th century must therefore fail. The colophon of a Ms. of T. S. mentioned by Weber<sup>2</sup> is said to give the date 1425 A. D. which if true would conclusively prove him to have lived at least two centuries before the time we have assigned to him. But this is not possible. The verse runs thus :—

तपोमास्यसिते रुणो चन्द्रनागाविचन्द्रकैः ।  
वाराणस्यां मिते वर्षे स्वार्थमिन्दुर्लेख वै ॥

Here the expression चन्द्रनागाविचन्द्रकैः has been incorrectly taken to mean *Saṁvat* 1481 or 1425 A.D. अविधि ought to be taken for 7 and not 4, and then the date becomes 1725 A. D., making the Ms. 12 years later than that of Dr.

<sup>1</sup> Stein.—*Catalogue of Sk. MSS. at Jammu,*

<sup>2</sup> Weber's Berlin Catalogue, No 683, p. 203.

Jacobi. Whatever uncertainty may still remain on the point, one thing is unquestionable that *Annambhaṭṭa* could have by no means been anterior to *Raghunātha* whose date is now tolerably settled.<sup>1</sup> It has also been suggested that the *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* of Kanchi mentioned in T. D.<sup>2</sup> may be some king contemporary with our author; but this is also not possible, for no king of that name is to be found in the genealogies of Kanchi after the 12th century. Even if the *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* be a real personage he must have lived before the 10th century, for the illustration in T. D. is literally copied from Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-Kandali* which was written in 991 A. D.<sup>3</sup> No inference can therefore be drawn from the mention of *Tribhuvana-Tilaka* as to the date of our author.

*Annambhaṭṭa* was the son of *Tirumala*, who is styled Ācārya and whose name is preceded by the honorific title of अद्वैतविद्याचार्य in the colophons of several of our author's works. The colophon,<sup>4</sup> which by-the-bye has been most useful in proving the identity of the several *Annambhaṭṭas*, is found only in Dr. Jacobi's copy of *Tarka-Dipikā* (marked J). It however occurs at the end of two other works of *Annambhaṭṭa*, namely *Mitāksarā*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of *Būdarāyaṇa*, and the fragment of a grammatical work named *Vivaraṇodyotana* or *Bhāṣya-pradipodyotana* consisting of annotations on *Kaiyyaṭa*'s celebrated gloss on *Patañjali*'s *Mahābhāṣya*. *Tirumala*, father of *Annambhaṭṭa*, appears to have been a *Rgvedi Smṛta Brāhmaṇa*, learned in the Vedanta philosophy and descended from a great man named *Rūghava* who performed a *Soma* sacrifice. It is not known whether *Tirumala* wrote any works, but several authors of that name are mentioned by Aufrecht. *Annambhaṭṭa* appears to have been an all-round scholar, for he has left works on at least four sciences, namely *Nyāya*, *Vedānta*, *Vyākaraṇa* and *Pūrvā-Mimāṃsā*. Besides the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Tarka-Dipikā*, Aufrecht

1 See *Introduction* p. LIII supra.

2 See p. 50 *infra*.

3 See *Introduction* p. XLV supra; P. B. Ben. ed. p. 6.

4 See p. 67 *infra*

mentions the following works as having been composed by Annambhāṭṭa :—<sup>1</sup> 1 *Mitāksarā*, 2 *Tattva-Bodhī-Tikā*, 3 *Nyāya-Parīṣṭa-Prakāśa* and 4 *Subodhī-Sudhāsūra*, otherwise called *Rāṇakojīvīnī*. Of these the first is a short commentary on Rādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-Sūtras* and is undoubtedly written by the author of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, since it has the same colophon<sup>2</sup> as is found in our Ms. of the *Dipikā* marked J. As to the other three nothing can be said with certainty as I have not been able to procure any copy of them. The second appears to be a commentary on some work named *Tattva-Bodhī*, and Aufrecht marks it as a *Nyāya* work, apparently on the authority of Oppert.<sup>3</sup> Aufrecht does not however mention any *Nyāya* work of the name *Tattva-Bodhī*, and possibly both he and Oppert were misled. We know only three works bearing the name *Tattva-Bodhī*, namely, a commentary on *Saṅkṣepa-Śāri-raka* by Nṛsiṁha, a Tantric work by Kṛṣṇānanda, and thirdly a commentary on Bhattoji's *Siddhānta-Kaumudi*. So Annambhāṭṭa's *Tikā* may be a commentary on either the first or the last. Or it is also possible that a Ms. of Annambhāṭṭa's *Vivaraṇodyotana*, presently to be mentioned, has been mistaken by Oppert for an independent work of this name. The third work, *Nyāya-Parīṣṭa-Prakāśa*, is said to be a commentary on Udayanācārya's *Nyāya-Parīṣṭa* and may possibly be Annambhāṭṭa's *Magnum Opus* on the *Nyāya* system. The fourth is said to be a commentary on *Rāṇaka* or *Nyāya-Sudhā* of Somesvara which in its turn is a commentary on the *Tantra-Vārtika* of Kumārīta. Besides these, Aufrecht and Hall mention two other works on grammar called *Kātyāyana-Prātiśākhya-Vyākhyāna* and *Mahā-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇodyotana* written by an author named Annambhāṭṭa.<sup>4</sup> The author of the first of these was a pupil

1 Aufrecht: *Catalogus Catalogorum*.

2 This colophon is repeated at the end of each chapter in a Ms. of the work which I had seen.

3 Aufrecht: *Catalogus Catalogorum* p. 20.

4 Hall: *Bibliographical Index of Indian Philosophical systems* pp. 68, 69.

of *Sumanāgala* and may or may not be the same as the son of *Tirumāla*. But the second work *Vivaraṇodyotana* also called *Bhāṣyapradipodycotana* which consists of notes on *Kaiyata*'s commentary on *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya* can now be safely ascribed to the author of the *Tarka-Dīpikā*. Two MSS. of a fragment of this *Udyotana* are mentioned in Hultzsch's recent Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in Southern India (Vol. I. p. 66), the colophon at the end of which tallies exactly with that found at the end of the *Dīpikā* and the *Mitākṣarā*. Hall's later opinion therefore that this *Udyotana* was written by some other *Annambhāṭṭa* cannot be accepted. Candraśekhara Śāstri of Madras mentions two other works of *Annambhāṭṭa*: *Tatva-Cintāmanyāloka-Siddhāñjana* and a *Brahmasūtra-Vṛtti*; while he calls *Mitākṣarā* a gloss on *Pāṇini's Sūtras* according to *Kāśikā*. *Annambhāṭṭa* thus appears to have been a versatile writer, since he has written at least three works on *Nyāya*, one on *Pūrvamimāṃsā*, one or two on *Vedānta*, and two if not three on grammar. *Annambhāṭṭa* is also said to have had an elder brother Rāmakṛṣṇabhāṭṭa who wrote *Siddhānta-Ratna*, a commentary on Bhattoji's *Siddhānta-Kaumua*.

Of all the works of *Annambhāṭṭa*, only the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā* appear to have attained any wide celebrity. They are the most popular works of their kind, and they have been for several generations used as text-books for beginners. The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual, namely, brevity, accuracy and lucidity. It was intended to supply an easy compendium of the main principles of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems, and the author has done his work admirably. Of course the work is not entirely free from faults. Some of its passages are marred by ambiguities of language or confusion of thought such as make them almost unintelligible without the aid of a teacher or a commentary; and even positive errors have crept in in one or two places. These occasional lapses were however inevitable, because they are mostly due to the author's anxiety to avoid all subtleties and controversial topics that may be beyond the comprehension of beginners. The attempt

to frame broad and accurate definitions without descending into the niceties of scholastic *Nyāya* was a difficult one, and it is highly creditable to our author that he has succeeded even so well. Passages like those referring to करण, परमर्श, सोपाधिक, and तक, as well as several others in the *Dipikā* only prove that even a clear-headed writer like Annambhatta could not avoid some of the pitfalls that are so plentiful in the path of a student of *Nyāya*.

The most glaring fault of the *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, however, is that it errs too much on the side of brevity; and the defect is sought to be cured by supplying some of the deficiencies in the *Dipikā*. In fact, the *Dipikā* is more like a revised and enlarged edition of the original than a mere commentary upon it. It appears to have been written some time after the *Saṅgraha*, for in several places the author introduces additions and corrections in the commentary, which are obviously later thoughts but which could not be conveniently inserted in the text after its circulation. The clause अनन्यथा-सिद्धत्वे सति<sup>1</sup> which is proposed to be added to the definition of कारण is one instance out of many showing how serious omissions in the text are supplied in the commentary. The way in which some of the new topics are introduced in the *Dipikā* also shows that they were most probably suggested when the author was actually teaching his primer. It is not therefore unreasonable to suppose that the *Dipikā* came to be written when the author saw by experience the necessity of elucidating the many obscurities that remained in the *Saṅgraha*. The practice of writing a commentary on one's own work was not uncommon among *Nyāya* writers. In mediæval times *Dinnāga* and *Dharmakīrti* had written commentaries on their own works. Similarly *Varadarāja* the author of *Tarkika-Rakṣā* wrote its commentary the *Vyākhyā*, and *Visvanātha*, the author of *Bhāṣū-Pariccheda* and *Siddhānta-Muktāvali* imitated him. Annambhatta seems to have taken *Visvanātha*'s works as his models.

Although Annambhatta rarely quotes or refers to any previous writer, there can be no doubt that he was aware of

<sup>1</sup> See T. D. p. 26 *infra*.

the latest views on the many controversial points. He does not slavishly follow any particular master, nor does he confine himself wholly to any of the ancient or modern schools of *Naiyāyikas*. He chooses his doctrines from all writers with the sole view of constructing a fairly consistent and intelligible system. As the *Saṅgraha* and the *Dīpikā* are professedly mixtures of both the *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* systems, the author borrows from writers of both schools; but unlike others who have adopted the same plan, he generally adheres to *Gotama*'s views with respect to matters coming under logic proper, i. e. in the sections treating of *Buddhi* and its subdivisions, but follows *Kaṇāda* in the rest of the book. In cases of conflict between the ancient and modern *Naiyāyikas* he mostly prefers the ancient view as being the simpler or more striking, and generally adopts the older definitions as far as possible. He has greater sympathy with the older *Acāryas* than with the modern ever-innovating writers of the Nuddea school. But although a conservative in this sense he generally keeps an impartial attitude and steers clear of all disputes without identifying himself with any particular side. It is this characteristic which distinguishes his works from other manuals, and which makes them as primers for beginners preferable even to the otherwise superior treatises of *Viśvanātha*.

Instances of specific borrowing are too numerous to mention. Many of his definitions of categories and their subdivisions he has copied literally from the scholium of *Praśastapāda*, e. g., those of इन्द्र्य, रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, संस्था, परिमाण, विशेष, and several others. Sometimes he adopts the amendment suggested by *Śridhara*, and sometimes he rejects *Praśastapāda*'s definition *in toto* in favour of a modern one, e. g. in the case of आत्मा and बुद्धि. Occasionally he borrows even long passages from *Praśastapāda*, e. g. the passage beginning with सा द्वितीया in Sec. 10 p. 6 *Infra*. He also appears to have borrowed largely from the writings of *Śridhara*, *Udayana* and *Śivāditya*, as well as the principal writers of the Nuddea school, *Gangeta*, *Raghunātha* and *Gadādhara*. Outside the circle of *Nyāya* writers, *Annambhāṭṭa* has the

greatest sympathy with the *Vedānta* school. He often quotes the views of the *Mimāṃsakas*, and even inserts a short disquisition on विष्णु in the concluding portion of the *Dipikā*.

Besides the *Tarka-Saṅgraha* and the *Dipikā*, the present edition includes another commentary on the *Saṅgraha* named *Nyāya-Bodhīṇī* by *Govardhanu*. It does not possess any peculiar feature that requires special notice. It is on the whole rather discursive, treating of some topics elaborately and omitting others altogether. Nothing is known about the writer; but from his work he appears to have been well-versed in the subtleties of the later *Nyāya*. He is apparently different from the writer of a commentary on Keśavamīśra's *Tarka-bhāṣā*. He makes valuable suggestions here and there, but his frequent indulgence in scholastic hair-splitting makes the work somewhat difficult for novices. The obscurity of the style and the want of a reliable Ms. are also great drawbacks in the case of this commentary. It is included in this edition for two reasons, first because it is taught to advanced pupils in many parts of India, and secondly because it will familiarize students with the controversial method and formulæ of the modern *Naiyāyikas*.

The popularity of *Annambhāṭṭa's* works can be best measured by the host of writers who have commented upon them. The commentaries on the *Saṅgraha* are too numerous to notice here, but a list of them, complete as far as our present knowledge goes, is given in Appendix B. Only two of these need special mention, the *Vākyā-Vṛtti* of *Meru Śāstri*, and the *Siddhānta-Candrodaya* of *Śrīkṛṣṇa Dhūrjati*. The former is very short but always to the point, and usually gives the meaning of the author in a few pithy sentences. The writer was a celebrated Pundit of modern times, and his remarks in cases of doubt or ambiguity are entitled to great weight. The *Siddhānta-Candrodaya* being perhaps too copious and exhaustive is useful to beginners but not always reliable. The best guide to the *Saṅgraha* and the *Dipikā*, however, is the *Tarka-Dipikā-Prakōśa* of *Nilakanṭha*, popularly known as *Nilakanṭhi*.

*Nilakantha* appears to be a recent author. According to Pundit Mukunda Jha of Darbhanga he was a son of Rāmabhaṭṭa surnamed Pāṇi of Kaundinya gotra and was born in Andhra country. In his later years he lived at Benares and died in 1840. His son *Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṁha* who also lived and died at Benares wrote a commentary, *Bhāskarodayā* on *Nilakantha's Prakāśa*.

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## ABBREVIATIONS.

- B. P.**—*Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana, edited and translated by Dr. E. Roer (*Bibliotheca Indica*).
- Brahm. Sut.**—*Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana with the scholium of Śaṅkarācārya.
- Brih. Up.**      }  
**Brih. Ār. Up.**      } *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.*
- Din.**—*Dīnakarī* or *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī-Prakāśa* by Divākara Bhaṭṭa.
- G. S.**—*Gotama-Sūtra* or Gotama's Aphorisms of Nyāya.
- J. B. B. R. A. S.**—Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- Jaimi. S.**—Jaimini's *Sūtras* on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.
- Kath. Up.**—*Kaṭhopaniṣad.*
- Kus.**—*Kusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya edited and translated by E. B. Cowell. (Calc. 1864.)
- N. B.**—*Nyāya-Bodhī* by Govardhana.
- Nil or Nilakantha.**—*Tarka-Dīpikā-Prakāśa* by Nilakantha.
- Nyāya-B.**—*Nyāya-Bindu* edited by Dr. P. Peterson (*Bibli. Ind.*.)
- Nyāya-B. T.**—*Nyāya-Bindu-tīkā* by Dharmottarācārya edited by Dr. P. Peterson.
- Nyāya-K.**—*Nyāya-Koṣa* by Bhīmācārya 2nd ed. (Bombay Sanskrit Series.)
- P. B.**—*Paśastapāda's Bhāṣya* with Śridhara's *Nyāya-Kandali* edited by Vindhyeśvariprasād (Vizianagaram Series, Benares.)
- Sankhya-T. K.**—*Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi* by Vācaspati-miśra edited by Tārānāth Tarka-Vācaspati (Calc. 1871.)
- Sarv. D. S.**—*Sarva-Darśana Saṅgraha* by Mādhavācārya (Calc. ed.)
- S. C.**—*Siddhānta-Candrodaya*, a commentary on *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Śrīkrishna Dhūrjati.

**S. M.**—*Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana.

**S. P.**—*Sapta-Padārthī* by Śivāditya.

**T. A.**—*Tarkāmr̥ta* by Jagadīśa.

**T. B.**—*Tarka-Bhāṣā* by Keśava Miśra, edited by S. M. Paranje (Poona.)

**T. D.**—*Tarka-Dīpikā*.

**T. K.**—*Tarka-Kaumudī* by Laugākṣi Bhāskara, edited by M. N. Dvivedi (Bombay Sanskrit Series.)

**T. S.**—*Tarka-Saṅgraha*.

**Vat.**—Vātsyāyana's Commentary on *Gotama-Sūtra* edited by Jibananda (Cal. 1874.)

**Ved. Par.**—*Vedānta-Paribhūṣā*, by Dharmarājādhvarīndra (Cal. ed.)

**V. S.**—*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* or Aphorisms of *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy by Kaṇāda.

**V. S. Up.**—*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtropaskāra* by Śāmkara Miśra, edited by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarka Pañcānana (Cal. 1861).

**V. S. Vṛitti.**—*Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-Vṛitti* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana (Cal. ed.)

**V. V.**—*Vākyā-Vṛitti*, a commentary on *Tarka-Saṅgraha* by Meru Śāstri (Bombay 1873).

अथ

## तर्कसंग्रहः

तर्कदीपिकया न्यायवोधिन्या च सहितः

[ १ ]

निधाय हृदि विशेषं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् ।  
बालानां सुखवोधाय क्रियते तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

अथ तर्कदीपिका

विशेषं साम्बूर्ति प्रणिपत्य 'गिरं गुरुम् ।  
टीकां शिशुहितां कुर्वे तर्कसंग्रहदीपिकाम् ॥

चिकिरिष्टस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिवो-  
धितकर्तव्यतार्कमेष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं निवृत्तिशिकी-  
षितं ग्रन्थादौ प्रतिजानीते—निधायेति ।

ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणा-  
वल्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलाभावेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनाद-  
न्वयव्यतिरेकव्यभिचारादिति चेत् । 'किरणावल्यादौ विघ्नवाहुल्यात्समा-  
प्त्यभावः । कादम्बर्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्विरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः ॥  
ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुते-

1 Nil gives as v. l. गिरं गुरुं and  
explains it निर्विघ्नविद्यानामुष्टद-  
टारम्. Y also reads पिरं.

2 A and F read निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यः,  
but all other copies omit नि-  
र्विघ्नः; P has असमाप्तिं.

3 M has बौद्धग्रन्थादौ for कादम्ब-  
र्यादौ in this and the following  
instance. F and Q interchange

कादम्बर्यादौ and किरणावल्यादौ,  
retaining the remaining sent-  
ence as above. N reads differ-  
ently मङ्गलाभावेऽपि किरणावल्या-  
दौ समाप्तिदर्शनात् मङ्गलसत्त्वेऽपि  
कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनात्, and  
gives the other v. l. in  
a footnote. See Note loc.  
cit.

रेव 'प्रमाणत्वात् । तथा हि—मङ्गलं वेदवोधितकर्तव्यताकं, अलौकिकाविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शीदिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचारवारणायालैकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाविगीतेति । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टार्थम् । "न कुर्यान्विष्फलं कर्म" इति जलताडनादेवपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥

तर्कसंग्रह इति । तर्कर्यन्ते प्रतिपादन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्तपदार्थस्तेषां संग्रहः संक्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं क्रियत इत्यर्थः । कस्मै प्रयोजनायेत्यत आह—सुखबोधायेति । सुखेनानायासेन बोधः पदार्थज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः ॥ ननु वहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्वग्रन्थः क्रियत इत्यत आह—बालानामिति । तेषामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्वालानां बोधो न भवतीत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह—निधायेति । विशेषं जगन्नियन्तारं शिवं हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा सर्वदा तद्वयानपरो भूत्वेत्यर्थः । गुरुणां विद्यागुरुणां वन्दनं नमस्कारं विधाय कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

### अथ न्यायबोधिनी

अखिलागमसंचारि श्रीकृष्णारूपं परं महः ।

ध्यात्वा गोवर्धनसुधीस्तनुते न्यायबोधिनीम् ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निविन्परिसमार्थमिष्टेदेवतानमस्कारात्मकं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं ग्रन्थादौ निबन्धाति निधायेति ॥

[ २ ]

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्त पदार्थः ॥

त. दी.—पदार्थान्विमज्जते—द्रव्येति । पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति न्युत्त्वाभिघेयत्वं <sup>३</sup>पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ नन्वत्र विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे सप्तग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत् । न । अधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात्<sup>४</sup> ॥ नन्वति-

<sup>1</sup> Some MSS. add "समाप्तिकामो भग्नलमाचरेत्" इति श्रुतेः । but the addition is not warranted as the context refers to अनुमितश्रुति only.

G reads पदार्थः सत्तैः.

<sup>3</sup> A F M and P add लभ्यते and also insert इति before it.

<sup>4</sup> A F and P add न्यून before अधिक unnecessarily; Y Z read लघ्ये for सिद्धे; Q has किमर्थं for व्यर्थम्.

स्त्रिः पदार्थः प्रमितो न वा । नाद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात् । नान्त्यः प्रति-  
योगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपर्येरिति चेत् । न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यत-  
मत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ 'ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्व-  
मिति वक्तव्यम् । एवं च सप्तभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्सप्तान्यतमत्वं कथमिति  
चेत्र द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं द्रव्यादिभेदसप्तकाभाववत्वमित्युक्तत्वात् ।  
एवमग्रेऽपि दृष्टव्यम् ॥

**न्या. बो.**—अथ पदार्थान्विभजते—द्रव्येति ॥ तत्र सप्तश्रहणं पदा-  
र्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्याप्तिलभाय । ननु शक्तिपदार्थ-  
स्याष्टमस्य सत्त्वात्कथं सप्तैवेति । तथाहि वहिसंयुक्तेन्वनादौ सत्यपि मणि-  
संयोगे दाहो न जायते तच्छून्ये तु जन्यते । अतो मणिसमवधाने  
शक्तिर्नश्यति । मण्यभावदशायां दाहानुकूला शक्तिरुत्पद्यत इति कल्प्यते ।  
तस्माच्छक्तिरतिरिक्तपदार्थं इति चेत्र । मणेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन तदभावस्य  
दाहकारणत्वैवनैव निर्वाहे मणिसमवधानासमवधानाभ्यामनन्तशक्तिरुत्पद्य-  
सततत्प्रागभावकल्पनाया अन्याख्यत्वात् । तस्मात्सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥

[ ३ ]

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यमेजोवाख्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥

**त. दी.**—द्रव्यं विभजते—तत्रेति । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये द्रव्याणि  
नवैवेत्यन्वयः । कानि तानीत्यत आह—पृथिवीत्यादि । ननु तमसो  
दशमद्रव्यस्य विक्षमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणि । <sup>१</sup>तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलती-  
त्यबाधितप्रतीतिवलाक्षीलरूपाधारतया क्रियाधारतया च द्रव्यत्वं ताव-  
सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावो रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न  
वायौ <sup>२</sup>स्पर्शमावात्सदागतिमत्वाभावाच्च । नापि तेजसि भास्वररूपाभावा-

1 Q. omits इति वक्तव्यम् and substitutes तदर्थत्वात् for इत्युक्तत्वात्.  
L omits the whole passage from ननु to उक्तत्वात्; Nil. also appears to have had doubts about its authenticity. See Note loc. cit.

2 A and F add after तथाहि a verse

तमः स्तु चलं नीलं परापरविभाग-  
वत् । प्रसिद्धद्रव्यवैधर्म्याक्षवेभ्यो भेत्तुमहति; but it seems to be interpolated from some other commentary. J omits तथाहि also.

3 A and J omit स्पर्शमावात्.

दुष्णस्पर्शाभावाच । नापि जले शीतस्पर्शाभावात्रीलरूपाश्रयत्वाच । नापि पृथिव्यां गन्धवत्त्वाभावात्स्पर्शरहितत्वाच । तस्मात्तमो दशमद्रव्यमिति चेत् । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथाहि—तमो हि न 'रूपवद्व्यमालो-कासहकृतचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वादालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्यचाक्षुषप्रमायामालो-कस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात्मौद्रप्रकाशकतेजःसामान्याभावस्तमः । तत्र नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् ॥

द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ लक्ष्यैकदे-शावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमतिव्याप्तिः यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वम् । लक्ष्यमात्रावर्तनमसंभवः यथा गोरेकशफलत्वम् । एतद्वूषणत्रयरहितो धर्मो 'लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वमसाधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव 'लक्षणत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिव्ययत्वादौ चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्विकल्पं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनत्वे तु न देयम् । व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसा-धनत्वात् ॥ ननु गुणवत्त्वं न द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । आद्यक्षणे उत्पन्न-विनष्टद्रव्ये चाव्यास्तरिति चेत् । गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्<sup>३</sup> ॥ नन्वेवमध्येकं रूपं रसात्पृथगिति व्यवहाराद्बूपादावति-व्याप्तिरिति चेत् । एकार्थसमवायादेव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणा-नज्ञीकरणात् ॥

न्या. वो.—द्रव्याणि विभजते—पृथिवीति । नन्वन्धकारस्य दशम-द्रव्यस्य सत्त्वात्कथं नवैवेति । तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रतीतेनीलरूपा-श्रयत्वेन क्रियाश्रयत्वेन च द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । न च कलृसद्रव्येष्वन्तर्भावा-ल्कुतो दशमद्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । आकाशादिपञ्चकस्य नीरूपत्वाद्वायो-रपि नीरूपत्वात् तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तमसो निर्गन्धत्वात् पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावः ।

1 A F and Q. read रूपि for रूपवत्.

2 A F and Q here insert यथा गोः सात्त्वादिमत्त्वम्, while P and Y have यथा गोः सात्त्वादिमत्त्वे सति शृङ्गित्वम्; but the words are found in no other copy.

3 Nīl. notices लक्ष्यत्वे as v. l. for लक्षणत्वे, and remarks that the two readings are identical in sense.

4 M adds संयोगसमवायिकारणता-वच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वजाति;

जलतेजसोः शीतोष्णस्पर्शवस्त्वात् तयोरन्तर्भावः । तस्मात्तमसो दशम-  
द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धमिति चेत्त । तमसस्तेजोऽभावत्वेनैवोपपत्तावतिरिक्तद्रव्यकल्प-  
नायां मानाभावात् । न च विनिगमनाविरहत्तेज एवान्धकाराभावस्व-  
रूपमिति वाच्यम् । तेजसोऽभावस्वरूपत्वे सर्वानुभूतोष्णस्पर्शस्याश्रय-  
वाधाद्रव्यान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । 'तस्मादुष्णस्पर्शरूपगुणाश्रयतया तेजसो  
द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तमसि नीलरूपप्रतीतिस्तु 'आन्तिरेव दीपापसरणक्रि-  
याया एव तत्र भानात् ॥

[ ४ ]

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापर-  
त्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्तेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्का-  
राश्चतुर्विशतिगुणाः ॥

त. दी.—गुणं विभजते—रूपेति । द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामा-  
न्यवान्गुणः । 'गुणत्वजातिमान्वा । ननु लघुत्वमृदुत्वकठिनत्वादीनां विद्य-  
मानत्वात्कथं चतुर्विशतिगुणा इति चेत्त लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात्  
मृदुत्वकठिनत्वयोरवयवसंयोगविशेषरूपत्वात् ॥

[ ५ ]

उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि ॥

त. दी.—कर्म विभजते—उत्क्षेपणेति । संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति  
संयोगसमवायिकारणं कर्म । कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा ॥ ननु अमणादेरप्यति-  
रिक्तस्य कर्मणः सत्त्वात् 'पञ्चेत्यनुपन्नमिति चेत्त' । अमणादीनामपि गम-  
नेऽन्तर्भावात् पञ्चविधत्वविरोधः ॥

[ ६ ]

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥

1 U and W read स्वशाश्वयद्रव्यं.

2 U has नीलत्वादि and W adds एवं कर्मवत्ताप्रतीतिरपि.

3 N here adds सामान्यवानिन्युक्ते

द्रव्यकर्मणोरतिव्याप्तिरत्तत्त्विरासार्थं

द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सतीति । द्रव्य-

कर्मभिन्न इत्युच्यमाने सामान्यादि-

व्यतिव्याप्तिरत उक्तं सामान्यवानिति  
but the passage is neither  
noticed by Nil. nor found in any  
other copy.

4 A and F add एव after पञ्च.

5 Some MSS. omit this sentence.

त. दी.—सामान्यं विभजते—परमिति । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति ।  
अपरं न्यूनदेशवृत्ति । सामान्यादिचतुष्टये जातिर्नास्ति ॥

[ ७ ]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥

त. दी.—विशेषं विभजते—नित्येति । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य  
परमाणव आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ॥

[ ८ ]

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥

त. दी.—समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह—समवायस्त्वति ॥

[ ९ ]

अभावश्चतुर्विधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्यो-  
वयाभावश्चेति ॥

त. दी.—अभावं विभजते—अभावेति ॥

[ १० ]

<sup>१</sup>गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या च । <sup>२</sup>नित्या  
परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या कार्यरूपा । <sup>३</sup>पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियवि-  
षयुभेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासा-  
न्यूर्ति । विषयो मृत्पापाणादिः ॥

त. दी.—तत्रोद्देशादिकमानुसारात्पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह—गन्धव-  
तीति नामा पदार्थसंकीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशकमे च सर्वत्रेच्छैव निया-  
मिका । ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्यवयवारब्दे द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादाद-  
व्यासिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवगन्धस्यैव तत्र

1 A D F K Q W and X add  
तत्र before गन्धवती; See note  
loc. cit.

2 A and B add इति after च,

3 All copies except A B and F  
omit सा before पुनः; see Note  
loc. cit.

प्रतीतिसंभवेन चित्रगन्धानज्ञीकारात् ॥ किं चोत्तन्नविनष्टघटादावव्याप्ति-  
रिति चेत्त गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमन्त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् ।  
ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीतिरतिव्याप्तिरिति चेत्त अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां  
पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र भानाज्ञीकारात् । ननु तथापि कालस्य सर्वाधारतया  
सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति चेत्त सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकसंबन्ध-  
भिन्नसंबन्धेन लक्षणस्याभिमतत्वात् ॥

पृथिवीं विभजते—सा द्विविधेति । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वम् ।  
ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमनित्यत्वम् ॥ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते—पुनरीति ।  
आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् । यदवच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्वो-  
गायतनम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ॥ शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेष-  
गुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगश्रयत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । शरीरे-  
न्द्रियभिन्नो विषयः । एवं च गन्धवच्छिरीरं पार्थिवशरीरम् गन्धवदि-  
न्द्रियं पार्थिवेन्द्रियम् गन्धवान्विषयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्त्वलक्षणं  
बोध्यम् ॥ पार्थिवशरीरं दर्शयति—शरीरमिति । पार्थिवेन्द्रियं  
दर्शयति—इन्द्रियमिति । गन्धग्राहकमिति प्रयोजनकथनम् ।  
ग्राणमिति संज्ञा । नासाग्रेत्याश्रयोक्तिः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञेयम् ।  
पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति—विषयेति ॥

न्या. बो.—गन्धवत्तिति । गन्धवत्त्वं पृथिव्या लक्षणम् । लक्ष्या  
पृथिवी । पृथिवीत्वं लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकम् । यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नं लक्ष्यं स धर्मो  
लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकः । यो धर्मो यस्यामवच्छेदकः सा तद्धर्मावच्छिन्ना लक्ष्यता ।  
तथा च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं पृथिवीत्वं लक्ष्यता पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्ना । एवं  
शीतस्पर्शादिलक्षणेषु जलादीनां लक्ष्यता जलत्वादीनां लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वं  
च बोध्यम् ॥

[ ११ ]

शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः । ता द्विविधाः नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः  
परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियवि-

1 A and B insert ता: before पुनः.

ceding section.

See Note on सा in the last pre-

पयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वा-  
ग्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ॥

त. दी.—अपां लक्षणमाह—शीतेति । उत्पन्नविनष्टजलेऽन्यासि-  
वारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वे तात्पर्यम् । शीतं  
शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसंबन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानमिति नातिव्यासिः ।  
अन्यतसर्वं पूर्वीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

[ १२ ]

उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः । तद्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणु-  
रूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् ।  
शरीरमादित्यलोके<sup>1</sup> । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति ।  
विषयश्वतुर्विधः । भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं वन्हादिकम् ।  
अविन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आ-  
करजं सुवर्णादि ॥

त. दी.—तेजसो लक्षणमाह—उष्णस्पर्शवदिति । उष्णं जल-  
मिति प्रतीतेस्तेजःसंबन्धानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्यासिः । विषयं विभजते—  
भौमेति । ननु सुवर्णं पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वाद्विद्विवदिति चेत्त ।  
अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति धृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन जलमध्यस्थृतादौ  
द्रवत्वनाशादर्शनेन असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशाभि-  
संयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्य-  
नुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वेन<sup>2</sup> पार्थिवत्वानुपत्तेः । तस्मात्पीतद्रव्य-  
द्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तरासिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरण-  
तया जलत्वानुपत्तेः रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिप्वनन्तर्भावात् तैजसत्व-  
सिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णस्पर्शभास्वरूपयोरुपष्टम्भकपार्थिवरूपस्पर्शभ्यां प्रतिब-  
न्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात्सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् ॥

1 A B and X add ग्रासिद्धं after शीतेति.

आदित्यलोके.

2 A inserts धृतवत् after त्वाधि-  
करणत्वेन.

[ १३ ]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्सर्वशरीरवर्ति । विषयो दृक्षादिक्भ्यनहेतुः ॥

शरीरान्तःसंचारी वायुः प्राणः । स चैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्माणापानादिसङ्गां लभते ॥

त. दी.—वायुं लक्षयति—रूपरहितेति । आकाशादावतिव्यासिवारणाय स्पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादावतिव्यासिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । ननु प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह—शरीरेति । स चेति । एक एव प्राणः स्थानभेदात्माणापानादिशब्दैर्व्यवहियत इत्यर्थः । स्पर्शानुभेदो वायुः । तथाहि—योऽयं वायौ वाति सत्यनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शो भासते स स्पर्शः क्वचिदाश्रितो गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । न चास्य पृथिव्याश्रय उद्भूतस्पर्शवतः पार्थिवस्योद्भूतरूपवत्त्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । न विभुत्तुष्टयं, सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः परमाणुस्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः ॥ ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वाद्भूतवदिति चेत्र । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति वहिरन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति घटादौ साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नास्तीति पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैव तस्मारिस्तेजसोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः । इष्टत्वात् । तस्माद्रूपरहितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः ॥

इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्योत्पत्तिविनाशकमः कथ्यते । ईश्वरस्य चिकिर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणुद्रव्यसंयोगे सति द्वाणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्द्वाणुकैरुद्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी महत्य आपो महतेजो महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पत्तस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य संजिर्हार्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया । क्रिया

परमाणुद्वयविभागे सति द्युषुकनाशः । ततरूयणुकनाशः । ततश्चतुर-  
णुकस्येत्येवं महापृथिव्यादिनाशः ॥ असमवायिकारणनाशाद्द्वयणुकनाशः  
समवायिकारणनाशात्यणुकनाश इति संप्रदायः । सर्वत्रासमवायिकार-  
णनाशाद्व्यनाश इति नवीनाः ॥

किं पुनः परमाणुसङ्घावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । जालसूर्यमरीचिस्यं  
सूक्ष्मतमं यद्रज उपलभ्यते तत्सावयवम् चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वात्पटवत् । त्यणु-  
कावयवोऽपि सावयवो महदारम्भकत्वात्तुवत् । यो द्युषुकावयवः स  
परमाणुः । स च नित्यः । तस्यापि कार्यत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्<sup>1</sup> । सृष्टिप्रलय-  
सङ्घावे “धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्” इत्यादिश्रुतिः प्रमाणम्<sup>2</sup> । सर्व-  
कार्यद्रव्यध्वंसोऽवान्तरप्रलयः । सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलय इति विवेकः ॥

न्या. ओ.—एवं पृथिव्यादि त्रिकं निरूप्य वायुं निरूपयति—  
रूपरहितत्वे सति स्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम् । सतिसप्त-  
म्या विशिष्टार्थकतया रूपरहितत्वविशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम्<sup>3</sup> । विशे-  
षणानुपादाने स्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे पृथिव्यादित्रिकेऽतिव्यासि-  
स्तद्वारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् । तावन्मात्रोपादान आकाशादिपञ्चकेऽ-  
तिव्यासिस्तत्रापि रूपरहितत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अत उक्तं स्पर्शेति । अति-  
व्यासिनीर्मालक्ष्ये लक्षणसत्त्वम् । यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वं लक्षणं कृतं चेद-  
लक्ष्यभूतगोभिन्नमहिष्यादावतिव्यासिस्तत्रापि शृङ्गित्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।  
अव्यासिनीर्मलक्ष्यैकदेशाद्विचित्वम् । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाश्रयीभूते कचिलक्ष्ये  
लक्षणस्यासत्त्वेमेवाव्यासिस्तिर्थः । यथा गोर्नीलरूपवत्त्वं कृतं चेच्छे-  
तगवि नीलरूपभावादव्यासिः । असंभवो नाम लक्ष्यमात्रे कुत्रापि  
लक्षणासत्त्वं यथा गोरेकशफत्वं गोसामान्यस्य द्विशफत्वेनैकशफवत्त्वस्य

<sup>1</sup> A F N Q and W add after  
this तथा च मेरुसर्पयोरपि समान-  
परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, F reads पत्ते,  
N has तुल्यपत्रसङ्घः for समान-  
परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, while Q. has तु-  
ल्यपरिमाणपत्ते:, but as all other  
copies omit the sentence it  
seems to be an interpolation.

<sup>2</sup> A C N P Y Z put the first  
part of the sentence in the  
form of a पूर्वपक्ष as ननु सृष्टिप्र-  
लयसङ्घावे किं प्रमाणम्; A C K Z  
omit ननु; A K Y read मानम्  
for प्रमाणम्.

<sup>3</sup> V and W omit this sentence.

कुत्रायसत्त्वात् । अतिर्यासचब्यासवसंभवानां 'निष्कृष्टलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते ।  
लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रति-  
योगिताकभेदसामानाधिकरण्यमतिब्यासिः । अव्याप्तिस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छे-  
दकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभाव-  
प्रतियोगित्वम् । असंभवस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकब्यापकीभूताभावप्रति-  
योगित्वम् ॥

[ १४ ]

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । तचैकं विशु नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—आकाशं लक्ष्यति शब्दगुणमिति । नन्वाकाशमपि किं  
पृथिव्यादिवज्ञाना । नेत्याह—तचैकमिति । भेदे प्रमाणाभावादित्यर्थः ।  
एकत्वादेव सर्वत्रोपलब्धेर्विमुत्वमङ्गीकरितव्यमित्याह—विभिति । सर्व-  
मूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं  
वा । विभुत्वादेवात्मवन्नित्यमित्याह—नित्यं चेति ॥

न्या. ओ.—आकाशं लक्ष्यति । शब्दगुणकमिति । अत्र गुणपद-  
माकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति वोतनाय न त्विव्यासिवारणाय ।  
समवायेन शब्दवत्त्वमात्रस्य सम्यक्त्वात् । तदुक्तं । रूपं गन्धो रसः स्पर्शः  
खेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः । बुद्ध्यादिभावनान्ताश्च शब्दो वैशेषिका गुणाः ॥  
तचैकमिति । अनेकत्वे मानाभावादिति भावः विभिति । सर्वमूर्त-  
द्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं च क्रियाश्रयत्वम् । पृथिव्यसेजोवायु-  
मनांसि मूर्तानि । पृथिव्यसेजोवाय्वाकाशपञ्चकं भूतपदवाच्यम् । भूतत्वं  
नाम बहिरन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वम् ॥

[ १५ ]

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विशुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी.—कालं लक्ष्यति—अतीतेति । सर्वाधारः कालः सर्व-  
कार्यनिमित्तकारणं च ॥

न्या. वो.—कालं लक्षयति—अर्तीतेति । व्यवहारहेतुत्वस्य लक्षणत्वे व्यवहारहेतुभूतघटादावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणाय अर्तीतेतिविशेषणोपादानम् ॥

[ १६ ]

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुदिक् । सा चैका विभ्वी नित्या च ॥

त. दी.—दिशो लक्षणमाह—प्राचीति । दिगपि कार्यमात्रे निमित्तकारणम् ॥

न्या. वो.—दिशो लक्षणमाह—प्राच्येति । उदयाचलसंनिहिता दिक्याची । अस्ताचलसंनिहिता दिक्प्रतीची । मेरोः संनिहिता दिगुदीची । मेरोन्यवहिता दिगवाची ॥

[ १७ ]

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधः परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव । जीवात्मा ग्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त दी.—आत्मनो लक्षणमाह—ज्ञानेति ॥ आत्मानं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह—तत्रेति । नित्यज्ञानाधिकरणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् ॥ नन्वीश्वरस्य सद्गावे कि प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विवाद्यमाभ्यन्तरं वा । नायमरुपिद्रव्यत्वात् । नान्त्यमात्मसुखादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानं लिङ्गाभावादिति चेत् । क्षित्यहुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वाद्विदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् ।

1 A B C F Q and X read नित्या विभ्वी च but the reading adopted in the text is better as it agrees with the definitions of काल and आत्मा.

2 A B X जीवात्मा परमात्मा च; C जीवः for जीवात्मा.

3 A B add उत्तरदुःखादिरहितः after एव.

4 A F and Q insert नायागमस्तथाविदागमाभावात् after लिङ्गाभावात्, but the words appear to be interpolated and are inconsistent with the Vedic text cited further on. Z has नाप्युपमानं साहृद्याभावात् नापि शब्दः शब्दस्य वेदात्मकस्येश्वरोक्तवेन प्रामाण्यादीश्वरासिद्धौ तत्यामाण्यासिद्धौ.

उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्वं कर्तुत्वम् । उपादानं समवायिकारणम् । सकलपरमाणवादिमृक्षमदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । “यः सर्वज्ञः स सर्वविद्” इत्याद्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् ॥

जीवस्य लक्षणमाह—जीव इति । सुखाद्यश्रव्यत्वं जीवलक्षणम् । ननु “मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम्” इत्यादौ सर्वत्राहंप्रत्यये शरीरस्यैव विषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेत्त । शरीरस्यात्मत्वे करपादादिनाशे सति शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसङ्गात् । नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तथात्वे “योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं त्वचा मृशामि” इत्यनुसंधानाभावप्रसङ्गादन्यानुभूतेऽन्यस्यानुसंधानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः । स च न परमाणुः शरीरव्यापिसुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मध्यमपरिमाणः । तथा सत्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्वित्यो विभुजीवः ॥

न्या. बो.—आत्मानं निरूपयति—ज्ञानाधिकरणमिति । अधिकरणपदं समवायेन ज्ञानाश्रवत्वलाभार्थम् ॥

[ १८ ]

‘सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं’ नित्यं च ॥

त. दी.—मनसो लक्षणमाह—सुखेति । स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । मनो विभजते—तचेति । एकैकस्यात्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान्मनसोऽप्येनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । परमाणुरूपमिति । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । ननु मनो नाणु किन्तु विभु स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति चेत्त । मनसो विभुत्व आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यासमवायिकारणस्याभावाज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न च विभुद्रव्यसंयोगोऽस्तिवति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुष्टुप्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । पुरितद्वितिरिक्तप्रदेश आत्ममनःसंयोगस्य सर्वदा

1 A. B. insert दुःख after सुख quite unnecessarily.

2 E. H. read अणुरूपे.

विद्यमानत्वात् । अणुत्वे तु यदा मनः पुरीतति नाज्ञां प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्वसिद्धिः ॥

न्या. वो.—मनो निरूपयति सुखादीति । उपलब्धिर्नाम साक्षात्कारः । तथा च सुखादिसाक्षात्कारकारणत्वे सतीन्द्रियत्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । इन्द्रियत्वमात्रोक्तौ चक्षुरादावतिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्वदलम् । विशेष्यानुपादान आत्मन्यतिव्याप्तिरात्मनो ज्ञानादिकं प्रति समवायिकारणत्वात् । अत इन्द्रियत्वोपादानम् ॥

[ १९ ]

चक्षुर्मात्राद्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिश-  
चित्रभेदात्समविधं पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्तिः । तत्र पृथिव्यां समविधम् ।  
अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्लं तेजसि ॥

त. दी.—रूपं लक्षयति—चक्षुरिति । संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय  
मात्रपदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । प्रभाभितिसंयोगेऽति-  
व्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्मात्राद्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम्<sup>2</sup> । रूपं विभजते—त-  
चेति ॥ नन्वव्याप्त्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपभिति चेत्र रूपस्य  
व्याप्त्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटेऽवयवरूपस्य प्रतीतिरस्त्विति चेत्र ।  
रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्व-  
प्रयोजकं गौरवात् । तस्मातपटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानुपपत्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः ॥  
रूपस्याश्रयमाह—पृथिवीति । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति—तत्रेति ॥

1 A, B, X read अभास्वरं शुक्लं and भास्वरं शुक्लं च respectively; J, K, have the same as A without the last च; E, G, H have शुक्लं भास्वरं. The reading adopted in the text is that of C, D, and Sc., and is preferred as making the sense clearer. अभास्वर and भास्वर, when prefixed to शुक्लं, serve to distinguish the particular kind of शुक्लत्वं of जल from

that of तेजस्; while, taken separately, they can give proper sense only if construed as adverbs modifying शुक्ल.

2 N has विशेष्यपदं देवं for चक्षुर्मात्राद्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम्. C, Y, Z omit the sentence प्रभाभिति &c.; while A omits the next sentence रूपं &c. G, L, M, P and W omit both sentences.

न्या. बो.—रूपं लक्षयति—चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहत्वविशिष्टगुणत्वं रूपस्य लक्षणम् । विशेष्यमात्रोपादाने रसादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतश्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहेति । तावन्मात्रोपादाने रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः । यो गुणो यदिन्द्रियग्राहात्मान्त्रिष्ठा जातिस्तदभावस्तदिन्द्रियग्राह इति नियमात् । तद्वारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहत्वं नाम चक्षुर्भिन्नोन्दियग्राहत्वे सति चक्षुर्ग्राहत्वम् । मात्रपदानुपादाने संख्यादिसामान्यगुणेऽतिव्याप्तिः संख्यादावपि चक्षुर्ग्राहत्वविशिष्टगुणत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अतस्तद्वारणाय मात्रपदम् । संख्यादेश्चक्षुर्भिन्नत्वग्निन्द्रियग्राहत्वाचक्षुर्मात्रग्राहत्वं नास्ति । अतीन्द्रिये गुरुत्वादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्ग्राहेति । अत्र लक्षणे ग्राहत्वं नाम लौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वम् । अग्राहत्वं नाम तदविषयत्वम् । तथा च चक्षुर्भिन्नन्दियजन्यत्वाचसाक्षात्काराविषयत्वे सति चक्षुर्जन्यचाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमिति फलितार्थः । ननु प्रमाभित्तिसंयोगे रूपलक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिस्तस्य चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहगुणत्वादिति चेत् । गुणपदस्य विशेषगुणपरत्वात् । न चैव विशेषगुणघटितलक्षणे संख्यादावतिव्याप्तिभावान्मात्रपदैवैर्यर्थमिति वाच्यम् । जलमात्रवृत्तिसांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय तदुपादानात् ॥ अथवा चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहजातिमद्गुणत्वस्य लक्षणत्वात् प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगादावतिव्याप्तिः संयोगत्वजातेश्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहत्वाभावाद्वटपटसंयोगस्य त्वग्निन्द्रियग्राहत्वात्तद्रत्जातेरपि त्वग्निन्द्रियग्राहत्वात् । अत्र जातिघटितलक्षणे गुणत्वानुपादाने चक्षुर्मात्रग्राहजातिमति सुवर्णादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतस्तद्वारणाय तदुपादानम् ॥ एवं रसादिलक्षणे विशेषणानुपादाने लक्ष्यभिन्नगुणादावतिव्याप्तिः । विशेष्यानुपादाने लक्ष्यमात्रवृत्तिरसत्वगन्धत्वादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतो विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुभयोरुपादानम् ॥

[ २० ]

रसनग्राहो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकदुक्षयतिक्खेदातपड्डिधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां पड्डिधः । जले मधुर एव ॥  
त. दी.—रसं लक्षयति—रसनेति । रसत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहाराय

गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह—पृथिवीति ॥ आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति—पृथिव्यामिति ॥

[ २१ ]

प्राणग्राहो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी—गन्धं लक्षयति—प्राणेति । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय गुणपदम् ॥

[ २२ ]

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राहो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः । शीतोष्णा-नुष्णाशीतभेदात् पृथिव्यसेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥

त. दी.—स्पर्शं लक्षयति—त्वगिति । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय गुणपदम् । संयोगादावतिव्यासिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ॥

न्या. वा.—स्पर्शं लक्षयति—त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह इति । अत्रापि मात्रपदं 'संस्यादिसामान्यगुणादावतिव्यासिवारणाय । अन्यविशेषणकृत्यं पूर्ववद्वोध्यम् ॥ ग्राहत्वपदार्थोऽपि पूर्ववत्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वरूप एव वोध्यः ॥

[ २३ ]

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्रापाकजं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥

त. दी.—पाकजमिति । पाकस्तेजःसंयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न व्यणुकादौ । आमपाकनिक्षिसे<sup>१</sup> घटे परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ इयामधटनाशे पुनर्द्वयं-

1 V reads संस्यादावतिव्याति which is perhaps preferable.

2 N Z and NL omit पाक. Other readings are आपाक and अपाक; but all are equally un-

satisfactory. The one adopted in the text may mean a furnace if interpreted as a *Bahuvrihi* compound: आमस्य (घटस्य) पाको यस्मिन्.

कादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः-  
संयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । अद्वृष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । व्यषुकादिरूपे  
कारणरूपमसमवायिकारणम् । इति पीलुपाकवादिनो वैशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य  
नाशं विनैवावयविन्यवयेषु परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु च युगपद्मान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति  
पिठरपाकवादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादिकमनित्य-  
मित्यर्थः ॥ अन्यत्रेति । जलादावित्यर्थः । नित्यगतमिति । परमाणुगत-  
मित्यर्थः ॥ अनित्यगतमिति । व्यषुकादिनिष्ठमित्यर्थः । रूपादिचतुष्टय-  
मुद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षमनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्षप्रयोजको धर्मः । तद-  
भावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

न्या. वो.—रूपादिचतुष्टयं पूर्थिव्यां पाकजमिति । एतचत्व-  
निर्णयश्चेत्थम् । पाको नाम विजातीयतेजःसंयोगः । स च नानाजा-  
तीयः । रूपजनको विजातीयः संयोगस्तदपेक्षया रसजनको विजा-  
तीयः । एवं स्पर्शादावपि । एवंप्रकारेण मित्रमित्रजातीयाः पाकाः  
कार्यवैलक्षण्येन कल्पनीयाः । तथाहि तृणपुञ्जनिक्षिप्त आप्रादौ  
उप्रमलक्षणविजातीयतेजःसंयोगात्पूर्वहरितरूपनाशे रूपान्तरस्य पीता-  
देवत्पत्तिः पूर्वरसस्याम्लस्यैवानुभवात् । क्वचित्पूर्वहरितरूपसत्त्वेऽपि  
रसपरावृत्तिर्दृश्यते विजातीयतेजःसंयोगरूपपाकवशात्पूर्वतनाम्लरसनाशे  
मधुररसस्यानुभवात् । तस्माद्वृपजनकपेक्षया रसजनको विलक्षणः ।  
एवं गन्धजनको विलक्षण एवाङ्गीकार्ये रूपरसयोरपरावृत्तावपि पूर्व-  
गन्धनाशे विजातीयतेजःसंयोगेन सुरभिगन्धोपलब्धेः । एवं स्पर्श-  
जनकोऽपि पाकवशात्कठिनस्पर्शनाशे मृदुस्पर्शानुभवात् । तस्माद्वृपादि-  
जनका विजातीया एव पाका यथाकार्यमुच्चेयाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमा-  
णुनामेकजातीयतेजःपि पाकमहिम्ना विजातीयद्रव्यान्तरानुभवः । यथा  
गोमुक्ततृणादीनामापरमाणवन्तं भज्ञे तृणारम्भकपरमाणुषु विजातीयतेजः-  
संयोगवशात्पूर्वरूपादिचतुष्टयनाशे तदनन्तरं दुग्धे याद्वां रूपादिकं  
वर्तते तादृशरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शजनकास्तेजःसंयोगा जायन्ते । तदुचरं  
तादृशरूपरसादय उत्पद्यन्ते । तादृशरूपादिविशिष्टपरमाणुभिर्दुग्धव्यषुक-  
मारम्भते । ततस्त्रियणुकादिक्रमेण महादुग्धारम्भः ॥ एवं महादुग्धारम्भकैः

परमाणुभिरेव दध्यारम्भते । एवं पाकमहिन्नैव दध्यारम्भकैः परमाणु-  
भिर्नवनीतारम्भ इति दिक् ॥

[ २४ ]

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः<sup>१</sup> संख्या । नवद्रव्यवृत्तिरेकत्वादिपरार्थ-  
पर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च<sup>२</sup> । नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्य-  
गतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ॥

त. दी.—संख्यां लक्षयति—एकत्वेति ॥

[ २५ ]

मानव्यवहारकारणं परिमाणं । नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः । तत्त्वतुविधम्  
अणु महदीर्घं हस्तं चेति ॥

त. दी.—परिमाणं लक्षयति—मानेति । परिमाणं विभजते—  
तदिति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्वं दीर्घत्वं हस्तत्वं चेत्यर्थः॥

[ २६ ]

पृथग्व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वं । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति—पृथगिति । इदमस्मात्पृथगिति व्य-  
वहारकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[ २७ ]

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—संयोगं लक्षयति—संयुक्तेति । इमौ संयुक्तविति व्यवहा-

1 A B C insert असाधारण between व्यवहार and हेतु here and in the following definitions of परिमाण, पृथक्त्व and संयोग, but the reading of the majority of

copies is preferred. See Note loc. cit.

2 A B insert सा before नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः

3 C E K X omit नित्यमनित्यं च,

रहेतुरित्यर्थः । संस्यादिलक्षणेषु सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाया-  
साधारणेति पदं देयम् ॥ संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्च । आद्यो  
हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्कायपुस्तक-  
संयोगः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । खात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वमव्या-  
प्यवृत्तित्वम् ॥

[ २८ ]

संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—विभागं लक्षयति—संयोगेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवार-  
णाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संयोगनाशक इति । वि-  
भागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तक-  
विभागः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्कायपुस्तकविभागः ॥

न्या. बो.—विभागं लक्षयति—संयोगेति । संयोगनाशकत्वविशि-  
ष्टगुणत्वं विभागस्य लक्षणम् । विशेषणमात्रोपादाने क्रियाया अपि संयो-  
गनाशकत्वात्त्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणत्वं विशेष्यम् ॥

[ २९ ]

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे<sup>१</sup> परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्ट-  
यमनोवृत्तिनी<sup>२</sup> । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कृतं  
परत्वम् । समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वम् ।  
कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह—परेति । परव्यवहारासाधारण-  
कारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वमित्यर्थः । परापरत्वे  
विभजते—ते द्विविधे इति । दिक्कृतयोरुदाहरणमाह—दूरस्थ इति ॥  
कालकृते उदाहरते—ज्येष्ठ इति ॥

1 H J omit असाधारण, but most  
of the copies agree in retain-  
ing it.

2 E G H J and X omit पृथिव्यादि  
etc.

[ ३० ]

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—गुरुत्वं लक्षयति—आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेग-  
समवायिकारणत्वाद्वैरेऽतिव्यासिवारणायाद्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—गुरुत्वं लक्षयति—आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनक्रियायां  
वेगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वात्त्रातिव्यासिवारणायाद्येति । उत्तरत्र स्थन्दन  
आद्यविशेषणमपि पूर्ववदेव योजनीयम् ॥

[ ३१ ]

आद्यस्थन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यभेजोवृत्तिः । तद्द्वि-  
विधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले नैमित्तिकं पृथि-  
वीतेजसोः । पृथिव्यां घृतादावभिसंयोगजन्यं<sup>१</sup> द्रवत्वम् । तेजसि  
सुवर्णादौ<sup>२</sup> ॥

त. दी.—द्रवत्वं लक्षयति—आद्यस्थन्दनेति । स्थंदनं सवणम् ।  
तेजःसंयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वम्<sup>३</sup> । तद्विधं सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वम् । पृ-  
थिव्यां नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वमुदाहरति<sup>४</sup>—घृतादाविति । तेजसि तदाह—  
सुवर्णादाविति ॥

[ ३२ ]

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—स्नेहं लक्षयति—चूर्णेति । कालादावतिव्यासिवारणाय  
गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्यासिवारणाय चूर्णादीति<sup>५</sup> ॥

न्या. बो.—स्नेहं लक्षयति—चूर्णादीति । चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुते  
सति गुणत्वं स्नेहस्य लक्षणम् । पिण्डीभावो नाम चूर्णादेवरणाकर्षणहेतु-  
भूतो विलक्षणः संयोगः । तादृशसंयोगे स्नेहस्यैवासाधारणकारणत्वम् । न

1 O D E J read °संयोगजं.

2 B omits तेजसि सुवर्णादौ.

3 G J Y Z omit द्रवत्वं after

नैमित्तिकः

4 A G J Y Z read पिण्डीभावेति;  
A has गुण for रूप wrongly.

तु जलादिगतद्रवत्वस्य । तथा सति द्रुतसुवर्णादिसंयोगे चूर्णादेः पिण्डी-भावापत्तेः । अतः स्त्रेह एवासाधारणकारणम् । विशेषणमालोपादाने कालादावतिव्यासिस्तद्वारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । वस्तुतस्तु द्रुतजलसंयोगस्यैव पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वम् । स्त्रेहस्य पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वे मानाभावात् । जले द्रुतत्वविशेषणात्करकादिव्यावृत्तिः ॥

[ ३३ ]

श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । स द्विविधो ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति—श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्यासिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति ॥ शब्दस्त्रिविधः । संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । तत्राद्यो भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यः । द्वितीयो वंश उत्पाद्यमाने दलद्रूयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्दः । भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः ॥

न्या. बो.—शब्दं लक्षयति—श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय गुणपदम् । रूपादावतिव्यासिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति । स त्रिविधः । संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यो भाङ्गारादिशब्दः । हस्ताभिधातसंयोगजन्यो मृदङ्गादिशब्दः । वंशे पात्रमाने दलद्रूयविभाग-जश्चटचटादिशब्दः । शब्दोत्पत्तिदेशमारभ्य कर्णविवरपर्यन्तं वीची-तरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा निमित्तपवनेन शब्दधारा जायन्ते । ततोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वशब्दः<sup>1</sup> कारणम् ॥

[ ३४ ]

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम् । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च ।

<sup>1</sup> V has उत्तरोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वपूर्वशब्दः.

<sup>2</sup> C K add गुणः after हेतुः A E

G X read हेतुर्ज्ञानं द्वुद्धिः See  
Note loc. cit.

संस्कारमात् जन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्विन्द्रं ज्ञानमनुभवः ॥

त. दी.—बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह—सर्वेति । <sup>१</sup>जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञा-  
नत्वेमव लक्षणमित्यर्थः । बुद्धिं विभजते—सेति ॥ स्मृतेर्लक्षणमाह—  
संस्कारेति । भावनास्त्वयः संस्कारः । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय  
ज्ञानमिति । घटादिप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय संस्कारजन्यमिति ।  
प्रत्यभिज्ञायामतिव्यासिवारणाय मात्रेति<sup>२</sup> ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति—  
तद्विन्द्रमिति । स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः ॥

न्या, वो,—बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह—सर्वेति । व्यवहारः शब्दप्रयोगः ।  
ज्ञानं विना शब्दप्रयोगासंभवाच्छब्दप्रयोगरूपव्यवहारहेतुत्वं ‘बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् ।  
बुद्धिं विभजते—सा द्विविधेति ॥ स्मृतिं लक्षयति—संस्कारेति । वहि-  
रन्द्रियाजन्यत्वविशिष्टं संस्कारजन्यत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वं स्मृतेर्लक्षणम् । विशे-  
षणानुपादाने प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुभवेऽतिव्यासिः । तद्वारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् ।  
संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः  
कारणत्वात्संस्कारध्वंसेऽपि संस्कारजन्यत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञायामति-  
व्यासिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति—तद्विन्द्रमिति । तद्वि-  
न्द्रत्वं नाम स्मृतिभिन्नत्वम् । स्मृतिभिन्नत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वमनुभवस्य लक्षणम् ।  
तत्र विशेषणानुपादाने स्मृतावतिव्यासिः । विशेष्यानुपादाने घटादावति-  
व्यासिः । अतस्तद्वारणाय विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुपयोरुपादानम् ॥

<sup>1</sup> J omits मात्र, while the word and the commentary on it are added in G in a marginal note. S. C. also notices the omission of the word in several MSS., while the absence of the sentence referring to it in several copies of T. D. makes it probable that the word may not have existed originally. It is however retained in accordance with Nil. See Note on मात्र loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> N and Q add कालादावतिव्या-

सिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । रूपादाव-  
तिव्यासिवारणाय सर्वव्यवहारेति;  
while Q has गुण for ज्ञान; but  
the passage is not found anywhere else, nor noticed; by Nil.

<sup>3</sup> A C J L P Y Z omit this sentence, and G adds it in the margin; but it is retained on the authority of M N Q W and Nil.

<sup>4</sup> All copies except V read ज्ञानस्य.

<sup>5</sup> C K R omit वहिरन्द्रियाजन्य-  
त्वविशिष्ट.

[ ३५ ]

स द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च । तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः  
यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम्<sup>१</sup> । स<sup>२</sup> एव प्रमेत्युच्यते । तदभाव-  
वति<sup>३</sup> तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः । 'यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति  
ज्ञानम् ॥

त. दी.—अनुभवं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवस्य  
लक्षणमाह—तद्वतीति । ननु घटे घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्यासिः घटत्वे  
घटाभावादिति चेत्र । यत्र यत्संबन्धोऽस्ति तत्र तत्संबन्धानुभव इत्यर्थाद्व-  
टत्वेऽपि घटसंबन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्यासिः । स इति । यथार्थानुभव एव  
शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यते इत्यर्थः । अयथार्थं लक्षयति—तदभाववतीति । न-  
न्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामव्यासिरिति चेत्र । यदवच्छेदेन यत्संबन्धाभाव<sup>४</sup>-  
स्तदवच्छेदेन तत्संबन्धज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् संयोगभाववच्छेदेन संयोग-  
ज्ञानस्य अप्रत्यात् संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसंबन्धस्य<sup>५</sup> सत्त्वात् नातिव्यासिः ।

न्या. बौ.—अनुभवं विभजते—स द्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवं  
लक्षयति—तद्वतीति । तद्वतीत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यकत्वम् । तच्छब्देन  
<sup>६</sup>प्रकारीभूतो धर्मो धर्तव्यः। तथा च तद्वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकत्वं<sup>७</sup> यथा-  
र्थानुभवस्य लक्षणम् । उदाहरणम् । रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । रजतत्व-

1 C H J K omit this sentence;  
E G Q X have instead यथार्थं  
घट इति; B adds सत्य before रजत.

2 The reading in all copies of  
T. S. and T. D. except J is सैव;  
but स एव is adopted as being  
grammatically more correct.

3 Q omits अनुभवः while C E  
have तत्प्रकारकश्च.

4 C H J F and Q omit this  
sentence. D adds further रज-  
तत्वाभाववति शुक्तो रजतत्वप्रकारक-  
ज्ञानमयथार्थज्ञानं; but this as

well as A's addition सैवाप्रमे-  
त्युच्यते seem to be interpola-  
tions.

5 G reads यदभावः for यत्संबन्धा-  
भावः.

6 A has संयोगज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वात् for  
संयोगसंबन्धस्य सत्त्वात्; J reads  
विविमानत्वात् for सत्त्वात्.

7 V adds ज्ञान before प्रकारीभूतः,  
perhaps better.

8 S T and W read तत्प्रकारत्वे स-  
त्यनुभवत्वं, perhaps better.

वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम् । तद्वनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपित-  
तचिष्ठप्रकारिताशालित्वमिति निष्कर्षः । अन्यथा यथाश्रुते रङ्गरजत-  
योरिमे रजतरङ्गे इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनप्रमेऽतिव्यासिः । तत्रापि  
रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः रङ्गत्ववद्विशेष्यकत्वरङ्गत्व-  
प्रकारकत्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् । उक्तनिष्कर्षे तु दर्शितप्रमे नातिव्यासिः । रज-  
तत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्ववद्वजतविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावात् । एवं रङ्गत्वप्र-  
कारताया रङ्गत्ववद्वजविशेष्यतनिरूपितत्वाभावाच्च । किं तु समूहालम्बने  
प्रमस्य रङ्गांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन रजतांशे रङ्गत्वावगाहित्वेन च रजत-  
त्वप्रकारतायाः रङ्गत्ववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वात् । एवं रजतांशे रङ्गत्व-  
प्रकारताया रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाचेति' ॥

अयथार्थानुभवं लक्षयति—तदभाववतीति । अत्रापि पूर्ववत्त-  
दभाववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपिततचिष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानत्वं विवक्षणीयम् ।  
अन्यथा रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रङ्गरजते इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनप्रमायामिति-  
व्यासिरेतत्समूहालम्बनस्य रजतरङ्गेभयविशेष्यकत्वेन रजतत्वरङ्गत्वो-  
भयप्रकारकत्वेन च रजतत्वाभाववद्वजतविशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः  
रङ्गत्वाभाववद्वजतविशेष्यकत्वरङ्गत्वप्रकारकत्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् । उक्तनि-  
ष्कर्षे तु न तत्रातिव्यासिः । तादृशप्रमायाः<sup>१</sup> रजतांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन  
रङ्गांशे रङ्गत्वावगाहित्वेन च रजतत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्वाभाववद्वज-  
निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावादेवं रङ्गत्वप्रकारताया रङ्गत्वाभाववद्वजत-  
निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावाच्च । उदाहरणम् । यथा शुक्ताविति ॥

[ ३६ ]

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुभित्युपमितिशब्दभेदात् । त-  
त्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुभानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ॥

त. दी. यथार्थानुभवं विभजते—यथार्थेति । प्रसङ्गात्मकरणं  
विभजते—तत्करणमिति । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाण-  
मिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

1 W reads differently; U adds मूहालंबने.

नानासुख्यविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानं स- 2 The reading is taken from W.

न्या. वो.—यथार्थानुभवं विभजते—यथार्थानुभव इति । तत्करणमिति । फलीभूतप्रत्यक्षादिकरणं चतुर्विधमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षादिचतुर्विधप्रमाणानां प्रमाकरणत्वं सामान्यलक्षणम् । एकैकप्रमाणलक्षणं तु वक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेत्यादिना ॥

[ ३७ ]

असाधारणं कारणं <sup>1</sup>करणम् ।

त. दी.—करणलक्षणमाह—असाधारणेति । <sup>2</sup>साधारणकारणे दिक्कालादावतिव्यासिवारणायासाधारणेति ॥

न्या. वो.—करणलक्षणमाह—असाधारणमिति । व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणमित्यर्थः । असाधारणकारणत्वं च <sup>3</sup>कार्यत्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताशालित्वम् । यथा दण्डदेव्यटादिकं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणत्वम् । कार्यत्वव्याप्यधर्मो घटत्वादिरूपधर्मः तदवच्छिन्नकार्यता घटे । तन्निरूपितकारणता दण्डे । अतो घटं प्रति दण्डोऽसाधारणकारणम् । अभ्यादिरूपव्यापारवत्त्वाच्च करणम् । साधारणकारणत्वं कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताशालित्वम् । यथा ईश्वराद्वादेः कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव कारणत्वात्साधारणकारणत्वम् ॥

[ ३८ ]

कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्तिः <sup>1</sup>कारणम् ।

1 All copies except B and K insert व्यापारवद् before असाधारण; in J the word is added in margin, apparently by another hand. But the प्रतीक in all copies of T. D. and the remarks of S. C. conclusively show that it did not exist originally. On this see Note loc. cit. G adds तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः, but the addition is unwarranted.

2 N here inserts चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षे जननीये चक्षुःसंयोगरूपो व्यापारः । तत्त्वात्विव्यासिवारणाय व्यापारवदि-

त्यपि देयम्. Y adds घटं प्रति कपालद्वयसंयोगवारणाय व्यापारवदिति; but neither passage is found in any other copy.

3 U and W have अतिरिक्त for व्याप्य.

4 The reading in the text is taken from G K Q X, as being most probably the correct one. A B C D F prefix अनन्यथा-सिद्धं to कार्यनियतः. J adds the word in margin. E has अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति नियतः, while H reads कार्येऽन्यथासिद्धिशून्यत्वे सति नियतः. See Note loc. cit.

त. दी.—कारणलक्षणमाह—कार्येति । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रासभादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो नियतेति । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽतिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्ववृत्तीति ॥ ननु तनुरूपमपि पटं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेत् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वमन्यथासिद्धिविरहः । अन्यथासिद्धिश्च त्रिविधा । येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तेन तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा तनुना तनुरूपं तनुत्वं च पटं प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र कल्पसनियतपूर्ववर्तिनैव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्रागभावस्य । एवं चानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो.—कारणं लक्षयति—कार्यनियतेति । कार्यं प्रति नियतस्वे सति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् । नियतत्वविशेषणानुपादाने पूर्ववर्तिनो रासभादेरपि घटादिकारणत्वं स्यादतो नियतेति विशेषणम् । नियतपूर्ववर्तिनो दण्डरूपादेरपि घटकारणत्वं स्यादतोऽनन्यथासिद्धपदमपि कारणलक्षणे निवेशनीयं दण्डरूपादीनामन्यथासिद्धत्वात् ॥

[ ३९ ]

कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ॥

त. दी.—कार्यलक्षणमाह—कार्यमिति ॥

न्या. बो.—कार्यं लक्षयति—प्रागिति । प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं कार्यस्य लक्षणम् । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वमिह घटो भविष्यतीति प्रतीतिर्जायते । एतत्प्रतीतिविषयोऽभावः प्रागभावस्तत्प्रतियोगि घटादिरूपं कार्यम् ॥

[ ४० ]

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सहकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति

यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम्<sup>1</sup> । यथा तनुसंयोगः पटस्य तनुरूपं पटरूपस्य<sup>2</sup> । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीयेमादिकं पटस्य ।

त. दी.—कारणं विभजते—कारणमिति । समवायिकारणस्य लक्षणमाह यत्समवेतमिति । यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति कार्येणते । कार्येणत्येतदुदाहरति तनुसंयोग इति । कार्येण पटेनैकस्मिस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वाचन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । कारणेन सहेत्येतदुदाहरति—तनुरूपमिति । कारणेन पटेन सहैकस्मिस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वाचन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति तदुभयेति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः<sup>3</sup> ॥

न्या. चो.—कारणं विभजते—कारणमिति । समवायिकारणं लक्षयति—यत्समवेतमिति ॥ यस्मिन्समवेतं सत् समवयेन संबद्धं सत् कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । उदाहरणं—यथा तन्तव इति । तन्तुषु समवयेन संबद्धं सत् पटात्मकं कार्यमुत्पद्यते इति तन्तवः समवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिततादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणत्वमिति । समवायसंबन्धेन घटाधिकरणे कपालादौ कपालादेस्तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनैव सत्त्वात् । समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिततादात्म्यसंबन्धाव—‘च्छिन्नकारणतायाः कपालादौ सत्त्वालक्षणसमन्वयः । समवयेन जन्यभावत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन द्रव्यस्यैव कारणत्वाज्जन्यमावेष

1 E and Q supply यत् and तत् which though not absolutely necessary are inserted as making the sense clearer.

2 K reads पटगतरूपस्य.

3 N here adds इदं च कारणत्रयं भा-

वकार्यस्यैव । अभावस्य तु निमित्तमात्रम्, but the words are not found in any other copy.

4 W inserts here कपालत्वायवच्छिन्न.

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु त्रिषु द्रव्यमेव समवायिकारणम् । द्रव्ये द्रव्यावयवाः समवायिकारणम् । अतो गुणादावपि द्रव्यमेव समवायिकारणमित्याशयेनाह पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेरिति । समवायिकारणमित्यनुष्ठयते । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति—कार्येणति । 'असमवायिकारणं द्विविधम् । कार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेत् सत् कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्येकम् । कारणेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेत् सत् कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यपरमित्यर्थः । अत्र कारणेनेत्यस्य स्वकार्यसमवायिकारणेनेत्यर्थः । जन्य-द्रव्यमात्रेऽवयवसंयोगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वात्पटात्मककार्यं तदवयवत-न्तुसंयोगस्यैवासमवायिकारणत्वं दर्शयन्प्रथममुदाहरति—यथा तन्तु-संयोगः पटस्येति । पटात्मककार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तौ समवेत् सत् समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् पटात्मककार्यं प्रति तन्तुसंयोगात्मकं कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । द्वितीयमसमवायिकारणं दर्शयति—कारणेन सहेत्यादिना । तदुदाहरति—तन्तुरूपमिति । 'कारणेन पटरूप-समवायिकारणीभूतपटेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तुरूपेऽर्थे समवेत् सत् समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् तन्तुरूपं पटगतरूपं प्रति कारणं भवति । अतोऽसमवायिकारणं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवाय-संबन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिता या समवायस्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वान्य-तरसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना कारणता तदाश्रयत्वम् । 'समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्ना कपालद्रव्यसंयोगनिष्ठा कारणता कपालद्रव्यसंयोगे वर्तते । एवमाद्यपतनक्रियायां च गुरुत्वद्रवत्वे असमवायिकारणे भवतः । आद्यपतनक्रियां प्रत्याद्यस्यन्दनक्रियां प्रति च तयोः समवायसंबन्धेनैव कारणत्वात् । अवयविगुणादौ त्ववयवगुणादेः स्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वसं-बन्धेनैव कारणत्वात्तसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणताश्रयत्वमवयवगुणादौ वर्तते । अवयवभूतकपालतन्तुरूपादेः स्वशब्दग्राहकपालरूपतन्तुरूपसमवायिक-

1 The following two sentences are omitted in C K R.

2 W reads differently.

3 Before समवाय° S T insert द्रव्यासमवायिकारणीभूतावयवसंबन्धे तु समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघट-

त्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपित°, but all other copies omit the words. S T also read संयोगत्वावच्छिन्ना for संयोगनिष्ठा. W reads differently.

पालतन्तुसमेवेतत्वसंबन्धेन घटपटादौ 'सत्त्वात् ॥ निमित्तकारणं लक्ष-  
यति—तदुभयभिन्नमिति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नमित्यर्थः ॥

[ ४१ ]

तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥  
त. दी.—करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति—तदेतदिति ॥

न्या. वो.—करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति—तदेतदिति । यदसाधारणमि-  
त्यत्र व्यापारवत्त्वे सतीत्यपि पूरणीयम् । अन्यथा तन्तुकपालसंयोगयोरति-  
व्यासिः । तन्तुकपालसंयोगयोरपि कार्यत्वातिरिक्तपटत्वघटत्वावच्छिन्नं  
प्रति कारणत्वादसाधारणत्वमस्त्येव । अतस्तत्र करणत्ववारणाय व्यापार-  
वत्त्वे सतीति करणलक्षणे विशेषणं देयम् । व्यापारत्वं तु तज्जन्यत्वे सति  
तज्जन्यजनकत्वम् । भवति हि दण्डजन्यत्वे सति दण्डजन्यघटजनकता ब्र-  
म्यादेदण्डव्यापारस्य । एवं कपालसंयोगतन्तुसंयोगदेवपि कपालतन्त्वादि-  
व्यापारस्यम् । कपालसंयोगस्य कपालजन्यत्वे सति कपालजन्यघटजन-  
कत्वादेवं तन्तुसंयोगस्य तन्तुजन्यत्वे सति तन्तुजन्यपटजनकत्वात् ।  
करणलक्षणेऽसाधारणविशेषणानुपादान ईश्वरादृष्टदेवपि व्यापारवत्त्वा-  
त्करणत्वं स्यात्त्रातिव्यासिवारणायासाधारणेति ॥

[ ४२ ]

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिर्कर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं  
प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति । तत्र निष्ठ-  
कारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किञ्चित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सवि-  
कल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति<sup>२</sup> ॥

1 S T W. read the passage some-  
what differently, though the  
sense is the same; thus अवय-  
विणुण्मृतघटपटरूपादौ त्वव्यवयु-  
णभृतकपालतन्तुरूपादैः स्वपदशात्-  
कपालतन्तुरूपादिसमवायिकपालत-  
त्वादिसमेवेतत्वसंबन्धेनैव कारण-  
त्वात्तसंबन्धावच्छिन्नकारणतात्रय-  
त्वमवयवयुणभृतकपालस्पतन्तुरूपादौ  
वर्तत इति लक्षणसंगतिः.

2 E instead of this has किञ्चि-  
दिदिमिति बस्तुमात्रावगाहिज्ञानम्;  
G J Q and X omit the words  
altogether.

3 E adds पाचकोऽयम्, but the  
addition, though desirable as  
giving an instance of किया, is  
not supported by any other  
copy.

त. दी.—प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह—तत्रेति । प्रमाणचतुष्प्रभव्य इत्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह—इन्द्रियेति । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थे घटादिः । तयोः संनिकर्षः संयोगादिः तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ तद्विभजते—'तद्विविधमिति । निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह—निष्ठकारकमिति । विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्त । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादप्दीति ज्ञानवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थापसङ्गात्मिर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः ॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति—सप्रकारकमिति । नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । सविकल्पकमुदाहरति—यथेति ॥

न्या. बो.—षड्बृंधेन्द्रियभूतप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य लक्षणमाह—तत्रेति । प्रमाभूतेषु प्रत्यक्षात्मकं यज्ञानं चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षं तत्प्रति करणं व्यापाखवदसाधारणमिन्द्रियं भवति । अतः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणम् । आद्यसंनिकर्षतिरिक्तचतुर्विधसंनिकर्षणां समवायघटितत्वेनेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाभावाद्यापारत्वं न संभवतीतीन्द्रियमनःसंयोगस्यैव षड्बृंधप्रत्यक्षे जननीय इन्द्रियव्यापारता बोध्या । मानसप्रत्यक्षे त्वात्ममनःसंयोगस्यैव सा बोध्या ॥ प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणमुक्त्वा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणमाह । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेति । आदौ लक्षणं जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वाभिप्रायेण । ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षसाधारणं लक्षणं तु ज्ञानाकरणकम् । ज्ञानाकरणकमिति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणं । ज्ञानं व्यासिज्ञानं सावद्यज्ञानं पदज्ञानं च तदेव करणं येषां तानि ज्ञानकरणकानि अनुमित्युपमितिशब्दानि तद्विज्ञत्वमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियाणामेव करणत्वात् ज्ञानस्य करणत्वम्<sup>३</sup> । इदं लक्षणमीश्वरप्रत्यक्षसाधारणमीश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्याजन्यत्वात् । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वा-

1 A G J Y Z omit this sentence.

2 S U and W read बाद्य for षड्बृंध.

3 C K R V omit this sentence, and perhaps it is spurious. C here adds विशेष्यमात्रोक्तौ स्मृतात्वतिव्याप्तिर्विशेषणमात्रोक्तौ तद्वृत्तिव्याप्तिर्विशेषसं प्रति स्वप्रतियोगि-

नः कारणत्वादत उभयोरुपादानम्.  
V is nearly to the same effect.

4 The reading of U and W is adopted as being more intelligible. Other copies transpose the sentences. U adds क्षेपकं लक्षणमिदं very appropriately. See Note loc. cit.

भिप्रायेणोत्तरमाह—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेति । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्य-  
त्वाभिप्रायेणदं लक्षणम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षं विभजते—निर्विकल्पकमिति ।  
तलक्षयति—निष्ठकारकमिति । प्रकारताशून्यज्ञानत्वमेव निर्विकल्प-  
कत्वमित्यर्थः । निर्विकल्पके चतुर्थी विषयता स्वीकियते । न तु  
त्रिविधविषयतामध्ये कापि तत्रास्ति । अतो विशेषणताशून्यत्वमिव वि-  
शेष्यताशून्यत्वं संनिकर्षताशून्यत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं संभवति ॥ सविकल्पकं  
लक्षयति—सप्रकारकमिति । विषयताया ज्ञाननिरूपितत्वात् ज्ञानस्य  
विषयतानिरूपकत्वेन प्रकारतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं सविकल्पकस्य लक्षणम् ।  
एवं विशेष्यतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं संनिकर्षतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं  
संभवति । उदाहरणं यथेति । इदंत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपिताडित्थत्वप्र-  
कारताशालिज्ञानं ब्राह्मणत्वप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं च सविकल्पकमित्यर्थः ॥

[ ४३ ]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः पद्मिधः । संयोगः संयुक्तस-  
मवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायो विशेष-  
णविशेष्यभावश्चेति । चक्षुषा <sup>१</sup>घटप्रत्यक्षज्ञने संयोगः संनिकर्षः ।  
घटरूपप्रत्यक्षज्ञने संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रू-  
पस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः  
संनिकर्षः चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् ।  
श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः संनिकर्षः कर्णविवरवृत्त्याका-  
शस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवा-  
यात् । शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः संनिकर्षः श्रोत्रसमवेते  
शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः  
संनिकर्षो घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य

<sup>1</sup> A B join the words in a com-  
pound; J reads विशेषणता च for  
विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च.  
K inserts ज्ञान after प्रत्यक्ष un-

necessarily.  
<sup>3</sup> K G read प्रत्यक्षे for प्रत्यक्षज्ञने,  
and omit संनिकर्षः in the follow-  
ing sentence.

विशेषणत्वात्<sup>१</sup> । एवं संनिकर्षपद्मजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करण-  
मिन्द्रियम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी.—इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षं विभजते—प्रत्यक्षेति । संयोगसंनिक-  
र्षमुदाहरति—चक्षुषेति । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः संनिकर्ष इत्यर्थः ।  
आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमु-  
त्पन्नते । संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति—घटरूपेति । तत्र युक्तिमाह—चक्षुः-  
संयुक्त इति । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायमुदाहरति—रूपत्वेति । समवाय-  
मुदाहरति—श्रोत्रेणेति । तदुपपादयति—कर्णेति । ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य  
कथं श्रोत्रसंबन्धं इति चेत्त वीचितरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा  
शब्दाच्छब्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसंबन्धात्मा-  
त्यक्षत्वसंभवात्<sup>२</sup> । समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति—शब्दत्वेति । विशेषणविशेष-  
ष्यभावमुदाहरति—अभावेति । तदुपपादयति—घटाभाववदिति । भूतले  
घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणा-  
न्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोऽभिविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत । दर्शना-  
भावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोधनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियैवाभा-  
वज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासंभवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थम-  
पेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात्<sup>३</sup> । विशेष-  
णविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तः संबन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञा-

<sup>1</sup> K here adds भूतलस्य विशेष्यत्वा-  
त् । As to the correct reading  
of this passage, see Note loc.  
cit.

<sup>2</sup> J has <sup>०</sup>पञ्चन्.

<sup>3</sup> J omits इन्द्रियं and reads प्रत्यक्षं  
प्रमाणं for प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणं.

<sup>4</sup> CGJLMNY omit शब्दात्,  
and ACFLMPQ omit शब्दस्य,  
but these are retained as helping  
to make the sense clear.  
For श्रोत्रदेशे P reads अन्यदेशे

which gives a somewhat  
different though equally good  
meaning.

<sup>5</sup> A F Q here add भूतलं विशेष्यं  
घटाभावो विशेषणं, which is un-  
warranted and misleading.

<sup>6</sup> N here inserts ननु विशेषणवि-  
शेष्यभावसंनिकर्षस्य लक्षणानाक्रा-  
न्तत्वात्कथं संबन्धत्वमिति चेत्,  
but the passage appears to be  
interpolated.

नमुपसंहरस्तस्य करणमाह—एवमिति । असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षमुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति<sup>१</sup> ॥

न्या. बो.—चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षकारणीभूतान् षड्बुधसनिकर्षान्विभ-  
जते—संयोग इत्यादिना । द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुष-  
त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम्<sup>२</sup> । द्रव्यसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिक-  
विषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवायस्य कारण-  
त्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वाव-  
च्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम्<sup>३</sup> । द्रव्याहकाणी-  
न्द्रियाणि चक्षुस्त्वद्भूमनांसि त्रीण्येव । अन्यानि ग्राणरसनश्रवणानि हुगुण-  
आहकाणि । अतस्त्वगिन्द्रियस्थले द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासंबन्धेन त्वा-  
त्त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति त्वक्संयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । एवं द्रव्यसमवेतत्वाचत्वाव-  
च्छिन्नं प्रति त्वक्संयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतोष्णत्व-  
शीतत्वादिजातिस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे त्वक्संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् ।  
एवमात्मरूपद्रव्यमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवे-  
तसुखादिमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवेत-  
समवेतसुखत्वादिमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् ।  
रसनग्राणयोस्तु रसगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षे हेतुता वाच्या । श्रवणेन्द्रियस्याकाशरूपत्वेन  
योरेव रसगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षे हेतुता वाच्या । श्रवणेन्द्रियेण च समं शब्दस्य समवायः संनि-  
कर्षः । शब्दसमवेतशब्दत्वादिजातिविषयकश्रावणप्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवायस्य  
हेतुता ॥ अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यमावो नाम विशेषणतासंनिकर्षः ॥  
पञ्चसनिकर्षेषु मध्ये संयोगस्थाने संयुक्तपदं घटयित्वा समवायस्थाने सम-  
वेतपदं घटयित्वा अभावस्थले निर्वाणम् । तथाहि द्रव्याधिकरणका-

1 N adds प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणत्वादि-  
त्यर्थः

2 S T V omit this sentence.

3 The whole passage from पञ्च-

विष्ठ to हति संक्षेपः seems to be  
corrupt. The reading of W is  
adopted as being the most  
intelligible.

भावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तविशेषणता । द्रव्यसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त-  
समवेतविशेषणता च । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त-  
समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता च संनिर्कर्षः । तत्र घटे घटत्वाभावः संयुक्त-  
विशेषणतया गृह्णते । घटसमवेतघटत्वादौ पृथिवीत्वाभावः संयुक्तसमवेत-  
विशेषणतया गृह्णते । घटसमवेतसमवेतरूपत्वादौ नीलत्वाभावश्च  
संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणतया गृह्णत इति संक्षेपः ॥ इति प्रत्यक्षपरि-  
च्छेदः समाप्तः ॥

[ ४४ ]

अनुमितिकरणमनुभानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः ।  
व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वहिव्याप्यधूमवा-  
नयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः<sup>1</sup> । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वहिमानेति ज्ञान-  
मनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः ।  
व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥

त. दी.—अनुभानं लक्षयति—अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनुमि-  
तेलक्षणमाह—परामर्शेति । ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः स्थाणुपु-  
रुषसंशयानन्तरं पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति पुरुष ए-  
वेति प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम् । “पुरुषं साक्षात्क-  
रोमि” इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेत्त । पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य  
विवक्षितत्वात् । सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता । साध्यसि-  
द्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका । सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिन्यामितीच्छायामनुमितिद-  
र्शनात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दा-  
हकारणत्ववत् सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारण-  
त्वम् ॥ परामर्शे लक्षयति—व्याप्तीति । व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं

<sup>1</sup> E and X omit ज्ञानं परामर्शः | omits अयम्.  
and perhaps for the better; G |

स परामर्शं इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति—यथेति । अनुमितिम्-  
भिनयति—तज्जन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्तिरक्षणमाह—यत्रे-  
ति । यत्र धूमस्तत्राभिरिति व्याप्तेभिनयः । साहचर्यनियम इति लक्षणम् ।  
साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरणं तस्य नियमः । हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ता-  
भावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यसामानाधिकरणं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । पक्षधर्मतास्वरूप-  
माह—'व्याप्त्यस्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—अनुमानं लक्षयति—अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनु-  
मितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणं परामर्शो व्यापारोऽनुमितिः फलं कार्यमित्यर्थः ।  
परामर्शस्य व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यानुमितिजनकत्वाच्च  
तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वरूपव्यापारलक्षणमुपपन्नम् । अनुमिति-  
करणत्वमनुमानस्य लक्षणम् । अनुमानं च व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । एतस्य परा-  
मर्शरूपव्यापारद्वारानुमितिं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणतयानुमितिकरणत्वमुप-  
पन्नम् । परामर्शजन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यत्वविशेषज्ञानत्वमनुमि-  
तेलक्षणम् । तत्र ज्ञानत्वमात्रोपादाने प्रत्यक्षादावतिव्याप्तिरत्स्तद्वारणाय  
परामर्शजन्यत्वे सर्ताति विशेषणोपादानम् । विशेषणमात्रोक्तौ परामर्श-  
ध्वंसेतिव्याप्तिरत्स्तद्वारणाय ज्ञानत्वोपादानम् । अनुमितिलक्षणघटकी-  
भूतपरामर्शलक्षणमाचेष्टे<sup>१</sup>—व्याप्तिविशेषेति । व्याप्तिविशेषं च तत्पक्ष-  
धर्मताज्ञानं चेति कर्मधारयः । अत्र विशेषपदस्य प्रकारतापरत्वात् पक्षधर्म-  
ताया ज्ञानमित्यत षष्ठ्या विषयत्वबोधनात् पक्षधर्मतापदस्य पक्षसंबन्धा-  
र्थकत्वात्कर्मधारयसमासे समस्यमानपदार्थयोरभेदसंसर्गलभेन च व्या-  
प्तिप्रकारकभिन्नं यत्पक्षसंबन्धविषयकं ज्ञानं तत्परामर्शं इति लभ्यते ।

1 Here adds व्याप्तो नाम व्या-  
प्त्याश्रयः स च धूमादिरेव तस्य पर्व-  
तादिनिस्पृष्टवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मतेत्य-  
र्थः, but the wording of the  
sentence as well as its absence  
in any other copy prove its

spuriousness.

2 C K R Y omit the sentence  
अनुमिति—माचेष्टे; and give the  
full definition of परामर्श in-  
stead of the following प्रतीक.

एवं सति धूमो वहिव्याप्य आलोकवान्पर्वत इति समूहालम्बनेऽप्युक्तप-  
रामर्शलक्षणमस्तीत्यतिव्याप्तिः । तद्वारणाय पक्षनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितहे-  
तुनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितव्यासिनिष्ठप्रकारताशालिङ्गानं परामर्श इति  
निष्कर्षः । एतादृशपरामर्शजन्त्वे सति ज्ञानत्वमनुभितेर्लक्षणम् ।  
अनुभितिपरामर्शयोविशेष्य कार्यकारणभावश्चेत्थम् । वहित्वावच्छिन्न-  
संयोगसंबन्धावच्छिन्नविधेयतानिरूपित- पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यताशाल्यनु-  
भितित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति वहित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-व्यासित्वाव-  
च्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-धूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-पर्वतत्वावच्छि-  
न्नविशेष्यतानिरूपित-विशेष्यिताशालिनिर्णयः<sup>1</sup> कारणम् । वहित्वावच्छि-  
न्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-व्यासित्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताया धूमत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्य-  
तानिरूपित-व्यासित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतायाश्च अभेदानज्ञाकर्तृमते वहित्वा-  
वच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित- विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नधूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारता-  
निरूपित-विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नधूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-पर्वतत्वाव-  
च्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितविशेष्यिताशालिनिर्णयः कारणमिति वाच्यम् ।  
स च निर्णयो वहिव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वत इत्याकारको बोध्यः ॥

यत्रेति । यत्रपदवीप्सावशात् धूमाधिकरणे यावति वहिमत्वलाभात्  
यावत्पदमहिम्ना वहेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं लब्धम् । तदेव स्पष्टयति-साहचर्यनि-  
यम इति । नियतसाहचर्यं व्यासिरित्यर्थः । नियतत्वं व्यापकत्वं । <sup>2</sup>साहचर्यं  
सामानाधिकरण्यम् । तथा च धूमव्यापकवहिसामानाधिकरण्यं व्यासिरि-  
त्यर्थः । वहेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं च धूमसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानव-  
च्छेदकर्धमेवत्त्वम् । तथाहि धूमाधिकरणे चत्वरमहानसादौ वर्तमानोऽभावो  
घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः । न तु वहित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-  
काभावः । कुतः । चत्वरमहानसादौ वहे: सत्त्वात् । एवं सति धूमाधिक-  
रणे पर्वतचत्वरादौ वर्तमानस्य घटाद्यभावस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं

1 The passage, which follows, seems to have been much tampered with. C K R V generally agree among themselves, though they materially differ

from the above.

2 The passage is taken from S and W, but is not found in other copies.

घटत्वादिकेमनवच्छेदकं वहित्वं वहौ वर्तते<sup>१</sup> तो धूमव्यापकत्वं वहौ 'वर्तते । इयमन्वयव्यासिः सिद्धान्तानुसारेण । पूर्वपक्षव्यासिस्तु प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरण—साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् । साध्यतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न—साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताक-- प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न-- प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नवैव्यधिकरणयावच्छिन्नाभाववदन्निरुपितहेतुतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्न—वृत्तित्वावच्छिन्न—प्रतियोगिताकाभावो व्यासिरित्यर्थः । तच्च केवलान्वयिन्यव्यासमिति सिद्धान्तानुसरणम् ॥

[ ४५ ]

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च । तत्र स्वार्थं स्वानुभितिहेतुः<sup>२</sup> । तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्यासिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्रते चायौ संदिहानः<sup>३</sup> पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्यासिं सरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनन्तरं वहिव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वते इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शं इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वहिमानिति ज्ञानमनुभितिरुत्पद्यते<sup>४</sup> । तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुक्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम्<sup>५</sup> । यथा पर्वतो वहिमान्धूमवस्थात् । यो यो धूमवान्स वहिमान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादितालिङ्गात्परोप्यग्नि प्रतिपद्यते ॥

1 S W here add तथा च धूमव्यापकवहिमानव्यधिकरणं व्यासिरिति फलितम्.

2 D adds परार्थं परप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः.

3 A B C D F H have गत्वा for गतः probably substituted to avoid repetition of गत. For तद्रते H has तत आइन्यने, a further emendation not war-

anted by the context.

4 C reads अनुभितिरुपन् for अनुभितिः; X omits it.

5 A B C D read परं प्रति बोधयितुं which makes the construction awkward; J reads प्रतीति for प्रतिपत्ति, and C प्रयुज्यते for प्रयुक्ते; G has पञ्चावयवोपेतं for पञ्चावयवं.

त. दी.—अनुमानं विभजते—अनुमानमिति<sup>१</sup>। स्वार्थानुमितिं दर्शयति—स्वयमेवेति । भूयोदर्शनेनेति । धूमाग्न्योव्यासिग्रहे साध्यसाधनयोर्भूयः<sup>२</sup> सहचारदर्शनेनेत्यर्थः । ननु पार्थिवत्वलोहलेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयोदर्शनेन<sup>३</sup> कथं व्यासिग्रह इति चेत्त व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्यासिग्राहकत्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानं द्विविधम् निश्चयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः कच्चित्कार्त्कचित्स्वतः सिद्ध एव । धूमाग्निव्यासिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावभङ्गप्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तकों व्यभिचारशङ्कनिवर्तकः ॥ ननु सकलवहिधूमयोरसंनिकर्षात्कथं व्यासिग्रह इति चेत्त । धूमत्ववहित्वरूपसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासन्त्य सकलधूमवहिज्ञानसंभवात् ॥ तस्मादिति । लिङ्गपरमशीर्दित्यर्थः । परार्थानुमानमाह—यन्त्विति ॥ यच्छब्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनान्वयः ॥ पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति—यथेति ॥

न्या. यो.—अनुमानं विभजते—स्वार्थमिति । स्वार्थानुमानं नाम न्यायाप्रयोज्यानुमानम् । तत्प्रयोज्यानुमानं परार्थानुमानम् ॥ न्यायत्वं च प्रतिज्ञाद्यवयवपञ्चकसमुदायत्वम् । अवयवत्वं च प्रतिज्ञाद्यन्यतमत्वम् ॥

## [ ४६ ]

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतो वहिमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान्स सोऽग्निमान्यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम्<sup>४</sup> । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मान्तथेति निगमनम् ॥

1 J Y omit this sentence. A adds स्वार्थानुमानं विविच्य दर्शयति—तथाहीति which is superfluous. F and Q here add तद्वैविध्यं दर्शयति—स्वार्थमिति । तत्रैति । उभयोर्मध्य इत्यर्थः ।

2 The passage is taken from N. A omits the whole of it, while other copies retain भूयोदर्शनेनाति, omitting the latter part, which, however, appears to be

necessary to complete the explanation.

3 M N omit वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेः; while J Y Z omit वज्रादौ only; L reads वज्रमणी, P हरिकं, and Q मण्यादौ.

4 The reading is that of D H K; J gives the same minus one सः and with महानसः. C E omit यथा महानसः, while A B F retain only the first three words.

त. दी.—अवयवस्वरूपमाह—प्रतिज्ञेति । उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञा-  
दिविभागमाह<sup>१</sup>—पर्वतो वह्निमानिति । साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ॥  
पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्यासिप्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम् ।  
पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः । अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम्<sup>२</sup> ॥

[ ४७ ]

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमितयोर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणम्<sup>३</sup> । त-  
सालिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् ॥

त. दी.—अनुमितिकरणमाह—स्वार्थेति ॥ ननु व्यासिस्मृतिपक्ष-

1 A G L P Y Z have विशेष for  
विभाग.

2 The passage from पञ्चम्यन्तं to the end appears to have been tampered with. All copies except G N and Z agree in reading it as above. N and Z give a materially different version:—पञ्चम्यन्तं तृतीयान्तं वा लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्यासि-  
प्रतिपादकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । व्यासिविशिष्टलिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वच-  
नमुपनयः । हेतुसाध्यवत्तया पक्षप्र-  
तिपादकं वचनं निगमनम् । पक्षज्ञानं  
प्रतिज्ञाप्रयोजनम् । लिङ्गज्ञानं हेतु-  
प्रयोजनम् । व्यासिज्ञानमुदाहरण-  
प्रयोजनम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमुपनय-  
प्रयोजनम् । अबाधितत्वादिकं निग-  
मनप्रयोजनम् । G and Q agree  
with this from व्यासिविशिष्ट<sup>४</sup> to  
the end. The repetitions and fuller explanation in this  
passage show that it is an interpolation. Nil. does not  
seem to be aware of it, especially its latter half begin-

ning with पक्षज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाप्रयो-  
जनम्. Having explained the  
definitions as read by N. Nil.  
notices the reading adopted  
in our text as a c. l. and  
remarks पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनय  
इति पाठे तु 'प्रयुज्यते' इति शेष-  
पूरणेन प्रदर्शितार्थं एव यथाकथ-  
चित् संगमनीयः । This shows  
that even Nil. found the text  
corrupt and was not satisfied  
with the reading usually met  
with. It is possible that some  
later writer corrected the  
loose definitions of उपनय and  
निगमन given by Annambhatta  
and the latter being retained,  
three more प्रयोजनघटित sen-  
tences were added to complete  
the list.

3 Curiously enough all copies  
except G K X read कारणं which  
is clearly a mistake. In J the  
vertical bar appears to have  
been erased afterwards.

धर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसंभवे व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः<sup>1</sup> किमर्थमङ्गी-  
कर्तव्य इति चेत्त । वहिव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्टप-  
रामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न कर-  
णम् । अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् । व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते परामर्श-  
द्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं<sup>2</sup> करणम् । तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः ॥  
अनुमानसुपसंहरति—तस्मादिति ॥

[ ४८ ]

लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्य-  
तिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च<sup>3</sup> व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि ।  
यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवच्चम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इ-  
त्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वहिर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा म-  
हावद् इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । ‘अन्वयमातव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि  
यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयो-  
र्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच् । व्यतिरेक-  
मातव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्ध-  
वच्चात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् । यथा जलम् । न  
चेयं तथा । तस्माच्च तथेति । ‘यद्गन्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्व-  
यदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥

त. दी.—लिङ्गं विभजते—लिङ्गमिति ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लक्ष-  
यति—अन्वयेनेति । हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । तदभावयोर्व्याप्ति-  
र्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह—अन्वयेति । केवलान्व-

1 A F and Q omit the words व्याप्तिलिङ्गं and विशिष्टं before परामर्शः.

2 After व्याप्तिज्ञानं A and F add पक्षज्ञानं साध्यज्ञानं लिङ्गज्ञानं य-  
त्क्रियज्ञन्यज्ञानमात्रं वा परामर्श-  
व्यापारकम्.

3 For व्याप्तिमत् C reads यत्र

व्याप्तिस्तत्.

4 O here adds यत्सर्वे तत्सर्वमन्व-  
यः । यदभावे तदभावे व्यतिरेकः;  
but the words are found no-  
where else.

5 C G H read ऋभ्यः; F has इतर-  
भेदवत्.

यिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतिशोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । केवलान्वयिनमुदाहरते यथा घटोभेदेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति । ईश्वरप्रमाविषयत्वं सर्वपदाभेदेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणी लक्षणमाह—व्यतिरेकेति<sup>१</sup> । केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदाहरते—पृथिवीति । नान्वतरमेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आद्य यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र हेतुसत्त्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽसाधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः । विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात् । <sup>२</sup>प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद्यतिरेकव्यासिज्ञानमपि न स्यादेति चेत् । जलादित्रयोदशान्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथेव्यां साध्यते । तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छब्देदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये । प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्धया साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिव्यतिरेकव्यासिनिरूपणं चेति<sup>३</sup> ॥

न्या, चो—अन्वयेनेति । साध्यसामानाधिकरणरूपान्वयव्यासिमानित्यर्थः । व्यतिरेकेणेति । व्यतिरेको नामाभावः । तथा च साध्याभावहेत्वभावयोर्व्यासिव्यतिरेकव्यासिः । इयं च व्यासिः यत्र यत्र वह्यभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभाव इति । यत्रपदवीप्सया वह्यभावतियावति धूमाभावग्रहणे यावत्पदस्य व्यापकत्वपरतया धूमाभावे वह्य-

1 A J Y Z omit this sentence. G replaces this and the next sentence by a single one व्यतिरेकदर्शयति—व्यतिरेकमात्रेति

2 M inserts अभावज्ञानाभावेन after प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावात्.

3 The concluding passage of T D beginning with तत्र is undoubtedly corrupt, and is absolutely unintelligible as it is read in most of the printed editions and MSS. Only N and J seem to give an appro-

ximately correct and intelligible reading. I have substituted मेद् for साध्य and changed प्रत्येकाधिकरण<sup>१</sup> into <sup>२</sup>करण on the single authority of N, because the emendations make the meaning clearer. J F and Q alone make नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये part of the previous sentence as it certainly ought to be. F and Q insert साध्याभावव्यापकीकृताभावप्रतियोगित्वमिति before व्यतिरेक<sup>३</sup>. See Note loc. cit.

भावव्यापकत्वं लब्धम् । एवं च वहयभावनिष्ठा व्यासिः स्वाश्रयीभूतव-  
हयभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वसंबन्धेन धूमनिष्ठतया गृह्णत इति  
व्यतिरेकव्यासिमत्त्वेन व्यतिरेकित्वेन धूमव्यापकवहिसामानाधिकरण्य-  
रूपान्वयव्यासिमत्त्वेनान्वयित्वेन च गयिते<sup>1</sup> । व्यतिरेकपरामर्शस्तु वहय-  
भावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिधूमवान् पर्वत इत्याकारकः ॥

केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह—अन्वयेति । व्यतिरेकव्यासिशून्यत्वे  
सत्यन्वयव्यासिमत्त्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । साध्ये केवलान्वयित्वमभावाप्रति-  
योगित्वम् । तथा चाभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकत्वं केवलान्वयिहेतोर्लक्षणम्<sup>2</sup> ।  
एतलक्षणं हेतोर्व्यतिरेकित्वेऽपि संगच्छते । साध्यस्य केवलान्वयित्वाद्य-  
तिरेकव्यासेरभावादन्वयमात्रव्यासिकं केवलान्वयीति मूलोक्तलक्षणमुप-  
पन्नम् । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । न चैवमाकाशा-  
भावे संयोगाभावे चाव्यासिरिति वाच्यम् । स्वविरोधिवृत्तिमदत्यन्ता-  
भावाप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् । एकजातीयसंबन्धेन सर्वत्र विद्यमा-  
नत्वं केवलान्वयित्वमिति नव्याः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह—  
व्यतिरेकेति ॥ अन्वयव्यासिशून्यत्वे सति व्यतिरेकव्यासिमत्त्वं केवल-  
व्यतिरेकित्वम् । यथेति । अत्र पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्नं पक्षः । पृथिवीतर-  
जलादिभेदः साध्यः । गन्धवत्त्वं हेतुः । अत्र यद्दन्धवत्तदितरभेदवदित्य-  
न्वयहृष्टान्ताभावात् गन्धव्यापकेतरभेदसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्यासि-  
श्राहासम्भवात् नास्त्यन्वयव्यासिः ॥ किं तु यत्र यत्र पृथिवीतरभेदाभावस्त्र  
तत्र गन्धाभावो यथा जलादिकमिति व्यतिरेकहृष्टान्तभूतजलादावितरभे-  
दाभावरूपसाध्याभावव्यापकता गन्धाभावे दृश्यते । इममेवार्थं मनसि निधाय  
यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्दन्धवद्यथा जलमिति ग्रन्थेन मूलकारो  
व्यतिरेकव्यासिमेव प्रदर्शितवान् । एवं व्यतिरेकव्यासिश्राहानन्तरम् इतरभेदा-  
भावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिगन्धवती पृथिवी इत्याकारकव्यतिरेकपराम-

1 S and W read the passage a little differently.

2 Instead of this sentence S and W have अथवा केवलान्वयिसा-

ध्यकत्वं तत् ।

3 W reads तथा च तयोः एकजाती-  
यसंबन्धेन सर्वत्र विद्यमानन्वाका-  
व्यासिः ।

र्शत् पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरुपितेरभेदत्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताका  
पृथिवी इतरभेदवती इत्याकारकानुमितिर्जीयत इति तत्त्वम् । 'यथा जल-  
मिति । जलमितरभेदाभावव्यापकगन्धाभाववदिति । न चेयं तथेति । इतर-  
भेदाभावव्यापकीभूतगन्धाभाववती न किंतु तदभावाभाववत्त्वाद्वन्धवती-  
त्यर्थः । तस्मान्न तथेति । तच्छब्देन गन्धाभावाभावरूपस्य गन्धस्य परा-  
मर्शेन तस्मादिति पञ्चम्यन्ताद्वन्धवत्त्वादित्यर्थोपलब्धेस्तथेतरभेदाभावव-  
तीत्यस्यायं भावः । तथा चेतरभेदाभावाभाववतीतरभेदवतीत्यर्थः ॥

[ ४९ ]

संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः । यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥

त. दी.—पक्षलक्षणमाह—संदिग्धेति । ननु श्रवणानन्तरभावि-  
मननस्थलेऽव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन संदेहाभावार्लिं-  
च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वहौ यत्वेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्याप्तिरिति चेत्त । उक्तपक्ष-  
ताश्रयत्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ॥

न्या. बो.—पक्षलक्षणमाह—संदिग्धसाध्येति<sup>1</sup> । साध्यप्रकारक-  
संदेहविशेष्यत्वं पक्षत्वम् । संदेहश्च पर्वतो बहिमान्न वा इत्याकारकः । अनु-  
मितेः पूर्वं साध्यसंदेहो नियमेन पक्षे जायत इत्यभिप्रायेणदं लक्षणं प्राची-  
नैः कृतम् । गगनविशेष्यकमेघप्रकारकसंदेहाभावदशायामपि शृहमध्यस्थ-  
पुरुषस्य घनगर्जितश्रवणेन गगनं मेघवदित्याकारकानुमितिर्जीयते । गग-  
नत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरुपितेमेघवत्त्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताकानुमितिदर्शना—  
त्वाचीनमतं विहाय नवीनेरनुमित्युद्देश्यत्वं पक्षत्वमिति स्थिरीकृतम् ॥

[ ५० ]

निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः ॥

त. दी.—सपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति ॥

1 The following passage seems  
to be corrupt. The reading of  
C K is adopted. S U and W

give a materially different  
reading.

न्या, वो.—सपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितसाध्येति । साध्यप्रकारक-  
निश्चयविशेष्यत्वं सपक्षत्वम् । निश्चयश्च महानसो वहिमानित्याकारकः ॥

[ ५१ ]

निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाददः ॥

त. दी.—विपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति ।

न्या, वो.—विपक्षलक्षणमाह—निश्चितेति । साध्याभावप्रकारक-  
निश्चयविशेष्यत्वं विपक्षत्वम् । निश्चयश्च हृदो वह्यभाववानित्याकारकः ॥

[ ५२ ]

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धिवाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः ॥

त. दी.—एवं सद्बेतुं निरूप्यासद्बेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते—सव्य-  
भिचारेति । अनुभितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् ।

न्या, वो.—एवं सद्बेतुचिरूप्य हेत्वाभासानिरूपयति—सव्यभि-  
चारेति । हेतुवदाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासाः दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः । दोषाश्च  
व्यभिचारविरोधप्रतिपक्षासिद्धिवाधाः । तद्विशिष्टा दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः ।  
हेतौ दोषज्ञाने सत्यनुभितिप्रतिबन्धो जायते व्यासिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धो वा  
जायते । अतो वादिनिग्रहार्थ वादिनोद्घावितहेतौ दोषोद्घावनार्थ दुष्टहेतु-  
निरूपणभिति भावः ॥

[ ५३ ]

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः । साधारणासाधा-  
णानुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैका-  
न्तिकः । यथा पर्वतो वहिमान्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्यभाव-  
वति हृदे विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः ।

1 C F K Q and V omit the sentence. | 2 G J omit "विपक्ष"; Q inserts "पक्षमात्रत्तिः before असाधारणः".

यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्ये-  
भ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्तिं । अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्त-  
रहितोऽनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत शर्व-  
स्यापि पक्षत्वादृष्टान्तो नास्ति ॥

त. दी.—सब्यभिचारं विभजते—स त्रिविध इति । साधारणं  
लक्षयति—तत्रेति । उदाहरति—यथेति । असाधारणं लक्षयति—स-  
र्वेति । अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह—अन्वयेति ॥

न्या. बो.—सब्यभिचारं विभज्य दर्शयति—साधारणेति । सा-  
धारणाद्यन्यतमत्वं सब्यभिचारसामान्यलक्षणम् । साधारणत्वं साध्याभाव-  
वद्वृत्तित्वम्<sup>१</sup> । पर्वतो वहिमानप्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र प्रमेयत्वेहतौ वह्यभाववद्वृत्ति-  
त्वरूपब्यभिचारे ज्ञाते वह्यभाववद्वृत्तित्वरूपव्यासिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।  
असाधारण इति । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वं साध्यवद्वृत्तित्वावच्छिन्न-  
प्रतियोगिताकाभावः<sup>२</sup> । हेतौ साध्यासामानाधिकरण्ये निश्चिते साध्यसामाना-  
धिकरण्यरूपव्यासिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ अनुपसंहारिणं लक्षयति—  
अन्वयेति । उभयदृष्टान्ताभावादन्वयव्यासिज्ञानव्यतिरेकव्यासिज्ञानोभय-  
सामग्री नास्तीत्यर्थः । सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात् पक्षातिरिक्तप्रसिद्धे-  
रितिभावः ॥

[ ५४ ]

साध्याभावव्यासो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतक-  
त्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥

त. दी.—विरुद्धं लक्षयति—साध्येति ॥

१ G J omit अनित्येभ्यश्च.

२ The passage from सब्यभिचारं  
विभज्य to वृत्तित्वम् is not  
found in C K R V.

३ The sentence is omitted in C  
K R and V; U has निश्चित-  
साध्यवद्वृत्तित्वम्.

न्या. वो.—विरुद्धं लक्षयति—साध्याभावव्याप्तिः इति । साध्याभावव्याप्तिः साध्याभावनिरूपितव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः साध्यव्याप्तिः भूताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । तथा च पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्याभावव्याप्तिः हेतुप्रकारकज्ञानात्पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्यप्रकारकानुभितिप्रतिवन्धः फलम् ॥

[ ५५ ]

'यस्य साध्यभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति । शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्वटवदिति ॥

त. दी.—सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति—यस्येति ॥

न्या. वो.—एवं सत्प्रतिपक्षेऽपि । विरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्विशेषस्तु विरुद्धे हेतोरेकत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षे हेतोद्वित्वेन च ज्ञातव्यः । सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति—यस्येति । साध्याभावसाधको हेतुः साध्यसाधकत्वेनोपन्यस्त इत्यसामर्थ्यसूचनमपि भवति ॥

[ ५६ ]

असिद्धत्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्त्यत्वासिद्धेति । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो 'गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् । सोपाधिकोऽव्याप्त्यत्वासिद्धः । साध्यव्याप्तकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकं उपाधिः । साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनविनिष्ठा-

1 A B place यस्य after हेत्वन्तरं; B omits विद्यते; G has विद्यते यस्य.

2 Q has आनित्यः for गुणः, and adds रूपवत्.

3 A B C D F and Q insert हेतुः after सोपाधिकः.

4 C H Q U and W have व्यापकत्वसुपाधिः, while E reads 'व्यापकत्वमुपाधित्वम्.

ष्ट्रात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूम-  
वान्वहिमत्त्वादित्यत्राद्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि<sup>१</sup> । यत्र धूमस्त-  
त्राद्रेन्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वहिस्तत्राद्रेन्धनसं-  
योगो नास्त्ययोगोलक आद्रेन्धनसंयोगभावादिति साधनाव्याप-  
कता<sup>२</sup> । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वाद्रेन्धन-  
संयोग उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वाद्वहिमत्त्वं व्याप्त्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥

त. दो.—असिद्धं विभजते—असिद्ध इति ॥ आश्रयासिद्धमुदा-  
हरति—गगनेति ॥ स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति—शब्देति ॥ व्याप्त्यत्वा-  
सिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह—सोपाधिक इति । उपाधिलक्षणमाह—सा-  
ध्येति । उपाधिश्चतुर्वेदः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्य-  
व्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक-  
श्चेति । आद्य आद्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा—वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्य-  
र्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्वयत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम्<sup>३</sup> ।  
तृतीयो यथा—प्रध्वंसो<sup>४</sup> विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानि-  
त्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा—प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र  
जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् ॥

न्या. चो.—आश्रयासिद्ध इति । आश्रयासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षताव-  
वच्छेदकविशिष्टपक्षाप्रसिद्धिः । यथा गगनीयत्वविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धेः सौर-

1 Some copies omit तथाहि.

2 C H K X and W omit इति  
साधनाव्यापकता.

3 For प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् C J L  
M Y Z read प्रमेयत्वात् which is  
perhaps better.

4 G here adds स इयमो मैतीतन-  
यत्वादित्यत्र मैतीतनयत्वावच्छिन्न-

द्यापत्वस्य व्यापकः शाकाद्याहार-  
परिणामिमेदः । प्रकारान्तरेण तृतीयो  
यथा; but this is undoubtedly  
interpolated.

5 J N M Q and Y read प्रागभाव  
for प्रध्वंस and are supported  
by the high authority of Nil.  
See Note loc. cit.

भ्यानुमितिर्ण सम्भवति' । स्वरूपासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षे हेत्वभावः । तथा च हेत्व-  
भावविशिष्टपक्षज्ञानात्पक्षविशेष्यकहेतुप्रकारकपरामशानुत्पत्त्या परामर्श-  
प्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध इति । प्रकृते धूमव्यापकत्वमाद्रेन्धन-  
न्धनसंयोगे गृहीतं चेद्वृम आदेन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यत्वं गृहीतम् । एवं  
वहयव्यापकत्वमाद्रेन्धनसंयोगे गृहीतं चेद्वृहो तदव्याप्यत्वं गृह्यते तदेव  
व्यभिचारित्वम् । तथा चोपाधिव्यभिचारित्वं साधने गृहीतं चेदुपाधिभू-  
तादेन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यधूमव्यभिचारित्वं गृहीतमेव । अनुमानप्रकारश्च  
पूर्वानुमानहेतुं पक्षीकृत्य वहिर्धूमव्यभिचारी धूमव्यापकादेन्धनसंयोग-  
व्यभिचारित्वाद्वित्वादिवद्यो यत्साध्यव्यापकव्यभिचारी स सर्वोऽपि  
साध्यव्यभिचारी । एवं प्रकारेण प्रकृतानुमानहेतुमूलपक्षे साध्यव्यभिचा-  
रोत्थापकतया दूषकत्वमुपाधेः फलम् । तथा च धूमभाववद्वृचित्वरूपधू-  
मव्यभिचारे गृहीते वहो धूमभाववद्वृचित्वरूपव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।  
न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धेव्यभिचारमेद इति वाच्यम् । धूमभाववद्वृचित्वाभा-  
वभावत्वेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धत्वं धूमभाववद्वृचित्वेन व्यभिचारित्वमिति  
भेदात् ।

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यस्य साध्याभावः ग्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स वाधितः । यथा  
वहिरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं  
स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण<sup>4</sup> गृह्यत इति वाधितत्वम् ॥

त. दी.—वाधितस्य लक्षणमाह—यस्येति । अत्र वाधस्य आद्या-  
भावनिश्चयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रति-

1 U and W read the passage differently.

2 C K R V omit the following two sentences.

3 K reads पदार्थत्वात् for द्रव्यत्वात्.

4 The reading adopted is that of A D E K; G H J read प्रत्यक्षेण

only which amounts to the same. B. has स्पर्शन प्रत्यक्षेण, and C स्पर्शनिन्. S. C. seems to prefer the latter. Possibly both स्पर्शन and स्पर्शन may have been later insertions. See Note loc. cit.

बन्धकत्वम् । इतेरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । ततापि साधारणस्याव्यभिचाराभावतया' विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतया' व्यापकत्वासिद्धस्य 'विशिष्टव्याप्त्यभावतयासाधारणानुपसंहारिणोव्याप्तिसंशयाधायकत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धयोः पक्षधर्मतज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघट(क?)तया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भवतीति प्राच्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः<sup>3</sup> ।

न्या. बो.—यस्येति । यस्य हेतोः साध्याभावः स च प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधित इत्यर्थः । तथा च प्रात्यक्षिकसाध्याभावनिश्चयेन साध्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । बाधितसाध्यकत्वाद्वेतोहेतुरपि बाधित इत्युच्यते ॥ इत्यनुमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

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उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापारः<sup>1</sup> । तथा हि कश्चिद्वयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्वोसद्वशो गवय इति 'श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं सरन्गोसदृशं' पिण्डं पश्यति । तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥

त. दी.—उपमानं लक्षयति—उपमितीति ॥

1 A and Q °भाववत्तया.

2 The reading is that of N and Nil. A C L P omit प्राच्चः leaving इति which then becomes redundant. G J Y Z omit इति प्राच्चः. A inserts न before निग्रह° and M reads निग्रहस्थानान्तरम् both of which are clearly wrong.

3 Q N and W omit this sen-

tence. F omits the rest of the passage.

4 A B D omit कश्चित्; K adds पुरुषः; A B D and Q read वाच्यम् for अर्थम्. N has पदार्थं for शब्दार्थम्.

5 K H add वाक्यं after इति.

6 C adds विशिष्टं after सदृशं; H reads सादृश्यविशिष्टं and A and W सदृशपिण्डं; J omits पिण्डं.

न्या. वो.—उपमानं लक्षयति । उपमितिकरणमिति । उपमिति लक्षयति—संज्ञासंज्ञीति । संज्ञा पदं । संज्ञी पदार्थः । तयोः संबन्धः शक्तिः । तथा च पदपदार्थसंबन्धज्ञानमुपमितिरित्यर्थः । उपमानमतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः । उपमितिः फलम् । गोसद्वशो गवयपदवाच्य इत्याकारकाङ्गोसद्वशत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकगवयपदवाच्यत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं जायते तदेव करणम् ॥ इत्युपमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

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आपवाक्यं शब्दः । आपस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा 'गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् । असात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतः' शक्तिः ॥

त. दी.—शब्दं लक्षयति—आपेति<sup>१</sup> । पदलक्षणमाह—शक्तमिति । अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसंबन्धः शक्तिः । सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः । तच्चिरासार्थमाह—अस्मादिति । डित्थादीनामिव घटादीनामपि संकेत एव शक्तिः न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ गवादिशब्दानां जातावेव शक्तिविशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपादिना इति केचित् । तत्र । गामानयेत्यादौ 'वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वतानयनयनादेव्यक्तावेव संभवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात् । शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण । व्युत्पिलुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानुन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्वमानय गां बधान इति वाक्यान्तर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरधशब्दस्याश्वत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते । ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वाद्यवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेत्र । 'काङ्गयां त्रिमुखनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ

1 W omits this. Q adds शुक्लां दृष्टेन after आनय.

2 A B D and F insert इच्छा after दृष्ट्वा unneccessarily. C more correctly reads इश्वरे-

च्छास्पसंकेतः.  
3 N and Q here add वाक्यं लक्षयति-वाक्येति,  
4 F and Q have वृद्धन्यवहारेण,  
5 A and M read कादयां.

सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात् विकसितपत्रे मधुकर<sup>1</sup> इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्यव-  
हारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पतिर्दर्शनाच्च ॥ लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः ।  
शक्यसंबंधो लक्षणा । गजायां घोष इत्यत्र गजापदवाच्यप्रवाहसंबन्धादेव  
तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते । सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्पर-  
संबन्धाभावानानाशक्तिकल्पनम् ॥ लक्षणा त्रिविधा । जहलक्षणाजहलक्ष-  
णा जहदजहलक्षणा चेति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावस्तत्र जहती यथा  
मञ्चाः कोशन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयस्तत्राजहती यथा छत्रिणो ग-  
च्छन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा  
तत्त्वमसीति<sup>2</sup> । गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसम्बन्धरूपा । अभिर्माणवक  
इति ॥ व्यज्ञनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता । अर्थशक्तिमूला चानुमानादिनान्य-  
थासिद्धा<sup>3</sup> ॥

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणावीजम् । तत्पतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम् ।  
तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः । नानार्थानुरोधात् प्रकरणादिकं  
तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः । नन्वर्थज्ञानार्थ-  
त्वाच्छब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासंभवादर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति  
चेत्र पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शब्दज्ञानहेतुत्वात् । अन्यथा घटः  
कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यत्रापि शब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः । समुदायशक्ती रूढिः<sup>4</sup> ।  
नियतपदत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः ।  
इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसं-  
भवादन्वयाशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीयेति गौतमीयाः ॥

<sup>1</sup> M N F and Q add मधुने पित्रति after मधुकरः but wrongly; J supplies the ellipsis by तिष्ठति more correctly. A reads सिद्ध for प्रसिद्ध incorrectly.

<sup>2</sup> G here adds सोऽयं देवदत्त इति च.

<sup>3</sup> The text of T D is here undoubtedly tampered with. J alone gives the reading adopted, which seems to be the

correct one as it is supported by Nil. A L omit शक्ति before लक्षणान्तर्भूता. A L C P make अर्थशक्तिमूला च part of the previous sentence. F N and Q add शब्दशक्तिमूला before and M पदशक्तिमूला after अर्थशक्तिमूला. Q V Z make the two sentences one. Y Z have भूतत्वात् and भूलत्वात् भूता and मूला respectively.

न्या, बो.—शब्दं लक्षयति—आसेति<sup>१</sup>। पदज्ञानं करणम्। वृत्तिज्ञानसहकृतपदज्ञानजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिव्यापारः। वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दबोधः फलम्। वृत्तिर्नाम शक्तिलक्षणान्यतररूपा। शक्तिर्नाम<sup>२</sup> घटादिविशेष्यकघटादिपदजन्यबोधविषयत्वप्रकारकेश्वरसंकेतः। ईश्वरसंकेतो नामेश्वरेच्छा सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः। शक्तिनिरूपकत्वमेव पदे शक्तत्वम्। विषयतासंबन्धेन शक्त्याश्रयत्वमर्थे शक्यत्वम्। शक्यसंबन्धे लक्षणा। सा द्विविधा। गौणी शुद्धा चेति। गौणी नाम सादृश्यविशिष्टलक्षणा यथा सिंहो माणवक इत्यादौ सिंहपदस्य सिंहसादृश्यविशिष्टे लक्षणा। शुद्धापि द्विधा जहलक्षणाजहलक्षणा चेति<sup>३</sup>। लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यमात्रबोधिका जहलक्षणा यथा गङ्गायां बोध इत्यत गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसम्बन्धस्य तीरे सत्त्वात् ताहशशक्यसम्बन्धरूपलक्षणज्ञानात् गङ्गापदातीरोपस्थितिः। लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यशक्योभयबोधप्रयोजिकाजहलक्षणा। यथा काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यत्र काकपदस्य दध्युपधातके लक्षणा। लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं दध्युपधातकत्वं तेन रूपेण दध्युपधातकानां काकविडालकुकुटसारमेयादीनां शक्यलक्ष्याणां सर्वेषां बोधात्। जहदजहलक्षणा वेदान्तिनां भवते<sup>४</sup>॥

[ ६० ]

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता संनिधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः। पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा। अर्थाद्बोयोग्यता। पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं संनिधिः॥

<sup>1</sup> S T and W insert here six sentences explaining the पदकृत्य of the definition of शब्दः but they are absent in older MSS. U prints them in brackets as an interpolation.

<sup>2</sup> The reading is that of U V and K. K omits शक्तिर्नाम, and T and W omit घटादिविशेष्यक; while C reads simply शक्तिर्नामश्वरेच्छा। सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः.

<sup>3</sup> S T and W read त्रिविधा for द्विविधा and add जहदजहलक्षणा as a third species.

<sup>4</sup> In the place of this short sentence S T and W have शक्यतावच्छेदकपरियागेन व्यक्तिमात्रबोधनाजहदजहलक्षणा। इयं च लक्षणा जीवव्रद्धाणोरैवं वदतां वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्तरात्या,

त. दी.—आकाङ्क्षेति । आकाङ्क्षादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथाकाङ्क्षादिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षां लक्षयति—पदस्येति ॥ योग्यतालक्षणमाह—अर्थेति ॥ संनिधिलक्षणमाह—पदानामिति । अविलम्बेन पदार्थोपस्थितिः संनिधिः । उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितया उक्तम् ॥

न्या. बो.—आकाङ्क्षेति । अव्यवहितोत्तरत्वादिसंबन्धेन यत्पदे यत्पदप्रकारज्ञानव्यतिरेकग्रयुक्तो यादृशशाब्दबोधाभावस्तादृशशाब्दबोधे तत्पदे तत्पदवत्त्वमाकाङ्क्षा<sup>१</sup> । तादृशाकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं शाब्दबोधे कारणम् ॥ अर्थात्ताधइति । बाधाभावो योग्यतेत्यर्थः ॥

[ ६१ ]

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरशः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्रिना सिञ्चेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोचारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सांनिध्याभावात्<sup>२</sup> ॥

त. दी.—गौरश इति । घटः कर्मत्वमित्यनाकाङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बो.—अग्रिना सिञ्चेदिति । अत्र सेककरणत्वस्य जलादिधर्मस्य वहौ बाधनिश्चयसत्त्वान् तादृशवाक्याच्छाब्दबोधः संभवति ॥ सन्निधि निरूपयति—असहोचारितानीति ॥ असहोचारितानि विलन्वेनोचारितानि ॥

[ ६२ ]

वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वासोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥

त. दी.—वाक्यं विमर्जते—वाक्यमिति । वैदिकस्य विशेषमाह—

१ R prefixes यत्पदविशेष्यक to अ-

व्यवहितः ।

२ S U and W here insert a long

explanation of आकांक्षा.

३ C H read संनिध्यभावात्, perhaps better.

वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादिति । ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथमीश्वरोक्तत्वमिति चेत्त । वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वाद्भारतादिवत् । न च स्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्वमुपाधिः । गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरंपरया वेदेऽपि कर्तृस्मरणेन<sup>१</sup> साधनव्यापकत्वात् । “तस्मात्पानात्मयो वेदा अजायन्त” इति श्रुतेश्च ॥

ननु वर्णा नित्याः ‘स एवायं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेत्त उत्पन्नो गकारो नष्टो गकार इति प्रतीत्या वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् ‘सोऽयं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सेऽयं दीपज्ज्वालेति-व॑त्साजात्यालम्बनत्वात् वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यस्यानित्यत्वाच्च । तस्मादीश्वरोक्तो वेदः ॥ मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेदमूलकतया प्रामाण्यम् । स्मृतिमूलवाक्यानामिदानीमिनध्ययनात्मूलभूताकाचिच्छास्वेच्छिच्छेति कल्प्यते । ननु पठ्यमानवेदवाक्योत्सादस्य कल्पयितुमशक्यतया विप्रकीर्णवादस्यायुक्तत्वाचित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेत्त । “तथापि वर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानाभावेन वोधकत्वासंभवात् ॥

न्या. वो.—वैदिकं लौकिकं चेति ॥ वैदिकं वेदवाक्यमित्यर्थः । इदमुपलक्षणम् । वेदमूलकस्मत्यादीन्यपि ग्राहाणि । लौकिकमिति । वेदवाक्यभिज्ञामित्यर्थः<sup>२</sup> । आसत्वं प्रयोगेहतुभूते यथार्थज्ञानवत्त्वम् ॥ इति शब्दपरिच्छेदः ॥

### [ ६३ ]

• वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥

त. दी.—नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्यदकदम्बकत्वात् ‘सद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसंर्भवाच्छब्दो न प्रमाणान्तरमिति चेत्त । अनुमित्यपेक्षया शाब्दज्ञानस्य विलक्षणस्य शब्दात्मत्येमीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसंमतत्वात् ॥

1. N-F and Q here add इत्यनुमानेन पौरुषेयत्वासिद्धेः; Z adds इत्यनु-

मानातः

2. A reads कर्तुः स्मर्यमाणत्वेन; N F and Q have सकर्तुकत्वस्मरणेन.

3. Q inserts तपः before तेपानात्.

4. This is the reading of L and M; C J N P Y Z have the same without सा before जात्याः;

A reads सोऽयं दीप इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानवज्ञात्यालम्बनत्वात्.

5. A and F have तथा सति for तथापि.

6. K R and V omit this sentence, while S and W omit the next.

7. F and Q insert here गामानय इष्टेन इति मद्वाक्यं.

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति 'पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुडक्ते' इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत इति चेत्न । देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुडक्ते दिवाऽभुज्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वादित्यनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात् । शते पञ्चाशदिति संभवोऽप्यनुमानमेव । इह वटे यक्षस्तिष्ठतीत्यैतिद्युमज्ञातमूलवक्तृकः शब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न मानान्तरम् । तस्मात्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाश्वत्वार्थेव प्रमाणानि ॥

सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां तद्विति तत्प्रकारकल्पं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति विचार्यते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतस्त्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परतस्त्वम् ॥ अनुमानग्राहत्वेन सिद्धसाधनतावारणाय यावदिति । 'इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेति' ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यग्रहाद्वाधवारणायप्रामाण्याग्राहकेति । इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्ठप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्रामाण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्पत्तस्त्वं न स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्प्रामाण्याश्रयेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहक इत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले व्यवसायेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तदग्राहकत्वात्पत्तस्त्वसिद्धिः ॥ ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्णते घटमहं जानार्मीत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटघटत्वयोरिति तत्संबन्धस्यापि विषयीकरणात् व्यवसायरूपप्रत्यासत्त्वस्तुल्यत्वात् पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसंबन्धस्त्वैव प्रमात्वपदार्थत्वादिति चेत्न । स्वतःप्रामाण्यग्रहे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेत्यनभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यवसायेन प्रामाण्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । तस्मात्पत्तोग्राहत्वाभावात्पत्तो ग्राहत्वम् । तथा हि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां जललाभे सति पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् यत्वैवं तत्त्वेवम् यथाप्रमा इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते ।

1 A here adds अनुपलव्यिन्य भानम् । परिशेषोपि अनुमाण्येव, but the words seem to be spurious as no other copy contains them. They are also super-

fluous, as अनुपलव्यिन्य has already once been referred to, while it is doubtful whether परिशेष is recognized as an independent proof.

द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्वलिङ्गनान्वयव्यतिरेकि-  
णापि गृह्णते ॥

प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः ।  
अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसंनिकषो  
गुणः अनुभितौ व्यापकवति व्याप्तज्ञानं उपमितौ यथार्थसाहश्यज्ञानं  
शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानम् इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारा-  
भावस्य व्यवसायेनानुपस्थितत्वादप्रमात्म्वं परत एव गृह्णते पितादि-  
दोषजन्यत्वादुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् ॥

ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्ति । न च 'शुक्ता-  
विदं रजतमिति' ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथास्त्वात्प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् ।  
रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृत्तिसंभवात् उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव  
सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेत्त । सत्य-  
रजतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाभवेन प्रवृत्ति-  
जनकतया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव  
कल्पनात् ॥

[ ६४ ]

• अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् । एकस्मि-  
न्धार्थिणि 'विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा  
स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्ताविदं  
रजतमिति । व्याप्त्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः यथा यदि वहि-  
र्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति' ॥

त. दी.—अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते—अयथार्थेति । स्वप्रस्य मानसविप-  
र्ययरूपत्वात् त्रैविध्यविरोधः ॥ संशयलक्षणमाह—एकस्मान्विति । 'घट-  
पटा'विति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । 'घटो द्रव्य'मित्यादाव-

1 The passage is variously worded in different copies.  
The reading in the text is that of A B D F U and S. C.  
C G H Q and W have वैशेष्य-

ज्ञानम्, while B J read °विशिष्ट-  
ज्ञानम्. E differs from all in giving विरुद्धनानाकोटिकं ज्ञानम्.  
2 X has यद्यदं निर्वाह्निः स्यात्तर्हि  
निर्भूमोपि स्यात्.

तिव्यासिवारणाय विरुद्धेति । 'पटत्वविरुद्धघटत्ववानि' त्यत्रातिव्यासिवारणाय नानेति ॥ विपर्ययलक्षणमाह—मिथ्येति । तदभाववति तत्पकारकनिश्चय इत्यर्थः ॥ तर्क लक्ष्यति—व्याप्तेति । यद्यपि तर्को विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्वेदेन कीर्तनम् ॥

न्या. बो.—यथार्थानुभवं निरूप्यायथार्थानुभवं विभजते—  
संशयेत्यादिना । एकेति । एकधर्मीवच्छन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितभावाभावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशय इत्यर्थः । भावद्वयकेटिकसंशयप्रसिद्धेः स्थाणुर्वेत्यत्र स्थाणुत्वस्थाणुत्वाभावपुरुषत्वपुरुषत्वाभावकेटिकः संशय इत्यर्थः<sup>1</sup> । विपर्ययो नाम ऋग इत्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्त्यारोपेणेति । तर्के व्याप्त्यस्य व्यापकस्य च 'व्यतिरेकनिश्चयः कारणम् । अन्यथाबाधनिश्चयाभाव इष्टपत्तिदोषे तर्कानुत्पत्तेः ॥

[ ६५ ]

स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा<sup>2</sup> । यथार्थायथार्थाच । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था ।  
अप्रमाजन्यायथार्था ॥

त. दी.—स्मृतिं विभजते—स्मृतिरिति ॥

[ ६६ ]

सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम्<sup>3</sup> ॥

1 C K V omit <sup>4</sup>this sentence, but as besides S T it is found in R also in a slightly different form, it is retained. The sentence as it stands in both S and R is corrupt and is therefore amended as above. S reads स्थाणुर्वेत्यादेः which is not intelligible, while R inserts एक before last कोटिक quite superfluously.

2 U and W read बाध for व्यतिरेक.

3 E H J K omit द्विविधा and join the two sentences. K adds इति after च.

4 It is impossible to ascertain the true reading of this and the next passage. A B C H J U and Q together with S. C. and V. V. agree in reading अनुकूलवेदनीयं and प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं respectively; while the other variants अनुकूलतया and प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं are found in D E G K, as well as Nil. I have adopted the latter as being grammatically more correct, and being supported by the high authority of Nil.

त. दी.—सुखं लक्षयति—सर्वेषामिति । सुख्यहमित्याद्यनुव्यव-  
सायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथनमिति  
द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. वो.—सुखं निरूपयति—सर्वेषामिति । इतरेच्छाऽनधीनेच्छा-  
विषयत्वमिति निष्कर्षः । यथाश्रुतेऽनुकूलत्वप्रकारकवेदनाविशेष्यत्वस्य  
घटोऽनुकूल इत्याकारकज्ञानदशायामनुकूलत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यत्वस्य घ-  
टादावपि सत्त्वाद्गुटादावतिव्यासिरिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणमुक्तम् । भोजना-  
दावतिव्यासिवारणायेतरेच्छानधीनेच्छाविशेषणम् । सुखेच्छायाः सुख-  
त्वप्रकारकज्ञानमात्रजन्यत्वात् ॥

[ ६७ ]

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥

न्या. वो.—दुःखं निरूपयति—प्रतिकूलेति । अत्रापीतरद्वेषान-  
धीनद्वेषविषयत्वमिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणम् । द्वेषविषयत्वमात्रोक्तौ सर्पदावपि  
द्वेषविषयत्वसत्त्वात्त्रातिव्यासिवारणायेतरद्वेषानधीनेति द्वेषविशेषणम् ।  
सर्पजन्यदुःखादौ द्वेषात्सर्पद्वेष इति सर्पद्वेषस्य सर्पजन्यदुःखद्वेषजन्यत्वा-  
दन्यद्वेषानधीनद्वेषविषयत्वरूपलक्षणस्य सर्पदावसत्त्वात्त्रातिव्यासिः ।  
फलेच्छोपयेच्छां प्रति कारणं । अतः फलेच्छावशादुपायेच्छा भवति । एवं  
फलद्वेषादुपायद्वेषः ॥

[ ६८ ]

इच्छा कामः ॥

[ ६९ ]

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥

[ ७० ]

कृतिः प्रयत्नः ॥

[ ७१ ]

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः ॥

[ ७२ ]

निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वर्धमः ॥

न्या. बो.—धर्माधर्मौ निरूपयति—विहितेति । वेदविहितेत्यर्थः ।  
निषिद्धेति । वेदनिषिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥

[ ७३ ]

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः<sup>१</sup> ॥

[ ७४ ]

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्यात् । नित्या ईश-  
रस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ॥

[ ७५ ]

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकथेति । वेगः  
पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोदृतिः<sup>२</sup> । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुभावनात्म-  
मात्रदृतिः<sup>३</sup> । अन्यथा कृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापादकः स्थितिस्थापकः  
कटादिपृथिवीदृतिः ॥

त. दी.—संस्कारं विभजते—संस्कार इति । संस्कारत्वजातिमा-  
न्संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह—वेग इति । वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां  
लक्ष्यति—अनुभवेति । आत्मादावतिव्यासिवारणायानुभवेति । अ-  
नुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्यासिवारणाय स्मृतीति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवी-  
नैरुत्कम् ॥ स्थितिस्थापकं लक्ष्यति—अन्यथेति ॥ संख्यादयोऽष्टौ नैमि-  
त्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेष-

<sup>1</sup> C and X read आत्मनो विशेषः,  
and K आत्मनि विशेषः; D omits  
विशेष.

<sup>2</sup> G J Q U W X omit द्विविधः  
and join the two sentences.

<sup>3</sup> O K read स्थितस्थापकः.  
4 E J X have वेगात्मः; D G X  
insert मात्र after मनः;

<sup>5</sup> D H J read तादवस्थापादकः; C  
and S. C. have तद्वस्थापकः

गुणः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्रव्यसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति-द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति'-जातिमन्त्रं विशेषगुणत्वम् ॥

न्या, वो—संस्कारं विभजते—संस्कार इति । भावनां लक्षयति ।  
 अनुभवेति । अनुभवजन्यत्वे सति स्मृतिहेतुलं भावनाया लक्षणम् ।  
 अत्रानुभवजन्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणानुपादाने आत्ममनःसंयोगेऽतिव्यासि-  
 रात्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानमात्रं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वेन स्मृतिं प्रत्यपि-  
 कारणत्वादतस्तदुपादानम् । आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यानुभवजन्यत्वाभावान्ना-  
 तिव्यासिः । तावन्मात्रे कृतेऽनुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्यासिः ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः  
 कारणत्वेनानुभवध्वंसस्याप्यनुभवजन्यत्वात् । अतः स्मृतिहेतुत्वोपादानम् ।  
 अनुभवध्वंसे स्मृतिहेतुत्वाभावान्नातिव्यासिः ॥

( ७६ )

चलनात्मकं कर्मैः । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेश-  
संयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरसंनिकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्र-  
कृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतु-  
ष्टयमनोमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी.—कर्मणे लक्षणमाह—चलनेति । उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्य-  
भेदमाह—ऊर्ध्वेति । शरीरेति । वक्त्वसंपादकमाकुञ्चनम् । क्रजुता-  
संपादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ॥

( ۹۹ )

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यम् । द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्तिः । तद्द्विविधं  
परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादिः<sup>५</sup> ॥

1 Instead of द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति N has युणवृत्ति. Z adds युण after जाति-मत्. Other copies omit the word altogether, but wrongly.  
 2 K adds तत्त्वाविभास

3 A B D have शरीरस्य; E H J X  
insert शरीर before विप्रकृष्ट also  
in the next sentence.

4 K omits मात्र; G J add कर्म  
after वृत्ति, perhaps better; Q

U and W omit the whole sentence.

5 C E G J Q U X and W omit  
 तद्विविधं परापरभेदात्. X has  
 instead परमधिकवृत्ति । अपरं  
 न्यनवृत्ति । H has परमपरं चेति  
 for परापरभेदात्, before द्रव्यगुण-  
 कर्मवृत्ति. A B D F insert जाति:  
 before द्रव्यत्वादि:

त. दी.—सामान्यं लक्ष्यति—नित्यमिति । संयोगादावतिव्यासिवारणाय नित्यमिति<sup>१</sup> । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्यासिवारणाय—अनेकेति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वं । तेन नाभावादावतिव्यासिः ॥

न्या. बो.—सामान्यं निरूपयति—नित्यमेकमिति । नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वं सामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः । नित्यत्वविशेषणानुपादाने संयोगादावतिव्यासिस्तत्राप्यनेकद्रव्यसमवेतत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तद्वारणाय नित्यत्वोपादानम् । अनेकसमवेतत्वानुपादान आकाशादावतिव्यासिस्तद्वारणायानेकसमवेतत्वविशेषणम् । अनेकत्वानुपादान आकाशगतैकत्वपरिमाणादौ जलपरमाणुरूपादौ चातिव्यासिर्जलादिपरमाणुगतरूपादेराकाशगतैकत्वपरिमाणादेनित्यत्वात्समवेतत्वाच्च । अतोऽनेक इति समवेतविशेषणम्<sup>२</sup> ॥

[७८]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः<sup>३</sup> ॥

त. दी.—विशेषं लक्ष्यति—नित्येति ॥

न्या. बो.—नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तय इति । नित्यद्रव्येषु परमाण्वादिषु वर्तमानाः । अत एव व्यावर्तका इतरभेदानुमितिहेतवः । नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तित्वरूपपक्षधर्मताप्रयोज्येतरभेदानुमापकशालिन इत्यर्थः<sup>४</sup> ॥

[७९]

नित्यसंबन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकम्-  
विनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । यथावयवावयविनौ  
गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति<sup>५</sup> ॥

1 N places this sentence after the next, omitting आदि. Other copies except A J Y omit the sentence altogether. Y omits the next sentence. Q and F insert घटात्यन्ताभावो घटात्यन्तगतोप्यसमवेतः before तेन नाभावा<sup>६</sup>.

2 The passage is variously read by K R V S U and W. MSS. C and V end here.

3 E G H K add अनता एव after विशेषाः; X adds वृथिव्यादिच्छु-

ष्टयस्य परमाणवः आकाशादिपञ्चकं नित्यद्रव्याणि ।

4 This is a portion of a long abstruse passage in W not found in other MSS.

5 A B E J omit आविनश्यत् which is however necessary.

6 E G J only insert यथा; but their reading has been adopted as making the sentence more grammatical.

त. दी.—समवायं लक्षयति—नित्येति । संयोगेऽर्तिव्यासिवारणाय नित्येति । आकाशादावतिव्यासिवारणाय संबन्ध इति । अयुतसिद्धलक्षणमाह—यथोरिति । नीले घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । अवयवावयविनाविति । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः । तज्जन्यद्रव्यमवयवि ॥

न्या. बो.—समवायं निरूपयति—नित्येति । संबन्धत्वं विशिष्टप्रतीतिनियामकत्वम् । तावन्मात्रोक्तौ संयोगेऽतिव्यासिरतो नित्येति विशेषणम्<sup>१</sup> ॥ यथोर्मध्य इति । यन्निष्ठकालनिरूपितोधेयतासामान्यं यदवच्छिन्नं तदुभयान्यतरत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

( ८० )

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोन्योन्याभावः यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति<sup>२</sup> ॥

त. दी.—प्रागभावं लक्षयति—अनादिरिति । आकाशादावतिव्यासिवारणाय सान्त इति । घटादावतिव्यासिवारणाय—अनादिरिति । प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ॥ प्रध्वंसं लक्षयति—सादिरिति । घटादावतिव्यासिवारणाय—अनन्त इति । आकाशादावतिव्यासिवारणाय—सादिरिति ॥ प्रतियोगिजन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्तव्यवहारहेतुध्वंसः ॥ अत्यन्ताभावं लक्षयति—त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभावेतिव्यासिवारणाय संसर्गावच्छिन्नेति । ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्यासिवारणाय त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभावं लक्षयति—तादात्म्येति । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्य-

1 S T and W omit this sentence | 2 Q and U omit भवति, and K. R. omit the next.

संसर्गभेदोदेकप्रतियोगिकयोरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्वहुत्वम्<sup>१</sup>। केवल-देवदत्ताभावो दण्डयभाव इति प्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः<sup>२</sup>:। एकसत्त्वे द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नोऽभावः। संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवति समवायसंबन्धेन घटाभावः। तत्रद्विटाभावाद्वित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिक-सामान्याभावश्चातिरिक्तः॥ एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि। घटत्वावच्छिन्नः पटो नास्तीति व्यधिकरणधर्मवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो नाङ्गीकि-यते। पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तस्यार्थः। अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी।

सामग्रिकाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः। घटाभाव-वति घटानयनेऽत्यन्ताभावस्यान्यत्र गमनाभावेऽप्यप्रतीतिर्घटापसरणे सति प्रतीतेः। भूत्ले घटसंयोगप्रागभावप्रधंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामक-त्वं कल्प्यते। घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावप्रधंसयोरसत्त्वादत्यन्ताभावस्या-प्रतीतिः। घटापसरणे च संयोगाव्यवसत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति। केवलाधि-करणादेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तरमिति गुरवः। तत्र। अभावानङ्गीकरे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अभावाभावो भाव एव नातिरिक्तः अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। धंसप्रागभावः प्रागभावधंसश्च प्रतियोग्येव<sup>३</sup>। अभावाभावोतिरिक्त एव तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूप-त्वान्वानवस्थेति नवीनाः॥

**न्या. ओ.—**प्रागभावं निरूपयति—अनादिरिति। धंसं निरूपयति

1 A's reading is corrupt and makes no sense. The reading of J has been adopted as the most intelligible; although even with it the passage is vague. N F Y Q and Z agree with J but omit अपि; W has भिन्नत्वं for बहुत्वं.

2 The passage seems to have been tampered with. The reading of A J is retained in the text, as being most probably the original. After दण्डयभावः

P adds केवलदेवदत्तसङ्गवेऽपि द-उडाभावे दण्डयभावः; all other copies read देवदत्ताभावात्, and some of them omit the following words up to प्रतीत्या.

3 C L M N Y Z omit the word प्रतीयोगिताक, which however makes no difference of sense as both expressions are common.

4 N F and Q add इति प्राप्यः after एव, but the words seem to be interpolated.

सादिरिति । अत्यन्ताभावं निरूपयति—त्रैकालिकेति<sup>1</sup> ॥ अन्योन्या-  
भावं निरूपयति—तादात्म्येति<sup>2</sup> ॥

[ ८१ ]

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भवात्समैव पदार्था इति  
सिद्धम्<sup>3</sup> ॥

त. दी.—ननु प्रमाण-प्रेमेय-संशय-प्रयोजन-दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्ता-  
वयव-तर्क-निर्णय-बाद-जल्प-वितण्डा-हेत्वाभास-च्छल-जाति-निग्रहस्था-  
नानां तत्त्वज्ञानानिश्चेयसाधिगम इति न्यायशास्त्रे षोडशपदार्थानामुक्त-  
त्वात्कथं समैवेत्यत आह—सर्वेषामिति । सर्वेषां सप्तस्वेवान्तर्भाव  
इत्यर्थः । ‘आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थमनोबुद्धिप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखाप-  
वर्गास्तु प्रमेयमिति’ द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ । रागद्वेषमोहा  
दोषाः । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादावात्मब्रमः ।  
प्रेत्यभावो मरणम् । फलं भोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च खसमाना-  
धिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीनदुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखं दुःख-  
हानिश्च<sup>4</sup> । दृष्टान्तो महानसादिः । प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सि-  
द्धान्तः । निर्णयो निश्चयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा बादः ।  
द्वभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना वितण्डा ।  
कथा नाम नानावकृकः पूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः । अभिप्रा-  
यान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्यार्थान्तरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणं छलम् । असदुत्तरं जातिः । सा-  
धर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षपर्कर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्ता-  
नुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिविनित्यानित्य—  
कार्याकार्यसमा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रतिज्ञा-  
हानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्यासो हेत्वन्तरम् अर्था-

1 S T U and W omit this, except त्रैकालिकेति, and instead of it give a long passage which is not found in other copies.

2 J K Q and W insert अपि, and

E एव, after सर्वेषां; they also insert एव after उक्तेषु.

3 This is the reading of C G J L P Y Z. A has सुखं दुःखं हानिश्च which makes no sense. N reads प्राप्तिः after सुख.

न्तरं निरर्थकं अविज्ञातार्थकं अपार्थकं अप्राप्तकालं न्यूनं अधिकं पुनरुक्तं अननुभाषणं अज्ञानं अप्रतिभाविक्षेपः मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः अपसिद्धान्तः हेत्वाभासश्च निग्रहस्थानानि । शेषं सुगमम् ॥

ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेत्त । प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्ते-रुपयोगात् कारणस्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादौ शुद्धिर्दर्शनादाधेयशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेत्त<sup>1</sup> । भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकाली-नास्पृश्यस्पर्शप्रतियोगिकयावदभावसहितभस्मादिसंयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धि-पदार्थत्वात् ।

स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूप-त्वात् । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलब्धत्वमेवेति ॥

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते । प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयो<sup>2</sup> विधिः । तत्यतिपादको लिङ्गादिर्वा । कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यता-ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्<sup>3</sup> । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । इष्टसाधनतालि-ङ्गकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले च विहित-कालजीवित्वनिमित्तकज्ञानजन्यस्यैव<sup>4</sup> प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्व-विशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसंधानजन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तत्र । लाघवेन कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनतूज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च नित्ये इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पाप-क्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङ्गार्थः । ननु “ज्योतिष्टेमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत्” इत्यत्र लिङ्ग स्वर्गसाधनकार्य-

1 G reads शुद्धिर्दर्शनात् शुद्धिः प-दार्थान्तरमिति चेत्त.

2 A P read प्रत्यवाय for प्रयत्न, which is wrong; M has प्रतिज्ञान, which is probably a mistake for प्रवृत्ति.

3 N and Q add कृतिसाध्ये प्रवृत्ति-दर्शनात् after प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात्, but

it is superfluous. A P wrongly separate ज्ञान from “साध्यता” and join it to प्रवर्तकम्, which makes no sense.

4 C L M N Q Y Z put this before नित्यनैमित्तिकः. A and Q have ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्य; J is doubtful

प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुविनाशिनः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वायोगात्-  
चोग्यं स्थायिकार्यपूर्वमेव लिङ्गाद्यर्थः<sup>1</sup> ॥ कार्यं कृतिसाध्यम् । कृतेः  
सविषयत्वात् । विषयकाङ्गायां यागोः विषयत्वेनान्वेति । कस्य कार्य-  
मिति<sup>2</sup> नियोज्याकाङ्गायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपरतयान्वेति । कार्य-  
बोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन ‘ज्योतिषोमनामकयागविषयकं स्वर्गकामस्य  
कार्यमिति वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते । वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्<sup>3</sup> “यावज्जीवमभिहोत्रं  
जुहुयात्” इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं कल्प्यते । “आरोग्य-  
कामो भैषजपानं कुर्यात्” इत्यादौ लौकिकलिङ्गः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणेति  
चेत्र । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्चयाभावेन साधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वा-  
हार्थमवान्तरव्यापारतया अपूर्वकल्पनात् । कीर्तनादिनानाशश्रुतेन<sup>4</sup>  
यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्तिवलक्षियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाध-  
नत्वं लिङ्ग बोध्यत इति लिङ्गत्वेन रूपेण विद्यर्थत्वम् । आख्यातत्वेन  
प्रयत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पाकं करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात् किं करोतीति  
प्रभे पचतात्युत्तराचाराख्यातस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वनिश्चयात् । रथो गच्छती-  
त्यादावनुकूलव्यापारे लक्षणा “देवदत्तः पचति तण्डुलान्देवदत्तेन पच्यते  
तण्डुलः” इत्यत्र कर्तृकर्मणोर्नाख्यातार्थत्वं किंतु तद्रौतकल्वादीनामेव ।  
तयोराक्षेपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उं-  
सर्गाणां द्योतकत्वमेव । न तत्र शक्तिरस्ति ॥

पदार्थज्ञानस्य परमं प्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथा हि । “औत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः  
श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” इति श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनामात्म-  
साक्षात्कारहेतुत्वबोधनात् । श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्यसं-  
भावनाऽनिवृत्युक्त्यनुसन्धानरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् मननोपयोगिपदार्थ-

1 A J Z omit आद.

2 A reads wrongly अन्वितस्य  
कार्यमिति for अन्वेति कस्य कार्य-  
मिति.

3 This is the reading of J N.  
A P have वैदिकालिङ्गत्वात्, L  
वैदिकालिङ्गत्वात्, M वैदिकालिङ्ग-

त्वात्, Z वैदिकलिङ्गत्वात्, all of  
which appear to be wrong.

4 This is the reading of Q; J  
N Y and Z read नाऽनाशः,  
while A reads कीर्तनादिना न  
श्रुतेस्तेन, both of which make no  
sense; L M P are also corrupt.

निरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगः । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगविधिना निदिघ्यासेन कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति देहादावहमभिमानरूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे सति दोषाभावात्मवृत्त्यभावे धर्माधर्मयोरभावाज्ञन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयोरनुभवेन नाशे चरमदुःखच्चंसलक्षणो मोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तेज्ञानमात्साध्यत्वात् “ तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ” इति साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु “ तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महामुने ” इति कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति चेत्र । “ नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुरुण्णो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्नभ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासात्पक्विज्ञानं कैवल्यं लभेत नरः ” इत्यादिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनात् । ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्म मोक्षसाधनं न साक्षात् । तस्मात्पदार्थज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥

इति श्रीमद्द्वैतविद्याचार्य-श्रीमद्राघवसोमयाजिकुलावतंस-श्रीमत्तिरुमलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनुनाऽनंभद्रेन कृता स्वकृततर्कसंग्रहस्य दीपिका संपूर्णा<sup>2</sup> ॥

न्या. वो.—सर्वेषामिति । प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डहेत्वाभासच्छलजतिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्त्रिःश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायस्यादिमे सूत्र उक्तानां प्रमाण-प्रमेयादीनामित्यर्थः । विस्तरस्त्वन्यत्रानुसंधेयः<sup>3</sup> ॥

1 After साक्षात् G V add तदुक्त-माचार्यस्तस्मात्पकारकं कर्मति.


2 This colophon is found in J alone, and is inserted here because it is important. It also occurs in two other works of our author.


3 This is the reading of R and

U. B omits प्रमाणप्रमेय—र्थः, and joins उक्तानां to next sentence. S and W read the passage differently. Different MSS. give various colophons, while S and W add a verse, which are omitted here.

काणादन्यायमतयोर्वालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।  
अन्नंभट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायान्नंभट्टविरचितः स्वकृतदीपिक्या श्रीगोव-  
र्धनकृतन्यायबोधिन्या च समेतस्तर्कसंग्रहः समाप्तः ॥





# NOTES.

## SECT. I.

### मङ्गलम्.

"Having enshrined the Lord of the universe in my heart,  
and having made a salutation to the preceptor, I compose this Compendium of all  
knowable things for the easy comprehension  
of beginners."

1. Following the usual orthodox practice, the author begins his work with a prayer to the deity and a salutation to the preceptor. This मङ्गल, say the commentators, is necessary for the completion of a work, and for two reasons; first because it is enjoined by the श्रुति, and secondly because its necessity is proved by inference. Of course there is no express Vedic text enjoining the मङ्गल, but the existence of such a text can be assumed on the authority of good usage (शिष्टाचार), by the well-known rule laid down by Jaimini असति ह्यनुमानम्<sup>1</sup> 'a श्रुति text is to be inferred when an express one is not to be found.' The argument for inferring 'a श्रुति text on the authority of शिष्टाचार is thus stated by T. D.—A मङ्गल is an act enjoined by the Vedas, because it has always been the object (विषय) of uncommon (अलौकिक) and unprohibited (अविगीत) practice of wise men, like दर्श and other rites. It is obvious that this inference is only available for the assumption of a text, when the शिष्टाचार happens to be अलौकिक (uncommon or sacred) and अविगीत (unprohibited). An अलौकिकाशिष्टाचार is that which is not रागादिग्रास, i. e. caused by our own inclinations, such as the ordinary human acts of eating and drinking, but which is practised as a duty rather than as a pleasure; while it is अविगीत when it is not expressly prohibited by श्रुति like the performance of a श्राद्धा ceremony at night.

1. Jaim. S. I. 33.

2. The Vedic origin of a मङ्गल having been thus established, the additional inference which proves its necessity for the completion of a book is rather of secondary importance. It is to be admitted however as a श्रुत्योदूलक तर्क, an argument supporting the *Sṛuti*. This inference is based on our experience that a book is finished when it is commenced with a मङ्गल, and not otherwise. This experience however, says an objector, is not invariable. We have instances of works which are left unfinished in spite of ample मङ्गल in the beginning, and also of books that were completed without the superfluous aid of a मङ्गल. The reply given to this objection is hardly convincing. It is founded on the maxim स्थितस्य गतिः समर्थनीया, and can only be justified on the supposition that the necessity of मङ्गल has been already incontrovertibly proved by the अनुमितश्रुति, and that the secondary inference is to be accepted only so far as it supports that *Sṛuti*. The author says that in those cases where the books were left unfinished in spite of the मङ्गल, the obstacles must be supposed to have been too numerous to be overcome by the amount of मङ्गल actually made, while, in the contrary instances of works completed without the मङ्गल, we might presume that the author had offered the required prayer, either in his previous birth or silently in his mind, although he did not insert it in his book.

3. The second line of the stanza indicates, as is usually done, what are called the four *Anubandhas*, or necessary elements of a literary work.

*The four Anubandhas.* These are:- 1 विषय (subject matter) 2 प्रयोजन (purpose) 3 संगति (connection) and 4 अधिकारी (*person for whom the book is written*). The अधिकारी in this case is a बाल, i. e. not an infant (स्तनधार), but one who is ग्रहणधारणपूर्ण, able to understand and retain the lessons given by his tutor. Two things are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, a supple understanding (ग्रहणशक्ति), and a retentive memory (धारणाशक्ति); and only he who possesses these two qualities is fit to learn this *Sāstra*. S. C. would have the बाल to be one who is अवीतशक्तिशावक्षेत्रशोऽनधीतभ्याद-

**शास्त्रः** i. e. one who has mastered grammar, poetry and vocabulary, but does not know Logic. सुखचार्याप् explains the purpose (प्रयोजन) why a new work like this is undertaken, when there were already many ably written treatises on the subject. The name तर्कसंग्रह at once explains the subject matter (विषय), namely तर्क, as well as its connection with the method of treatment adopted in the book (संग्रह). तर्क is defined as तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिग्राह्यते इति तर्कः इत्यादिततत्त्वदर्थः. The word तर्क is employed in *Nyāya* writings in several different senses, but the one intended here is quite unusual. It is rarely met with anywhere except in the titles of a few manuals similar to the present work, such as तर्ककौमुदी, तर्कभाषा, तर्कबृति and तर्कमूल. संग्रह primarily means a collection but here it signifies a compendium or brief exposition. T. D. and T. C. define it simply संक्षेपण स्वरूपस्यतम्. V. V. and S. C. give a more elaborate definition, making a संग्रह comprise three parts, namely, उद्देश (simple enumeration), लक्षण (definition) and परीक्षा (examination or exposition). The present book contains all these three पदार्थादिश from Sec. 2 to Sec. 9 and their लक्षण and परीक्षा together from Sec. 10 to the end.]

4. Either the passage मङ्गले कूडाणि etc. is corrupt or the author has committed a strange solecism.

*A disputed reading* I have retained the reading of A, because, while it is found in most of the copies, it is not much worse than the others given by F, Q or N. If *Kirāṇavāli* and *Kādambarī* are the well-known works of that name, they are quite inappropriate as opposite instances of the efficacy of मङ्गल. *Kirāṇavāli*, if it be the commentary on *Praśastapāda*'s scholium on the aphorisms of *Kaṇāda*, by the famous logician *Udayanācārya*, is supposed to be an unfinished work, said to extend only as far as the section on चुद्धि; but the eight MSS. collected by Pandit Vindhyeśwari Prasād Dube for his edition in Benares Sanskrit Series contain only the chapters on इन्द्र and युज. It however begins with a मङ्गल to the Sun and Creator, and may therefore be a fit instance of non-completion in spite of मङ्गल. But *Kādambarī* too, if it is the same as the well-known work of *Būṇabhaṭṭa*, remained unfinished, although it opens with no less than 20 verses of मङ्गल. *Kādambarī* therefore cannot

serve as a counter-instance of a work completed without a मङ्गल unless of course we resort to the two-fold supposition, that its completion by the author's son is to be considered as समाप्ति proper, and that the opening मङ्गल does not form part of the book. The latter supposition is apparently supported by T. D's subsequent words कादम्बर्यादौ ग्रन्थाद्विरेव मङ्गलं कृतं which are interpreted by some to mean that the मङ्गल verses are outside the book. But the interpretation is not approved by *Nilakantha* who takes the word वहि: to mean जन्मान्तरादौ. Either therefore the author committed a mistake or he meant some other *Kādambarī* which is not known at present. The difficulty is no doubt removed in M. which reads वौद्यग्रन्थादौ for कादम्बर्यादौ, but the reading is not supported by any other copy and is probably an emendation of some one who perceived the mistake. The commentator T. C. also omits *Kādambarī*, and mentions in its stead a प्रसन्नातिग्रन्थ. The other readings given in F, Q and N, and apparently supported by *Nilakantha* and S. C., are equally faulty, since although the solecism as regards *Kādambarī* is removed, a similar one is committed about *Kiraṇāvali* which is neither completed nor is devoid of मङ्गल. T. C. and S. C. avoid the difficulty about *Kiraṇāvali* by substituting नास्तिकग्रन्थादौ for it. Of course there is the possibility that *Kiraṇāvali* may have been finished by its author and a portion of it is now lost; but the supposition is improbable, and does not lessen a whit the difficulty as regards the actual presence of मङ्गल. Some have supposed that the *Kiraṇāvali* mentioned here is a नास्तिकग्रन्थ, and not the commentary of *Udayana*, but no such work is known. In short whatever reading we accept, the difficulty created by the mention of *Kiraṇāvali* and *Kādambarī* as opposite instances is insuperable, since both of them, being incomplete in spite of a long or short मङ्गल, are works exactly of the same nature.

## SECT. II. पदार्थः:

"There are seven Categories:—Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity, Co-inherence or Intimate relation and Negation."

1. The *Dipikā* following the etymological sense of the word (पद्म्य अर्थः) defines a पदार्थ as 'a thing having a name' (अभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्). अर्थ is a thing to which the senses travel (क्रच्छन्तीन्द्रियाणि यं सः), i. e. any external object which is comprehended by the senses. पदार्थ, therefore, means any object that is namable. Other definitions of पदार्थ convey the same sense. S. C. defines पदार्थत्वम् as ज्ञेयत्वम्, while T. C. and S. P. as प्रमितिविषयत्वम्, i. e. any thing which is an object of knowledge. A thing however which is knowable must also have a name; and so knowability (ज्ञेयत्व) and namability (अभिधेयत्व) regarded as definitions of पदार्थ are interchangeable. The word is invariably used by the *Vaiśeṣikas* in this composite sense.

2. The rendering of the word पदार्थ by 'category,' though not quite accurate, is convenient *Aristotle's categories*, and useful for all practical purposes. Ballantyne used the word 'category,'

while Colebrook translated पदार्थ by 'predicament'; but both renderings are inaccurate, inasmuch as they imply something which can be predicated of another, while पदार्थ implies not only a thing which is predicable of another, but also a thing which is capable of having something predicated of it. Categories, especially in the Aristotelian sense, are a classification of predicates only, and not an enumeration of all namable things (including both subjects and predicates) as the *Padārthas* of the *Vaiśeṣikas* are. In this respect, the classification of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is superior to that of Aristotle. The latter enumerated ten categories, 1 Substance, 2 Quantity, 3 Quality, 4 Relation, 5 Place, 6 Time, 7 Posture, 8 Appurtenance or Property, 9 Activity and 10 Passivity. Of these the last nine only can be properly said to be predicable of something else, i. e. substance, but sub-

stance itself, being assumed to be an *Ens* (Being) independent of all attributes, cannot be predicated of anything. It cannot be predicated even of itself, because in that case it will be an attribute and not substance. Thus in including substance among the categories Aristotle confounded the notion of a predicate with that of a namable thing; but *Kaṇāda* is not open to the charge inasmuch as his *Dravya* is a namable thing, and therefore a *Padārtha*. Notwithstanding this distinction, however, the word category has been employed in so many senses by subsequent European philosophers that one is almost justified in using it as an equivalent of पदार्थ also. In the history of philosophy, the categories have been successively a classification of universal things, or of words, or of forms of thought; and consequently they have now come to mean simply the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. In this general sense, *Kaṇāda's Padārthas* are as much categories as those of Aristotle or of Kant or of Mill; only that their number and arrangement would vary according to the fundamental principle on which the classification is based, and the purpose for which it is intended. The classification of Aristotle is mainly logical, that of *Kaṇāda* metaphysical. One is concerned with notions and propositions, the other with external objects which give rise to those notions. The seven *Padārthas* of the *Vaiśeṣikas* can therefore be easily apportioned among the categories of Aristotle. *Dravya* and *Guna* correspond to Substance and Quality, respectively. Aristotle's Quantity is classed among the *Gunas* by *Kaṇāda*. Relation is of two kinds: *Saṃyoga* and *Samavāya*, the first of which is a *Guna* and the second a distinct *Padārtha*. The remaining categories really fall under relation in its widest sense, but some of them are separately recognized by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Thus Time and Place are *Dravyas*. Activity is *Karma* while Passivity is simply negation of it. Property may be *Sāmānya*, *Viśeṣa* or any common attribute called by later *Naiyāyikas* an *Upādhi*. Lastly Posture is संस्थानविशेष and is at best a *Guna*. Aristotle does not mention *Abhāva* or negation as he deals only with *Ens* or Being.

3. The various classifications of *Padārthas*, given by Indian systematists, can be likewise reduced to the seven *Padārthas* and *vice versa*, if one clearly understands beforehand the particular standpoint of each. *Nyāya* writings do not explain the process by which the seven-fold division of *Padārthas* was first obtained, but if we may make a guess,

the process must have been something like this.

*Classifications of Padārthas.* A notion is either positive or negative, and so the external object of a

notion might be भाव or अभाव. भाव things again are of two kinds, properties and a common substratum in which they reside. The latter is त्रय. Of the properties, again, some reside in many objects conjointly, others in individual things singly. The first is सामान्य, while the latter class is again divisible into properties that are stationary and those that are evanescent *i. e.* यज्ञ and कर्म. The remaining two *Padārthas*, समवाय and विशेष, are assumed to explain the special theories of *Vaiśeṣikas*. Other Indian philosophical schools also have their own classification of things, suited to their particular doctrine or theory. Every system of science or philosophy in ancient times thought it necessary to begin by arranging the Universe into a few elementary classes. Thus *Gotama* enumerates sixteen *Padārthas*, necessary for the functions of logic; the *Vedāntins* have two, *Cit* and *Acit*; the *Rāmānujas*, one more, *Īśvara*; the *Sāṅkhyas*, twenty-five; the *Mimāṃsakas* eight; and so on. All schools do not use the word पदार्थ exactly in the same sense. It is used even more loosely than the word *category* in Europe, and often-times implies nothing more than topics to be treated in a book.

4. The *Tarka-Dīpikā* says that the word सप्त is used to exclude a larger number. T. D. and other commentaries here give a curious disquisition as to whether an eighth *Padārtha* can be logically proved. An eighth *Padārtha* is either known or unknown. If it is known, it exists and the restriction to seven is wrong; if however it is unknown it cannot be negated, because there can be no negation of an unknown quantity. This dilemma is cleared by defining

पदार्थत्व to be इत्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्त, i. e. the genus पदार्थ is covered by any one of the seven species, *Dravya* etc. The passage, however, beginning with ननु is of doubtful authenticity, as it is questioned by *Nilakantha*, who remarks, “एवं च बहु पुस्तकेषु सप्तान्यतमत्वाप्रसिद्धिशङ्कातत्समाधानपररूपं ‘ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वामि’ यादिग्रन्थस्यासत्त्वे ऽपि न क्षतिरिति ध्येयम्.”

5. It is probable that the word ‘seven’ is used merely to emphasize the seven-fold enumeration of the modern *Vaiśeṣikas* as distinguished from the six *Padārthas* of *Kaṇāda* and the sixteen of *Gotama*. The original aphorisms of *Kaṇāda* mention only six categories, and the seventh, अभाव, is added by commentators on the ground that the six up to समवाय being all भाव things, i. e. entities, necessarily imply their contradictory the *non-entity*. Consequently many first divide things into भाव and अभाव, the former being then subdivided into six. The sixteen categories of *Gotama*, and several others assumed by other *Naiyāyikas*, are reconciled with the sevenfold enumeration by T. D. in its concluding passage.<sup>1</sup>

### SECT. III. द्रव्याणि.

“Of these seven categories (तत्र=सप्तपदार्थमध्ये S. C.) the class *Dravya* comprises nine, and nine only :—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul and mind.

1. Out of the seven categories enumerated in the preceding section, the author now mentions the nine subdivisions of the first, *Substance*. T. D., T. K., T. C. and S. C. give two definitions of द्रव्य, viz. द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वम् and गुणवत्त्वम् to which may be added क्रियावत्त्वम् and समवायिकारणत्वम्; but all these, except perhaps the last, are defective. The first appears like a purely verbal definition, or a truism which teaches us nothing new about the thing defined. S. C. however tries to justify it by arguing that द्रव्यत्वजाति is independently proved, either by direct perception or by inference. The inference is put thus, द्रव्यवृत्तिर्या समवायिकारणता सा किञ्चि-

1. P. 64 supra.

दर्मावच्छिन्ना, कारणतात्वादप्प्रतिकारणतात्व, i. e. the intimate causality residing in a *Dravya* is distinguished by some attribute ( which is the genus *Dravya* or substantiality ) because every causality such as that of a stick has a distinguishing attribute. The argument of course makes two assumptions which are not yet proved, viz. that only a *Dravya* can be an intimate cause, and that such a cause must have some attribute to distinguish it. The second definition is superior though still defective. If we say that a substance is anything in which qualities reside, we exclude an important class of substances, namely all created things just at the moment of their production, when according to the theory of the *Naiyāgikas* they are without any attribute. आये क्षेण निर्यन्तं द्रव्यं तिष्ठति is an axiom of *Nyāya*, for if the qualities are supposed to rise simultaneously with the substances and not a moment later, all distinction between qualities and substances will virtually disappear. The definition गुणवत् will not therefore apply to *Dravys* at the first moment of their creation and is therefore अव्याप्त. The defect is remedied by amplifying it thus, एणसमानाधिकरण-सत्ताभिन्न-जातिमत्त्वं द्रव्यत्वम्. Although products in the first moment are without attributes, they possess even then a जाति ( i. e. द्रव्यत्व in this case ) which co-exists with qualities in the same substratum. But such a definition again would be too wide because सत्ता ( existence ) is also a जाति that is co-existent with qualities ; hence the word सत्ताभिन्न is inserted in the definition to qualify जाति. This amplification however makes the latter definition almost as verbal as the first द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वम्, only the word द्रव्यत्व is avoided. Though thus theoretically faulty, the definition is good for all practical purposes. The definition समवायिकारणत्वम् is technically correct for only a *Dravya* can be the समवायिकारण of a product, but it is पारिभाषिक as being based on a peculiar doctrine of *Vaiśeṣikas* and is not therefore easily intelligible to ordinary people.

2. The difficulty of defining a substance accurately arises from its very nature. A definition which is not to be merely verbal must be an exhaustive enumeration of all essential attributes; but a substance *ex hypothese* is something

that, while underlying all attributes, is quite distinct from them. Now if the qualities which are enumerated as the definition of substance are essentially and invariably connected with it, they are part and parcel of substance itself, and not attributes distinct from it; while if they are not so connected they do not constitute a definition. This dilemma has perplexed philosophers of all ages and countries, and consequently many of them, like Berkeley in England and the *Buddhas* in India, have denied any independent entity such as a *substance* altogether. This is not a satisfactory solution, however, as the necessity of having some *substratum* for the qualities still remains. To obviate this, others like the *Vedāntins* acknowledge the reality of *substance* but call its manifestation अनिवचनीय, indefinable, or माया.

2. The propriety of नवैव is the same as that of सप्त in the last section, the words being used to

*Why nine.* limit the number of substances to nine only. T. D. here controverts the position of the *Fhāṭṭa* school of *Mimāṃskas* that darkness

is a *dravya*. Darkness, says the objector, is a substance because it is blue and moves, and therefore the definition of

*Dravya*, व्यक्तिपावत्, strictly applies to it.

*What is darkness.* But darkness cannot be classed under any of the nine *dravyas* above enumerated.

As darkness has colour it cannot fall under any of the last five, ether, time, space, soul and mind, which are colourless. It is not air because it has neither touch nor constant motion which are the attributes of air. It is not light, as it has neither bright colour, nor hot touch. It is not water because it has neither cool touch nor white colour, the colour of water. Lastly it is not earth, because it has neither scent nor touch. Darkness therefore, not falling under any of the nine *dravyas*, must be regarded as a tenth one, and so the restriction to nine is wrong. Having thus stated the objector's argument in full, T. D. answers it by declaring that darkness is, according to the *Naiyāyikas*, merely the negation of light. A tenth *dravya* can be either with or without colour; but darkness cannot be the latter as it is blue. Nor can it be a substance having colour, because

every such substance requires light for being perceived with the eyes, while darkness is perceived only when there is no light. Darkness is therefore defined as प्रौढपकाशकतेजःसामान्याभावः, i. e. absence of large and illuminating light in general. The S. C. explains the propriety of each word in the definition thus : The word सामान्य implies that darkness is total absence of any light whatever, and not the absence of a particular light such as that of the sun or the moon or a lamp. The word पकाशक is necessary because otherwise there will be no darkness wherever there is gold which is classed by *Naiyāyikas* under *Tejas*. Finally प्रौढ excludes the possibility of darkness being negatived even by minute particles of light. How is then the perception of blue colour and motion in darkness to be accounted for ? T. D. declares it to be a misapprehension. Besides the above two views with respect to the nature of darkness, *Mādhyāñcārya* the author of *Sarvadarśana-Saṅgraha*<sup>1</sup> mentions two more, namely those of Śrīdhara, the reputed author of *Nyāya-Kāṇḍali* and of a section of the *Prabhākara* school of *Mimāṃsakas*. The first mentions that darkness is nothing more than the blue colour imposed on something else, thus making darkness a quality only ; while the latter call it absence of knowledge of light, and not that of light itself. A fifth doctrine would say that instead of regarding darkness as the absence of light we should deem it *dravya* and regard light itself as the absence of darkness. But these views are not warranted by experience, and the one propounded above as to darkness being the absence of light is the most satisfactory. The controversy, however, well illustrates the aptitude of Indian mind for hair-splitting.

3. Incidentally T. D. gives under this section the three characteristic marks of a perfect definition. T. D. defines a लक्षण as दूषणव्यरहितो धर्मः i. e. an attribute free from the three faults. A more scientific definition of लक्षण, however, is that given by *Vātsyāyana* उद्दिष्टस्यातत्त्वविवेचकधर्मो लक्षणम्, a.

1. *Sare. D. S. Calc. ed.*, p. 108.

definition is an attribute which differentiates the *definitum* from all things different from itself.<sup>1</sup> In other words लक्षण is what English logicians call a 'differentia.' Another definition of लक्षण is व्यावर्तकम् which with the qualifications mentioned by T. D. means the same thing as the preceding. A fourth definition and one of a somewhat different kind is असाधारणम्; and असाधारणत्वम् is defined as लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानियतन्तवम् a characteristic mark which exactly covers all (*i. e.* not more nor less) things denoted by the *definitum*. From this it will be seen that the idea of a definition entertained by Indian logicians was somewhat narrow. It was not an exclusive enumeration of all the essential *characteristics* of a thing, but only a *differentia*, or "laying down the boundary" (as the word definition etymologically means) which separated the thing defined from everything else. The function of a definition was more negative than positive; that is, a definition was more often intended merely to exclude all things other than the *definitum* than to give us any accurate notion of the *definitum* itself. Accordingly any characteristic that was peculiar to the *definitum* was made to serve the purpose. The consequence was that the definitions of the *Naiyāyikas* often became merely verbal or nominal, which satisfied the ear as it were but conveyed no idea of the thing defined. द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वम् and पृथग्व्यवहारकारणम्, which are given by *Annabhātta* as definitions of द्रव्य and पृथक्त्व respectively, may be mentioned as instances of this kind of inconsequential definitions. Another device employed to escape difficulties was first to give a wide description of the *definitum* and then to narrow it down by the express exclusion of superfluous objects by using words like इतर or भिन्न, as for instance, the definition of इन्द्रिय, शब्देतरोऽप्त etc. For practical purposes, however, the definitions of *Naiyāyikas* are generally useful and often ingenious; and a student bearing the above limitations in mind will escape the misconceptions and prejudices that are likely to arise owing to the peculiar form of many definitions he will meet with in the course of his study.

1. *Vāt.* on G. S. I. 1, 2.

4: The three faults mentioned in the definition of लक्षण given by T. D. are अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति, and

*Its three defects*

असंभव. अव्याप्ति is लक्ष्यैकदेशाद्वित्वम् i. e.

non-pervasion by the characteristic of a

portion of (the class denoted by) the *definitum*. For instance, if we define a cow as a tawny animal, we exclude all black, red or white cows. अतिव्याप्ति is extension of the attribute to things not denoted by the *definitum*, as when we define a cow as a horned animal, and thereby include buffaloes that have horns but are not cows. असंभव is the total absence of the characteristic from the *definitum* itself, as when we define a cow to be an animal with uncloven hoofs. Of these असंभव is only a kind of अव्याप्ति *in excelsis*. In short, a proper definition ought to be neither too narrow, nor too wide, nor totally false. If, for instance, we define a cow to be an animal having a dew-lap, we avoid all the three faults, since all cows have dew-laps and none but cows have them. It is not possible always to have such a perfect definition. *Annambhāṭa* often employs simple enumeration instead of a regular definition; and when even this is not possible he contents himself with an approximate description. For examples of the first see Sects. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9, while for the latter see Sects. 8, 11, 12, 20, 25-32. Such enumerations or descriptions, besides, are better suited to the untrained understandings of the beginners for whom this treatise is mainly written. The author has wisely relegated all abstruse definitions and discussions to the commentary.

#### SECT. IV. गुणः

“*There are twenty-four qualities, viz. colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension or magnitude, severality, conjunction or contact, disjunction, priority or propinquity, posteriority or remoteness, weight, fluidity, viscosity, sound, intellect or understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort or volition, merit, demerit and faculty.*”

*Qualities.*

The T. D. defines a *Guna* as गुणवज्जातिमान्, possessing the genus *Gunas*, or द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान् Quality defined. "possessing generality and being at the same time different from substances and motions." The first is only a verbal definition, but the latter needs explanation. According to the theory of the *Naiyāyikas*,<sup>1</sup> जाति or सामान्य resides in three *Padurthas* only, viz. *Dravya*, *Guna* and *Karma*. The definition सामान्यवत् would therefore cover all the three, and hence it is restricted to *Guna* by expressly excluding *Dravya* and *Karma*. The same is expressed in another way as द्रव्यावृत्ति-नित्यवृत्ति-जातिमान् i. e. possessing a जाति which permanently inheres in a receptacle other than a *Dravya*. Here the word नित्य excludes कर्मवज्जाति which, like individual motions, is transitory; while the epithet द्रव्यावृत्ति excludes both द्रव्यत्वं and सत्ता. The definition of *Guna* given in B. P. is fuller, अथ द्रव्याभिता ज्ञेया निरुद्धा निक्रिया गुणः<sup>2</sup> i. e. *Gunas* reside in *dravyas* and are themselves devoid of attributes and motions. This slightly varies from the original definition of *Kanāda*, which is द्रव्याभ्युगुणताम् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणम्.<sup>3</sup> The expression संयोगविभागेष्वकारणम् is added in the *Sūtra* to exclude *Karma* which is the cause of conjunction and disjunction.

2. Comparing the several definitions of *Guna*, we find that it is clearly distinguished from *Dravya*.

*Guna* distinguished from *Dravya* and *ya* as an attribute dependent on something else i. e. *dravya*, which is self-supported,

while it is distinguishable from *Karma*, as an attribute which is fixed or permanent, and not evanescent or transitory. Both *Guna* and *Karma*, quality and motion, are accidents attaching to Substance, the *Ens*, which underlies and supports them; but *Guna* is permanent while *Karma* is evanescent. They are as it were two different phases of the same phenomena. *Guna* in the process of change is action, while *karma* when made fixed and permanent becomes a *guna*. For instance, the motion of a carriage is action because it may cease at any moment, but

1 See *Infra Notes to Sect. VI and LVII.*

2 B. P. 85.

3 V. S. I, 1, 16.

the motions of the earth and the planets are *gunas* because they are permanent and belong as it were to their very nature; similarly heat which is *Guna* is produced by motion of molecules, while गुरुत्व or weight produces the action of falling. This distinction is succinctly put in one of the definitions of *Guna* given above, इन्याहृनि-नित्यहृनि-जातिमान्, and will be made still more clear by the following extract—“We understand by a *quality* that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing—what it is—what belongs to it permanently, as an individual, or in common with others like it—not that which passes, which vanishes and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an accident; it is heavy: that is a *quality*. Every fact, every accident, every phenomenon supposes a *quality* by which it is produced, or by which it is undergone; and reciprocally every quality of things which we know by experience manifests itself by certain modes or certain phenomena; for it is precisely in this way that things discover themselves to us.”<sup>1</sup>

It is doubtful whether the *Naiyāyikas* of India had obtained a correct notion of *qualities*, while as to *actions* they do not seem to have gone very deep into the matter. The list of 24 *gunas* is by no means based on a common *fundamentum divisionis*, while subsequently there is no attempt to probe into the real nature of each.

3. The *Tarka-Saṅgraha* like all modern works on *Nyāya* enumerates twenty-four *Gunas*, but *Number of qualities* the original aphorism of *Kaṇāda* mentioned only seventeen. The *Sūtra* runs:—स्वपरस-गन्धस्पर्शः सद्भूयः परिमाणानि पृथक्कन्तं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे गुरुत्वः सुखदुःखे इच्छादेवौ प्रयत्नात्म गुणाः.<sup>1</sup> To this list commentators add seven more, गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, खेद, संस्कार, धर्म, अधर्म and शब्द, under the shelter of च. *Sāṃkara Miśra*, the author of *Upaskāra*

<sup>1</sup> *Dict. des Sciences Philosoph.* quoted in Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, p. 398.

<sup>2</sup> V. S. I, 1, 6.

explains the omission by saying that these seven are not expressly mentioned in the *Sūtra* because they are too well-known. The addition is expressly made by *Praśastapāda*.<sup>1</sup> It cannot at present be ascertained who had the ingenuity of first discovering this hidden meaning of च ; but the fact at any rate shows that there was a time when the system was sufficiently elastic to admit material improvements. The modern school of *Naiyāyikas* reduce the number of *gunas* to 21, excluding परत्व, अपरत्व and पृथक्त्व as being not *gunas* proper. परत्व and अपरत्व, they say, are accounted for by विप्रकृष्टत्व and सनिकृष्टत्व or ज्येष्ठत्व and कनिष्ठत्व, while पृथक्त्व does not differ from अन्योन्याभाव.

4. Others have tried to increase the number of *gunas* by further additions. T. D. instances 3 *gunas* which are not expressly mentioned in the list, viz. लघुत्व, मृदुत्व and कठिनत्व, while S. C. adds a fourth, आलरय. These, however, it is argued, need not be considered as separate *gunas*, as all of them are negations or contradictories of some one of the 24 *gunas*. Thus लघुत्व is nothing but the negation of गुरुत्व, while मृदुत्व and कठिनत्व are simply different degrees of संयोग. आलरय is the opposite of प्रयत्न. In this way any quality not mentioned in the list can be shown to fall under one of those already mentioned. On the other hand, if it be asked why both धर्म and अधर्म are mentioned since the latter can only be the opposite of the former, it is answered that the *Naiyāyika* idea of अधर्म is that of something positive, and not simply the negation of धर्म. अधर्म is actual demerit and not the mere absence of merit. The same remark applies to three other pairs of contrary qualities, संयोग विभाग, परत्व अपरत्व, and लुभ हुस. Logically speaking these are the contraries and not the contradictories of each other. Some include both धर्म and अधर्म under one head, अद्वृट.<sup>2</sup>

1 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 10.

2 B. P. 161.

5. The explanations are no doubt ingenious but there appears to be a good deal of confusion of ideas. In saying that लघुत्व (lightness) is the opposite of गुरुत्व, *Annambhatā* seems

*Heaviness and lightness.* to confound the two senses of the word गुरुत्व viz., 'heaviness' and 'weight.' लघुत्व is opposed to गुरुत्व in the first sense alone, while in the latter and the wider sense, namely weight, it is only a lesser degree of गुरुत्व, both lightness and heaviness marking different degrees of weight. Similarly मृदुत्व and कठिनत्व or either of them are also entitled to be classed independent qualities like द्रवत्व, for all the three are different degrees of संयोग of particles. आलस्य, being identical with स्थितिस्थापकत्व or *inertia*, is a positive quality and not merely a negation of effort. The nine qualities from चतुर्दि onwards are peculiar attributes or functions of Soul and ought to have been classed separately. The enumeration of *guṇas* in fact is rather rough and unscientific.

6. The twenty-four *guṇas* have been distributed in various ways according to the different Classification of principles of division adopted. The *guṇas* are either नित्य or अनित्य, सामान्य or विशेष, एकेन्द्रियशाहा, द्विन्द्रियशाहा, or अतीन्द्रिय, and so on. Some of these distributions are given below, as likely to be useful to students :—

I. First, the twenty-four *guṇas* are distributed among the nine substances in the following manner :—

स्पर्शादियोऽद्वौ वेगारब्धसंस्कारो महतो गुणाः ।  
अद्वौ स्पर्शादियो रूपं द्रवो वेगश्च तेजसि ॥  
स्पर्शादयोऽद्वौ वेगश्च गुरुत्वं च द्रवत्वकम् ।  
रूपं रसस्तथा स्नेहो वारिष्येते चतुर्दिशः ॥  
स्नेहहीना गन्धयुताः क्षितावेते चतुर्दिशः ।  
हुस्त्र्यादिष्टं स्त्र्यादिष्टवकं भावना तथा ॥  
पर्माधर्मां गुणा एते आत्मनः स्युभवतुदिशः ।  
संख्यादिष्टवकं कालदिशोः शब्दश्व ते चतुर्दिशः ॥

संख्यादयाः पञ्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यत्तोऽपि चेश्वरे ।  
परापरत्वसंख्यादयाः पञ्च वेगश्च मानसे<sup>1</sup> ॥

"The qualities of air are touch, number, quantity (dimension), individuality (severalty), conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity, and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity, are assigned to light.

"Water is the site of 14 qualities, viz., of the eight before mentioned (*i. e.* सर्वादि), and further, of velocity, gravity, fluidity, colour, taste and viscosity.

"Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscosity, and the addition of smell.

"The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition (effort), number, quantity (dimension), severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit.

"The qualities of time and place are number, quantity (dimension), severalty, conjunction, and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to ether.

"Those five qualities (संख्या, परिमाण, पृथक्त्व, संयोग, and विभाग) together with intellect, desire, and volition (effort), abide in God; the same five qualities with posteriority and velocity, in the mind".<sup>2</sup>

II. *Gunas* are also divided into सामान्य and विशेष. A विशेष गुण is defined द्रव्यविभाजनापविद्युतसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति-गुणवृत्ति-जातिमान<sup>3</sup> which in simple English means a quality that resides in one substance only at one time, and not in two or more substances conjointly. सामान्य *gunas* are those which reside in two or more substances jointly. The विशेष and सामान्य *gunas* are enumerated as follow :—

बुद्ध्यादिपद्मं स्पर्शान्ताः स्नेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः ।  
अट्टभावनाशब्दा अमी वेशोपिका गुणाः ॥

1 B. P. 23-33.

2 Roer's translation of B. P. Bibl. Ind. p. 13.

3 T. D. p. 60 *Supra*.

• संस्थादिरपरत्वान्ते इवः सांसिद्धिकस्तथा ।  
गुरुत्ववेगो सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः<sup>1</sup> ॥

"Special qualities are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, touch, viscosity, natural fluidity, fate, memory and sound. General qualities are: number, quantity (dimension), severality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity, gravity, and velocity."<sup>2</sup>

III. *Gunas* are also divided into those which are apprehended by one external sense only (एकेन्द्रियग्राहा), viz., colour, taste, odour, and touch; those which are apprehended by two senses, eye and touch (द्विन्द्रियग्राहा), viz., number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity and viscosity; and those again which are not perceived by an external sense (अतीन्द्रिय), viz., gravity, merit, demerit and faculty.

For other classifications see M. M. Bhimacharya's *Nyāya-Kośa* (second edition) pp. 232-4, and *Bhāṣū-Pari-echeda*, 85-97.

## SECT. V. कर्माणि

*Motion or Action is of five kinds only, viz., Tossing or throwing upwards, Dropping or throwing downwards, Contraction, Expansion and Going or Motion in general.*

1. The division of Karma is in strict conformity with the aphorism of *Kanāda*.<sup>3</sup> The T. D. as in the case of *Guṇa*, offers two definitions of *Karma* also, of which the first संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणम् is a real one. (Motion is the non-intimate cause of conjunction, but is not itself conjunction.) The meaning of असमवायिकारण will be explained later on; it is sufficient to note here that only

1 B. P. 89-91.

2 Roer's Translation of B. P. Bib, Ind. p. 53

3 V. S. 1, 1, 7.

*karma* and some *guṇas* can ever be the non-intimate causes of *dravyas* or *guṇas*. *Karma* is supposed to be the non-intimate cause of conjunction, as when a hand touches a book the motion of the hand is such a cause of the conjunction of the hand with the book. But sometimes one conjunction is the non-intimate cause of another conjunction, as for instance, the conjunction of the hand with the book is the non-intimate cause of the connection of the whole body with the book. This connection therefore is expressly excluded by the words संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति.

2. The definition of *Karma* given in *Kaṇāda's sūtra* is more elaborate though essentially the same. एकद्रव्यमणुं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्मलक्षणम्<sup>1</sup> means that action inheres in one substance, but is not a quality, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction. The first two epithets exclude अव्याप्ति द्रव्य and some qualities like संयोग, while the last is practically identical with संयोगसम्बाधिकारण of T. D. Śāmkara Miśra mentions several other definitions of *Karma* in his Commentary on V. S. I, 1, 17 (Calc. ed. p. 35). The only one which is worth nothing is नित्यावृत्तिसत्तासाक्षाद्वाप्य-जातिमत्वम्, which means that कर्मत्वजाति resides in a thing (कर्म) which is never permanent. The wider genus सत्ता resides in द्रव्य, मणु and कर्म of which the former two are sometimes नित्य; but कर्म is never नित्य, as it is always transitory. *Karma* is said to last only for five moments<sup>2</sup> and so कर्मत्वजाति is said to be नित्यावृत्ति.

3. The division of *Karma* into five kinds does not appear to be very logical. If all miscellaneous motions such as gyration (अभ्यन्तर), evacuation (रेचन), flow (स्पन्दन), flaming up (ऊर्ध्वावलन) and slanting motion (तिर्यङ्गमन) are to be classed under simple going (गमन), why cannot, it may be

1 V. S. I. 1, 17.

2 Rœr's Transl. B. P. Bibl. Ind p. 4. note.

asked, उत्क्षेपण and the other three also be similarly included under it ? *Nilakantha* justifies this arbitrary division on the quaint but easily comprehensible ground that it would be sacrilegious on our part to question what is laid down by a free-willed sage like *Kaṇāda* (न चोत्क्षेपणादीनां गमने इत्तर्भावाऽस्तिवृत्तं क्षकनीयम् । स्वतत्रैच्छस्य नियोगपर्यनुयोगानर्हस्य क्वेः संमतत्वादिति भावः ). A closer inspection, however, might reveal some sort of principle even in this arbitrary division. Motion is primarily divided into three kinds according to its direction, namely, vertical, horizontal and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion may be from below upwards (उत्क्षेपण), or from above downwards (अप्त्क्षेपण). Horizontal motion also may be twofold, motion nearer to oneself (अकुञ्चन) or motion further from oneself (प्रसारण). All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of गमन. It is not of course meant that the above groups exactly correspond to the ordinary conceptions of उत्क्षेपण etc.; but that some such principle was in the mind of the *Sūtrakāra* when he made the division seems to be highly probable.

## SECT. VI. सामान्यम्.

*Genus or Generality is of two kinds, wider or extensive and narrower or limited.*

1. In Section LXXVII *Annambhaṭṭa* defines सामान्य as नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतम्, and adds that this सामान्य resides in *Dravya*, *Guna* and *Karma*. There are three characteristics of generality: that 1 it is eternal, 2 it is one, and 3 it resides in many. Conjunction and some other qualities such as द्वित्वादिसंख्या reside in many, but they are not eternal, and therefore the word नित्य in the definition of सामान्य excludes them. The dimension of an atom is both eternal (for atom is eternal) and resides in many; but it is not one residing in many (एकमनेकानुगतं) and hence the word एकम्. अत्यन्ताभाव however

is eternal, one and residing in many. Therefore the word अनुगतम् is interpreted as समवेतम् or समवायसंबन्धेन वर्तमानम्, thereby excluding negation which does not reside in things by *intimate* union, while सामान्य does. The word *Genus* is a convenient rendering of सामान्य as Ballantyne and others have adopted it, although it is not quite accurate. Genus may perhaps be a more appropriate rendering of जाति. Genus in English not only means the common characteristic residing in several individuals, but comprehends the individuals also, while सामान्य or जाति denotes only the common characteristic. Genus is a class, सामान्य or जाति is the common attribute which distinguishes that class. Other definitions of सामान्य are, नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतम् and नित्यत्वे सति स्वश्रयान्योन्याभावसमानाधिकरणम् which are however not as good as that given by T. D. But they all imply that सामान्य was conceived by later *Naiyāyikas* to be some attribute having a real external existence in the individual objects comprised in it. The original aphorism of *Kaṇāda* is ambiguous and conveys a somewhat different notion. सामान्यं विशेष इति चुद्धयपेक्षम्<sup>1</sup> conveys the sense that the notion of generality depends on the operation of our own intellect. A quality becomes a सामान्य only if we conceive it as residing in many; while the same is विशेष when we regard it as a *differentia*. A property for instance exists in a certain number of objects, which are so far of one kind; if we use the property for grouping those objects into one class, it is सामान्य, if for distinguishing them from all other objects in the world, it is विशेष. Thus an attribute, though inhering in the object, cannot become a सामान्य until our intellect has recognised it to be so. As long, for example, as I have seen only one elephant and do not know that there are others of the same kind, the genus elephant does not exist, at least so far as I am concerned. Similarly the same attribute, e. g. घटन्त्र, is सामान्य if regarded as residing in all pots, and is a विशेष if regarded as distinguishing pots from other things. Such seems to have been the original conception, but subsequently सामान्य appears to

have come to be regarded as an attribute having an absolute and not merely a relative existence externally.)

2. In later times सामान्य came to be used synonymously with जाति, and was given an independent and eternal existence apart from the individual objects. This will be clearly seen from the various divisions of सामान्य. *Annambhātta*, following the commentators on Kanāda's aphorisms divides सामान्य into पर and अपर, higher or extensive and lower or non-extensive. The instances are सत्ता (existence) and द्रव्यत्व (substantiality) respectively. Of course the terms पर and अपर are relative only, the same attribute द्रव्यत्व for instance being अपर with respect to सत्ता and पर with respect to घटत्व. Some other writers make a threefold division of सामान्य. The T. A. for example divides सामान्य into व्यापक (widest) e. g. सत्ता, व्याप्ति (narrowest,) e. g. घटत्व and व्याप्त्यव्यापक (middle) e. g. द्रव्यत्व. This division obviously regards the common characteristic as existing in itself and absolutely, while the former two-fold division only sought to fix its relative extent as compared with higher or lower generalities. द्रव्यत्व can be sometimes पर and sometimes अपर, but सत्ता must always be व्यापक, and द्रव्यत्व only व्याप्त्यव्यापक. The terms in the former division were relative; in the latter they are absolute. This is not the place to discuss which division is more consonant with reason, but it may be noted that the latter though apparently simple is beset with difficulties from which the former is free. *Annambhātta* therefore was justified in disapproving of the threefold division, if we may accept the interpretation of the word इति after परमपरं च as given by V. V., which remarks अत्रेतिशब्दस्य स्वसमभिव्याहृत-पदार्थ-तावच्छेदक-परत्वापरत्वरूप-द्विप्रकारवत्सामान्यमिति वाक्यार्थः.

3. सामान्य is again divided into two sorts, अखण्ड and सखण्ड.  
*Jati* and *Upādhi*.  
 The first is otherwise called जाति and is defined as साक्षात्सन्वद्भुत सामान्यम्, that which is directly connected with the thing such as द्रव्यत्व, कर्मत्व etc. The second is called उपाधि and is defined as

परंपरया सम्बद्धम्, indirectly or meditately connected with the object such as प्रभेयत्व, दृष्टित्व etc. Every common characteristic does not constitute a *jāti*. A number of persons might be blind or lame or black, but blindness, lameness or blackness does not constitute an independent class. The circumstances which prevent a common characteristic from becoming a *jāti* are summed up in the following verse of *Udayanācārya* :—

व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः ।

स्वपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिवाधकसंयगः ॥

The circumstances that prevent *generality* from becoming a class are six: (1) Unity of the object, e. g. the sky being one all-pervading thing, there is no *jāti* as आकाशत्व; (2) Identity of things though the names be different, e. g. घटत्व and कलशत्व are not different *jātis* as both words denote the same thing; (3) Cross-division, e. g. भूतत्व and मृतत्व a.e not *jātis* as they constitute cross-divisions, आकाश being भूत and not मृत, and मनस् being मृत but not भूत, while the remaining four, पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजस् and वायु, being both भूत and मृत; (4) Want of finality, e. g. *jāti* itself cannot have *jāti* on it, for in that case, there being *jāti* over *jāti ad infinitum*, there will be no finality; (5) Violation of essence, e. g. the *Visesas* (particularities), though innumerable, cannot have a *jāti* विशेषत्व on them, because by hypothesis they are essentially opposed to the conception of *jāti*; (6) Lastly, want of proper connection prevents *jāti*, e. g. समवायत्व cannot be a *jāti* because, as every *jāti* rests on its आश्रय by समवायसंबन्ध, there cannot be a समवाय on समवाय, and समवायत्व, if accepted as a *jāti*, cannot have any connection with its आश्रय. All these therefore are mere *Upādhīs*. The student will now be able to understand *Annambhāṭṭa's* remark that सामान्य, or more properly its one variety the *jāti*, can rest on *Dravya*, *Guna* and *Karma* only, and cannot rest on the last four *Padārthas*. Even amongst the first three there are many things that cannot have जाति, such as ether, time and space. It will be seen from the above that उपादि is any characteristic which belongs to several individuals, while जाति is only a particular kind of them, fulfilling certain conditions necessary to consti-

tute a proper class. These conditions are implied by their opposites in *Udayana's* verse quoted above. If you take a hundred persons you can arrange them in various groups, as for instance by their nationality, or the language they speak, or the complexion of their body, or by their education. But each of these groups cannot constitute a class, for in that case there will be the absurdity of one person belonging to several classes, and all notions of genus and species will be confounded. Human being is a class because we can at once recognize certain well-marked characteristics which clearly distinguish human beings from all other animals; but blackness cannot be a class, for if it be so we shall have to group black men in the same class as black sheep or black stones. This distinction between जाति and उपाधि is very important and is one of the subtlest discovered by Indian logicians.

### SECT. VII. विशेषः-

*The Individualities or Particularities residing in eternal things are innumerable.*

1. The idea of विशेष, particularity, ( called अन्त्यविशेष by *Kanāda*) is a counterpart of that of सामान्य (generality), as the one necessarily implies the other. In Sect. LXXVIII, *Annam-bhaṭṭa* defines विशेष as residing in eternal substances and serving the purpose of distinguishing them from each other, while this section further tells us that those particularities are innumerable, one being assigned to each eternal substance. A more accurate definition of विशेष is स्वतो व्यावर्तकत्वम्, that which distinguishes self from itself. The peculiarity of a *Viśesa* is that it performs the double function of differentiating one eternal substance from all others, and also that of differentiating itself from other *Viśesas* and everything else. The latter assumption is necessary, because otherwise we shall have to suppose a second *Viśesa* over the first to differentiate it from others and so on *ad infinitum*.

2. The eternal substances in which *Viśeṣas* inhere are the atoms of the first four substances, earth, water, light and air, together with the remaining five substances, ether, time, space, soul, and mind.

3. Other definitions of *Viśeṣa* are जातिरहितव्ये सति नित्यद्रव्यमात्रवृत्तिः, एकमात्रसमवेतव्ये सति! सामान्यशून्यः and अत्यन्तःयावृत्तिहतुः, all of which amount to the same thing, namely, that *Viśeṣa* is a *padārtha* assumed to account for the difference of atoms and other eternal substances from one another. The necessity of this assumption is established by S. C. thus—" घटादीनां कपालसमवेतव्यादिकं पटादिभेदकमस्ति परमाणुनां तु परस्परभेदकं न किञ्चिदस्त्यतोऽनायत्या विशेष आश्रयितव्यः ". A jar is distinguished from a piece of cloth because the component parts of the first are distinct from those of the latter ( अवयवभेदादवयविभेदः ), and so on we may argue until we arrive at the ultimate constituents of matter, namely the atoms. But as an atom has no parts, we cannot account for the distinction of one atom from another by the same process of reasoning. Similarly we cannot account for the mutual distinction of the imperishable substances such as ether, time and space. There is therefore no help ( अनायत्या of S. C. ) but to assume a separate individuality in each of the substances to account for its distinctive character. This individuality is called the विशेष of that substance, and they are as innumerable as the atoms and other eternal substances. It is not right to translate this विशेष by 'difference' or 'differentia,' because the latter words denote the special characteristics of a species as distinguished from genus, while विशेष concerns the individual only.<sup>1</sup>

4. This doctrine of विशेष is supposed to be a peculiar tenet invented by the *Vaiśeṣikas*, and one from which they derive their appellation; but it is singular that the original aphorisms of *Kanāda* do not give much prominence to it. It is referred to

*Why Viśeṣa is  
recognized.*

1. See Bain's Deductive Logic p. 73.

only incidentally as it were, in the *Sūtra* अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः<sup>1</sup> which, while treating of सामान्यं, distinguishes its occasional विशेषवृत्तं<sup>2</sup> from the well-known ultimate *Viśeṣas*, that are called final, because they reside in the final atoms of matter. On this bare reference the commentator *Prāśastapāda* founds the theory of विशेष which is however wholly repudiated by many of the modern *Naiyāyikas* who are otherwise followers of the *Vaiśeṣika* school. They argue that, granting that *Viśeṣas* are necessary to distinguish individual atoms, there must be something else to distinguish the *Viśeṣas* themselves from one another. If however it is said that the latter function is done by the *Viśeṣas* themselves by some peculiar inherent faculty, why not then attribute this inherent faculty to the atoms themselves. If you have to bring in the inherent faculty somewhere, why not suppose it in the individual atom itself and discard the superfluous *Viśeṣa* altogether, rather than first attribute a *Viśeṣa* to the atom and then attribute the inherent faculty of self-distinction to the *Viśeṣa*? The argument is irresistible but not a new one. *Prāśastapāda* the oldest known commentator on *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* already anticipates and answers it thus:—“अथान्यविशेषविवृत्परमाणुषु कस्माक्तं स्वतः प्रत्ययव्याहृतिः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं वा कल्प्यते इति चेत् तादात्म्यात् । इह तादात्म्यनिमित्प्रत्ययो भवति यथा घटादिषु प्रदीपात् । न तु प्रदीपे प्रदीपात् । यथा च श्वर्मांसादीनां स्वत एवाग्नित्वं तयोगादन्येषां तथेहापि तादात्म्यादन्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव प्रत्ययव्याहृतिस्तद्योगान्यरमाणवादिविति<sup>3</sup> ।” The answer however is hardly satisfactory. It is of course scarcely needful to say that the doctrine of *Viśeṣa* is not accepted by other Indian schools of philosophy such as the modern *Naiyāyikas*, the two sections of the *Mīmāṃsakas*—namely, the *Bhāṭṭas* and the *Prābhākaras*, and the *Vedāntins*.

1 V. S. 1, 2, 6.

2 See V. S. 1, 2, 3, and our Note under Sect. VI. on p. 90 *Supra*.

3 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 323.

## SECT. VIII. समवायः

*Intimate Union is one only.*

1. समवाय etymologically means the act of coming together closely, and is therefore used to denote a kind of 'intimate union' between two things which are thereby rendered inseparable so that they cannot be separated without themselves being destroyed. It is therefore more appropriate to translate समवाय by 'intimate union' rather than by co-inherence as Ballantyne has done. *Annambhāṭṭa* defines समवाय in Sect. 79 as 'a permanent connection existing between two things that are always found inseparable'. The समवाय is called नित्य-संबन्ध in contradistinction to संयोग which is a *guṇa* and is always अनित्य. The expression अयुतसिद्ध denotes things one of which is always dependent on the other, as the jar on its components or the quality on the substance. अयुतसिद्ध is the opposite of युतसिद्ध which may be taken to mean either "proved to be joined" or "proved to be separated," according as we take the verb यु in the sense of 'to join' or 'to separate'. In either case the meaning of युतसिद्ध is the same. In the first sense युतसिद्ध means things which are proved to have been actually joined and therefore which must have once existed in a state of separation, while in the latter sense युतसिद्ध simply denotes things which are proved to have once been separated. Those things therefore which are not thus proved, that is, which have never existed in a separate condition, are अयुतसिद्ध. The two halves of a jar were separate before they were joined together; their connection therefore is संयोग which can be destroyed at any moment by separating them again. But the jar never existed and can never exist separately from the two halves; the connection of the jar with the halves is therefore समवाय. These अयुतसिद्ध things are limited in number. In fact there are only five pairs of things between which समवाय is supposed to exist, viz., 1 the product and its parts (अवयवावयविनौ), 2 the quality and the qualified (गुणगुणिनौ), 3 the motion and the moving (क्रियाक्रियावन्ती), 4 the indivi-

dual and the common characteristic ( जातिव्यक्ति ), and lastly 5 particularity and the eternal substance in which it inheres ( विशेषनित्यवृत्ते ). The definition in the *Sūtra* is simpler and less comprehensive इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः,<sup>1</sup> from which it may be inferred that the notion of समवाय was crude at first, and must have been gradually developed by later writers.

2. In Sect. VIII *Annambhāṭṭa* emphatically says that समवाय is one and one only, in order to repudiate the position of the *Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas* and a modern school of *Naiyāyikas*. These latter deny even नित्यत्व to समवाय. The नित्यत्व of समवाय is proved by the argument that as all positive products (भावकार्य) are generated in their material cause by समवाय relation, a समवाय if produced will require another समवाय and so on *ad infinitum*. समवाय therefore must be regarded unproducible *i. e.* नित्य. Of course this नित्यत्व is only relative<sup>\*</sup> and not absolute such as that of an atom. समवाय is नित्य in the sense that it can neither be produced nor destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Now comes the question why this separate entity of समवाय is recognised at all. Here there is a difference of opinion between the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas*, or the old and the modern schools, as S. C. calls them. The former hold that समवाय is observed by perception, and therefore no other proof is required to prove its existence. The *Vaiśeṣikas* however, of whom *Annambhāṭṭa* is one, deny perceptibility to समवाय, on the ground that a connection is perceptible only when the two connected things are perceptible, while समवाय often exists between things one of which (*e. g.* आकाश the समवायकारण of शब्द) may be imperceptible. In their opinion समवाय is proved by inference only, and the argument is often put as *Annambhāṭṭa* has put it in his commentary on Sect. 79.

3. The doctrine of समवाय is very important and may in one sense be said to be the corner-stone of *Nyāya* philosophy. It is the समवाय that explains the phenomenon of causality as conceived by the *Naiyāyikas*; and it is this theory that makes them so intensely realistic, in marked opposition to idealistic schools like the *Vedānta*. The conception of समवाय is in fact a key to the whole theory of causation as viewed from the *Nyāya* standpoint, and consequently the doctrine has been strongly animadverted by writers of the *Sāmkhya* and *Vedāntic* schools who hold different views. The *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas* also agree with the latter in repudiating समवाय. The theory of atoms for which the *Naiyāyikas* have been so famous is but a necessary result of the doctrine of समवाय. Śaṅkarācārya, in his commentary on *Brahma-Sūtra* II. 2. 13, lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the समवाय theory, namely, the inconsistency of calling समवाय a connection between two distinct things, and at the same time regarding it as of a totally different kind from संयोग. If संयोग exists on the संयोगि *dravyas* by समवाय, समवाय also requires another समवाय to exist on the समवायिः; and so there is the absurdity of an *ad infinitum*. To avoid this difficulty समवाय is regarded as a distinct *padārtha* and not a *guṇa* and the *Naiyāyikas* add that the first समवाय does not rest upon the समवायिः by another समवाय but is identical with it. Why then, rejoins the *Vedāntin*, do you not take संयोग to be identical with the संयोगिः. As to संयोग being a *guṇa* and समवाय an independent *padārtha*, says the *Vedāntin*, that is a technicality of your own invention, and we do not accept it. It cannot also be said that समवाय being नित्य is of a different kind from संयोग, and must be treated differently, for संयोग also is sometimes eternal, as for example the संयोग of काल or आकाश with परमाणु, while समवाय itself is not truly eternal, it being liable to destruction by the destruction of the product. But the chief

*The doctrine of  
Samavāya.*

objection against समवाय is that, if समवाय is to be regarded as identical with its कार्य and कारण, would it not be better and simpler (लाघव) to regard the कार्य itself as identical with the कारण? Hence the *Vedāntins* and *Sāṃkhyas* hold the cause and its product to be connected with each other not by समवाय, but by the relation of identity (तादत्त्व). The doctrine of अयुतसिद्ध on which that of समवाय depends is also ruthlessly criticized by Śāṅkarācārya.<sup>1</sup> The gist of his criticism is that the notion of cause and effect being अयुतसिद्ध, that is, being connected together in an inseparable union, is directly opposed to the hypothesis that the cause is always anterior to the effect. As a matter of fact the cause and effect are one and the same thing, and not two different things joined together inseparably by a fictitious union called समवाय. The whole realistic theory of the *Naiyāyikas* is therefore based on a fiction which has no basis in actual experience. This is not the place to go deeper into this controversy which has been vigorously carried on between the rival disputants from the earliest to the latest times; but what has been said will be sufficient to give the student an idea as to how the doctrine of समवाय and the theory of causation built upon it lie at the very root of the whole *Nyāya* system of philosophy.

### SECT. IX अभावः-

*Negation is of four kinds :—Antecedent, Consequent, Absolute, and Reciprocal.*

1. The ninth section only enumerates the four kinds of negations, reserving the definitions of each for a future occasion. They are *antecedent negation* or non-production, *consequent negation* or destruction, *absolute negation*, and *reciprocal negation*. The word *negation* used by Ballantyne conveys the idea of *Abhāva* better than *non-existence*, which is hardly applica-

1 *Brah. Sātra II, 2, 17.*

ble in the case of अन्योन्याभाव. *Antecedent negation* is that which exists before a thing is produced, and the *consequent results after its destruction*. *Absolute negation* exists always and in all places except where the thing itself is. *Reciprocal negation* is the denial of one thing being any other, such as that a jar is not a piece of cloth.

2. Other writers divide अभाव first into two kinds, अन्योन्याभाव and संसर्गाभाव, and then split the latter into the remaining three. Thus *Viśvanātha* says in *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* :

अभावस्तु द्विधा संसर्गान्योन्याभावभेदतः ।  
प्रागभावस्तथा इवसोऽप्यत्यन्ताभाव एव च ॥  
एवं त्रैविध्यमापद्धः संसर्गाभाव इव्यते ।'

Mutual or reciprocal negation may be defined as the negation of identity. All other kinds of negation are grouped under संसर्गाभाव which, literally translated, means negation by contact, the contact being between the thing negated and the thing on which its negation is affirmed. Thus when we say इह भूतले घटो नास्ति we affirm the negation of घट on a particular spot. Similarly the antecedent and the emergent negations also are affirmed with reference to some external अधिकरण, with which they are said to be connected, while अन्योन्याभाव simply denotes the mutual non-identity of two things. In short, in both kinds of अभाव, i.e. संसर्ग and अन्योन्य, there are always two things referred to : but in the first, one is negated of the other, while in the other, both are negated of each other. Thus an अन्योन्याभाव may be resolved into two संसर्गाभाव. For instance घटः पटो नास्ति is a proposition affirming the mutual negation of घट and पट ; and it may be split up into two propositions घटे पटत्वं नास्ति and पटे घटत्वं नास्ति, both of which are examples of संसर्गाभाव. In अन्योन्याभाव the words expressive of the two things are always in the same case, i. e. the nominative ; while in the other case one word is usually in the locative as denoting the अधिकरण on which the negation rests. संसर्गाभाव is divided into प्रागभाव, प्रद्वसाभाव, and अत्यन्ताभाव, of which the first two are nothing but the non-produc-

tion and the destruction, respectively, of a thing. अन्यताभाव is absolute negation, and comprises all varieties other than those mentioned. A discussion as to its exact nature will be found under Sect. 80.

3. The simplest definition of अभाव is भावभिन्न, what is distinct from existing things, but other *Abhāva defined* definitions are more elaborate. S. C. defines अभावत्व as प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनविषयत्वम्, i. e. a *padārtha* the knowledge of which is dependent on the knowledge of its contradictory. S. M. defines it as द्रव्यादिष्टान्योन्याभावत्वम् a *padārtha* in which rest the mutual negations of all the other six *paaṛthas*, i. e. which is distinct from the six categories, substance etc. While really meaning the same as भावभिन्नत्वं, this definition begs the question by inserting अन्योन्यभाव, a sub-variety of अभाव, into the definition of अभाव. It is therefore faulty. A third definition, given in *Sarva-Darsana-Saṅgraha*, is असमवायत्वे सत्यसमवायित्वम्, i. e. अभाव not being itself समवाय is not connected with anything else by समवाय.<sup>1</sup> *Naiyāyikas* hold that अभाव is an object of direct perception and is connected with its अधिकरण by the relation called विशेषणता ; that is, when we say घटाभावद्वृतलम् we regard घटाभाव as an attribute of भृतल, just as we call दण्ड the attribute of दण्डी. This peculiar conception of negation discloses the habit of *Naiyāyikas* to invent any number of fictitious conventionalities, if they are convenient for practical purposes. Really speaking, to class अभाव as a *padārtha* along with the other six is an absurdity. There is not the least resemblance between the two groups, as one is the direct opposite of the other. अभाव can be a *padārtha* only in the most literal sense of the word, namely, the connotation of a word (अभाव), but really speaking it cannot be said to have any external existence. It is *non-existence* pure and simple, and all varieties of it such as the non-existence of this thing and that thing are mere conventionalities of speech. In what respect, for instance, does a घटाभाव differ from a पटाभाव ? Really in nothing essentially, for both agree in their simple

<sup>1</sup> *Sarv. D. S. Calc.* ed. p. 109.

character of negation. But one might say that we find अभाव even where there is a पट, and *vice versa*; and therefore the two negations must be different. But this means that we only attribute the difference of the things (प्रतियोगी) to their negations. In other words, the भेददृढ़ि on the अभाव is simply आरोपित, while as a matter of fact all negation is pure and characterless. It follows that अभाव cannot really be the विशेषण of भूतल, for a विशेषण, in order to be apprehended, must exist, while the essence of अभाव is non-existence. *Vedāntins* and others therefore who refuse to recognize अभाव as a *padārtha* regard it simply as कैवल्यस्त्र, that is, as भूतल itself and nothing more.

4. It seems that the *Vaiśeṣikas* had not originally conceived of अभाव as a separate *padārtha*. *Kṛṇūda's* aphorism<sup>1</sup> enumerates only six *padārthas*, omitting अभाव altogether. But the ingenuity of commentators has added a seventh category अभाव as being intended though not expressed by the *Sūtrakūra*, the intention being gathered from the occurrence of the word अभाव in some other *Sūtras*, such as "कारणमावात् कार्यभावः"<sup>2</sup> and असतः क्रियागुणव्यपेशाभावादर्थन्तरम्.<sup>3</sup> To recognize a separate entity because a word expressive of it occurs somewhere in a work is not indeed a very strong argument. Similarly *Udryanācārya* in his *Kiranāvalī* remarks "एते च पदार्थः (the six mentioned in V. S. I, 1, 3) प्रयानतयोदिटा अभावस्तु स्वरूपवानपि नोदिटः प्रतियोगिनिस्तृपणाधीननिस्तृपणन्वात् न तु तुच्छत्वात्". This is more like an apology for the non-mention of अभाव in the original *Sūtras* than an argument for recognizing it as a separate *padārtha*. Whatever be the case, the recognition of अभाव as an independent entity has been a distinct gain to Indian logic, inasmuch as it has greatly facilitated the processes of analysis and reasoning. Even those who deny it the status of a *padārtha* cannot often help clothing their propositions in its terms. The wonderful accuracy of the Indian syllogism is in a great measure due to the use of such fictitious but well-understood expressions as अभाव, प्रतियोगी and अनुयोगी.

5. Here ends the first chapter of *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, which S. C. names पदार्थोदिशविभागनिरूपणम्. According to the well-known dictum of the scholiast, the *Vaiśeṣika* system consists of three parts, the enumeration, the division and the definitions of *padārthas*. The author of *Tarka-Saṅgraha* first enumerates the *Padārthas* in the second section, and then proceeds to state their divisions and subdivisions in Secs. 3 to 9. From the tenth section onwards he enters upon their definitions or स्वरूपकथन severally, and defines them in the order in which they have been enumerated.

### SECT. X. पृथिवी.

*Earth is that which has odour. It is of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is atomic, non-eternal is product. It is also threefold, body, organ and object. Body is that like ours; organ is the olfactory sense at the tip of the nose; object comprises the earthy stones and the like.*

1. The author defines earth as गन्धवती 'having odour,' which means गन्धसमवायिकारणम्, the intimate cause of odour.<sup>1</sup> The relation expressed by the termination वत् here is समवाय only, for otherwise the definition will overlap on *time* and *space*, with which गन्ध is connected by कालिक and देशिक relations respectively. Besides the apparent अतिव्यापि on *time* and *space*, the T. D. notices three other objections against the definition : 1st, it will not apply to a product which, being composed of parts having both good and bad smells, is rendered odourless owing to the two kinds of smell being mutually destroyed ; nor can it be said that in that case perception of odour is rendered impossible. You will have therefore, says the opponent, either to recognize a चित्रगन्ध 'variegated odour,' which you do not, or your definition will be inapplicable to such a case. The author denies both alternatives, saying that in such cases we can distinctly apprehend the different odours of component parts, and so there is no need of recognizing one variegated odour of the whole. The second objection is the same as in the case of युणवत्त्र as

a definition of *Dravya*, viz. that it will not apply to a product in the first moment of creation, when it is supposed to be without attribute. The answer to the present objection is also the same, viz. amplification of the definition (p. 77). The third objection is drawn from our experience that even water and other substances besides earth possess smell. The answer is that the smell belongs not to the water but to earthly particles mixed with it. There is a fourth objection which the author does not notice. We see many earthly things such as stones which are odourless, and the definition may not apply to them; but the answer would be that the smell in them is अनुदृत, that is, though existing, it is not perceived owing to unfavourable circumstances.

2. Although odour is mentioned as the differentiating attribute of earth it is not its only attribute.

*Its attributes.* *Kaṇāda's* aphorism स्परसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी describes earth as possessing four qualities, colour, savour, odour and touch, which Śāṅkara Miśra construes as giving four alternative definitions of earth. Besides these four material qualities, earth is credited with ten others, making in all 14 qualities residing in earth, for which see quotation *Supra*. p. 85.

3. Four copies A B D and K add तत्र before गन्धवती, but the *pratikas* in all the copies of *Dipikā* except A, as well as that in S. C. show that the sentence began with गन्धवती, and that the तत्र got into the text by error, probably from the opening sentence of the *Dipikā*. The तत्र in the *Dipikā* is explained by *Nilakantha* as पृथिव्यादेषु ( नवद्रव्येषु ) मध्य इत्यर्थः.

4. Earth is first divided into eternal and non-eternal: the first being atomic, and the second a product. T.D. defines नित्यत्व as ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम्, its contrary ध्वंसप्रातयोगित्वम् being अनित्यत्व.

*Earth eternal and non-eternal.* That which is not liable to destruction is eternal, and its opposite is the non-eternal. These definitions of T. D. are however incomplete. *Vākyavṛtti* defines नित्यत्व and अनित्यत्व more correctly, as नित्यत्वं प्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वे सति ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् and

अनित्यत्वं प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वध्वं सप्रतियोगित्वान्यतरवत्वं बोध्यम्. The T. D. does not take into account past as well as future eternity, and consequently its definition of नित्यत्व overlaps on प्रध्वंसाभाव which, being indestructible, is ध्वंसाप्रतियोगी, but which is not नित्य as it has प्रागभाव. There are some however who regard ध्वंस as eternal; and according to them T.D.'s definitions will be correct. नित्यत्व is also defined in another and a simpler way as ब्रह्मालिक-संसर्गवच्छिन्नत्व, "being distinguished by a connection with the three times, past, present and future", i. e. existing in all times. Whichever definition we take, products are always अनित्य as they do not exist prior to their production. The eternal portion of earth is the atoms which are the ultimate material causes of all earthy products. The atomic theory of the *Vaisesikas* will be explained later on. (See note Sect. XIII).

5. Earth is again divided into three kinds, body, organ  
*Another division.* of sense and mass. The body is that which belongs to human beings like ourselves; the organ is that of smell which apprehends odour and is situated at the root of the nose; while mass comprehends all other earthy things, such as stones etc. This threefold division of earth is very ancient, being derived from the aphorism of *Kanāda*.<sup>1</sup> But there is a difference of opinion as to whether this threefold division is of पृथिवी in general or of कार्यरूपा पृथिवी only; and the controversy, so far as we are concerned, turns partially, if not mainly, on the correct reading of the passage in *Tarka-Saṅgraha*. A reads सा उनान्निविधि, but as all other copies of the text as well as the commentaries agree in omitting सा before उनः there was no alternative but to omit it here also. The reading सा can be defended on the ground that by unmistakably applying the threefold division to कार्यरूपा पृथिवी it makes the meaning of the passage clear, and thus brings the text into harmony, not only with other works like P. B., S. P., S. M., and others, but also with *Kanāda's* aphorism तत्युनः पृथिव्यादि कार्यद्रव्यं विविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम्.<sup>2</sup> The word सा however is not absolutely necessary, since S. C. extracts the same sense out of the word उनः. The chief objection against सा, as also

against the interpretation put on the passage by S. C. to make it conform with the works mentioned above, is that the interpretation does not agree with T. D.'s note on the passage प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते. The remark apparently shows that the three-fold division is not a sub-division of one of the two kinds of पृथिवी first mentioned, namely कार्यस्था, but an altogether independent division of पृथिवी itself. Having divided earth into eternal and non-eternal, the author mentions another division of the same according to its forms and functions. But here comes the question, does Annambhaṭṭa say something which is in direct opposition to Kanāda's Sūtra? The Sūtra distinctly ascribes the three-fold division to product earth only: and the scholiast Praśastapāda also clearly states his opinion by remarking विविधं चास्याः कार्यं। शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम्।<sup>1</sup> Annambhaṭṭa, by taking in the whole earth (eternal and non-eternal), would be plainly contradicting the Sūtra and the scholiast, which is highly improbable as the present work is distinctly based on Praśastapāda's scholium. As a matter of fact, whichever interpretation we take, the ultimate result, as observed by Nilakanṭha, is the same, namely, that laid down in the Sūtra. Nilakanṭha noticing these two ways of interpretation remarks अत्र नित्यपृथिव्या-शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नत्वरूपविषयलक्षणाकांतनेन विषयांतर्गतत्वमिति पृथिव्याभिविधत्व-मत एव मूले पुनर्भिविधेयत्वुक्तिः संगच्छत इति ध्येयम्. Even if the three-fold division be ascribed to पृथिवी in general, it does not apply to नित्या पृथिवी, that is, atoms, as all the atoms obviously fall into the third of the latter three divisions i. e. विषय. In other words, नित्या पृथिवी instead of being the genus of the latter three kinds becomes a variety of one of them. In this way the passage in T. D. can be made to agree with the Sūtra, and both views reconciled.

6. शरीर is defined as आत्मनो भोगायतनम्, but a more accurate definition is अन्त्यावयवित्वं सति चेष्टाश्रयम्, that is, a final product which possesses voluntary action. अन्त्यावयवित्वं is defined as अवयवज-

*The three varieties  
of the earth*

न्यत्वे सत्यवद्यजनकत्वम्, a thing which is produced from parts but does not itself become a producer of another product, such as a jar. Our body is such a final product, because it does not

*Body.* constitute a part of any other larger product; and it possesses the additional character of being the seat of voluntary actions. चेष्टा

is defined as हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थक्रिया an act which conduces to the acquisition of the desirable and prevention of the undesirable. A hand or a foot is also the seat of such चेष्टा, but it is not a final product as it forms a part of a larger body. Body is divided into योनिन् embryonic, and अयोनिन् non-embryonic. The first is शुकशोणितमेलनजन्य and belongs to human beings, quadrupeds, birds etc. The second kind is possessed by insects born of perspiration, plants and semi-divine personages, like the sage *Manu*, who were self-born owing to the influence of अहृष्ट. This classification comprehends the whole Biology of the *Naiyāyikas*.

7. The second division of earth is organ of sense, which is also limited to animate nature. इन्द्रिय is

*Organ.* defined as शब्देतरोऽन्तत्रिशेषसूणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः संयोगाश्रयम्. "An organ of sense is

the seat of that contact of mind which produces knowledge, but is not the seat of any manifested special qualities except sound." The *Naiyāyika* theory of perception is given by S. C. thus:—आत्मा मनसा संसृज्यते मन इन्द्रियेणेन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षम्. "The organ is united with the external object on the one hand and is on the other connected with the mind which acts as a link with the soul." So the contact of the mind is with two things at once, viz. the soul and the organ, and both are the causes of knowledge. The first part of the definition ending with सति is therefore inserted to exclude the soul, which is the seat of 14 special qualities,<sup>1</sup> while the organ of sense possesses none. But then one might object that as the organs of sense such as smell and sight partake of the nature of their respective constituents, viz., earth and light, they must possess odour and colour, the special qualities of

1. See quotation p. 85-86 *Supra*.

earth and light. The answer is that they do possess them, but the qualities are not manifested in them, and hence the word उद्भूत is inserted to qualify विशेषण. In this form however the definition becomes too narrow, because it does not apply to श्रोत्र, the organ of hearing, which being by hypothesis आकाशस्वरूप possesses one उद्भूतविशेषण viz. शब्द. This defect is removed by excluding शब्द (शब्देतर) from the special qualities that are not manifested in an organ of sense. In this way the definition is made to denote an organ alone. Other and perhaps simpler definitions of इन्द्रिय are शरीरसंयुक्त ज्ञानकारण-मतीन्द्रियम्<sup>1</sup> and स्मृत्यजनक-ज्ञानजनक-मनःसंयोगश्चयत्वम्<sup>2</sup>. In the first of these अतीन्द्रिय excludes the Soul and external objects, while शरीरसंयुक्तम् excludes निविकल्पज्ञान which being अतीन्द्रिय is the proximate cause of सविकल्पज्ञान. In the second definition the words स्मृत्यजनक exclude the Soul. इन्द्रिय is of two kinds, the internal (अन्तरिन्द्रिय) which is mind, and the external (बहिरिन्द्रिय) which are five, viz. the organs of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, corresponding to the five elements. Of these the organs of smell, taste and hearing apprehend qualities only, while the rest apprehend substances as well as qualities.)

8. The third devision of earth is विषय object, which comprehends the whole mass of inorganic substances. The term विषय is used here somewhat loosely. It signifies everything that

at any time becomes the object of our knowledge. Organs of sense not being objects of direct preception may perhaps be excluded from the class विषय, but organic bodies, at least of all the living beings beside ourselves, do become the objects of perception and ought therefore to fall under विषय. One's own body being subjective (आध्यात्मिक) may be ranked apart, but the bodies of other persons are as much objects of knowledge as houses or stones. Why then should they not be included under विषय ? The reason is that the word विषय is used here in a restricted sense. It

1 T. K. p. 3.

2 Tattva-Cintāmaṇi.

means those things only which are always the objects and never the subjects of knowledge. The bodies of living beings though objects of other men's knowledge are subjective so far as each individual is concerned, while inanimate things like stones not having any knowledge of their own must always remain objects and objects only.) This point does not seem to have been clearly understood by commentators, although the difficulty was perceived by them. S. C. for instance remarks "यदेत्तद्वक्षणं शरीरादावतिव्याप्तिमिति विभाव्यते तदा शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नत्वमेव तदनुसरम् । वर्तुतस्तु शरीराद्विक्षमपि विषय एव । भेदेन कीर्तनं तु बालधीवैश्वाय," that is, although the three-fold division is a cross-division in as much as the usual definition of विषय (भोगोपयोगी विषयः) would also apply to bodies and organs, the latter are classed separately for the clear understanding of beginners. This explanation of S. C. is of course copied from a similar one in *Muktāvalī* : शरीरेन्द्रिययोविषयत्वेऽपि प्रकाान्तरोपन्यासः शिष्य-कुद्धैवश्यार्थः.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to guess how such a cross-division tends to the easy comprehension of beginners, but probably these commentators, while noting that body and organ are expressly excluded from विषय, did not quite realize why the meaning of the word विषय was thus restricted. It is also significant that *Annambhāṭṭa* defines विषय simply as शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नः, and thus carefully abstains from any reference to भोग or उपभोग.

9. There are two other questions with regard to the extent of the class विषय which cannot be so easily answered. The first is whether atoms are included in विषय. The definition भोगोपयोगी would of course exclude them, for atoms being अतीन्द्रिय can never be the objects of enjoyment. Besides other works expressly exclude them. *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* for instance has:—

विषयो द्वचणुकादिश्च ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहृतः ॥<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, as observed in a previous note (*Supra* p. 106) *Annambhāṭṭa* would seem to include atoms under विषय, and the fact that he gives a definition of विषय which

<sup>1</sup> S. M. Cal. ed. p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> B. P. 37.

applies to atoms as well as products supports the conjecture. The second question is whether plants are to be classed with शरीर or with विषय. The question seems to have very much exercised later writers, and there is a difference of opinion. *Praśastapāda* includes trees under विषय,<sup>1</sup> while *Viśvanātha*, the author of *Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*, declares in favour of the opposite view.<sup>2</sup> Śaṅkara Miśra discusses the arguments on both sides and arrives at the only reasonable conclusion, तथापि चेष्टावत्त्वमिन्द्रियवत्त्वं च नोद्दिदां रुट्टरमतो न शरीरत्वबहारः.<sup>3</sup> *Annam-bhatta* also would seem to take the same view.

## SECT. XI. आपः.

*Water is a thing having cold touch. It is of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is atom, non-eternal is the product. It is again three-fold, body, organ, and object. Body is in the region of Varuṇa, organ is the sense of taste perceiving savour and residing on the tip of the tongue ; masses are rivers, seas etc.*

1. Water is defined as having cool touch. Like earth, water is divided, first into eternal and non-eternal, and then into body, organ and mass. The watery body is possessed by beings in the regions of *Varuṇa*, the organ is the organ of taste located at the tip of the tongue, and the mass comprehends rivers, oceans etc. This and the following paragraph on light closely resemble the last one treating of earth, and appear to have been inserted with an eye to symmetry. They are good examples of how a passion for analogies and symmetry in everything often leads to unwarranted and absurd conclusions. Because we see earthy bodies and earthy atoms, we are also asked to believe in watery and luminary bodies as well as atoms in the *Varuṇa* and *Āditya* regions respectively. *Kanāda* defines water as रूपरसस्पर्शवत्य आपो द्रवाः स्त्रिग्धाः,<sup>4</sup> and al-

1. P. B. Ben. ed. p. 23.

2. S. M. Cal. ed. p. 26.

3. V. S. Up. Cal. ed. p. 214.

4. V. S. II, I, 2.

so affirms the coldness of the touch of water,<sup>1</sup> but it is singular that no trace of the subsequent classification is found in his *Sūtras*. These details in the case of water as well as of light have been supplied by commentators, whose dialectical ingenuity never fails to supply arguments for defending the grossest absurdities. The objection, for instance, that a watery body having no solidity, would be like a bubble of water, incapable of enjoyment, is met by the reply that though such a body would be mainly composed of watery particles, there would be enough of earthy atoms in it to add consistency and cohesion. This watery body is held to be only अयोनिज्. Another objection that if coldness is the special attribute of water how is it felt in slabs of stone, is answered by attributing the coldness to the presence of water in the stone. The remarks made in the three preceding notes on the last section as to the propriety of the division and cross-division, apply *mutatis mutandis* to this and the following sections also. For the qualities residing in water see quotation at p. 85 *Supra*.

### SECT. XII द्वेषस्.

*Light has hot touch. It is of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal; eternal is atomic, non-eternal is product. It is again threefold, body, organ and mass; body is well-known in the Solar region, organ is the sight which perceives colour and resides in the forepart of the black pupil of the eye; mass is fourfold, earthy, heavenly, gastric and mineral. Earthy (mass) is fire and the like; heavenly is lightning etc. produced from watery fuel; gastric causes digestion of things eaten; mineral is gold and the like.*

1. The only variation in this section over the last two is  
the sub-division of विषय into four kinds of  
*Light.* light; 1 earthy, in the shape of common  
fire and the light of the glowworm; 2 cele-

tial, in the shape of lightning which is fed by the fuel of water (आप इन्धनं यस्य तत्), as well as sun-light, moon-light and submarine fire; 3 gastric, which is instrumental in digesting the food eaten; and 4 mineral, such as gold and other metals. The first two kinds are undoubtedly real fires; but it will re-

1. V. S. II, 2, 5.

quire a very strong metaphor to class the latter two among the luminary substances. The gastric juice is called fire because it consumes food like fire, and produces heat in the body. The last case of luminous metals will be discussed further on.

2. The threefold division of light and the four-fold subdivision of its third variety are taken from

*Varieties of lustre.* *Praśastapāda's* scholium, while the original *Sūtras* themselves contain no trace of them. Śaṅkara Miśra, the author of *Upas-*

*kāra* gives another four-fold division of light, viz., 1 having colour and touch manifested, as sun-light; 2 having colour manifested but touch unmanifested, as moon-light; 3 having both colour and touch slightly unmanifested, as the lustre of the eye; 4 having colour slightly unmanifested, but touch fully manifested, as a red-hot postsherd.<sup>1</sup> This division is of course not compatible with the first, and proves that the symmetrical classification adopted by *Annambhatta* was regarded by Śaṅkara Miśra as an innovation of the Scholiast not reconcilable with the original *Sūtra*. It may be remarked in passing that the organ of sight is located by *Naiyāyikas* at the top of the black ball, but modern science places it still further back on the retina, the black eye-balls being simply windows to let in external light. Another now exploded doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* was that before an object could be perceived, the organ of sight went out of the eye, reached the object and then returned back to its place carrying with it the impression of the object; while it is now proved that the organ does not go out at all but the rays of the sun falling on the object carry its impression to the retina of the eye.

3. *Naiyāyikas* have spent much argument to prove why

*Gold is light.* gold and other metals are classed under light. The argument by which the luminosity (तेजस्त्व) of gold is established is explained at length in T. D. Gold is light because it

can neither be earth, nor water, nor wind. Its being any of the last five *dravyas* is of course out of the question. Gold is not earth because the fluidity of melted

1. V. S. Up. Cal. Ed. p. 74.

gold is not destroyed even by application of extreme heat, while the fluidity of earthy things such as clarified butter is generally found to vanish at certain temperature when there is no counteracting force. The fluidity of gold remains intact even in the absence of any counteracting force. Gold cannot therefore be of earthy nature. It cannot be water because its fluidity is occasional and not inherent; nor can it be wind as it has colour. Gold therefore is light, the heat and brilliancy natural to light being concealed by the obstruction of earthy colour and touch. The argument may be put in the following syllogism:—

सुवर्णं तैजसम् । असाति प्रतिबन्धकेऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगे च सत्यप्यनुचित्य-  
मानद्रवत्वत्वात् । यज्ञैवं तत्त्वैवं, यथा घृतम् ।

The fallacy or rather a number of fallacies in this reasoning can be easily detected. In the first place, the proposition that the fluidity of every earthy substance must be destroyed by extreme heat is an arbitrary assumption based on insufficient data. Modern science proves that the solidity and fluidity are not definite qualities belonging to particular kind of substances as the *Naiyāyikas* hold; but they are simply states of matter dependent on temperature. Thirdly the device of accounting for the non-appearance of any quality by the supposition of a counteracting force is often, as here, carried rather too far. If obstructing causes can explain the disappearance of heat and brilliancy of light, why can they not explain the non-destruction of the fluidity of gold? To remove this objection the words असाति प्रतिबन्धके are introduced in the हेतुवाक्य, for we often see that when there is an obstructing cause, even earthy substances, such as ghee placed in water, do not lose their fluidity. But how is it to be proved that there is no obstructing cause in the case of gold also? The difficulty of converting metals to gaseous state by the application of strongest possible heat seems to have struck the Indian thinkers early, but owing to the infancy of experimental sciences they did not wait to verify their conceptions of solidity and fluidity. They rather preferred the easier way of solving the difficulty by relegating these apparent exceptions to a different category altogether.

ther. The *Nāiyāyikas* included the metals under तेजस् to which their peculiar lustre gave them affinity. The *Mīmāṃsakas* went further and reckoned the metals as a distinct *dravya*.

### SECT. XIII. वायुः.

*Air has touch without colour. It is of two sorts eternal and non-eternal; eternal is atomic, non-eternal is product. It is again threefold, body, organ and mass; body is in the aerial world, organ is the sense of touch, apprehending touch and spread over the whole body, mass is the cause of the shaking of trees etc.*

*Air circulating within the body is Prāṇa. Though one, it acquires different names such as Prāṇa, Apāna, etc. owing to (different) situations.*

1. This section also is modelled on the three last preceding Air. Air is defined as colourless and possessing touch. It is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal, and again of three kinds, body in the regions of wind, organ of sense in the shape of the airy cuticle extending over the whole surface of our body, and object or mass in the form of the wind that blows and shakes trees.

2. Another variety of air is however mentioned, called Breath. vital air or breath, which is nothing but wind moving inside our body. There is a difference of opinion as to how breath is to be classed under wind. *Praśastapāda* and the ancient school mention breath as a fourth kind of air and distinct from the body, organ, and mass; while later works on *Nyāya* generally include it under mass. It is doubtful what view *Annambhaṭṭa* takes, but from the unconnected manner in which he has tacked the definition of प्राण to the section on वायु, he seems to be undecided. While he divides वायु into three kinds only, and not into four as *Praśastapāda* has done, he does not expressly class प्राण under विषय. In the *Dīpikā* also he carefully avoids the point, although the अवतरण “ननु प्राणस्य कुञ्चन्तर्भावः” would seem to show that he

had to say something on the point. He gives however a decided opinion as to the identity of the five breaths. Although प्राण is mentioned as one of the five breaths, it can

also be used as a generic name for all of  
them, as the remaining four are nothing  
more than the same प्राण called by  
different names, according to the different parts of body  
it travels over and the different functions it performs.  
There are not really five breaths but only one passing  
through five places and performing five functions, each at its  
proper place. Praśastapāda simply says क्रियमेदादिभिरपानादि-  
संज्ञां लभते, the first word आदि including स्थान. Annambhatta has  
improved upon him by employing the word उपाधि which sig-  
nifies both क्रिया and स्थान. The exact meaning of उपाधि will  
be discussed further on. The five breaths are differentiated by  
their places in an old verse :—

हृदि प्राणो घुणे उपानः समानो नामेसंस्थितः ।  
उदानः कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ॥

*Prāṇa* is situated in the breast, *Apāna* in the rectum, *Samāna* in the navel, *Udāna* in the throat and *Vyāna* over the whole body.

The functions and names of the five are explained thus:-  
मुखनासिकाभ्यां निष्क्रमणप्रवेशनात्प्राणः । मलादीनामधोनयनादपानः । आहा-  
रेणु पाकार्थे वह्ने: समुक्तयनात्समानः । उद्धर्वे नयनादुदानः । नाडीमुखेणु वितन-  
नाद्व्यानः । These five breaths also bear mythological  
names:—

उद्गारे नाम आस्त्वातः कूर्म उन्मीलने स्थृतः ।  
कृकरः क्षुकरो ज्ञेयो देवदत्तो विजूभ्यमाणः ।  
न जहाति मृतं चापि सर्वव्यापी धनंजयः ॥

As the whole of this peculiarly *Pauranic* physiology has been imported into modern *Nyāya* works it cannot be totally ignored, but it is not necessary to dwell on it here any further. It may be noted, however, as a good example how Indian systematists often imported foreign material into their systems, and reconciled it as far as possible with their fundamental doctrines.

3. Air has been defined as devoid of colour, and possessing touch; the first epithet distinguishes it from the first three and the second epithet from the last five *dravyas*. The touch in the air is again neither hot nor cool, and therefore different from the touch in light or water. Air thus occupies a somewhat middle and ambiguous position between the visible and the invisible *dravyas*; and consequently a hot discussion has been carried on between the ancient and the modern schools of *Naiyāyikas* as to whether air is perceptible or not. The ancients held that air cannot be perceived but can only be known by inference ; and *Annambhatta* inclines to the same view. The argument, says T. D., that air is perceptible like a jar , as it possesses perceptible touch, is wrong, because manifested colour is a necessary condition precedent to perceptibility. A condition (उपाधि) is defined as साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकः, that which is greater in extent than साध्य (the thing to be proved) but is not more extensive than the साधन or हेतु ( reason ). In a good syllogism the साध्य must always be greater than, or at least equal in extent to, the हेतु, e. g. the साध्य fire should always exist wherever there is smoke, the हेतु. When however the हेतु is greater in extent than the साध्य, there are necessarily found cases where the हेतु exists but the साध्य does not ; and consequently an argument based on that हेतु becomes fallacious. These cases are due to an उपाधि. Now let us put the above argument in a syllogism, and the उपाधि will at once appear :—

वायुः प्रत्यक्षः  
प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शश्रयत्वात्  
या यो द्रव्यत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शश्रयः स स प्रत्यक्षः यथा घटः ।  
तथा चायम् ।  
तस्मान्यथा ।

Here हेतु is सोपाधिक because there is an उपाधि intervening between the हेतु and the साध्य. The उपाधि is उद्भूतस्पवद् ( the state of having manifested colour) and is of course greater in extent than the साध्य and less than the साधन. The उपाधि is greater than the साध्य because we can say यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्य-

प्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोऽनुतस्यपवच्चम्, all substances visible to external senses have manifested colour. The words द्रव्य and बहिरनिदिय are used in order to make it clear that we are talking of sensuous perception of substances only, and thus to exclude आत्मा and perceptible qualities like स्वप्न. We cannot however assert यत्र यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शात्रयत्वं तत्रोऽनुतस्यपवच्चं, wherever there is tangibility there is manifested colour, because we know as a fact that air though प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शात्रय does not possess उद्भूतस्य. The उपाधि is therefore साधनाव्यापक. On account of its existence the व्याप्ति or major premise becomes too extensive, and the whole argument is a fallacy. Separated from its technicalities, the above reasoning amounts to this. According to the hypothesis of the ancient *Naiyāyikas* the term प्रत्यक्षत्व has a narrower meaning and is exclusively applied to the cases of ocular perception. Hence substances and qualities that are apprehended by other senses but are not seen by the eye do not become objects of perception. In this restricted sense of प्रत्यक्ष, namely ocular perception, it is evident that उद्भूतस्यपवच्च must be a necessary condition and that air which has no स्वप्न cannot be perceptible.

The modern *Naiyāyikas*, who affirm the perceptibility of air, deny this *in toto*, because they deny the very hypothesis that बहिर्दृश्यप्रत्यक्षत्व is confined to ocular perception only. Their view is explained by S. C. as being बहिर्दृश्यप्रत्यक्षं प्रति महत्वविशिष्ट-विभूत्यावृत्त- विशेषणः महत्वविशिष्टोऽनुतस्यपैद्युतःपद्माः दत्तद्वा करणम्, that is everything is perceptible that possesses some special quality having महत्व but not विभूत्य, as for instance manifested colour or manifested touch, combined with magnitude. On this hypothesis modern *Naiyāyikas* regard air as perceptible, as it is the object of स्पर्शन, as opposed to चाक्षुष, प्रत्यक्ष, but atoms are not, because they have no magnitude. *Anambhatta* holds the ancient view and regards air as inferable only.

4. The inference to prove the existence of वायु is stated at length in T. D. The not-hot-not-cold touch which we feel on the blowing of the wind must reside in some substance as it is a quality, because the व्याप्ति, यो यो इष्टः स स किञ्चिद्द्रव्याश्रयः is universally true. Now the touch cannot reside in earth, because all earthly matter having manifested touch has also manifested colour which is not found here. The touch cannot also reside in water or light, because it is neither cold nor hot. It cannot reside in the four all-pervading substances, ether, time, space and soul, for if it did, it ought to be found everywhere. Finally it cannot rest in mind, because mind being atomic, any quality residing in it cannot be felt. So there must be a ninth substance, different from these, where this touch may reside, and that substance we call air.

It is not necessary to criticise the above reasoning, because it is too evidently founded on a total ignorance of the nature of atmosphere as determined by modern physical science. The idea that our atmosphere is a mixture of different gases and not one uniform वायु, and that it has several distinguishing properties besides touch and other 'special qualities,' never occurred to these Indian physicists. Roughly speaking, पृथिवी, जल and वायु of the *Naiyāyikas* may be identified with the three states of matter, solid, fluid and gaseous, while तेजस् is a sort of material embodiment of the energy of heat. The Hindu physicist most probably did not know that heat and luminosity are the results of the same kind of chemical action. Luminosity or भास्वरागुणकरूप was classed as a variety of colour, while औदय was a kind of touch.

5. As air is the last of the four tangible *dravas* which are divided into eternal and non-eternal, the T. D. takes occasion to state the *Nyāya* theory of creation and destruction of material things. Motion is first produced in the atoms as a result of God's will. This motion produces conjunction of two monads giving birth to a diad. Three diads or binary atoms make one tertiary. From this last is produced the quadrilateral, and so on, until the great masses of earth, and water, and light, and atmosphere are formed.

*How world is created,*

6. The destruction of things takes place in the same order, that is, when God wills to destroy effects, motion is produced dividing the monads, and thereby destroying the binary.

*Process of destruction.*

Thence follows the destruction of the tertiary, and so on, until the mass of earth becomes extinct. This is the process of creation and destruction which is unanimously accepted by all *Naiyāyikas*; but there is a difference of opinion between the ancient and the modern schools as to the precise cause which immediately brings about the destruction of things. The old traditionists (*स्प्रदाय*) held that with one exception the destruction of effects is immediately brought about by the destruction of their causes, the exception being the binaries which are destroyed, not by the destruction of their causes, i. e. the monads which are indestructible, but by the destruction of the *union* of the monads or primary atoms. In other words, the binaries are destroyed by the dissolution, and the subsequent products by the destruction, of the parts composing them. The dissolution of parts no doubt occurs in the latter cases also, but there it is itself the result of the destruction of parts. The moderns object to this multiplicity of causes on the ground that it is simpler (*लाभ*) to assume only one uniform cause in all cases, namely, the dissolution of the union binding the parts, than to suppose one cause for the binaries and another for other effects. In their opinion, therefore, there is only one cause for the destruction of all effects, namely the dissolution of the union which is the अनमवापि कारण or non-intimate cause of the product.

7. The difference between the two views is much more radical than appears at first. According to the former view, the process of destruction always proceeds from cause to effect i. e. the destruction of parts always precedes the destruction of effect. When the monads are separated, the binaries are necessarily destroyed, and the destruction of the latter as necessarily involves the destruction of the tertiaries. In this manner the final product is destroyed the last just as it is the

*Criticism of the  
two processes  
of destruction.*

last to be produced. Now this is diametrically opposed to the view held by other schools of Indian philosophers, especially the *Vedāntins*. *Fādārāyāra* in *Brahma-Sūtra* II, 3, 14 expressly says that the process of destruction is just the opposite of that of creation ; that is, the final product is destroyed first, then its parts, then their parts respectively, until we arrive at the ultimate causes. In other words, destruction is accomplished by the successive resolution of things into their components. This is in accordance with the rule warranted by our experience that analysis or division proceeds in a contrary way to synthesis or composition, whilst the *Naiyāyika* theory lays down that the building and the pulling down processes are accomplished exactly in the same way. This means that as we build a house from the foundation to the top, we should pull it down in the same order. This is certainly an impossibility ; for, as *Sāṅkarācārya* in his commentary on the above mentioned *Irmasūtra* justly points out, if the destruction of effect follows that of parts, there must be an interval when the parts have vanished but the effect remains. Where could the effect reside in this interval? Not on the intermediate parts which are already extinct, nor on the ultimate atoms between which and the final effect there is no direct connection. The existence of the effect in the absence of the parts is as absurd as it would be impossible to take away the foundation of a house without bringing down the roof. The theory of destruction laid down by the ancient *Naiyāyikas* is therefore opposed to reason as well as experience. But the view of the moderns is not so inconsistent with the natural order of things. Their theory that destruction of effects is produced by the dissolution of the union of parts is equally reconcilable with the old *Naiyāyika* doctrine and the Vedantic doctrine, according as we conceive the process of destruction to begin from the non-intimate cause of व्यष्टिक and end with that of the final product, or vice versa. The old *Naiyāyika* theory is positively opposed to the order of nature, while the modern is reconcilable with it.

8. The *Naiyāyikas* accept the old mythological idea of two cosmic dissolutions, an अवांतरप्रलय ( intermediate dissolution ) when all tangible products only are destroyed, and a महाप्रलय ( universal dissolution ) when all things, material and immaterial, are merged in the *primum mobile*, that is, the atoms. These periodical creations and destructions, says T. D., are proved on the authority of the *Sruti* text यता यथा-पूर्वमकल्पयत्, 'the Creator made the creation as before,' the word 'before' implying that there was a previous creation of which the present one is a copy.

9. This is a convenient place for an explanation of the

*The doctrine of atoms.* *Naiyāyika परमाणुवाद* or Indian atomic theory, as it is essentially connected with the evolution and ultimate form of the first

*First proof for the existence of atoms.*

four substances. The *Nyāya* theory of creation and destruction as explained above presupposes the existence of atoms, while the division of earth, water, light and air, into eternal and non-eternal is founded on the same fact. T. D. therefore properly asks and answers here the question what is the proof for the existence of these atoms on which so large a part of *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines seems to be based. The argument briefly put by T. D. may be explained thus: Every visible thing is composed of parts, for a thing in order to be visible must have three dimensions, length, breadth and thickness; and these dimensions necessarily presuppose smaller parts. A line has length because it is a succession of many points, while a surface has length and breadth because it is a series of lines placed side-ways. A mathematical point on the other hand having no dimension can never be perceived and is really speaking nothing but a notion. Having established this universal and self-evident proposition that every visible thing has parts ( यत्र यत्र चाक्षुषद्व्यत्वं तत्र साव्यवत्वं यथाप्ते ), we get the further axiom, also proved by experience, that every object having parts is divisible into any number of smaller parts. From these two axioms we

come to the conclusion that by gradually dividing and subdividing a thing howsoever large we can arrive at particles as minute as we please. But the same experience which gives us the above two self-evident axioms puts a limit to our power of division, and we find that beyond a certain limit we cannot go on dividing a particle *ad infinitum*) In modern times Chemistry has increased this power of division largely but still it is not indefinite, and science is forced to assume a limit on which it bases all its calculations. This limit is the परमाणु of *Nyāya* and the atom of European scientists, the smallest of the small, and the ultimate constituent of all matter in the universe. Human mind cannot think without having some purely simple notions which it combines into complex ideas, and these simple notions must have their counterparts, such as the atoms, in the external world. This is the genesis of the atomic theory, and the *Nyāyika* argument to prove the existence of परमाणु is essentially the same, although clothed in the phraseology of their peculiar dogmas. The smallest visible particle is the mote in the sunbeam which is called अणुक, ब्रह्मणु, or द्रुटि, that is, a tertiary atom. This mote being visible must have parts. Each of these parts again, called इच्छुक, is divisible into smaller parts because it produces the large magnitude in the ब्रह्मणु, just as the thread of a large piece of cloth is itself divisible. To explain this it must be noted here that in *Nyāya* theory the महत्त्व, magnitude, is a distinct species of dimension from अनुत्त्व, and cannot therefore be produced from it. If द्रुटि had no parts and were itself the ultimate particle, its अनुत्त्व would have been incapable of producing the महत्त्व of इच्छुक: while by assuming a further subdivision of इच्छुक into two atoms, we can account for the magnitude of इच्छुक by saying that it is the number of atoms composing the binaries forming a इच्छुक, and not their अनुत्त्व, that gives rise to the latter's magnitude. It is for this reason that while two atoms make one binary molecule three binaries are thought necessary to make up a tertiary. The number two only intensifies in the product the परिमाण of

each part; and thus the compound of two binaries, which are अणु, would be अणुतर i. e. still more minute, and not महत्र as the व्यष्टक really is. Therefore the number of binaries composing the व्यष्टक is fixed at three to account for its magnitude, while, no such reason existing in the case of द्वयष्टक, the number of its parts i. e. the atoms, need not be more than two. Hence the mnemonic couplet जालमूर्यमधिचिरस्थं यस्तमं दृश्यते रजः । तस्य पष्ठतमो भागः परमाणुः स उच्यते ॥ The atom is the sixth part of the little mote which we see in the sun-beam coming through the window.

10. The question then arises -In what respect does the अणुत्र of a binary differ from the अणुत्र of an atom? That the two atoms are different cannot be disputed, because atoms being parts of binaries must be smaller, and also because their परिमाण has a distinct name पारिमाणदल्य which is never applied to binaries. Now, according to the law that like produces like, the अणुत्र of a द्वयष्टक must be greater *in degree* than the पारिमाणदल्य of a परमाणु, that is, a binary must be more minute than the atom, which is absurd. To obviate this difficulty as well as that about the महत्र in व्यष्टक, the *Naiyāyikas* make an exception of atoms and binaries to the usual rule that the magnitude of the product is nothing but the magnitudes of parts intensified so many times. They assert that the magnitude of the product is produced by any one of the three causes, *viz.* the magnitude, the number, or the particular arrangement of parts. *Kaṇāda*, in the aphorism कारण-बहुत्वाच,<sup>1</sup> by the च in which according to commentators we are to understand the two other causes कारणमहत्र and प्रचय-विशेष, lays down this multiplicity of causes, and expressly distinguishes अणुत्र from महत्र in the next aphorism. While the महत्र of products from व्यष्टक upwards is caused by कारण-महत्र as well as प्रचय, अणुत्र is caused by बहुत्व or number of parts only. But here comes the question why we should stop at the sixth part of व्यष्टक. There seems to have been a difference of opinion as to why we must go even so far. Some are for stopping at द्वयष्टक and others at त्रुटि or व्यष्टक

even,<sup>1</sup> but no one appears to go beyond the परमाणु, except of course the *Vedāntins* and the *Sāṃkhyas* who deny the परमाणुत्वाद altogether. The necessity of stopping at this limit is of course founded on the usual argument of *regressus ad infinitum*. If we have to stop somewhere it is better that we should stop at the earliest limit available; for, as T. D. puts it, if this परमाणु also is a product of still smaller parts, there will be अनवर्त्या. The same argument is often put in another way. Why is this jar distinct from or larger or smaller than the piece of cloth or that jar? The answer is that the constituent parts of this jar are different or more or less numerous than those in the other. The parts of each are again larger or smaller according as they contain more or less sub-divisions. Reasoning in this way we find that a mountain is far bigger than a mustard seed, because the number of ultimate parts, that is the atoms, is much larger in the first than in the second. These ultimate particles must be all indivisible and of equal magnitude, because so long as there are degrees of size amongst them, there will be a possibility of reducing the larger to the size of the smaller, that is, there will be further division. The indivisibility of atoms necessarily implies that they are all of equal size. It is nothing but their greater or smaller number therefore that can make one thing, like the mountain *Meru*, big, and another thing, like a mustard seed, small. To calculate these numbers we must have a common unit like परमाणु. If we however do not recognize परमाणु and go on dividing *ad infinitum*, the number of parts in both things will be equal but the parts will vary in magnitude, and the question why one is larger than the other will ever remain unsolved. Thus the parts in both the *Meru* and the mustard seed being always the same in number, namely infinite, there is no reason why the one thing should differ in size from the other, and perfect equality ought to exist between the two (मेरुसर्पपयोस्तुत्यत्वप्रसङ्गः). If however, we fix upon a

unit like परमाणु, we can easily account for their different magnitudes by the varying number of atoms in each.) It can be easily guessed from this that the statement made above that the magnitude of a thing depends on the number (बहुत्व) or the size (महत्व) or the peculiar arrangement (प्रचयविशेष) of its parts was only provisional, the real cause in all cases being the number of ultimate parts, while the latter two causes were simply the variations of the first. This may perhaps account for their omission in the original aphorism of Kanāda.<sup>2</sup>

11. A third but not a very convincing argument for proving the necessity of atoms may be stated in Dr. Roer's words—  
Third proof for  
the existence of  
atoms.  
 "To say that the point where the end is obtained is not eternal would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cessation of the progress from small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved. "<sup>2</sup>

12. Such is the परमाणुवाद which originally distinguished Vaiśeṣika philosophy from others, and which was afterwards imported into various other systems. It closely resembles the doctrine of atoms which found acceptance with several Greek philosophers. Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the name of atoms. To these atoms he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which such as are homogeneous were united, whilst the lighter ones were dispersed throughout space. The universe was made of matter consisting of ultimate indivisible atoms which are indestructible and

<sup>1</sup> V. S. VII, 1. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Roer's Trans. of B. P. Bib, Ind. p. 16 Note.

eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind and spirit from this atom-born universe, thus partially agreeing with *Kanāda* who excludes spirit but includes mind and intellect in matter. Leucippus and Democritus excluded both. Epicurus added nothing to the doctrine. The परमाणु-वाद of *Kanāda* also materially agrees with the modern atomic theory of Dalton on which the whole science of chemistry may be said to be founded. The conception of atoms, simple as it seems when once comprehended, is one of the most subtle and shows a considerable advance of philosophical thought. The doctrine has been sharply criticized by ŚāṅkaraĀrya and other Vedantic writers, and their criticisms have greatly tended to diminish its popularity ; but the credit of originality is none the less due to the philosopher who first discovered it.

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## SECT. XIV. आकाशम्.

*Akāśa or ether is that which has sound for its (special) quality. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.*

This definition of ether differs from the preceding four in that the word युण is inserted in it, when *Ākāśa or ether*, the author might have as well said शब्दवत् or शब्दसमवायि आकाशम्. What is then the propriety of the word युण ? V. V. and S. C. explain it as intended to controvert the doctrine of *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas* that sound is a substance and not a quality ; but the explanation is rather far-fetched. That of N. B. and *Nilakantha* is better, namely that the word युण is used for विशेषयुण and implies that sound is the special quality of ether and ether alone, as distinguished from all other substances. Colour and other qualities are found in several substances, and even odour, the special quality of earth, is often associated with water and air; but sound is always confined to ether. Hence the author defined earth as simply गन्धवती while he defines ether as शब्दयुणम्. As to the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrine that sound is substance, it is already denied

by the mention of शब्द among the *guṇas*. *Akāśa* is also defined as संयोगाजन्यविशेषणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणम्<sup>1</sup> i.e. ether is the seat of that particularity (विशेष) which coexists with a special quality (sound) that is created but not produced from conjunction. Ether, being eternal and all-pervading, has a विशेष of its own, but this विशेष is distinguished from that of soul, as it is accompanied by a *created* special quality i.e. sound, and hence the qualification जन्यविशेषण etc. But then the *particularities* in atoms are also accompanied by *created* qualites and hence they have to be excluded by the further epithet संयोगाजन्य, the special qualities in atoms such as पाकजस्त्रप being often अद्युत्यंसंयोगजन्य. This elaborate definition therefore ultimately amounts to the same as शब्दशृणा. Ether is the best available though not quite accurate English equivalent for *Akāśa* because it resembles the latter in being an all-pervading and imponderable substance. Ether however carries light and heat only, and not sound, which function is assigned by modern science to the atmosphere. Ether therefore resembles *Akāśa* in all respects, except its special quality of producing sound. Both ether and *Akāśa* are substances proved by inference, that is, their existence is presumed in order to account for certain natural phenomena, such as the diffusion of light and sound which are otherwise inexplicable.

2 *Kanāda*<sup>2</sup> concludes sound to be the sign (लिङ्ग) of *Akāśa* by process of exhaustion, because no other substance is capable of having sound as its attribute of *Akāśa*. The question in what respects *Akāśa* differs from *Dik* will be discussed under *Dik*. The fact seemst to be that the names of the five elements including *Akāśa* came down to the *Naiyāyikas* from a very ancient source and that they had no choice but to recognize them if they wanted to preserve their orthodoxy. They only assigned to each such place and functions as harmonized with their own physical theory of the universe. Our author mentions three characteristics of *Akāśa*, that it is one, all-pervading, and eternal. The

1 Sarv. D. S., Calc. ed. p. 104.

2 V. S. II, 1, 27.

epithet *one* implies that the mention of numerous *Akāśas* such as घटाकाश and मठाकाश in common parlance is due to उपाधि and cannot be real. Being one and emitting sound everywhere, ether is necessarily all-pervading; and being all-pervading it must be eternal also. Being विभुति *Akāśa* is अतीन्द्रिय, imperceptible, and therefore known only by inference. The syllogism may be put thus : शब्दः पृथिव्याच्छब्दत्रयातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितः । अष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति समवायिकारणवत्त्वात् । यज्ज्ञेवं तत्त्वं यथा स्तप्तम्.

3. T. D. defines विभुत्व, all-pervasion, as सर्वसूतप्रव्यसंयोगित्वम्, contact with all corporeal objects. Corporeality (सूतत्व) again is defined as परिचिह्नन्तरिमाणत्वम्, the quality of having definite dimensions. सूतत्व is defined by N. B. as क्रियावदद्रव्यत्वम्. Corporeal substances are thus either those that have definite dimensions or that have motion. The second definition practically amounts to the same as the first, because action or motion implies movement of either the parts or the whole from one place to another, and that is not possible unless the substance is limited in space. The corporeal substances are five : earth, water, light, air, and mind. They and their common properties are enumerated as follows :—

क्षितिर्जलं तथा तेजः पवनो मन एव च ।  
पशपरस्त्वसूतत्वक्रियावेगाश्रया अमी ॥२

These however do not constitute a separate class as they come under *Udayana's* exception, cross-division.<sup>2</sup> The class of five सूत *dravyas* crosses with that of five भूत *dravyas*, the first four being common to both, but मनस् of the one class being replaced by आकाश in the other. The distinction between सूत and भूत is simple. सूत *dravyas* are corporeal substances that are limited in space and have definite dimensions ; while the भूत *dravyas* are not necessarily so. They are simply elemental substances which singly or by combination among themselves become the material causes of all the products in the world.

मनस् though atomic does not produce anything else and is not therefore भूत, while आकाश though all-pervading produces sound. The other four substances are of course both भूत and सूर्त्. सूर्त्वत्व is opposed to विभूत्व ( all-pervasion, ) भूत्वत्व to कार्यरहितत्व or अविकासित्व ( invariability ). Soul is only a substratum of knowledge and not being its material cause cannot be either भूत or सूर्त्.

## SECT. XV. काठः.

*Time is the ( special and instrumental ) cause of the use of ( words ) past etc. It is one and all-pervading.*

1. Annambhatta's definition of time is very simple and is best for all practical purposes, although it labours under the fault of being merely a verbal one. This and the succeeding definitions based on व्यवहार are convenient descriptions of the things and are sufficient for their identification, but they do not convey the full connotation of the terms. व्यवहार is defined by V. V. as वाच्यप्रयोगस्पः i. e. statements such as past time and future time. The word हेतु here, as well as in the following definitions where it is applied to व्यवहार, is to be understood in the restricted sense of असाधारणनिमित्तकारण, special and instrumental cause. Time is the instrumental cause of व्यवहार, as distinguished from *Akūsha* which is its material cause. व्यवहार, of course, is nothing more than words or sound. Similarly, time is the special cause of व्यवहार alone, as distinguished on the one hand from all other effects of which time is only the general cause ( साधारणकारण ), and on the other, from space and other things which are enumerated as साधारणकारणानि along with time, and which are therefore the general causes of all effects including व्यवहार. Thus the word हेतु, when taken in the above restricted sense, frees the definition of time from three faults, viz. an अतिव्याप्ति on ether, a second अतिव्याप्ति on space and other general causes, and an unnecessary restriction ( अक्षयाप्ति ) in calling time the cause of one thing only when it is really the cause of all effects. The definition in the text, being based on common usage of certain words, teaches us nothing new about the thing itself. The utmost

that it tells us is that time is some unknown entity which is necessary to explain why we speak of certain occurrences as past, others as present and others as future. The fact of there being a common usage of those terms is proved by our daily experience, and the *Naiyāyika*, finding no better way of explaining it, assumes an independent substance, which is its source but about the real character of which he is as much in the dark as those who deny the substance altogether.

2. Another and apparently more accurate definition of time is that given by *Viśvanātha*—

जन्यानं जनकः कालो जगतामाश्रयो मतः ।  
परापरत्वधीहेतुः क्षणादिः स्याद्गुपाधितः ॥<sup>1</sup>

This is compressed into परापरत्वतिकर्त्त्वं यौगपद्यायौगपद्य-चिरक्षिप्र-प्रत्ययकारणं द्रव्यं कालः । that is, time is the substance which is the (instrumental) cause of our cognitions of priority or posteriority, simultaneity or otherwise, slowness or quickness.<sup>2</sup> The only material difference between this and *Annambhāṭṭa*'s definition is that the latter's व्यबहार (common usage) is substituted by प्रत्यय (cognition). According to *Annambhāṭṭa* time is the cause of व्यबहार, that is a certain kind of speech or language; while according to *Viśvanātha* and others it is the cause of a certain kind of cognitions or mental notions. Now as language and thought are identical, or rather as language is but the outward expression of thoughts, both definitions practically amount to the same<sup>3</sup> thing. There can be no outward expression unless there are mental notions previously, while according to many no thinking is possible without the aid of language. Anything therefore which is an essential element of the one must be so of the other also. *Annambhāṭṭa* stops short at language and is therefore safe; *Viśvanātha* in going a step further to thought, treads on debatable ground; for one may, while accepting the instrumentality of time to व्यबहार as a broad and indubitable fact, deny that an independent entity like time is

1 B. P. 44-5.

2 Saṅkara Miśra on V. S. VII, 7, 25.

the cause of our particular cognitions. For aught we know, the cognitions may be due to other causes, and when produced they constitute a separate class the common property of which we denote by the word time. It is therefore obvious that *Annambhatta* was wise in purposely making his definition simple and somewhat vague.

3. The question what is time essentially, apart from its being the cause of any व्यवहार or धी remains to be answered ; and it has remained unanswered till now in spite of the various speculations of Indian and European philosophers. Among the Indians, *Sāmkhyas* denied the existence of an independent entity like time, including it under *ākāśa*, while some modern *Naiyāyikas* identify time and space with God. Time being an incorporeal and imperceptible substance is only inferrible. The argument may be stated thus : परत्वापरत्वे सासमवायिकारणके । भावकार्यत्वाद्वट्वत्. It must be remembered that time being संयोगस्त्रय is the असमवायिकारण of the qualities परत्व and अपरत्व, which have the substances in which they reside for their material causes. The संयोग with which time is here identified is the contact of रविक्रिया or तपनपरिस्पन्द ( motions of the sun ) with material objects like घट. These motions of the sun constitute the *Upādhis* that mark the divisions of time such as moments, days and months.

4. Time is regarded as one, all-pervading and eternal entity like *Ākāśa*, its particular divisions like those of *Ākāśa*, being due to *Upādhi* and therefore unreal. Here *Annimbhatta* probably means to deny the doctrine of a section of *Naiyāyikas* who assign reality to moments only, and regard time in general as merely a collection of such moments. It is clear from the above that the *Naiyāyikas* did not apply the test of a searching analysis to the conception of time, just as Kant for instance has done in modern times. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant arrives at the conclusion that the conception of time as well as those of space and causality are ultimate facts lying at the basis of all experience and

*Time is eternal and  
all-pervading.*

are derived from intuition only. We cannot account for it by any theory founded on experience, because experience itself is possible only when we have first the idea of time. It seems the *Naiyāyikas* had a faint notion of this fact, which they roughly expressed by saying that time is the cause of speech ( व्यवहार ) or thought ( धी ).

### SECT. XVI. दिक्.

*Space is the ( special and instrumental ) cause of the employment of words East, etc. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.*

1. The definition of space in the text is modelled on that of time. *Viśvanātha* gives Space. a more comprehensive and accurate definition, दूरान्तिकादिधीर्थः the cause of ( our ) notions of far and near.<sup>1</sup> Another definition of space given in *Sarv. D. S.* is more technical, अकालत्वे सत्यविशेषगुणा महती,<sup>2</sup> 'space is that which not being time is extensive and is devoid of any special quality'. Space, like time, is one, all-pervading and eternal, while its varieties which are counted four or ten or any larger number, are due to *Upādhi*. The conception of space very nearly corresponds to that of time, although the two things can be sufficiently distinguished to make them separate entities. The remarks as to time in the preceding notes apply *mutatis mutandis* to space also. The difference between time and space is slight but clear. (Time is the cause of कालिकपरत्व, space of देशिकपरत्व. The उपाधि which diversifies time is production, or in fact, any kind of action, while the उपाधि in the case of space is contact with corporeal objects, जन्यमात्रं क्रियमात्रं वा कालोपाधिः । सूर्तमात्रं दिग्युपाधिः ( S. C. ). This means that the divisions of time are determined by production and destruction of things, while those of space by the greater or smaller number of visible objects that intervene between two spots.

2. Another distinction between time and space is :—  
नियतोपाध्युक्तायकः कालः । अनियतोपाध्युक्तायका दिक्.<sup>3</sup>

1 B. P. 46.

2 Sarv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 104.

3 V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 115.

The relations of time are constant, for when a moment of time is said to be present or future with reference to any object or event, it is always so; while the relations of space are often varying, that is, the spot of ground, which may be eastward of one thing at one time, might be westward of the same thing at another or of a different thing at the same time. This means that the divisions of time are fixed and settled, while those of space are relative only. This is not however quite correct, for the relations of time are in fact as varying as those of space. The same object or event which is past in reference to one moment may be future or present with reference to another. The only positive assertion that we can make about the two conceptions is that they are complementary to each other and cannot vary at the same moment; that is, we can speak of different times only with reference to a particular spot, and of different spaces with reference to a specific moment of time. Like time, space is inferrible only, the inference being expressed in the form : देशिकपरत्वापस्त्वे सासमवायिकारणके । भावकायत्वाद्वटवत्.

3. It may be asked in what respect *Dik* differs from *Ākāśa* and *dik*. *Ākāśa* and why the two are separately recognized. Of course as treated in the *Nyāya* system the difference between the two is too patent. *Ākāśa* is a भूतद्रव्य, *Dik* not; *Ākāśa* is the material cause of sound and has a special quality; *Dik* does not produce sound and has no special quality; *Dik* resembles time in being the general cause of all effects, while *Ākāśa*, like earth and other material substances, produces one kind of effect only, namely, sound. *Ākāśa* belongs to the region of matter, *Dik* to the province of mind; *Ākāśa* has an objective existence, *Dik* is known by subjective experience only. In this way the two can be easily differentiated, but the question goes deeper. The objector will admit that ether and space, as conceived by the *Naiyāyikas* may be different entities, but he may still ask, why they are conceived so different at all. In what respect do they differ essentially; and if one is dropped, cannot its functions

be assigned to the other ? It is not easy to answer the question in this form, because the conceptions of ether and space are extremely vague and general. It appears however that the *Naiyāikas* recognized the two entities, because they could not reconcile the notion of a material cause of sound with that of a general cause of all effects. A thing which produces a positive material quality like sound must be material ; but then it cannot be the instrumental cause of mere relations like परत्वं and अपरत्वं, which constantly vary and have, so to say, only a mental existence. Besides it is possible that Ākāśa had already taken its place in the popular mind as one of the five elements before the time of *Naiyāikas*, and they had therefore no choice but to incorporate it into their system, while they invented a new substance called *Lik* to account for ideas and notions, that could not be attributed to Ākāśa as it was then conceived. Whatever may be the case, the distinction between the two as defined in the *Nyāya* system is perfectly clear.

## SECT. XVII. आत्मा.

*The Soul is the substratum of Knowledge. He is two-fold, Human and Supreme. Of these the Supreme Soul is the All-powerful, Omniscient God, devoid of pleasure and pain. The Human Soul is different in each body and is all-pervading and eternal.*

1. The eighth substance is Soul, which is defined as 'the substratum of knowledge.' The word अधिकरण here implies that the knowledge resides in the soul by intimate relation

(समवाय); otherwise the definition might overlap time and space, which are the receptacles of all things (सर्वधार) by कालिक and देशिक relations respectively. This soul is of two kinds, Supreme and Human, of whom (तत्र) the Supreme Soul, namely God, is One and Omniscient, while the human Soul is all-pervading, eternal, and different in each body. The soul being असूत्रं is inferrible only, the argument being that the existence of organs of sense and their appropriate objects implies a distinct knower who can use them. करणव्यापारः सकर्तुकः । करणव्यापारत्वात् । उद्दिक्रियायां वास्यादिव्यापारत्वः । The activity of organs must have an agent to account for it, for every instrument requires an agent to handle

it, as for instance, an axe in cutting. Kanāda's aphorism likewise runs इन्द्रियार्थप्रसिद्धिनिवृत्यार्थोऽथान्तरस्य हेतुः । The followers of Gotama however confine this inference to the Supreme Soul only, holding the human soul to be capable of being perceived. Another argument to prove the existence of soul is बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्यादृद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः । पृथिव्यादृद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणवात् । यज्ञेर्वं तज्ज्वरं, यथा रूपादि । The soul has to be inferred because a substratum is wanted for the qualities बुद्धि सुख दुःख इच्छा देव प्रयत्न धर्म and अधर्म, which cannot reside in any one of the eight inanimate substances, earth etc.

2. As souls are innumerable it may be said that they constitute a class and have a common property आत्मत्व, residing in all of them. आत्मा therefore may be defined as आत्मत्वसामान्यवाद<sup>2</sup> or असूर्तसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजाति<sup>3</sup>. According to the latter definition, soul is a species of substance having as common property that is intimately connected with an incorporeal thing. As there are four incorporeal substances, ether, time, space and soul, of which the first three being single do not form a class, आत्मत्व will be the only sub-class of रूपत्व that is intimately connected with an incorporeal thing.) To this definition however some might object on the ground that as Supreme and human souls are dissimilar in every respect, they cannot be huddled together in one class, and there cannot therefore be any common जाति as आत्मत्व; at least such a जाति will not reside in ईश्वर. The answer to this objection is that possession of knowledge is a property common to both kinds of souls, whatever be their other differences, and it is sufficient to make आत्मत्व a जाति covering both the Supreme and the human souls. This is implied in such general Vedic texts as आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः<sup>4</sup> The argument is characteristic and very important too. It is characteristic because it shows how a single common property often suffices the *Naiyāyikas* to form a class notwithstanding that the individuals might disagree in all other respects. The argument also explains the

1 V. S. III, 1, 2.

2 T. K. p. 3.

3 Saiv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 104.

4 S. M. Calc. ed. p. 37.

anomaly of including two such quite distinct and dissimilar things as Supreme and human souls under one category. No two conceptions can be more opposed to each other than those of God and the human soul. One is Omniscient and One, the other is ignorant and numerous. One is the Creator and Master of the universe, the other is the slave and the plaything of fate. One is entirely free from pleasure and pain, the other is subject to all transient passions. Almost every attribute, that can be predicated of one is necessarily denied of the other. And yet the *Naiyāyikas* have grouped both of them together, because they have the single common characteristic of possession of knowledge. This knowledge again is different in both, being eternal in the Supreme, and evanescent in the human souls, but that does not necessarily make the two souls totally dissimilar. This seems to be the reason why *Annambhāṭṭa* has given ज्ञानाधिकरणत्व as a general definition of आत्मा in preference to others that are debatable. The word चैतन्य ( life ) also seems to be purposely avoided in defining आत्मा, because in the wider sense of the term even plants have चैतन्य, but they fall under विषय as they have no आत्मा according to a section of the *Naiyāyikas*. चैतन्य can be identified with आत्मा in its narrower sense only, namely, conscious life.

### 3. The method of grouping God and man together as sub-

*Are the Vais'esi-  
kas atheists.* divisions of one category as well as the argument with which it is defended appear somewhat arbitrary and have led some

writers to suspect that the आत्मा in the original aphorisms of *Kaṇāda* meant जीवात्मा only, and the inclusion of God or परमात्मा under the same category was due to commentatorial ingenuity. It is said that all the descriptions and arguments to prove the existence of soul evidently apply to जीवात्मा, while there is no clear and specific mention of God in the aphorisms of either *Kaṇāda* or *Gotama*. Some have argued from this circumstance that both the *Nyāya* and the *Vaisesika* systems were at first atheistic.

Without however going so far we might assume that the guess is not very wide of the mark and *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* might have at first purposely excluded God from their systems, not as being totally non-existent, but as being beyond and above the phenomenal world with which their systems were chiefly concerned. Possibly the aphorists confined themselves to a classification and discussion of sublunary things only without minding the supernatural agency, while commentators considering this as a defect, supplied the omission by inserting God under the only category where it was possible to do so. Thus for instance while *Prasastapāda* says nothing about God, his commentator Śridhara classes God along with the human soul, although the former has six and the latter fourteen qualities.<sup>1</sup> Whatever be the truth, the *Naiyāyikas* do not attach much importance to the inclusion of God under आनन्द and always speak of Him as an independent entity whenever occasion requires. When they speak of soul, they generally mean जीवात्मा only. This is another illustration how a love of symmetry and completeness which characterises Indian systematists often overrides their philosophical accuracy. The student should also note the fact that soul is here mentioned as one of the substances, along with earth, water etc. Nothing can show better the materialistic tendency of *Nyāya* philosophy than this inclusion of spirit under the same category as dead matter.

4. The T. D. supplies a deficiency in the text as it were by stating in full the celebrated *Naiyāyika* argument to prove the existence of God.

The argument is a reply to an atheist like *Cārvāka* or *Bauddha*, who absolutely denies the existence of God because there is no positive proof of it. God, say the atheists, cannot be perceived, because, being a colourless substance, He is not the object of external senses; nor can He be perceived mentally, as He is far removed from pain and pleasure felt by the soul. God cannot also be inferred as no similar instance can be given to

support the inference. As to आगम or testimony it is useless, first because it is not universally accepted as a valid proof, and secondly because the *Vedas* themselves depend for their authority on God and cannot therefore prove His existence. Our author denies this and declares the existence of God provable by inference based on the universally accepted principle of causality. The argument is

स्थित्यंकुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं । कार्यत्वात् : यथत्कार्यं तत्कर्तृजन्यं यथा घटः ॥

Every effect must have an agent ;

The universe is an effect ;

∴ It must have an agent.

This agent is called God. It should be noted that this argument is founded on several assumptions; viz. 1 that the relation of causality is universal, i. e. every effect must have a cause; 2 that every product must have a sentient and intelligent producer; 3 that this world is such a product and 4 that its producer must be such an extraordinary Being as God. The first, says the *Nāyāyika*, is a self-evident axiom, known to us intuitively as it were, and corroborated by experience. The second is proved by daily observation, because we see that a jar is made by a potter and a piece of cloth is woven by a weaver, without whom they could not have been produced. Creation results from some kind of motion in the atoms, and motion requires previous effort or volition. This last being the quality of sentient soul only, it follows that no creation is possible unless there is a sentient being pre-existing to set the particles of matter in motion. The third assumption, that this world is a product is also based on observation. Plants and animals are products because we see their birth, growth and death. These occurrences cannot be spontaneous, and there must be some hidden agency to prompt them. Besides they happen with such a remarkable regularity that one is forced to think that the agency directing them must be an intelligent one, and not simply *Adṛṣṭa*, fate or

destiny, which is assumed to be a universal cause of all creation. The last premise necessarily follows from the preceding ones, because a Creator of this multifarious universe must be Omniscient and Omnipotent, and in fact must possess all attributes usually ascribed to God; otherwise he will be either incapable of creating or be himself liable to creation and destruction. This reasoning is of course powerless against an opponent who denies any one of the above premises or the validity of the common experience on which they are founded.

5. T. D. defines कर्तृत्व as उपादानगोचरपरोक्षज्ञानचिरीर्पकृतिमत्त्वम् i. e. the agent is one who possesses (three things), an intimate cognizance of the material cause, a will to act, and an effort. The three attributes ज्ञान, इच्छा and कृति are closely related to one another as cause and effect. There cannot be an effort (कृति) unless there is a will, and a will to produce can only arise when there is previously direct cognition of the material cause on which the will is to operate. अपरोक्षज्ञान is required because mere knowledge of an absent (परोक्ष) material cause such as earth in a pit or cotton on the tree, will not suffice. The material must be at hand and under the agent's control at the time of creation. It is suggested by some and with great plausibility, that the definition of कर्तृत्व may be confined to कृतिमत्त्वम् simply, as कृति being the final stage necessarily presupposes the other two, ज्ञान and इच्छा. It follows that the Creator of the universe must have direct knowledge of the atoms of all substances, must have a will to create, and also power to bring about such a creation. He must therefore be Omniscient and Omnipotent.

6. The weakness of the argument to prove a Creator lies in the third and the fourth of the aforesaid four assumptions which are not accepted by many. How do we know for instance that this universe is a product? Individual things in the world may be products in our common acceptation of the term, but that does not necessarily prove that the whole is a product too. The whole does not always share the nature of the parts, as for instance in a windmill although each particle moves, the whole is stationary. Secondly, our human experience being limited

we cannot positively say that everything in this world is a product and that there is nothing which is not produced. Thirdly, *Naiyāyikas* themselves accept several eternal things such as atoms, ether, time, space, souls and minds. If these are eternal, they cannot be products and can have no Creator. If they are excepted, the Creator of the remainder cannot be omniscient and omnipotent. Anyhow the *Naiyāyikas*' theory of God is inconsistent with their other doctrines. Fourthly, since every intelligent agent must have a will, God also must have desire and the consequent feelings of pleasure and pain. He cannot therefore be much better than frail mortals. Lastly, to call this world a product or effect is begging the whole question; for cause and effect being merely correlative terms, a thing cannot be called effect unless and until its cause is proved. The universe therefore cannot be called a product unless you first independently prove the existence of its Creator. Such are some of the objections advanced by the *Vedāntins* and other monistic philosophers against the teleological argument of the *Naiyāyikas*. The controversy as to an independent Creator of the Universe ultimately resolves itself into the distinction between dualism and monism.

7. The student will do well to master the full armoury of *Nyāya* arguments by which the existence of a personal God outside the universe is proved. These arguments or proofs are summed up by *Udayanācārya* in the following verse :—

कार्योजनभृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः ।  
वाक्यात् सदस्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वाविद्वयः ॥ १ ॥

" From effects, combination, support etc., from traditional arts, from authoritativeness, from Śruti, from sentences thereof, and from particular numbers--an everlasting Omniscient Being is to be established. " <sup>2</sup>

The first of these eight or nine arguments to prove the existence of God is the same as the one discussed above, viz. that a Creator is necessary to account for this phenomenal world. The second आयोजन or 'combination' is explained as the action which produced the union of two atoms forming the binary compound at the beginning of creation,

1 *Kus.* V. 1.

2 *Ibid.* Cowell's Trans., *Bib In* p. 64.

and which being action, required an intelligent actor. The third proof, ' support ' means that the world depends upon some Being who prevents it from falling. The etc. ( आदि ) includes destruction of the world and presupposes a destroyer. *Pada* here means पटादिसम्प्रदायव्यवहार, that is, traditional arts of weaving cloth etc. which could have been invented at first only by some intelligent being. ' Authoritativeness ' is a certain virtue inherent in the *Vedas* whereby they produce right knowledge in us, and therefore implying a Being who imparted that virtue. The proof of *Śruti* establishes a Being who made the *Vedas* what they are. Again the *Vedas* consisting of sentences must have been produced by some author just as *Mahābhārata* and other books. The last proof, ' number,' requires a little explanation. It is held that the magnitude of a binary is produced not from the infinitesimality ( परिमाणदल्य ) of atoms but from the number ( two ) of the atoms composing the binary;<sup>1</sup> and it is also a *Nyāya* doctrine that the conceptions of duality and subsequent numbers are produced in things by an effort of the mind. The duality therefore which produced binaries at the beginning of creation must have been first conceived by some intelligent being existing before creation. Number is thus a proof of the existence of God. *Udayanācārya* also establishes God's existence in another way, namely, first by proving *Adṛśta* or destiny, and then arguing that the inanimate destiny must have some intelligent Being to regulate it.<sup>2</sup> Many of these arguments of *Nyāya* writers are identical with those given by Aristotle and widely used in modern times by Paley and the Christian divines. The idea of God or a Supreme and Omniscient Creator of the world which was at first rather faint in the *Sūtras*, came to occupy an important place in the *Nyāya* system as developed in later times.

8. *Nyāya* writers, while unanimous on the point of God's existence, do not agree as to his attributes. *God's attributes.* Some hold that God can make creation although He has no body owing to absence of any *Adṛśta* in his case; others say that God may be

<sup>1</sup> See note p. 123 *Supra*; and P. B. Ben. ed. p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> *Kus* 1. 4.

sometimes endowed with a body ( as in the various incarnations ) by our *Adṛṣṭa* just as a woman gets a body according to the *Adṛṣṭa* of her husband. A third school calls the atoms the body of God ; and a fourth assigns that honour to ether. A fifth section conceives God to be formed of two bodies, the Creator and the thing to be created, at the beginning of creation ; while a sixth one reaches the climax by giving a body to God in the same way as a devil gets one for itself by possessing some human medium. All these speculations are due to attempts to overcome the difficulty how a Creator could create without having a physical body as well as organs of sense and action. The *Nyāya* enumerates eight special qualities of God, namely, number, ( the greatest ) dimension, severality, disjunction, intellect, desire and effort. The Supreme Soul differs from the human in not having pain, merit and demerit; but there is a controversy as to whether He has pleasure. The modern *Naiyāyikas* hold on the authority of texts such as नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म, that God enjoys eternal happiness just as He has eternal knowledge, while the ancients interpret the word आनन्द as meaning simply दुःखाभाव, and deny any positive pleasure or pain to God. *Annambhatta* as usual appears to prefer the ancient view; and hence probably the epithet सुखदृश्वादिरहित which is found interpolated in some MSS. of T. S.

9. Having proved the existence of God, T. D. defines the  
*Human Soul.* human soul as सुखाद्याश्रयः, thereby excluding God who is devoid of pleasure or pain.

जीव is also described variously as इन्द्रियाधिकाता, or जन्यमोक्षयोग्य or जन्यज्ञानवान्, all which epithets are merely contradictions of the attributes of God. The human soul can be easily proved to be distinct from body or organs, and also to be numerous, eternal and all-pervading. The *Cārvākas* say that our body itself is the soul, because our self-consciousness 'I am a man' 'I am a Brahman,' relates to the body; but it is not so, because the self remains the same although the body changes as it grows from infancy to old age. Besides we have the opposite consciousness 'my'

body, 'my head' etc. and we feel no diminution of self even if parts of body such as arms or legs be cut off. Others maintain that the soul is identical with organs of sense as is proved by our consciousness 'I am blind' 'I am deaf'; but this is also not true, for the deprivation of any one or all the organs does not injure the soul. Again if the organs were soul, there would be as many different souls in a body as there are organs of sense, and besides, says T. D., we should not have, as we have now, the identity of consciousness that the same person. *i. e.* I, who saw the jar at a former time, touch it now. Nor is mind the soul, as mind being atomic would be incapable of simultaneously apprehending many objects. The soul is therefore something different from all these. The human souls are conceived to be numerous, and not one as the *Vedāntins* hold, in order to account for the variety of experiences of pleasure, pain etc. in different bodies. The same soul however passes through several bodies; otherwise we cannot form certain impressions and habits (such as the sucking of a new-born child) that seem to come to us intuitively as it were, and are really derived from our experience in previous births. Plurality of souls is thus reconciled with the doctrine of transmigration. It follows from this that the human soul is eternal, for otherwise he could not pass through several births without losing his identity. He must also be all-pervading, for he can neither be atomic nor of any intermediate magnitude. If atomic he could occupy only a minute spot in the body and thus could not simultaneously feel pleasure or pain at distant parts of the body. If the soul had an intermediate magnitude he would be liable to destruction by the enlargement or diminution of that magnitude. Again, how is this middling magnitude to be determined? It would be either the same size as the body, as the *Jainas* hold, or it would be different, being larger or smaller. In the latter case the soul would be too large or too small to exactly occupy the body as he should. In the former case the difficulty arises as to how a soul which was small in the small body of a child could increase when the child grows to manhood; and similarly how the same soul which in one birth was of the size of an

elephant could in another birth be accommodated in the body of an ant. If it is said that the size varies, then it is not the same soul, and there would be different souls not only in different births but even at different stages of life. Hence the soul must necessarily be regarded as all-pervading. To this last supposition an objection may be made that each all-pervading soul would occupy all bodies and thus the experiences of all beings would be cognized by every individual. The answer to this objection is that the soul though all-pervading cognises things, not by himself, but by contact with a mind which is separate and confined to each body.

6. There is one point with respect to जीव which being controversial seems to have been purposefully omitted by T. D., namely whether जीव is perceived or is only to be inferred like ether and other incorporeal substances. The followers of Gotama hold that जीव is perceptible by the mind because it is the object of such mental cognitions as 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy.' The Vaisesikas maintain that जीव is not perceptible even mentally, because the cognition 'I am happy' refers not to the pure Ego, but to the quality of pleasure or pain which thus becomes the sign of the existence of जीव. A still greater objection to the perceptibility of soul is that he being the pereceiver of everything cannot perceive himself, the knower and the known being always different. जीव is therefore only inferrible, the inference being सखादिसोक्षाकरो द्रव्याश्रितः । गुणत्वाद्रपवत्. जीव may also be inferred from the existence of organs of sense, or of qualities such as द्वृद्धि which can reside in soul alone. Several of these so-called 'signs' of soul are enumerated in Kanāda's aphorism—प्राणापान-निमेषोन्मेष-जीवन-मनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरत्रिकारा: सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाभ्यात्मनो लिङ्गानि । Annambhaṭṭa seems to favour the Vaisesika view of the inferrible character of soul, though he does not explicitly say so. The human soul has 14 special properties, for which see quotation, p. p. 85-6 Supra.

## SECT. XVIII. मनः-

*Mind is the organ which is the instrument of the cognition of pleasure etc. Being assigned to each soul, it is countless, atomic and eternal.*

1. Etymologically mind is not simply the instrument of thought, (मन्त्रतेजेन), but in reality its functions are much more extensive, because it is not only the direct cause of internal experience, such as that of pleasure and pain, but is also an aid in the perceptions of external senses. The *Naiyāyikas*, strangely enough, give much prominence to the latter two functions of the mind, and entirely subordinate, if not actually deny, its character as the instrument of thinking. Even taking these two functions assigned to mind, it has a double character. It is both an organ of sense itself, and an accessory to other organs. *Annam-bhaīta's* definition, being founded on the former of these two functions, distinguishes mind from other organs which give knowledge of external objects only, while mind brings about internal cognition of such things as lie beyond the province of the other organs. Hence the word उपलब्धिः is purposely used here in the restricted sense of direct internal cognition; while साधन means an instrumental cause. By सुस्वादि, V. V. remarks, are to be understood all qualities that reside in the soul by intimate relation, and which could therefore be perceived by mind alone. The word इन्द्रिय is purposely inserted in the definition to exclude soul as well as the conjunction of mind with soul, both of which are instrumental in bringing about the cognition. If we however take the word साधन in the strict sense of a करण, the word इन्द्रिय seems to be unnecessary and may be dispensed with ; for आत्मा will be excluded as being the agent and not the करण proper of a cognition, while आत्मसनःसंयोग being न्यापार is distinct from the करण. Perhaps the word इन्द्रिय is introduced to contradict those theorists who refuse to call mind an organ ; but of this later on.

T. D. gives another definition, स्वर्गहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वम् which, though technically correct enough, does not give us much insight into the nature of the thing defined. Of the

five intangible substances, ether, time, space, soul and mind, the last alone, having a limited dimension, can act, while the first four being all-pervading can never have any motion. Mind being thus intangible and corporeal is only inferrible, the inference being, as usual in such cases, drawn from the functions assigned to it. The mode of reasoning is to assume a certain cause to account for such effects or phenomena as are known to be undoubted facts and cannot be explained in any other way. The argument for mind is उत्तादिसाक्षात्कारः करणसाध्यः । जन्यसाक्षात्कारस्त्वाच्चाकृष्टसाक्षात्कारवत्.<sup>1</sup> *Kanāda* and *Gotama* give two different proofs of mind which are if possible even more convincing than the above! *Kanāda's* aphorism आत्मेन्द्रियार्थं संनिकर्षे, ज्ञानस्य भावेऽभावश्च मनसो लिङ्गम्<sup>2</sup> gives as a proof for mind the fact that knowledge is produced or not according as there exists or not the conjunction of mind with soul, organs and objects. *Gotama* lays stress on the fact that our cognitions are always successive and never simultaneous युग्मज्ञानात्मयतिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्.<sup>3</sup> There can be only one conjunction at a time, and therefore a succession of cognitions such as we daily experience can be possible only with an intermediate link like the atomic mind.

2. The minds are as innumerable as there are human souls, one being assigned to each of the latter. The word नियत is interpreted by V. V. so as to include both the principal and the accessory functions of the mind—अत्र समवेतकारणत्वे सत्यसमवेतभीगकारणत्वं नियतत्वशब्दार्थः<sup>4</sup> i.e. the word नियत implies the instrumentality of mind both to the cognition of those things that are intimately united with soul, as well as of those that are not so united. More probably it implies that the same mind is always associated with the same soul and accompanies him through his successive births; otherwise we cannot account for survival of impressions acquired in previous births. It may also be mentioned here that some assume मातृत्व as a जाति residing in all individual minds, while others deny it.

1 S. C. loc. cit.

2 V. S. III, 2, 1.

3 G. S. I, 1, 16.

4 V. V. loc. cit.

3. The most important property of mind is its infinitesimality (अणुत्व), because it is necessary to explain its chief function, that of acting as a connecting link between the soul and the external organs. The *Mimāṃsaka*s hold mind to be all-pervading, and their argument is मनो विभुः स्पर्शात्यन्ताभावपत्वादकाशवत्, or मनो विभुः विशेषगुणशूल्यद्रव्यत्वात् कालवत्, or मनो विभुः शानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वादात्मवत्.<sup>1</sup> This inference by analogy however is contradicted by our experience, for if mind were all-pervading it would be in contact with all organs of sense at once, and there would be a variety of perceptions simultaneously. Not only so, but as this contact of mind with the senses would continue always, there would be no sleep or cessation of knowledge. The contact of mind with the organs must therefore be occasional and voluntary, and the mind therefore must have a limited magnitude so that it can be attached to and severed from the organs at pleasure. The argument employed by T. D. is a little different and is not quite correct. If mind were all-pervading, there would be no contact of mind with the all-pervading soul, for it is a *Nyāya* doctrine that two all-pervading substances can never be mutually in contact. To this the *Mimāṃsaka* has an obvious reply that he does not accept the *Nyāya* doctrine, and therefore there is no impossibility of अत्मसत्त्वसंयोग in his theory. T. D. thereupon urges that if such a contact between two all-pervading things were admitted it would be eternal and continuous, and there would be no sleep. The *Naiyāyika* can account for sleep by supposing that it is induced when the atomic mind enters a particular vein in the body, called उरित्; but the *Mimāṃsaka* cannot do so, for even assuming that अत्मसत्त्वसंयोग ceases as soon as mind enters the उरित्, there will be still some portion of it outside as, being all-pervading, the whole of it could never be contained in उरित्, and the contact of this out-lying portion with soul would never cease.<sup>2</sup> The weakness of this argument of T. D. lies in the assumption that the contact of mind with soul

ceases as soon as the former enters पुरीतत्; but no reason is given for this assumption. Even granting that the mind is atomic, the continuity of its contact with soul cannot be prevented, for the soul being all-pervading must be present wherever the mind may be situated. The difficulty in fact will be greater, for in this case the *Naiyāyika* cannot take shelter behind his doctrine of non-contact of all-pervading things. This difficulty is sought to be removed by the arbitrary assumption that the contact of mind with soul ends at the mouth of पुरीतत्. As a matter of fact if the soul is all-pervading it should be present in, as well as out of, the पुरीतत्, and the contact of mind with it should never cease. An alternative assumption to account for the same phenomenon of sleep is that there is no त्वग्निद्रिय in पुरीतत्, and that contact of mind with त्वक् is a necessary condition for all knowledge, त्वङ्गनः संयोगो ज्ञानसामान्ये कारणमित्यर्थः; but this is as arbitrary as the above. The argument based on आत्ममनःसंयोग is not therefore as satisfactory as the other one based on इन्द्रियमनःसंयोग. The phenomena of sleep and knowledge can be sufficiently accounted for by conjunction and severance of mind with organs of sense, even if the आत्ममनःसंयोग is continuous.

4. The *Naiyāyika* theory of sleep already hinted above is peculiar. [पुरीतत् is an intestine somewhere near the heart and conceived as a sort of fleshy bag in which the mind remains during sleep.] The process is thus described by *Dinakarabhatta* :—

" ग्रथमं सुषुप्तचकूलमनः क्रियया मनसाऽमनो विभागः, ततः आत्ममनः संयोगनाशः, ततः पुरीतदात्मकोत्तरदेशेन मनसः संयोग उत्पयते; सैव सुषुप्तिः. The पुरीतत् as well as the theory of sleep based upon it are not however pure inventions of the *Naiyāyikas*. Both are more or less fully described in ancient writings, and the originality of the *Naiyāyikas* consists simply in the way they adapted them to their own psychological system. Texts like

1 S. M. Calc. ed. p. 48.

2 Div. Bomb. ed. p. 115.

"अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति यदा न तस्य च वेद हिता नाम नाड्योऽशासनतिसह-  
स्माणे हृदयात् पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्ठन्ते ताभिः प्रत्यवसृप्य उर्गति शेषे"<sup>1</sup> had  
already formulated a physical theory of sleep which all orthodox schools were bound to accept, modifications being  
permitted only where the *Śruti* was silent. The above text  
of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, for instance, vaguely says that  
*he* or *it* entered from the heart to the पुरीतत् by way of seventy-  
two thousands of arteries; and hence the *Vedāntins* take that  
*he* to be जीव, while the *Naiyāyikas* take *it* to be मनस्. This  
पुरीतत्, which is said to be joined to the heart by 72000 feeder  
arteries, is also called सुषुप्त्ना नाडी by *Yogins* and *Vedāntins*,  
who describe it as opening at the top of the head called ब्रह्म-  
रन्ध and as being the path by which the soul of a ज्ञानी passes  
out of the body to the solar region.<sup>2</sup> The *Naiyāyikas* of course  
with their usual shrewdness adopted only so much of this  
anatomy as suited their purpose and substituted mind for the  
उरुप् of the original. [The notion of this entrance of the thinking  
element into some narrow vein near the heart was  
probably derived from the observed slackening of the blood  
circulation in the arteries, and the consequent slower palpita-  
tions of the heart during sleep.] Anyhow modern anatomy  
and physiology do not support the theory.

5. Whether the word इन्द्रियं is inserted in the definition of  
mind to exclude आत्ममनःसंयोग or to re-  
pudiate the doctrine of an opponent, it is  
certain that both the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*  
schools agree in calling mind an इन्द्रिय; or rather the *Nyāya*  
expressly says so and the dogma is imported into the *Vaiśeṣika*  
system as one that is not explicitly repudiated by  
*Kaṇāda*, according to the maxim अप्रतिष्ठमनुमते भवति.<sup>3</sup> [Mind  
must be called an organ, because it is the instrument of  
internal perception. Other doctrinaires, and especially the *Vedāntins*, deny इन्द्रियत्वं to mind.] As the point has considerable  
bearing on the *Nyāya* definitions of perception and inference

1. *Bṛh. Up.* IV. 1, 19.

2. *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya* on *Brahm. Sūt.* III, 2, 7.

3. *Vāst.* on *G. S.* I, 1, 1.

as well as on some other kindred topics, it will be worth while here to explain it once for all. प्रत्यक्ष will be presently defined as इन्द्रियार्थसनिकर्पजन्यं ज्ञानम्. If the mind is not इन्द्रिय, the definition will not cover perception of pleasure and pain, while, if mind is इन्द्रिय, it will overlap on अनुभिति which also results from contact of mind with external objects such as the mountain and smoke. It will be seen further on how *Naiyāyikas* get out of this dilemma, but the fact that it arises has sufficed the *Vedāntin* to deny इन्द्रियत्व to mind. The chief consideration however which weighs with the *Vedāntin* is authoritative texts of *Sṛuti* like “इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यार्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः”<sup>1</sup>, in which mind is not only mentioned separately but placed on a higher level than the organs, thereby implying that mind is not इन्द्रिय. As to the other horn of the dilemma, namely that mental perception will not come under the given definition of प्रत्यक्ष, *Vedāntins* escape it by repudiating the *Nyāya* definition of perception itself as incorrect.<sup>2</sup> It must also be remembered that though the later *Naiyāyikas* stoutly maintain the इन्द्रियत्व of mind, the doctrine is not expressly stated in either of the *Sūtras*. While *Kaṇāda* is admittedly silent upon it, *Gotama* does not include mind in the list of organs,<sup>3</sup> but mentions it separately among his *Prameyas*.<sup>4</sup> After all the controversy seems to be nothing more than a battle of words. So long as all are agreed in distinguishing mind from the five external organs, and treating it as an entity by itself, it does not matter whether you call it इन्द्रिय or अतःकरणादृति or anything else. [If mind is an organ, it is an internal organ (अन्तरिन्द्रिय) quite distinct from the external organs, while if it is not an organ it is so much akin to one that it shares many of its properties and functions.]

1. Kath. U. p. III, 10.

2. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* Calc. ed. p. 3.

3. G. S. I, 1, 12.

4. G. S. I, 1, 9.

## SECT. XIX. रूपम्.

*Colour is the (special) quality which is cognised by eye alone. It is of seven kinds, and resides in earth, water, and light. All the seven are found in earth, pale white in water, and brilliant white in light.*

1. The definitions of colour, savour, odour and touch are taken from *Praśastapāda's* scholium Colour. with the exception of the words मात्र and युण. The latter words seem to have been suggested by Śrīdhara's comment.<sup>1</sup> The word मात्र excludes number which is cognised by eye as well as touch; while युण excludes on one side प्रभा which is *dravya*, and on the other रूपत्वजाति, it being a rule that the जाति and अभाव of a thing are perceived by the same sense as the thing itself. But the प्रभाभिन्नसंयोग, being a *guna*, will still come in; and to exclude it therefore the word युण is interpreted as विशेषयुण, special quality, although T. D. seems to take the word in its general sense. Why then, one might ask, insert मात्र when सङ्घात्या too like संयोग might be excluded by taking युण in the sense of विशेषयुण? The answer is that मात्र is also necessary to exclude सांसाद्धिकद्रवत्व. This is obviously a refinement of a later commentator (S. C.), for T. D. does not notice it. V. V. is not satisfied with the definition in the text, hedged as it is with so many qualifications, because परमाणुरूप which is imperceptible to the eye is not included in it. V. V. therefore proposes as a better definition त्वगश्राहा-चक्षुर्ग्रहा-युणविभाजकधर्मवत्त्वम्. The prefix त्वगश्राहा serves the purpose of मात्र; while by saying युणविभाजकधर्मवत्त्वम्, which is the same as युणत्वावान्तरजातिमत्त्वम्, instead of mere युणत्वम्, we include परमाणुरूप which has a युणत्वावान्तरजाति, namely रूपत्वजाति, although it is not चक्षुर्ग्रहा itself. The purpose can equally be served by adopting the enlarged definition suggested by T. D. to exclude संयोग. It is needless to remark that युण or cognition means here our ordinary cognition, and not the supernatural perception of *Yogins* who can perceive anything by any organ of sense they please. Śimkara Miśra<sup>2</sup> gives four

1. P. B. Ben. ed. p. 104. et. seq.

2. V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 201.

necessary conditions for the perception of colour, viz.  
 1. large magnitude ( महत्परिमाण ), 2 visibility ( उद्दूतत्व ),  
 3 not being overpowered ( अनभिशूतत्व ), and 4 the property  
 स्फृतत्व. The colour of atoms is not perceived because  
 atoms have not a large magnitude; the whiteness of the eye  
 is not perceived because it is अनुदृत; the whiteness in com-  
 mon fire and the lustre of rubies are unperceived owing to  
 their being overpowered by earthy matter; while savour and  
 touch are unperceived because they have no स्फृतत्वज्ञाति. The  
 modern theory first propounded by Newton is that colour  
 belongs to light only and that a ray of white light con-  
 tains all the primary colours which can be separated by a  
 prism of glass. An object appears to have the colour which  
 it reflects. The colours of earth and water are therefore not  
 their own, but are derived from the particular rays reflected  
 from them.

2. Colour is of seven kinds, white, blue, yellow, red,  
 green, tawny and variegated. This enum-  
 Varieties of  
 Colour. eration of seven colours is not known  
 either to *Praśastapāda* or *Sridhara*, and

is probably borrowed from some later writer. The last  
 variety being a mixture of the preceding six, it is naturally  
 asked why चित्रस्पृष्टि is recognized separately. Instead of  
 supposing a new colour why cannot, says the objector,  
 चित्रस्पृष्टि be called simply a mixture of several colours, and  
 a variegated piece of cloth be simply designated as  
 having so many colours? To this T. D. replies that, colour  
 being a व्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म, there cannot be several colours in one  
 and the same object.

A व्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म is defined as स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रति-  
 योगी धर्मः, i. e. a quality which never co-exists with its own  
 अत्यन्ताभाव ( absolute negation ) in one and the same object.  
 The opposite of this is an अव्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म which is a quality  
 that resides in a portion of the object only, and is therefore  
 co-existent with its own absolute negation residing in  
 another portion of the same object. Thus when a  
 monkey sits on the top of a tree, the monkey touches  
 the top only and not the root of the tree. The कपिसंयोग is  
 therefore said to be अव्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म, residing in the top, while  
 its अत्यन्ताभाव is मूलावृत्तिधर्म, residing in the root of the  
 same tree. This संयोग is therefore an अव्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म.

व्याप्त्यदृतिधर्म is a quality which covers the entire thing and not a part of it only, like the whiteness or blueness of a jar which resides in all its parts.

If चित्रस्त्र be only a collection of several colours, each individual colour will be अव्याप्त्यदृति, i. e. partial, while there will be no one colour covering the whole. What of it if there be not, rejoins the objector ; can we not still perceive the piece of cloth by means of the colours of its parts ? You cannot, says the author, for there is no colour in the piece of cloth as a whole, and without a colour you cannot perceive an object. But are there not so many instead of one colour in the piece ? They are useless, replies the author, to make it visible, because individually they reside in parts only while collectively they do not form one quality of the whole, it being a peculiar doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* that a collection (समुदाय) is not a thing by itself apart from its components.

A समुदाय, if it exists apart from its parts, would be a product different from its parts ; but where would it then reside ? Not in each part, nor in all put together, since it is distinct from all of them. समुदाय is therefore not distinct from the parts and is, like द्वित्वादिसंख्या, only a पर्याप्तधर्म i. e. a conjoint attribute. Such being the case, a collection of several colours cannot by itself constitute a quality which would make the piece of cloth visible. But here a question arises, why is a colour at all necessary for the perception of a thing ? Let the condition precedent for perceptibility be not रूपबन्न, possession of colour, but रूपबन्समवेतत्व, the state of being intimately united with things having colour. So although the piece of cloth may not have a colour of its own, it is in intimate union with parts that have colour, and will be therefore perceptible. The objection to this view is that such a condition precedent (रूपबन्समवेतत्व) for perceptibility is unnecessarily elaborate and therefore not preferable to the usual one रूपबन्न. The result of this discussion is that we must recognize an independent चित्रस्त्र to account for the perceptibility of a variegated piece of cloth.

3. The definition and divisions of रूप must have already shown to a critical student that the *Naiyāyika* conception of रूप is somewhat restricted. It is clear that what we ordi-

narily call the form or shape of a thing (आकारविशेष), such as its roundness or squareness, is not comprehended under रूप. It neither falls under any one of the seven colours, nor does the definition चक्षुर्मत्रिग्राहाद्यगुणत्वं apply to it, for form can be apprehended by the eye as well as by touch. Hence रूप is translated here by ' colour ', although in popular parlance it signifies form as well. Under what head then would this form go ? *Naiyāyikas* call it simply an अवयवसंस्थानविशेष particular arrangement of parts, and as such would probably include it under संयोग. Other scholastics such as the *Vedāntins* do not regard form as in any way distinct from the thing or its parts; for, they say, we recognize the same identical person in a देवदत्त standing and a देवदत्त sitting although the arrangements of his limbs (अवयवसंस्थान) are different in the two cases. The point is noticed here simply to clear a possible doubt.

4. Colour of all sorts resides in earth, while water and light have only one kind, namely white.

*Distribution of colours.*

The whiteness of light, however, being brilliant, differs from that of water, which is not so. The meaning of the passage is clear; but curiously the reading in the majority of the copies of the text is unsatisfactory if not actually corrupt, rendering the passage almost unintelligible. Only two MSS. in fact give the correct reading which is adopted in the text, others mostly reading अभास्वरं शुक्लं and भास्वरं शुक्लं, and thus apparently making अभास्वरं and भास्वरं independent attributes of रूप and not qualifications of whiteness as they really are. There are no separate colours like भास्वर and अभास्वर, but the words are introduced to distinguish between the particular sort of whiteness that resides in water and that which resides in light. Even with the reading भास्वरं शुक्लं we can no doubt get the right meaning by taking भास्वरं to be an adverb modifying the adjective शुक्ल; but then the construction becomes extremely awkward. In any case there ought to be no doubt as to the real meaning of the passage.

## SECT. XX, XXI, XXII. रसः, गन्धः, स्पर्शः.

Savour is the quality apprehended by tongue; it is of six kinds : sweet, sour, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter ; it resides in earth and water ; earth contains all the six varieties ; water only the sweet.

Odour is the quality apprehended by the nose ; it is fragrant and non-fragrant, residing in earth only.

Touch is the quality apprehended by skin only ; it is of three kinds : cool, hot, and tepid, residing in earth, water, light and air ; of these cool touch is (found) in water, hot in light and tepid in earth.

1. The three qualities of savour, odour and touch are

*Savour.*

here grouped together as they are treated symmetrically. कटु and तिक्त mean pungent and bitter respectively, and not *vice versa*,

as Ballantyne translates them wrongly. Earth has all varieties of savour, while water has only one, viz. sweet. Other tastes, such as sourness and salt, which are sometimes apprehended in water, are due to the dissolution of earthy matter in it.

2. Odour is apprehended by the nose and is of two kinds,

*Odour.*

fragrant and non-fragrant, residing in earth only. चित्ररस is not recognized because we never experience it, the several

savours when mixed in one substance being in reality apprehended separately and one after another. चित्रगन्ध and चित्रस्पर्श are impossible because their varieties are mutually repellent, and cannot therefore reside in one substance at one time. The word मात्र is omitted in the definitions of रस and गन्ध as unnecessary because the two organs apprehend their respective qualities only and nothing else. It is however necessary in the definition of स्पर्श, for the sense of touch apprehends other qualities besides touch, such as number and conjunction, which are also perceived by the eye. The word युण is retained in the three definitions to exclude the जाति respectively residing in the three qualities, viz. रसत्व, गन्धत्व and स्पर्शत्व. It is needless to remark that the three definitions are to be understood as जातिविशिष्ट (e. g. सनग्राह-जातिमान) in order to include the qualities in atoms.

3. *Annambhāṭṭa* following old authors divides स्पर्श into

*Touch.*

three kinds, hot, cold, and temperate ; but some others are for recognizing चित्रस्पर्श also, the reason given being

the analogy with colour (चित्रस्पर्शस्तु रूपस्थलीयसुक्त्या स्वीकरणीय एव<sup>1</sup>). चित्रस्पर्श however is not so possible in the three-fold division as in the theory of those who divide स्पर्श into numerous kinds such as:—

रूपः शीतस्तथैवोणः स्तिग्धश्च विशदः स्वरः ।  
कटिनश्चिक्षणः शुक्षणः पिच्छलो दारुणो मृदुः ॥  
एव द्वादशविस्तारो वायव्यो गुण एव च<sup>2</sup> ।

The idea seems to be that the eye and the organs of touch being the chief organs through which most of our perceptive knowledge is derived, चित्ररूप and चित्रस्पर्श have to be recognized to account for the perception of a whole having variegated parts. No such necessity however exists in the case of objects having different odours or savours, as even if they are never perceived at all, they can be inferred from their qualities. The same is the case with स्पर्श according to those who deny स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्ष to objects having touch. Hence *Sankara Miśra* remarks: न च हरीतक्या रसोऽपि चित्र इति वाच्यम् । हरीतक्या नीरसत्वे दोषाभावात्.<sup>3</sup>

### SECT. XXIII. पाकजापाकजत्वे.

*The four qualities, colour etc., are products of heat and non-eternal in earth; elsewhere they are natural and either eternal or non-eternal. Those inhering in eternal things are eternal; those in non-eternal things are non-eternal.*

1. The four qualities colour, savour, odour, and touch

*Production of qualities.* are both eternal and non-eternal; they are sometimes produced by heat, and sometimes they are natural. In earth they are said to be produced by heat, and are consequently non-eternal, while in the remaining three substances they are natural and are both eternal and non-eternal, the eternal being confined to the eternal atoms, and the non-eternal belong-

1 V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 292.

2 *Māhā-Bhārata.*

3 V. S. Up. Calc. Ed. p. 286.

ing to products which are non-eternal. The author is silent as to whether natural and eternal odour resides in the atoms of earth. If it does, the words पाकजमनियं च ought to be supplemented by the further addition अपाकजं नित्यं. The distinction between पाकज and अपाकज appears to be that earth can change its qualities by the application of heat, while water, light and air do not change them. Not that water and air do not become hot by the contact of heat, but the change of touch in their case does not affect the material but belongs to the light that is mixed with them.

2. T. D. here states briefly the rival theories about पाकजोत्पत्ति, that sharply divides the

*The controversy  
of Pilupāka and  
Pūharapōka.* *Vaisesikas* from the *Naiyāyikas*. The former are called पीलुपाकवादिनः because they explain the change of colour in

an unbaked jar by the separate baking of individual atoms, while the *Naiyāyikas* are called पिटरपाकवादिनः because they supposed the change of colour to be accomplished in the jar itself. पाक is defined as स्वपादिपरावृत्तिफलक-विजातीयतेजः-संयोगः, application of external heat which effects a change of colour and other qualities. It is of various kinds according to the effects, one changing only colour as in a baked jar, another changing colour, odour and savour as in an artificially ripened mango-fruit, and so on. The word विजातीय excludes a change by heat in metals, which, being तेजस्, are सज्जातीय. When a jar is baked, the old black jar is, according to *Vaisesikas*, destroyed, and its several compounds, of binaries etc. are also destroyed. The action of the fire produces the red colour in separate atoms, which are then joined by the same action of fire into new compounds, and eventually produce a new red jar. This complicated process of dissolution and reconstruction of the jar is necessary to allow all the atoms in the jar to be baked, for if the jar remained intact, the fire cannot penetrate it and bake the atoms in the interior. The reason why we cannot perceive this process of dissolution and reconstruction is its great rapidity. The time occupied by this process has been variously computed, some holding it to be nine moments, others ten, others eleven, and a fourth school, five only. The order of nine moments, which is generally

accepted, is thus given by *Viśvanātha* :—<sup>1</sup> “तथाहि (१) वह्निसंयोगतर्कम् । ततः परमाणवन्तरेण विभागः । तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशः । ततो व्यथुकनाशः । (२) ततः परमाणौ द्यामादिनाशः । (३) ततो रक्तायुत्पत्तिः । (४) ततो द्रव्यारम्भानुग्रहणक्रिया । (५) ततो विभागः । (६) ततः पूर्वसंयोगनाशः । (७) तत आरम्भकसंयोगः । (८) ततो व्यष्टिकोत्पत्तिः । (९) ततो रक्तायुत्पत्तिः” Of these the first four steps constitute the first moment marking the gradual destruction of the binary, and make up, together with the following eight ones, the total number of nine moments. Those who accept a disjunction arising from disjunction (विभागजविभाग) make ten moments by adding after the third another step वह्निनोदनजन्यपरमाणु-कर्मणो नाशः cessation of the action in the atoms produced by the original conjunction of fire; while the advocates of eleven moments add another disjunction after the first step. Again, if of the nine moments above described we take the first, the second, then the next two, then the next four, and then the last, we have the time divided into five moments only.<sup>2</sup> To this fantastical theory the *Naiyāyikas* who advocate पिटरपाकवाद object on the ground that, if the first jar is destroyed and a new one substituted, the identity of the jar can never remain intact. We recognize the jar to be exactly the same jar as before; we observe the same through all stages of baking; and other pots placed over it do not tumble down, as they must if their support is completely destroyed even for a moment. Again how do the number, the shape and even the lines on the jar remain the same? These strong objections are answered by the counter-question, how does the identity of a jar remain intact even if we scratch some particles out of it with a needle-point, although the jar after scratching becomes minus some particles and is quite different from the former one?<sup>3</sup> The followers of *Nyāya* therefore accept the simpler and on the whole the more reasonable theory of the change of colour being accomplished without the total dissolution and reconstruction of the jar. The objection how fire can reach the atoms is met with by the practical

1. S. M. Calc. Ed. p. 103.

2. For further explanation see V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 291, Roer's Trans. of B. P. Bibl. Ind. pp. 57-9, and Sarva, D. S. Cowell's Trans. p. 154.

3. V. S. Up. calc. ed. pp. 289-90.

instance of water boiling inside a pot placed over fire without actual touch. In this way the controversy between the पीलुपाक (baking of atoms) and the पिठरपाक (baking of the pot) has been carried on by their respective partisans with a scholastic subtlety and an amount of energy that are quite disproportionate to the importance of the result. The doctrine of पीलुपाक has in fact become one of the standing tests of distinguishing a genuine *Vaiśeṣika* from his rival the *Naiyāyika* proper.

3. The chief points of distinction between the two schools are stated in the following

*Vais'ēskas and Naiyāyikas.* distich:—

द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पन्नौ विभागे च विभागने ।

यस्य न स्वलिता द्वुद्विस्तं त्रै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

The *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines about द्वित्व and विभागजविभाग will be explained subsequently. Whatever view of पाकजोत्पत्ति we adopt, it is certain that the qualities in earth are non-eternal. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* पीलुपाक, even गन्ध in earthly atoms seems to be non-eternal; but the other theory leaves the point doubtful.

#### SECT. XXIV. संख्या.

"Number is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of (words) one, two etc." It resides in the nine substances from one to Parārdha. Oneness is eternal and non-eternal, eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternals. Duality and the rest are only non-eternal everywhere.

1. The definitions of संख्या and परिमाण in the text are taken from *Praśastapāda*.<sup>1</sup> The word हेतु here, as in the definition of time, is to be understood in the sense of असाधारण-निमित्तकारण, असाधारण in order to exclude universal causes like time and space; and निमित्त to exclude ether which is the

material cause of all व्यवहार. Number is the first of the common qualities, i. e. those which reside in all the substances. They are enumerated as follows:—

सङ्ख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवः सांसिद्धिकस्तथा ।

गुरुत्ववेगो सामान्यगुणो एते प्रकीर्तिः ॥ १

Number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority and posteriority, these seven, together with derivative fluidity, gravity and velocity, are qualities common to all substances. They appertain to substance in general, and not to any particular kind of substance; and hence they cannot be due to special characteristics which distinguish one class from another. It will be noticed that all these qualities connote really a state, aspect or arrangement of the thing or its parts, and not any attribute inherent in the thing itself. They are, to adopt modern phraseology, subjective or notional rather than objective or material. They are in fact imposed upon the thing by the operation of our own mind; that is, as the *Vedāntin* would say, they are अव्यक्त or आरोपित. It is true that we apprehend them, but we cannot assert positively whether they have a real existence in the external object or are merely conceptions of our own mind imposed upon the object. It will be more correct to say that we conceive them than that we perceive them. The special qualities (विशेषगुण) on the other hand, which have been already enumerated, have a real objective existence. Number of course is pre-eminently a subjective property and varies at our will, for we can contemplate a number of things, each as one separately, or all as so many or all as one collection. The *Vaiśeṣikas*, had undoubtedly realized the true nature of number, for they called duality and the higher numbers अपेक्षाद्वादिजन्य.

Out of the numbers which are ordinarily counted from one to a *parārtha* or a lakh of lakhs of crores, unity resides in eternal substances like atoms, while the other kinds are found

in products. The transientness of non-eternal unity in products arises from facts such as that a log of wood ceases to be one when you break it into pieces. Numbers from duality onwards being अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य are non-eternal. Śaṅkara Miśra regards द्वृत्य, i. e. an indefinite multitude, as a separate number apart from त्रित्वादि which are all definite ; but this opinion is not generally accepted.<sup>1</sup>

2. The verse quoted in Note 3 on Sect. XXIII<sup>2</sup> mentions द्वित्व as one of the three contested *What is duality.* points between *Nyāga* and *Vaiśeṣika* schools. The *Vaiśeṣika* view, which is no doubt shared by *Annambhaṭṭa*, is that all numbers from duality onwards are produced (जन्य) and not simply made known (ज्ञाप्य) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि. अपेक्षाबुद्धि is defined अनेकत्वबुद्धिर्या साऽपेक्षाबुद्धिरुच्यते<sup>3</sup>, which may be translated as "the notion which refers to many unities is called the अपेक्षाबुद्धि." It is difficult to translate अपेक्षाबुद्धि by "comprehending intellect" as Roer does, or by any other exact English equivalent; but its meaning can be easily understood. When two things are brought before us, we do not at once cognize them as two, but first apprehend each one separately, as this one and that one. These separate notions are denoted by the term अपेक्षाबुद्धि. When the conceptions of these two unities are formed in our mind, they are joined together and produce one general notion of duality ; and then we get the knowledge that there are two things. The process is thus described :—

" तत्र प्रथममिन्दियार्थसंनिकर्षः । तस्मादेकत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिः । ततो द्वितीयत्वात्तिः । ततो द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । तस्माद्वित्वगुणज्ञानम् । ततः संस्कारः ।

First we have the contact of the organ of sense with the object (i. e. each of the two jars); thence arises the knowledge of the genus unity (apart from the individual); then the distinguishing perception, अपेक्षाबुद्धि, by which the notion of nnity is realized in each of the objects, and we

1 V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 322.

2 *Supra*. p. 159.

3 B. P. 108.

4 *Sarv. D. S.* Calc. ed. p. 10.

apprehend "this is one," "this is one" etc.; then the production of duality by the combination of separate unities; then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality; then the cognition of that quality of duality as existing in the two things; and lastly the consciousness that we see two things. In this way we derive the complex knowledge of two, three etc. from the simple notions of unity. The reason why द्वित्व is regarded at अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य and not अपेक्षाबुद्धिज्ञाप्य is rather subtle. It is that अपेक्षाबुद्धि cannot simply be the ज्ञापकहेतु of द्वित्व like a stroke which reveals a sound lying dormant in ether; but it is the कारकहेतु of द्वित्व, because it is always found inseparably associated with द्वित्व, while a ज्ञापकहेतु need not be so (अपेक्षाबुद्धिद्वित्वादरुत्पादिका । चञ्चकत्वानुपत्तेः । तेनानुविधीयमानत्वात् । शब्दं प्रति संयोगवत्). *Mādhabācārya* gives a simpler argument, viz. that the non-eternal अपेक्षाबुद्धि cannot be ज्ञापक of द्वित्व, which, like the quality पृथक्त्व, resides in several objects conjointly; while अपेक्षाबुद्धि resides in each object separately, and hence it must be the ज्ञापकहेतु of द्वित्व. The importance of this subtle distinction lies in the different views of द्वित्व to which it leads. According to one, द्वित्व is an independent reality, different from the several unities of which it is composed and generated by अपेक्षाबुद्धि; according to the other view it is already comprehended in the unities, and is only revealed when several of them are brought together. It may be further mentioned that both the notion of duality and its generating cause अपेक्षाबुद्धि vanish away when their purpose is served, that is, when the objects are actually perceived as two. As soon as द्वित्वगुणबुद्धि, the result of अपेक्षाबुद्धि, is produced, the latter which lasts for three moments only is destroyed, and with its destruction, its direct effect, the duality, is also destroyed, and there only remains the cognition 'two dravyas'. The steps follow in this order : 1 एकत्वज्ञानः 2 अपेक्षाबुद्धिः 3 द्वित्वोत्पत्ति and एकत्वज्ञाननाशः 4 द्वित्वज्ञानः 5 द्वित्वगुणबुद्धि and अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशः and 6 द्वित्वनाश and द्रव्यबुद्धि. The reason for this assumed destruction of अपेक्षाबुद्धि and द्वित्वबुद्धि is rather technical, being founded on the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrine that all cognitions, being qualities of the all-pervading soul, last for three moments only, and are destroyed by the generation of their effects. The student has been led through this labyrinth of speculative subtlety in order to acquaint

him with the exact import of Annambhaṭṭa's simple dictum, द्वितादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव, that is, duality and other larger numbers are always अनित्य.

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### SECT. XXV. परिमाणम्.

*Dimension is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of measurement. It resides in the nine substances, and is of four kinds: minuteness, largeness, length and shortness.*

1. Each of the four kinds of dimension mentioned above may again be divided into two kinds, as मध्यम middling and परम extreme. Thus an atom has extreme minuteness, which is also technically called परिमाणदल्प (infinitesimality) from परिमण्डल a globular atom; a binary has मध्यमाणुत्व middling minuteness; Ākāśa has परममहत्व or विभूत्व all-pervasion; and all tangible objects such as a jar have मध्यममहत्व intermediate greatness. The comparative use of these words, as this pearl is minuter or larger than that other, is secondary. The distinction between अणु and महत् on the one hand and दीर्घि and द्रव्य on the other seems to be that the first two denote magnitudes of two or three dimensions, i. e. bulk, while the latter two denote one dimension only such as a line. This four-fold division of परिमाण is after all rough, many including द्रव्यत्व and दीर्घत्व in अणुत्व and महत्व respectively. As a matter of fact all of them are relative terms, and denote different numbers of constituent parts or degrees of contact in which they are combined. परिमाण is again divided into नित्य and अनित्य; that residing in eternal things as परिमाणदल्प and विभूत्व being नित्य, and all the rest अनित्य. अनित्यपरिमाण is threefold, संद्वयानन्य, परिमाणजन्य and पवरानन्य. For the explanation of these see Notes 9 and 10 on Sect. XIII, pp. 121-3, *supra*.

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## SECT. XXVI. पृथक्त्वम्.

*Severity is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of one thing being different from another.*

1. The definition in the text is rather crude. A better though a little more abstruse definition of **पृथक्त्व** is अपोद्धारन्यवहारकारणम्, the cause of our practice of separating one thing from all the rest.<sup>1</sup> अपोद्धार is अपक्रयावधिमपेक्ष्य य उद्धारो निर्धारणम् सः, that is, the determination of the identity of one thing by separating it from all others. The reason why **पृथक्त्व** is regarded as distinct from अन्योन्याभाव is that the notions conveyed to our mind by the two are of different sorts. When we say घटः पटो नास्ति we simply get a negative notion, that a jar is not a piece of cloth; while by पटाद्वरः पृथक् we get a positive notion that one is quite distinct from the other. **पृथक्त्व** therefore tells us something more than अन्योन्याभाव, for it not only informs us that a jar is not a piece of cloth but also that it is a different thing. The importance of this distinction may be illustrated by another example. We can say that a jar is *not* the quality of blueness residing in it, but we cannot say that it is distinct from it, the two being inseparably connected. Similarly we can say that a black unbaked jar is not the same as the red jar when baked, but it is not **पृथक्** from it. Again we can say दण्डी देवदत्त is not देवदत्त without a **दण्ड**, but the two are not distinct persons. In short **पृथक्त्व** is opposed to objective identity of the things, while अन्योन्याभाव is to the sameness of their natures. **पृथक्त्व** is a *material* distinction; अन्योन्याभाव *notional* only. In the same way **पृथक्त्व** can be distinguished from वैधर्म्य or वैशिष्ट्य.

## SECT. XXVII. संयोगः.

1. *Conjunction is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of calling two things united.*

1. संयोग is also defined as the contact of two things that were first separate (अप्राप्ययोस्तु या प्राप्तिः सेव Conjunction. संयोग इति<sup>2</sup> ); and therefore there can be no संयोग between two all-pervading things which

1 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 138.

2 B. P. 114.

are never apart from each other. संयोग is always artificial and non-eternal. T. D. divides it into two kinds, कर्मज that born of action, and संयोगज that produced by another conjunction. The contact of the hand with the books is of the first kind, because it is produced by the motion of the hand, while this contact of the hand with the book produces another conjunction, namely that of the body with the book, which is therefore संयोगज. The कर्मज संयोग is again of two kinds, अन्यतरकर्मज and उभयकर्मज. The instance of the first is the contact of the bird with the mountain, in which the bird alone moves while the mountain is stationary. The examples of the second kind are the meetings of two fighting rams, or of two wrestlers, or of two clouds, where both the things move. संयोगज again is two-fold, that of a thing just produced, such as the contact of an effect with something already connected with its material cause, and that of a thing previously existing, as the contact of the tree in consequence of the contact of the hand and the tree. All kinds of contacts are अन्याप्यवृत्ति, that is, cover only a part of the thing, and are destroyed either by separation or destruction of the आश्रय, namely the things connected.

2. Three MSS. of T. S. insert the word असाधारण after व्यवहार in the definitions of सहस्र्या, परिमाण, पृथक्त्व and संयोग, but the reading of others that reject it appears to be the right one and has been adopted. Although the qualification असाधारण is necessary to exclude universal causes, it can be and is always presumed wherever the words कारण or हेतु occur as in the definitions of काल and दिक्; and so there is no need of its express mention. There are also other grounds to believe that the word असाधारण did not exist originally but was supplied by the *Dipikā*. The words असाधारणेति पदं देयं in the *Dipikā* would of course have been conclusive on the point had they been found in all MSS. of the work. S. C. however is quite explicit, as it remarks—“उपदीश्वितलक्षणचतुष्पदे-साधारणपदं देयम् । क्वचित्पुस्तके परिमाणपृथक्त्वलक्षणे ॥ साधारणपदं दृश्यते तत्त्वाधुनिकैर्न्यस्तामिति बोध्यम् ॥”

3. The साधारणकारण ( universal cause ) referred to in this and the preceding definitions is defined by *Universal Causes.* V. V. as कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिस्त्रेपितकारणम्, which signifies that a universal cause is a cause of all effects as effects, and not as particular products; as for instance, a stick is an instrument of a jar because it is a jar and not any other thing, while time and space are instrumental causes of the same jar because it is a product. These universal causes are eight, God, His knowledge, His will, His effort ( तज्जनिच्छालुतयः ), antecedent negation ( प्रागभाव ), time ( काल ), space ( दिश् ) and destiny ( अदृष्ट ), comprising both merit and demerit. Some add the absence of counteracting influences ( प्रतिबन्धकाभाव ) as a ninth universal cause. These, being universal causes, are necessarily implied wherever we speak of a cause or an effect; and consequently when a thing is specially mentioned as a cause or an effect of another, they are not meant.

### SECT. XXVIII. विभागः.

*Disjunction is the quality which destroys conjunction.*

1. Disjunction is not merely the absence of संयोग, in which case it would have fallen under अभाव Disjunction. and need not have been reckoned as a separate quality : but it denotes an actual separation which produces the destruction of a previous contact. Again by disjunction we denote not the act of separating which is excluded from the definition by the word उण् but the state which immediately results from the act of separation. Hence *Annambhāṭṭa* defines विभाग differently and not on the analogy of संयोग as विभक्तव्यवहारकारणम् or विभक्तप्रत्ययकारणम्, as is done by *Viśvanātha*. The latter definitions being ambiguous may as well denote the state of being separate as the actual act of separation. The order of succession therefore is always this : first कर्म्, act of separating, then separation here called विभाग, then पूर्वदेशसंयोगमताशा, and lastly अपरदेशसंयोग. When we remove a jar from one place to another, we have an effort to lift it up,—this is the कर्म्; then the jar is lifted from the ground,—this is विभाग; then its contact with the particular spot is severed,—this is संयोग मताशा; and lastly it is

placed on another spot,—this is अपरेदशसंयोग. विभाग is therefore the cause of and not the same as संयोगनाश. Two trees on the opposite banks of a river have always remained apart, but there has never been an actual separation of them. विभाग has the same varieties as संयोग, and the examples also are similar, namely, कर्मज ( subdivided into उभयकर्मज and अन्यतर-कर्मज) and विभागजविभाग. There is however a difference of opinion as to the last between the *Vaisesikas* and the *Naiyāyikas* proper, the latter not recognizing विभागजविभाग at all.<sup>1</sup> The instance of a विभागजविभाग is हस्ततरुविभागात् काय-तत्त्वविभागः separation of the body from the tree, consequent upon the removal of the hand from the tree. Here the separation of the body is not directly caused by the motion of the hand because the two things (विभाग and हस्तक्रिया) reside in different receptacles, viz. the body and the hand respectively, while there is no motion in the body itself which might cause the separation. This argument by which the necessity of recognizing a विभागजविभाग is sought to be proved is founded on the axiom that the motion of a part is not the motion of the whole (as we see in a stationary revolving wheel) and so the motion of the hand is not itself the motion of the body. विभागजविभाग is also divided into two kinds, कारणमात्रविभागज and कारणाकारणविभागज, for which however see *Sarv. D. S. Calc.* ed. p. 107.

### SECT. XXIX. परस्पापरत्वे.

*Posteriority and priority are the (special and instrumental) causes of the common usage of the words posterior and prior. They reside in the four (substances), earth, etc. and the mind. They are twofold, caused by space and time. The posteriority caused by space is in the remote, and priority so caused is in the near. Posteriority caused by time is in the elder, and priority so caused is in the younger.*

1. Posteriority and priority may also be designated *remoteness* and *proximity* respectively.

*Priority and posteriority.* These qualities reside in the first four substances, because they are the only corporeal and non-eternal substances having a limited di-

<sup>1</sup> See verse quoted in Note 3 of Sect. XXIII p. 159 supra.

mension. Mind, being corporeal, possesses only one kind of priority and posteriority, namely that made by space, दिक्षत्, but not the other caused by time, as mind is eternal. The last four substances remaining are both eternal and incorporeal and cannot therefore have any kind of परत्व or अपरत्व. Really speaking परत्व and अपरत्व are nothing more than relations of corporeal things to time and space, expressed in the form of qualities for the purpose of marking their varying degrees.

### SECT. XXX, XXXI. गुरुत्वम्, द्रवत्वम्.

*Gravity is the non-intimate cause of the first fall, and resides in earth and water.*

*Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow, residing in earth, water and light. It is two-fold, natural and artificial.*

1. The definitions of Gravity and Fluidity are analogous,

*Gravity and Fluidity.*

one being called 'the non-intimate cause of the first act of falling,' and the other 'a like cause of the first act of flowing.'

The word आद् is inserted in both definitions to exclude velocity ( वेग ) which is the non-intimate cause of the second and all subsequent acts of falling or flowing. As a matter of fact, falling and flowing are essentially the same acts, one being the coming down of a solid from a higher level, while the other is the same act in a fluid; but the *Naiyāyikas* do not seem to have realized this. They do not also seem to have known the dynamical theory of falling bodies, as is clear from their calling गुरुत्व the cause of the first falling only, while it is in fact the cause of every act of falling. The confusion of the two meanings of the word गुरुत्व, viz. weight and heaviness, is already noticed and commented upon.

2. Fluidity is of two kinds, natural as that of water, and artificial as that of melted ghee. The distinction between संसारेक and नैमित्तिक द्रवत्व, though spoken of as inherent and absolute, seems to have been made to indicate the fact that some things remain fluid at normal-temperature and others

1 See Note 3 on Sect. IV. p. 85, *Supra.*

not. Those of the first kind such as water are said to possess natural fluidity, while others requiring the application of additional heat have artificial fluidity only. The solidity of snow and hail which are forms of water is exceptional and hence does not affect the proposition.

3. Unlike gravity, fluidity is assumed in light also, namely, in melted gold and other metals, while the gravity of the metals is ascribed to earthy portion in them. It might be urged that, following the analogy of gravity, even the fluidity of metals can be attributed to some watery portion in them ; but this cannot be, says the *Vaisesika*, for in that case it would be सांस्थिक, while the fluidity of metals is really नेमित्तिक only. Again why cannot the same earthy portion, which accounts for the gravity of metals, also account for its नेमित्तिक इवाच ? This is also not possible for the fluidity of metals is of a different kind, being अनुद्दित्यमान (indestructible) even by the application of extreme heat, while that of earthy substances is उच्छ्रयमन. Light in the form of metal's must therefore be regarded as having a peculiar fluidity of its own.

### SECT. XXXII. स्नेहः-

*"Viscosity is the quality which is the (special and instrumental) cause of the agglutination of powders and resicles in water only."*

1. The viscosity found in oil, milk and other such earthy substances is of course due to the watery portion in them. How can oil, says an objector, inflame fire if there is water in it, while water itself extinguishes fire ? Here too, the *Vaisesika* is ready with his explanation, viz. तैलान्तरे तप्रकर्षा-द्वन्द्यातुकृता। Oil hastens fire because it has a greater amount of viscosity than pure water. It is not explained however whence this greater viscosity in oil comes if it is due to water alone. पिण्डीभाव means thickening or concentration. It is the peculiar combination which holds particles of powder together. The reason why this पिण्डीभाव requires a special quality स्नेह and cannot be attributed to

द्रवत्व is that melted gold which possesses fluidity cannot form lumps of powders. N. B., however, quite appositely remarks that liquid water is alone the real cause, while solid water such as hail and ice is incapable of agglutinating particles. The fact is that the modern scientific theory of molecular attraction and repulsion which induced the three states of solid, liquid and gaseous in all matter was hardly known to Indian physicists, and hence they were often led into giving fantastic explanations of ordinary phenomena.

2. T. D., N. B. and S. C. say that the propriety of the word यूग्म in the definition of संह is to exclude time etc.; but this does not seem correct, as time and other universal causes are already excluded by interpreting हेतु as असाधारणहेतु. V. V. explains the word as excluding चूर्ण, but this is also incorrect, since चूर्ण can be excluded by taking हेतु in the sense of निमित्तकारण as it has been hitherto taken. It appears more reasonable to understand यूग्म as excluding the act of agglutinating which is also the special and instrumental cause of सिष्टोभाव. Hence either the line कालादा etc. in T. D., which is retained in this edition because it is found in all copies, is interpolated by some one who failed to understand the text or Arṇambhaṭṭa deliberately used the word हेतु here in a narrower sense than previously. Probably he borrowed the definition from a more ancient work, without determining accurately the propriety of each word.<sup>1</sup>


### SECT. XXXIII. शब्दः.

*Sound is the quality which is apprehended by the sense of hearing, and resides in ether alone. It is two-fold, inarticulate or noise and articulate or words. The noise is (heard) in drums etc; while words appear in the form of Sanskrit language.*

1. Besides the two-fold division in the text, the T. D. gives another three-fold division of sound, making in all six varieties of it. (The latter three divisions are : 1 संयोगज, born of conjunction, such as the sound of a drum produced by the contact of the stick or hand with the drum; 2 विभागज, born of disjunction, such as the sound produced by splitting a bamboo-stick; and 3 शब्दज born of sound, such as all subsequent sounds which are produced from the first one.)

Sound.

2. A more elaborate division of sound is the following :—



And so on. The articulate sound will be treated further on under शब्दप्रमाण ( Sect. 59-63. ).

3. The शब्दज शब्द is recognized to account for the fact that

*The Nyāya theory of sound.* sound can be heard at any distance from the place where it is first produced. There are only two senses which apprehend their

objects at a distance, namely, sight and hearing. Of these the eye is supposed to go outside to the object, and carry back its impression to the mind. But the organ of hearing being of the nature of all-pervading Ākāśa cannot move शोत्र or organ of hearing is defined as the Ākāśa which is कर्णशकुल्यवच्छिन्न, i. e. the portion of ether limited and severed from the rest of the Ākāśa by the cavity of the ear. Evidently शोत्र cannot go out of the ear-cavity by which it is conditioned, for as soon as it goes out it will be no शोत्र but common ether. As the organ of hearing cannot go to its object, it is necessary that the object should reach the ear, so that anyhow the two may come into contact. But the sound which is produced in that portion of Ākāśa which is immediately in

contact with the drum is distant from the ear and cannot itself travel to the ear, being, as a quality, inseparably connected with a definite portion of the *Akāśa*. Besides it is a doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* that sound is अनित्य and cannot last for more than a few moments. This first sound therefore is supposed to produce a second similar sound in the next piece of *Akāśa*, and this second a third; and so on, until the train reaches the portion of *Akāśa* confined in the ear, that is, the शोब्र. It is this last sound produced in the शोब्राकाश that is directly perceived by the organ of hearing, and as it is the last of a series generated by the first sound, it is called शब्दज. So far this theory of sound is accepted by all *Naiyāyikas*, but there is a slight difference of opinion as to the mode in which sound travels or rather propagates its species. Some, applying the analogy of ocean-waves (वीचीतरङ्गन्याय), say that the series of sounds travels in a straight line in one direction only, namely from the drum direct to the ear. Others apply the analogy of a कदम्ब flower (कदम्बगोलकन्याय), the filaments of which shoot round about in all directions; and so they say that sound travels not in one direction only but in all directions, that is, innumerable series of sounds start from the central point where it was first produced, and go in every direction. The simple fact that the sound of a drum is heard on all sides and not in one direction only is enough to prove that the latter analogy is nearer the truth than the former. The whole of the above theory of sound is very crude and faulty owing to the inveterate habit of Indian philosophers to indulge in speculations in matters that can be known only by actual observation or experiments. They did not know that the real organ of hearing is the *tympanum* in the ear which has a closer similarity with the drum than with the *Akāśa*, while the fact of the sound being carried by air by means of successive undulations of air-particles was also undreamt of. Instead of investigating the nature of sound in such practical directions, the *Naiyāyikas* exhausted their energies in discussing whether sound was eternal or non-eternal. The pros and cons as well as the importance of this last controversy in Indian philosophy will be noticed later on.

## SECT. XXXIV. बुद्धिः.

*Cognition is the ( special and instrumental ) cause of all communication or intercourse, and it is knowledge. It is twofold, remembrance and apprehension. Remembrance is knowledge produced from mental impression alone. Knowledge other than remembrance is apprehension.*

1. Cognition is the proper equivalent for बुद्धि as used in the *Nyāya* system. Ballantyne translates *Cognition*, बुद्धि by 'understanding,' and Roer by 'intellect:' but both renderings are wrong. The word बुद्धि is capable of having three meanings:-1st the act of knowing, which may be called 'understanding'; 2ndly the instrument of knowledge which is 'intellect,' and 3rdly the product of the act of knowing, which is 'cognition.' It is in this last sense that the word is invariably used in *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* philosophies. This should be quite clear from the mention of बुद्धि among the qualities, that is, as a property of the soul. A cognition is undoubtedly such a property; while *understanding* is an act, and *intellect*, being an instrument of knowledge, is a substance, and is identified by *Naiyāyikas* with mind. Other schools of philosophers such as the *Sāṃkhyas* and the *Vedāntins* designate बुद्धि as an elemental thing under the name महत्त्व, and divide it into several faculties performing different functions, namely, अहंकार and अंतःकरण. According to them, therefore, बुद्धि is an instrument of knowledge; but their doctrine is emphatically repudiated by *Naiyāyikas* who regard बुद्धि as a quality of the soul and capable of being perceived, while the direct instrumentality of knowledge is assigned to mind which being atomic is imperceptible. Hence in the definition given in the text बुद्धि is said to be knowledge itself, and not an instrument of knowledge.

2. व्यवहार is as V. V. rightly defines it, द्वोधयिषापूर्वकवाक्यप्रयोगः, utterance of words for the purpose of communicating ideas, and not आहारविहारादिः as S. C. has it, for the latter is too wide and would include involuntary actions, such as walking in sleep; which are not prompted by knowledge. Briefly speaking, बुद्धि is a property of the soul which prompts articulate language; or, in other words, it is thought clothed in intelligible words. This invariable association of

बुद्धि and व्यवहार makes the above definition too narrow, inasmuch as it does not apply to निर्विकल्पज्ञान or mere sensation, which is a species of cognition, but which can never be expressed by articulate language. V. V. therefore modifies the definition into तादृशव्यवहारजनकतावच्छेदकजातिमत्त्वम्, that is, cognition is the quality having that जाति which characterizes the efficient cause of the above kind of व्यवहार. Thus निर्विकल्पज्ञान, though itself not व्यवहारहेतु, has the जाति बुद्धित्व which differentiates the व्यवहारहेतु.

3. The definition of बुद्धि given in the text is in many respects more convenient in practice than *Other definitions.* scientifically accurate. The T. D. therefore supplies a better definition, जानामीत्तर-

तुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानत्वम्. Cognition is said to be that knowledge (ज्ञान) which becomes the subject (गम्य) of the consciousness (अनुव्यवसाय) having the form 'I know.' This requires a little explanation. Perceptive knowledge according to Nyāya is acquired by going through three successive steps, viz इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष, ज्ञान and अनुव्यवसाय. When an object like a jar is brought before us, our organ of sight first comes into contact with it, and carries an image of the object to the mind which conveys it to the soul. This organ is called the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, efficient cause of perception. This image is then converted into a cognition or बुद्धि having the form अयं घटः 'this is a jar.' This cognition (घटज्ञान) again being a property of the soul, the Ego becomes घटज्ञानवान्, which when combined with the ever present अहंकार 'I am,' results into the compound consciousness, घटज्ञानवानहमस्मि or घटमहं जानामि 'I know a jar.' This last consciousness is called अनुव्यवसाय because it always follows व्यवसाय or simple cognition. Hence the cognition 'This is a jar' (अयं घटः) is said to become the subject matter of the consciousness 'I know.' The peculiarity of this definition consists in the fact that other scholastics, such as the Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntins, do not recognize the cognition अयं घटः to be the गम्यज्ञान of a further अनुव्यवसाय, but give the name cognition to अनुव्यवसाय itself. The definition thus states a peculiar doctrine of Nyāya.

4. Another noteworthy definition of बुद्धि given in the

*Sapta-Padārthī* of Śivādityācārya is आत्माभ्यः प्रकाशः, which the commentator *Jinavardhana* explains, अज्ञानांथकात्तिरस्कारकारकसकलपदार्थस्याध्यप्रकाशकः प्रदीप इव देवीप्यमानो यः प्रकाशः सा बुद्धिः, knowledge is of the nature of light because it dispels the darkness of ignorance and illuminates all objects to the mind's eye. The epithet आत्माभ्यः means residing in the soul as a property, and explains *Annambhatta*'s definition of आत्मा as ज्ञानाधिकरणम्, बुद्धिः and ज्ञान being of course synonymous. *Prasastapāda* defines बुद्धिः merely by giving उपलब्धिः, ज्ञान and प्रत्यय as its synonyms.<sup>1</sup>

5. The wording of the definition in four copies is different, being हेतुज्ञानं बुद्धिः instead of हेतुबुद्धिज्ञानम्; while two other copies add युग्मः after हेतुः quite unnecessarily. The interchange of ज्ञानं and बुद्धिः has an important bearing on the right understanding of the definition; for the other reading is not only ambiguous, but is likely to mislead some into taking बुद्धिः to be only one species of knowledge which is व्यष्टिहरहेतुः. As a matter of fact ज्ञान is an independent predicate of बुद्धिः intended to describe the exact nature of cognition, and probably also to exclude the possibility of बुद्धिः being mistaken for the act or the instrument of knowledge. It contradicts according to S. C. the doctrine of *Sāṃkhya*s that बुद्धिः or महत्त्व is a material element, produced from प्रकृति and identical with अन्तःकरण the instrument of knowledge. One copy of T. D. inserts कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति, but that is incorrect, as time etc. are excluded by taking हेतु as असाधारणहेतु. Another propriety of the word ज्ञान noticed by S. C., viz., that बुद्धिः here does not mean excess of knowledge, as in expressions like बुद्धिमान् देवदत्तः, is rather far-fetched. The expression is borrowed from *Gotama*'s aphorism, बुद्धिरुपलाभिज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्<sup>2</sup> and is probably used as a hint to the student that *Gotama*'s psychology and logic are easily reconcilable with the system of *Vaiśeṣika padārthas* adopted in this book. Whatever may be

1 P. B. Ben. ed. p. 171.

2 G. S. I, 1, 15.

the case it is evident that in this and in all the following sections of the book treating of the kinds and proofs of knowledge the author is a consistent follower of *Gotama* rather than of *Kaṇāda*, and has attempted with considerable success to incorporate the *Nyāya* doctrine of proofs with the *Vaiśeṣika* system of *padārthas*.

6. Cognition is of two kinds, remembrance and apprehension.

*Divisions of cognition.*

Remembrance is defined as the knowledge which is born of a mental impression alone (संस्कार).

This संस्कार is that particular kind of it, which is called भावना and which is defined further on (Sect. 75) as being born of apprehension and causing remembrance. So भावनासंस्कार is properly speaking the operation (उपाय) which comes into existence, between the product स्मृति, and its cause अनुभव. उपाय is defined as तज्जन्यते सति तज्जन्यतादः, that is, an intermediate operation born of the cause and producing the thing which is the effect of that cause. उपाय is therefore a sort of intermediate link between the effect and its cause, which often, as in this case of स्मृति, is separated by a great interval of time.)

7. The insertion of मात्र in the definition of स्मृति has been

*Definition of Smṛti,*


sharply criticised, and as strongly defended. The word, it is said, excludes प्रत्यभिज्ञा (reminiscence) which is produced by

संस्कार but not by it alone, as a direct perception of the object is also an operating cause in it. The difference between प्रत्यभिज्ञा and स्मृति consists in the presence or absence of the thing recollected. When a man, for instance, who has seen an elephant with a driver on its back, sees either the elephant or the driver alone, and at once remembers the other one, his knowledge is said to be remembrance, and is solely due to the impression that had been left on his mind since he saw the elephant with a driver on its back. The thing which brings back to the mind the memory of the absent object by the law of association is called the उद्धोषक (reviver) of that संस्कार. In प्रत्यभिज्ञा (reminiscence) the object recollected is actually before our eyes, and the novelty of the knowledge only consists in the identity of the

object now perceived with some one previously seen, as when on seeing देवदत्त one recollects that it is the same देवदत्त whom one saw before. Here the actual perception of देवदत्त is as much the cause of knowledge as the impression left on the mind by a former perception; and hence प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारमात्रजन्य but प्रत्यक्षसहकृतसंस्कारजन्य. Several copies of T. S. and T. D. omit मात्र in the definition in the text as well as the sentence in T. D. referring to it. S. C. appears to have had both readings before him as he expressly prefers the one with मात्र. Other writers omit मात्र from the definition on the ground that even without it the definition does not cover प्रत्यभिज्ञा because there the immediate cause of the प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not the previous impression, but the remembrance of the identity of the thing (तना = देवदत्तता) which is produced from संस्कार.<sup>1</sup> In a remembrance the impression is the immediate cause, while in a reminiscence the impression produces remembrance of identity, and then this remembrance of simple identity produces the reminiscence that that identity resided in the object actually seen. Thus प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारजन्य at all, and hence मात्र is unnecessary. Nilakantha answers this argument by simply remarking that the cause of प्रत्यभिज्ञा is the impression of identity and not an intermediate remembrance. Another objection to the definition is that it is असंभूत and will not cover even स्मृति which is not संस्कारमात्रजन्य but अनुभवजन्य also: but the असंभव can be removed either by taking जन्य in the sense of साक्षात्जन्य or by construing the definition, as Nilakantha remarks, to mean चक्षुराद्यजन्यत्वे सति (and not संस्कारजन्यत्वे सति) संस्कारजन्यत्वम्. As to संस्कारध्वसं which is also संस्कारमात्रजन्य it is excluded by ज्ञान.

8. The author defines अनुभव as 'all knowledge other than Apprehension.' remembrance,' i. e. all cognitions which are newly acquired and are not repetitions of former ones. The negative definition of अनुभव in the text is due to the fact that अनुभव is a simple ultimate operation of the mind which is at the bottom of all other mental operations, including even the act of defining. Besides a definition of अनुभव is really unnecessary, as by simply excluding स्मृति

or repeated knowledge, the definition of बुद्धि will also serve for the residuum, that is अतुभव. This and the subsequent divisions and sub-divisions of बुद्धि are according to the system of Gotama. The *Vaisesika* division is slightly different and may therefore be profitably compared with that given in the text. *Praśastapāda* divides and subdivides बुद्धि as follows :—<sup>1</sup>



Of these लैङ्गिक is inference, while आर्द्ध which is a kind of प्रत्यक्ष is the supernatural perception of Yogins. Others can be easily identified with their corresponding varieties given in the text.

9. The three words बुद्धि, अतुभव and स्मृति are rendered into English by 'cognition,' 'apprehension' and 'remembrance,' because they are their nearest equivalents ; but the meanings of the last two require to be clearly defined. Remembrance, recollection, and reminiscence, for instance, are analogous but easily distinguishable. *Remembrance* is an idea which recurs to the mind without the operation of an external object on the sensory nerve, and is thus opposed to *pereception*; while it becomes *recollection*, if it is sought after and found with difficulty and effort.<sup>1</sup> स्मृति is *remembrance* as above defined and probably includes *recollection* also, as *Naiyayikas* do

not seem to make a distinction between a spontaneous and an artificial recollection. *Remembrance* as above defined may seem to be concerned with impressions gained from perception only; but there is no reason why a former inference treasured up in mind or an impression produced from a previous remembrance should not be remembered as well; and hence स्मृति properly speaking is general and comprehends all impressions however originally derived. *Reminiscence* is the act by which we endeavour to recall and re-unite former states of consciousness, and is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former one. This is akin to प्रत्यभिज्ञा. *Apprehension* is the simple knowledge of a fact, and is an act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object.<sup>2</sup> Simple apprehension is again divided into two kinds, *incomplex* and *complex*, which respectively correspond to *Naiyāyika* निविकल्पक and साविकल्पक ज्ञान. This is not exactly the अनुभव of *Nyāya*, but it is very near it. *Cognition* is knowledge in its widest sense, embracing sensation, perception, conception and notion. According to Kant, *cognition* is the determined reference of certain representations to an object; that is, to cognize is to refer a perception to an object by means of a conception. A dog *knows* his master, but does not *cognize* him, because it has not the faculty of forming a mental conception of the master. An absent-minded man *sees* an object, but does not *cognize* it because his mind is not working to form a notion of the object.<sup>3</sup> The *Naiyāyikas* expressed this idea by saying that in an अनुभव, the property of the external object must become the प्रकार of the corresponding cognition.

1 Locke : *Essay on Human Understanding*, Bk II. c<sup>t</sup> 19.

2 Whately : *Logic*, B<sup>t</sup> II. ch. I. sec. 1.

3 Haywood : *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 593.

## SECT. XXXV. अनुभवः.

*It (apprehension) is twofold: true and false. The true one is the apprehension of a thing having an attribute as possessing that attribute and it is called Pramā; the false one is the apprehension of a thing not having an attribute as possessing that attribute, e. g. knowledge of silver in a conch-shell.*

1. Apprehension is divided into right (यथार्थ) and wrong (अयथार्थ), the first being usually called *Apprehension*, प्रमा and the second अप्रमा. (यथार्थानुभव is a correct apprehension in which the object is cognized as it is (यथाभूतोऽथो यस्मिन् सः). It is defined तद्वत् तत्प्रकारकः which may be paraphrased as तद्विशेषकस्तत्प्रकारकः, that is apprehension of a certain object possessing an attribute as possessing that attribute.)

2. The words विशेषण, विशेष्य and प्रकार should be carefully noted as they constantly occur in *Nyāya* works. When we see an object, the object and प्रकार becomes the विशेष्य of our knowledge, while the characteristic, which distinguishes that object and makes it what it is, is called the प्रकार of the same knowledge. Thus in the cognition, अयं घटः, घट the object of the cognition is the विशेष्य, while घटत्व, the distinguishing property of घट, is the प्रकार of the corresponding cognition. Hence the cognition अयं घटः is defined as घटत्वबद्धविशेष्यक-घटत्वप्रकारक, that is, one which has a jar possessing the attribute jar-ness for its object (विशेष्य), and has घटत्व for its special characteristic (प्रकार). The use of this two-fold terminology is that while the विशेष्य describes the form of the cognition, प्रकार distinguishes it from similar cognitions, as for instance घटज्ञान from पटज्ञान. There is a similar distinction between विशेषण and प्रकार. When we see a नीलघट, the quality of नील becomes a प्रकार of the cognition of the blue jar, while the same quality blueness is a विशेषण of the jar itself. Similarly in the cognition अयं घटः, घटत्व is the विशेषण of घट and the प्रकार of घटज्ञान. विशेषण is the property of a material object, while प्रकार is the property of knowledge.

3. The definition of प्रमा-तद्वत् तप्रकारकोऽनुभवः—can therefore be paraphrased into घटत्वबद्धविशेष्यक-घटत्वप्रकारकोऽनुभवः which in simple language means that in a right apprehension that

same characteristic which marks the object must also be the distinguishing property of its notion. Hence V. V. remarks सत्त्वयर्थे विशेषत्वम्, meaning that the locative तद्रूपि denotes that the thing (*i. e.* घट) possessing तत् (*i. e.* घटत्व) is the object (विशेष) of the apprehension, which has the same तत् for its प्रकार. All this can be briefly expressed by saying that right apprehension is the knowledge of an object as it really exists. The opposite of this is अप्रमा, namely, the cognition of a property (तत्त्वकारकः) in a thing which does not possess that property (अतद्रूपि). The cognition of silver-ness, in a thing which is silver is प्रमा; while the same cognition of silver-ness, if made in a mother-o' pearl, which is *not* silver, becomes अप्रमा. The use of the qualification तद्रूपि in the definition of प्रमा is made apparent in a combined knowledge of two or more things. Suppose we perceive घट and पट simultaneously and together, but instead of cognizing घट as घट and पट as पट we take घट to be पट and *vice versa*. Here we have a knowledge which has both घट and पट for its objects (विशेष) and also घटत्व and पटत्व for its properties (प्रकार); but it is not a प्रमा because घटत्वप्रकार belongs to the part-cognition which is पटविशेषक and *vice versa*. Hence the necessity of saying that the knowledge must be तत्त्वकारक with reference to the object itself (तद्रूपि).

#### 4. A very subtle objection to the definition is suggested and answered by T. D. The definition

*Some objections.*

applies to a cognition of घट when we can interpret तद्रूपि as घटत्वाधिकरण; but it can not apply to a cognition of घटत्व itself as residing in a घट, for घटत्व is not the अधिकरण of घट or any other thing; so the expression तद्रूपि is meaningless in this case, and the definition will be अव्याप्ति. The difficulty can be avoided by taking तद्रूपि to mean तत्त्वदर्थवृत्ति, so that as घट is the अधिकरण of घटत्वसम्बन्ध, so घटत्व is the अधिकरण of घटसम्बन्ध and the definition comprehends both. Similarly the definition of अप्रमा is too wide as it will apply even to a right cognition, 'This is in union.' For conjunction being a partial (अव्याप्त्यत्वात्) property, the same thing is always संयोगवृत् as well as संयोगाभाववृत्; and a cognition इदं संयोगि will be both प्रमा as well as अप्रमा. But this is not so, for in a wrong cognition the knowledge is obtained from a part where there is a

negation of संयोग, while in a right cognition the संयोग is known to be on the part having संयोग. Again although a thing resides in another by संयोग and not समवाय, its absolute negation subsisting on the same substratum by समवायसंबंध does not make it a wrong cognition.

All this scholastic subtlety does not lessen even a bit the inherent ambiguity of the definitions. The practical difficulty is, which of the many properties of a thing is denoted by तत्, and is therefore to be taken as the test of right apprehension. That they are the घटत्व of घट and पटत्व of पट will of course be the prompt reply; but do घटत्व and पटत्व, it may be asked, convey any definite ideas apart from घट and पट? We cannot understand घटत्व or पटत्व unless we first know what घट or पट is. How can then घटत्व or पटत्व become the test of judging the validity of the knowledge of घट or पट? It is said that we see a घट truly when we observe घटत्व in it, but properly speaking we cannot see घटत्व in the thing unless we have first recognized the thing to be घट. It is not easy to overcome this dilemma.

5. Other philosophers such as the *Sāmkhyas* and the *Vedāntins* reject the *Nyāya* definitions and define प्रमा as अनविगतावधितार्थविषयत्वम्, a cognition having for its object a thing that was not apprehended before and that is never contradicted. अनविगत excludes स्मृति and may be omitted if the definition is to apply to both right apprehension and right remembrance. स्मृति also, according to *Anāmbhatta* (see Sect. 65 *infra*), is divisible into पूर्ण and अपूर्ण, though its validity depends on other reasons; but according to some *Naiyāyikas* स्मृति is of one kind only. As to the three kinds of अपूर्णतुम्ब see Sect. LXIV and notes thereon. There is no reason why the following four divisions of प्रमा should not also be applicable to अपूर्णतुम्ब. Thus there may be a wrong perceptive knowledge owing to defect of organs and other causes, or a wrong judgment due to fallacious reasoning, or a false analogy, or a misunderstanding of words.

All these, it seems, will fall under the second division of अवधार्य, namely, विषय, unless of course they have the additional characteristics of संशय and तर्क.

### SECT. XXXVI. अनुभवमेदाः.

*Right apprehension is divided into four kinds: Percept, Judgment, Analogy and verbal knowledge. The instruments of these are also four, namely: Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word or Language.*

1. The superiority of Sanskrit terminology is proved here by the fact that except in the case of Right apprehension प्रत्यक्ष the same root supplies two distinct and appropriate names, one for the instrument, and the other for the result of knowledge, while in English we are often obliged to employ the same term for both. Even in Sanskrit much confusion often results from the ambiguous use of the word प्रत्यक्ष for both knowledge and its instrument. I have therefore borrowed some new terms from English logic, so as to provide different names for each of these. *Perception* is commonly applied to knowledge, its instrument, as well as the act of knowing; but I have restricted it to the instrument only, or rather the instrument in the act of knowing; while a new term *Percept* is used on the authority of Max-Müller to denote the particular notion acquired by *perception*.<sup>1</sup> The act of reasoning is denoted by *Inference*, while the conclusion reached is called *Judgment*, which according to Mansel is "a combination of two concepts related to one or more common objects of possible intuition."<sup>2</sup> उपमिति and उपमान are respectively rendered by *Analogy* and *Comparison*, the latter denoting the act of establishing similarity between two things, while the former implies the similarity so established. There is no appropriate name for शास्त्रज्ञान, 'authority' and 'tradition' which are sometimes employed

1 Max-Müller: *Science of Thought* p. 20.

2 Mansel: *Prologom. Log.* p. 60.

meaning quite different things. *Verbal Knowledge* and *Word* are therefore used for शब्दज्ञान and शब्द respectively.

2. The four varieties of प्रमा as well as their instruments will be defined and explained later; *What is Pramāṇa*, but it will be useful first to examine the general nature of प्रमाण. The aim of Nyāya as that of all sciences being the attainment of truth, a knowledge of ' proofs ' by which that truth is to be known is necessary, according to the maxim मानाधीन मेयसिद्धि, ' knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on a knowledge of the measure.' When we have once determined the nature and limits of valid proofs, it is comparatively easy to arrive at true knowledge by employing those proofs properly ; or rather the latter function, being beyond the province of any art or science, may be left to the judgment and capacity of each individual. The greater part of Nyāya writings is therefore devoted to a consideration of these proofs, and many controversies have raged respecting them among rival systematists. The number of proofs has varied greatly with different schools from one to nine, and all of them have been equally tenacious in holding to their favourite theories. Annambhatṭa follows Gotama in recognizing four proofs,<sup>1</sup> but the assignment of each to the four divisions of प्रमा respectively seems to be his own improvement. प्रमाण ( प्रमीयतेऽनेति ) is defined in T. D. as प्रमाकरणम्, 'the instrument of right apprehension' ; but the definition is rather vague, and inapplicable in those cases where the proofs, though perfectly valid in themselves, lead to wrong knowledge owing to extrinsic causes.

3. The definition given by the author is according to some imperfect, as it mentions only one function of a proof, namely, प्रमाजनकत्वं ( production of प्रमा ), and does not comprehend its other function, प्रमात्वज्ञापकत्वं ( determination of the validity of the प्रमा ). Another and a somewhat more accurate definition is साधनाभ्याव्यातिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमात्वाप्तम्,<sup>2</sup> 'proof is that which is always followed by right apprehension (प्रमा ).

1 G. S. 1, 1, 3.

2 Sarv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 110.

and is united with the appropriate organ and the receptacle of knowledge, *viz.* soul'. Thus proof is first an invariable condition of प्रमा, and not merely the cause of प्रमा. प्रमाण has a double function; it not only produces right apprehension, but sometimes also tests its truth. It is not therefore प्रमाकरण only, but प्रमात्वज्ञापक also; and so the definition प्रमात्वात् is more correct as comprehending both. The *Naiyāyikas* are परतःप्रामाण्यवादिनः, *i. e.* they hold that the validity of a cognition is proved not by itself, but by some other extraneous means. The objection in their view is not therefore very serious. प्रमाण is neither soul, nor mind, nor the organs of sense, for if it had been so there would have been no necessity of its separate mention apart from these latter which are already enumerated. The *Mimāṃsaka*'s define प्रमाण as अनधिगतार्थगन्तु, 'that which apprehends an object not known before'; but this definition, says S. C., is wrong because in a long series of sensations of the same object, the first only thereby becomes प्रमा, while the succeeding sensations will not be प्रमा, being अविगतार्थ. The *Mimāṃsaka*'s answer to this objection is that each individual sensation is different from its predecessor inasmuch as it was produced at a different moment. The expression अनधिगत is intended to prevent भावनासंस्कार being called the proof of स्मृति. The *Naiyāyikas* restrict all proofs to अनुभव or new cognitions and call स्मृति mere repetitions thereof caused by संस्कार from previous impressions.

4. Before proceeding further, it will be worth while to notice two varieties of knowledge recognized by European logicians, which are apparently left out of the *Naiyāyika*'s classification of ज्ञान, namely *intuitions* and *beliefs*. An *intuition* is any knowledge whatsoever, sensuous or intellectual, which is apprehended *immediately*, that is, without the instrumentality of any sense or mental faculty. Axioms in Geometry, and the notions of time, space and causality are such *intuitions*, which do not come under any of the heads of अनुभव of the *Naiyāyikas*. Some of these are accounted for otherwise, as by the recognition of time and space as independent entities which are *inferred* from their effects. The rest will be probably included under स्मृति as reminiscences of previous births retained by जट. The doctrines of

अदृष्ट and transmigration enable Indian philosophers to explain many facts that are incomprehensible to Western thinkers. The other kind of knowledge that is apparently left unnoticed is *belief* or *faith*, which differs from *cognition* in that it denotes "those exercises of the mind in which we *believe* in the existence of an object, not now before us and under immediate inspection."<sup>1</sup> We often entertain many notions which are not self-evident and yet which we do not know to be positively true. These are beliefs. The *Naiyāyikas*, it seems, would include them, if authoritative, under शान्तज्ञान, and if not, under अप्रमा. In this way the classification of ज्ञान may claim to be exhaustive.

## SECT. XXXVII. करणम्.

*An instrument is a cause which is peculiar.*

1. A करण is defined as 'a cause which is peculiar.'

*Proximate Cause.*

असाधारण is inserted to exclude general causes such as time and space ; but this

does not seem to be the sole purpose of the word. The word must also be intended to exclude other causes such as the intimate and the non-intimate causes of a thing, which are neither universal nor करण. असाधारण is better paraphrased by Nilakantha as यदिलम्बात्प्रकृतकार्यानुत्यादस्तत्कारणत्वम्, that is, 'a cause without which a desired effect will never be produced;' but this also is not strictly accurate. A करण properly speaking is the immediate or proximate cause that gathers together the scattered materials and gives final shape to the product. It is the cause which, other accessories being present, is absolutely necessary for the completion of the effect. This seems to be the meaning of असाधारण here, which considerably differs from the sense in which it is used in other passages.<sup>2</sup> But even so much restriction is not sufficient to

1. M'Cosh *Intuitions* p. 196.

2. See Sec. 29, and the reading of several copies in Secs. 24-5-6-7.

ensure perfect accuracy in the definition of करण. For example, दण्ड is an असाधारण निमित्तकारण of घट and is therefore its करण ; but a दण्ड in a forest can never be the करण of a घट, although the definition would equally apply to it, as it is potentially if not actually an efficient cause of घट. To exclude दण्ड in the forest, the ancient *Naiyāyikas* inserted an additional qualification व्यापारवत्वे सति, so that only a दण्ड, which is actually employed in the act of producing a jar, is its करण, while a दण्ड in the forest having no व्यापार is excluded. व्यापार is defined by S. C. as इन्द्रियतरत्वे सति तज्जन्यत्वे मति तज्जन्यजनकः that is, 'an operation which, not being a इन्द्रिय, is the product of a thing (तत्), and produces the effect of that thing. When an axe lops off a tree, the axe is the करण, the cutting is the final product, and the contact of the axe with the wood is the व्यापार, because it is produced from the axe and produces the cutting. The words इन्द्रियतरत्वे मति are inserted in the definition of व्यापार to prevent an intermediate product (मध्यमावयविन्), such as a कपाल, being व्यापार, although it is produced from atoms and produces the jar. So the complete definition of a करण according to the ancient view is व्यापारवद्साधारण कारणम् i. e. 'a peculiar and operative cause.'

2. This has given rise to an important controversy between the ancients and the moderns. The modern view.

The latter disapprove of the ancient definition of करण above given and propose one of their own: फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम्, i. e. 'a cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product'. This of course excludes दण्ड in the forest as well as all universal and special causes, which are not necessarily and immediately followed by the effect. The difference between the two views is not merely verbal but fundamental, for quite different things are designated करण according as we accept either of the definitions. The definition of the ancients requires the करण to be व्यापारवत्; and therefore strictly speaking it must always be a substance in which actions and qualities that constitute a व्यापार may inhere; while according to moderns it is this व्यापार itself which becomes the करण as it is even more proximate to the effect than the material करण of the ancients. When an object for instance is visible

the organ of sight comes into contact with the object. This contact (इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष) is the व्यापार, and the organ of sight would be the करण in the act of perception according to the ancients; while the moderns would call the संनिकर्ष itself the करण, as the फल (percept) immediately follows from it, but is not necessarily produced from इन्द्रिय. In an inference the ancients are rather inconsistent in calling लिङ्गज्ञान or व्याप्तिज्ञान the करण of अनुमिति; since, being a cognition i.e. a *guna*, the ज्ञान cannot properly speaking possess a व्यापार which is either *guna* or *karma* and as such can inhere in a substance alone. In अनुमिति the प्रामाण्य is called the व्यापार by the ancients, and the करण by the moderns. Another inconsistency of the ancient view is that on the analogy of प्रत्यक्ष there is no reason why mind should not be the करण of अनुमिति instead of व्याप्ति; and mind being also the करण of सखादिप्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति and मानसप्रत्यक्ष would be confounded. These are some of the reasons which make the moderns reject the definition व्यापारवद् and define a करण as simply फलायोगव्यवहृत्तिभूम् or more briefly फलव्याप्तम्, that is, one which is invariably associated with the फल. This difference of definitions results in the important distinction of the व्यापार of the ancients becoming the करण of the moderns; while the करण of the ancients merges, according to the modern view, into the general category of simple causes.

3. The original notion of a करण seems to be that conveyed in Keśava Miśra's definition साधकतमं कारणं, which is explained as प्रणटं कारणं, a cause *par excellence*.<sup>1</sup> Many causes contribute to produce an effect but some of them are related to the effect more closely than others. Of two murderers one who strikes the blow has certainly a greater share in the murder than the other who simply holds the victim. Some causes are most active and also most essential in production, while others simply aid it. The horse which draws the carriage is certainly more efficient than the wheels which only facilitate motion by lessening friction. These are causes pre-eminently so called, and are distinguished from other causes by the special name करण. The प्रकर्ष, pre-eminence of

1. T. B. Edn. ed. p. 10.

the करण, is therefore said to consist in its activity or efficiency (व्यापारवत्त्व). Hence a करण came to be defined as व्यापारवकरणं. But here comes another difficulty. The definition व्यापारवत् is obviously inaccurate since it applies to an agent also who is by far the most active in the production, but who is not called a करण. Somehow or other the notion of an instrument or means is involved in that of करण, and the agent therefore ought to be excluded. Hence in discussing the definition of प्रमाण as प्रमाकरण, Kesava Miśra remarks सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेये च प्रमानुत्पत्तेनिद्रियसंयोगादौ तु सत्यविलम्बेनैव प्रमोत्पत्तेनिद्रियसंयोगादिरेव करणम्,<sup>1</sup> that is अविलम्बेन कार्येत्पत्ति (immediate production) constitutes the प्रकर्ष of a करण, and this is found only in the case of इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष. Other efficient causes, such as the knower and the object of knowledge are not called करण even though they may be व्यापारवत् because the result is not produced even if they exist. This restriction of करण necessarily led to the abandonment of व्यापारवत्त्व, and the substitution instead of अविलम्बेन कार्येत्पादकत्व, or more accurately फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नत्व, as a definition of करण. But this farther restriction went too far as it excluded organs of sense, and in fact all instruments from the class of करण. The moderns boldly accepted this as an इष्टापत्ति, but the ancients could not assent to it as the idea of करण was inextricably involved in their mind with the notion of an instrument. They therefore satisfied themselves by retaining व्यापारवत्त्व and excluding the agent expressly by inserting in the definition of प्रमाण some such limitation as अनुभवव्याप्तजात्यवच्छिन्नकार्यतानिस्तिकारणताथ्यत्वे सति. आत्मा or प्रमाता is excluded because he is the कारणताथ्य (i.e. the cause) of many other effects besides a प्रमा which is a species of अनुभव (अनु-जाति). This is the gist of the controversy about करण, which has furiously raged between the ancient and modern Naiyāyikas.

4. The two views being thus distinct, the question naturally occurs which of them is adopted by Annambhatta. Before answering Author's view. this question, it is necessary to discuss the reading व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणम्, which occurs in most of the copies of the text, but which has been for

1 T. B. Bom. ed. p. 26.

various reasons rejected in this edition. Although व्यापारवद् is necessary to complete the definition, it is almost certain that the word did not exist there originally. The *Pratikas* in

*A reading discus-*  
*sed.*

T. D., N. B., S. C. and *Nil.* prove that the definition began with असाधारण ; while the fact that both S. C. and *Nil.* expressly quote व्यापारवकारणम् as an ancient substitute for असाधारण कारणम् shows that in their opinion at least व्यापारवत् did not form part of *Annambhāṭṭa*'s definition. Besides, if it had been there, the author ought to have defined व्यापार and explained the propriety of व्यापारवत् either in the text or in the commentary, which he does not do. One Ms. no doubt inserts the words तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः after the definition of करण in the text ; but the addition is clearly spurious; and the readings of N and Y are equally unauthenticated. In Sect. 41 again, the author repeats that असाधारण कारण alone is करण without mentioning व्यापारवत्, while in Sect. 47 he calls लिङ्गपरामर्शै itself the करण of अनुमिति, although it cannot be so according to the definition व्यापारवत्. But as if not wishing to leave the point in any doubt, the author himself, in the *Dipikā* on Sect. 47, quotes व्यापारवकारणं as a distinct view which he disapproves, remarking emphatically लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शसैव करणत्वात्. On the other hand, at the end of Sect. 43 he as emphatically declares इन्द्रिय to be the करण of प्रत्यक्ष which can only be true if we accept the ancient definition. Similarly he calls साट्टद्यज्ञान the करण of उपमिति, and mentions अतिदशवाक्यार्थस्मरण as a distinct व्यापार. In the case of शान्तज्ञान again he seems inclined to prefer the modern doctrine.

5. The question therefore which view was accepted by *Annambhāṭṭa* must still remain involved in doubt. Probably he had formed no decisive opinion on the point, and was wavering between the two conflicting views. That there is a clear inconsistency between his calling on the one hand इन्द्रिय and साट्टद्यज्ञान the करण of प्रत्यक्ष and उपमिति respectively and on the other his preference for परामर्श as the करण of अनुमिति is undeniable ; but it is hard to believe, as some have supposed, that such a glaring inconsistency was due to an oversight of the author. Most probably he was fully conscious of it, and accepted it as inevitable in an elementary

treatise like the present, which, being intended for beginners, preserved as much consistency and accuracy as was compatible with simplicity and clearness. If he had accepted either of the two views *in toto*, he must necessarily have launched into the controversy as to the comparative merits of the rival views, which from its subtlety and intricacy is quite beyond the capacity of beginners. He followed the ancient view in प्रत्यक्ष and उपासेति, because it was more easily comprehensible by beginners, while by accepting परामर्श to be the करण of अनुमिति, he certainly made his treatment of inference simpler, more rational and more methodical. Thus practical expediency rather than theoretical consistency seems to have weighed with the author in his accepting different doctrines in different places. That he purposely did this seems evident from his employment of such a vague word as असाधारण in the definition of करण and the total absence of any allusion to व्यापारवत् either in the text or in the commentary of the present section. This omission must have been deliberate, for the controversy about व्यापारवत् had raged furiously, and was too important to be passed over through inadvertency by such a careful writer as *Annambhatta*. The conclusion seems irresistible that he purposely used an ambiguous word like असाधारण which might apply to either of the two views of करण.

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## SECT. XXXVIII. कारणम्.

*A cause is that which invariably precedes the effect.*

1. The definition of करण having referred to a कारण, the latter is now defined as [that which invariably (नियत) precedes (पूर्वत्ति) its effect (कार्य). That a cause must precede its effect is evident, for otherwise it will not be a cause.] T. D. remarks that पूर्वत्ति is inserted to exclude कार्य itself. [But all antecedent things are not necessarily causes. The potter's ass that carries the earth of which jars are made, precedes the jar, but it is not an invariable antecedent, for earth can be brought in hand or in a cart, and so the jars can be made without the aid of the ass. Hence the word नियत is inserted to exclude all but invariable antecedents.]

2. The definition in the text is not however sufficiently accurate, and hence T. D. adds another qualification (अनन्यथासिद्धन्ते सति, which means "provided the antecedent thing is not connected with the effect too remotely.") The father of the potter for instance invariably precedes the jar, for without him the potter would not be born, and without the potter there could be no jar; but the potter's father and all his ancestors are not causes of the jar. Again while दण्ड is the cause of the jar, the दण्डरूप is not, although it is as much an invariable antecedent as the दण्ड itself. To exclude these the limitation अनन्यथासिद्ध is added, so that all things, which, though invariably preceding, are not immediately connected with the effect, are excluded. S. C. paraphrases the definition as कार्यान्तियता (अवश्यभाविती) पूर्वत्ति: (पूर्वक्षणत्ति:) यस्य तत्त्वाः. नियतपूर्वत्तित्व is explained as अवश्यवहितपूर्वकालावच्छेदन कार्यदेशे सत्त्वम्, i. e. "existence in the same place as the effect at the moment immediately preceding its production." This will exclude the ass, the potter's father and even the अरण्यस्थ दण्ड if necessary; but दण्डरूप and दण्डत्वज्ञाति would still come in, and can be excluded only by a separate qualification such as अनन्यथासिद्ध. Accordingly V. V. sums up the complete definition of कारण as नियतान्यथासिद्धभिन्नत्वे सति कार्यावश्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छिन्न-कार्याधिकरणदेशनिरूपिताप्रयतावदभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकर्थमवत् कारणम्. The whole of this long and terribly involved expression means nothing

more than that a cause must be invariable (नियत), must not be too remote (अन्यथासिद्धभित्र) and must not be the counter-entity (प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मवत्) of a negation (अभाव) that resides in the place of the effect (कार्याधिकरणदेशनिष्पितधियतावत्) at the moment immediately preceding production (कार्याच्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छिद्ध). All these circumlocutions have no doubt their use in the *Nyāya* system, but the whole definition does not after all amount to much more than Mill's definition of a cause as 'an unconditional and invariable antecedent'.

3. The word अनन्यथासिद्ध being thus necessary to complete the definition of कारण, it may be asked

*A reading discuss-* why it is omitted in the text of this edition,

especially when it is found in almost all copies. The reasons for dropping अनन्यथासिद्ध from the text are not indeed as strong as those for omitting व्यापारवत् from the preceding definition; but they are sufficiently cogent to warrant the guess that the word did not originally exist in the text but was probably added afterwards by the *Dipikā*. The reading in the text is taken from four authentic MSS. as being what the author probably wrote at first. Five copies prefix अनन्यथासिद्ध to the definition, while two others read अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति and कार्ये अन्यथासिद्धशृन्यत्वे सति respectively before नियत etc. In J, the oldest of the MSS. available, the word is absent in the body but is added in the margin by a later corrector. V. V. and S. C. appear to take अनन्यथासिद्ध as part of the definition; but N. B. is evidently of the contrary opinion, its remark अतोऽनन्यथासिद्धमपि पदं कारणलक्षणे निवेशनीयम् showing that it did not find the words in the original. Any doubts on the point however should be removed by the प्रतीक in T. D. which is the same in all copies and which shows that the definition began with the word कार्य. Besides the wording of T. D. अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् also implies that the words were added by the commentary and did not stand in the text at first. The different readings of E and H also bear a very close and therefore suspicious resemblance to the remark in T. D. and suggest the inference that they were inserted into the text from T. D. by some later copyist to supply the imperfection of the original definition. It may therefore be presumed that the word अनन्यथासिद्ध was at first left out of the definition of कारण.

either inadvertently or purposely as being too obscure for the easy comprehension of beginners, and the omission was supplied by the author himself in the *Dipikā*, which is evidently intended for advanced scholars. Later copyists, however, who could not bear to see the definition in a standard book being so palpably imperfect, tried to supply the omission from the commentary and supplied it differently.

4. अनन्यथासिद्धि is the opposite of अन्यथासिद्धि, which means

*Propriety of the qualification.* 'proved to be antecedent through another', that is, a thing the antecedence of which

is due to the antecedence of another thing

to the effect. Roer translates the word अन्यथासिद्धि by 'superfluous causality', probably on the authority of some writers who explain अन्यथासिद्धि as denoting a cause which is not necessary for the production of effect.<sup>1</sup> But this view is wrong as will appear from the following quotation from S. C., which, after explaining अन्यथासिद्धि as अवश्यकृतनियतपूर्ववार्तिन एव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहश्रूतम्, remarks "केचिनु अन्यवकृतनियतपूर्ववार्तिन एव कार्यसंभवे तदिक्षमन्यथासिद्धं यथा स्वप्रागभावशून्यस्थले कृतनियतपूर्ववार्तिनो गंधप्रागभावादेव पाकजस्थलेऽपि गंधरूपकार्यसंभवे तदिक्षो स्वप्रागभावो गंधप्रागभावनान्यथासिद्धं हति बश्नति तदसत्। दण्डत्वादेवन्यथासिद्धवानापते।" The argument of S. C. is that अन्यथासिद्धि is not merely a cause that is unnecessary for production, but everything that accompanies a necessary antecedent; otherwise दण्डत्वजाति will not be अन्यथासिद्धि as it is quite necessary for the production of a jar, because without दण्डत्व there will be no दण्ड and consequently no घट also. Roer's rendering is therefore incorrect and the word really means 'a thing which is proved to be antecedent (cause) to the effect, through another or because it accompanies another', that is, a secondary cause deriving its character through the primary and real cause.

1. Roer's trans. of B. P. Bibl. In. p. 10.

5. T. D. mentions three varieties of these 'secondary antecedents,' which *Annambhāṭṭa*, says *Nilakantha*, borrowed from *Gāṅgeśa*, the author of *Tattva-Chintāmani*, viz. :—(1) first, the things that are connected by समवायसर्वप with कारण, and are therefore antecedent to effect through it, as for instance the तनुरूप and तनुत्व, which being intimately united with तनु, are antecedent to its effect पट ; (2) secondly, the things that are antecedent to कारण, and are therefore *a fortiori* antecedent to the effect, such as the potter's father who, being anterior to the potter, must be antecedent to the jar also, or as ether which is antecedent to a jar, because it is the intimate cause of the word पट that always precedes the thing पट ; (3) and thirdly, all other concomitants of कारण that are not connected with it by समवाय, such as रूपग्रामभाव which is not the cause of गन्ध, although in a baking jar or a ripening mango it co-exists with गन्धप्रागभाव which is the real cause of गन्ध. This classification does not claim to be exhaustive, and in fact, the first two classes are obviously included in the last.

6. Others mention *five* varieties of अन्यथासिद्ध which are thus summed up by *Viśvanātha*:—

येन सह पूर्वभावः ( 1 ) कारणमादाय वा यस्य ( 2 ) ।  
अन्यं प्रति पूर्वभावे ज्ञाते यत्पूर्वभावविज्ञानम् ( 3 ) ॥  
जनकं प्रति पूर्ववर्तीतामपरिज्ञाय न यस्य गृह्णते ( 4 ) ।  
अतिरिक्तमथापि यद्भवेन्नियतावश्यकपूर्वभाविनः ( 5 ) ॥

And these are illustrated thus:—

एते पञ्चान्यथासिद्धा दण्डत्वादिकमादिमम् ।  
घटादौ दण्डस्थादि द्वितीयमपि दर्शितम् ॥  
तृतीयन्तु भवेद्वयोम कुलालजनकोऽपरः ।  
पञ्चमो रासभादिः स्यादेत्त्वावश्यकस्वसौ ॥ १

Of these the first two correspond to the first class of *Annambhāṭṭa*, the third and fourth to his second class, and the fifth to his third. The splitting of the first two varieties mentioned in T. D. is based on minute distinctions between the illustrations which are of no special importance. अन्यथासिद्धि being thus described and its need to complete the definition being proved, an objection may be made to the retention of the word नियत in the definition of कारण as its purpose is served by the last kind of अन्यथासिद्धि, the instance रासभ coming under that head. नियत is not however useless, for, though an individual ass may be अन्यथासिद्धि as regards a particular घट, रासभत्व in general is not so with respect to घटत्व, and hence नियत is necessary to exclude it. It may also be pointed out that the word अन्यथासिद्धि is too vague and general, and नियत helps to make its meaning more definite.

## SECT. XXXIX. कार्यम्.

*Effect is the counter-entity of antecedent negation.*

1. As the definition of cause is framed in terms of the effect, we cannot fully understand it unless we know what effect is. [Effect is therefore defined as a thing that is the counter-entity of (its) anterior negation; in other words an effect is that which has a beginning. प्रागभाव will be subsequently explained as the negation of a thing before it comes into existence: and so, to say that an effect has a प्रागभाव is tantamount to saying that it has a beginning (आदि) and is not eternal. Eternity may however be limited on both sides, past and future, of which past non-eternity alone corresponds to कार्यत्व. Both प्रागभाव and धर्म are non-eternal, but धर्म, having a beginning but no end, is कार्य.

while प्रागभाव having an end but no beginning is not कार्य. Hence कार्य is defined as the प्रतियोगी ( contradictory ) of प्रागभाव. प्रागभाव is not a कार्य, as it cannot be a प्रतियोगी of itself.]

2. [ Now what is a प्रतियोगी ? The idea of a प्रतियोगी is one of those conceptions which are more easy to understand than to define ; and consequently various definitions of प्रतियोगिता

*What is a Prati-yogin.*

are given according to the standpoints from which the writers view it. प्रतियोगिता is no doubt a relation ; but how can there be any relation between existence ( भाव ) and non-existence, between a thing and *no-thing* ? अभाव however is an independent entity according to Nyāya ; and hence this relation is possible. Besides प्रतियोगिता is not an objective connection between two external things ; it is truly speaking a purely subjective relation existing between the subjective notions of those things. Though the things may be non-existent and immaterial, their notions are real enough to allow a relation between them. Thus an अभाव may be pure negation, but the notion of अभाव is positive and really exists in the mind ; and it must therefore have some external object to which it corresponds. अभाव itself cannot be this object because it has no positive existence ; and hence this object by which the notion of अभाव is produced and is to be explained must be found among the six positive *padārthas*. That भावपदार्थ therefore by which a particular notion of अभाव is explained is called the प्रतियोगी of that अभाव. A घट is thus called the प्रतियोगी of घटाभाव, and पट of घटाभाव, because the notions of those two negations depend for their existence on the prior knowledge of घट and पट respectively. This is one kind of प्रतियोगितासंबंध, and is called विरुद्धत्व ( opposition ). Another kind is called विनिवेद्यत्व and exists between a thing and its attribute or rather between two objects and the relation between them, as for instance, when we say that a face is like the moon, moon is the प्रतियोगी of the सादृश्यसम्बन्ध residing in सुर. In this case also the notion of सादृश्य depends on the prior knowledge of the moon, but this प्रतियोगिता differs from the former in having a corresponding external object. The first प्रतियोगिता is a relation between two things of which one

exists and the other does not, while the second lies between things which are both positive and existing. The first may be called contrariety as that between चट and चटाभाव; the second co-existence as that between moon and its attribute the साहस्र, meaning of course those qualities which it has in common with सूर्य. Similarly the thing in relation to which this प्रतियोगिता is spoken of is called the अनुयोगी of the relation. Thus सूर्य of which the likeness to the moon is predicated is the अनुयोगी of the साहस्र; while the छतुर्ळ of which चटाभाव is likewise predicated is called the अनुयोगी of that अभाव. Now चट is प्रतियोगी of चटप्रागभाव; and पट of पटप्रागभाव; so कार्य in general is the प्रतियोगी of the प्रागभाव of all products, that is of प्रागभाव in general.

3. The definition of कार्य given in the text involves a very important principle which is one of the cardinal doctrines of *Nyāya* philosophy, and which, as having been the subject of bitter controversy, requires some notice. [The doctrine is that an effect is non-existent before production, and is quite distinct from its cause. This apparently simple doctrine, involving as it does many wider issues, sharply divides the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* from other schools of philosophy, and is as a matter of fact the keystone of its realistic philosophy. There are four principal theories of causation accepted by different Indian philosophers, which are thus summed up by *Mādhabavīcūrya*:—“इह कार्य-कारणभावे चतुर्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः प्रसरतः । असतः सज्जायत इति सौमतः सञ्चिरन्ते । नैयायिकादयः सतोऽसज्जायत इति । वेदान्तिनः सतो विवर्त-कार्यजातं न तु वस्तु सदिति । साहस्राः पुनः सतः सज्जायत इति ।”<sup>1</sup>

[While the *Buddhas* hold that a real effect is produced from an unreal cause, that is, from absolute non-existence, the *Vedāntins* maintain the opposite view of the reality of

<sup>1</sup> *Sarva-D.L.S.* Calcutta ed. p. 142.

the cause and the total unreality of effect. The *Naiyāyikas* and *Sāṃkhyas* accept the reality of both cause and effect, but while the latter hold both of them to be always and simultaneously existing, the *Naiyāyikas* consider the effect to be non-existing before creation. In the *Bauddha* system, creation is the production of a *thing* out of *nothing*; in *Nyāya* it is the production of a *new* thing out of an old one; in *Sāṃkhya* it is merely the evolution of the latent properties of the cause itself; in *Vedānta* it is a mental conception only, and corresponds to no actual change in the cause itself. ]

<sup>Realism and idealism.</sup> 4 [The *Bauddha* view is opposed to the celebrated Aristotelian maxim *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, and has been severely criticised by all orthodox schools<sup>1</sup>, while the third, viz. the *Vedāntic* view being involved in the general doctrine of *Māyā* stands by itself. The bitterest controversy has raged between the *Sāṃkhyas* and the *Naiyāyikas*, as regards their particular views, namely, the सत्कार्यवाद and the असत्कार्यवाद as they are respectively called.] The *Nyāya* view is admirably summed up in *Annambhata*'s definition of कार्य, that an effect being the प्रतियोगी of प्रागभाव in general is totally non-existent before creation.

5. The सत्कार्यवाद of the *Sāṃkhyas* as well as the arguments by which it is supported are thus summarized in *Iśvarakṛṣṇa*'s tenth *Kārikā* :—

असदकरणात्, उपादानयहणात्, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।,  
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च, सत्कार्यम् ॥२

Five reasons are given for rejecting the *Nyāya* doctrine of non-existent effect, and holding that the effect does exist latently in the cause even before creation. First, that which

1. See *S'āmkara*. on *Brahm. Sūt.* II, 2, 26.

2. *Sāṃkhya. T. K.* 10.

does not exist can never be created, for a blue colour cannot be changed into yellow even by a thousand artizans. Secondly, the material cause is always found associated with the effect, as sesamum with oil ; and as there can be no association with a non-existing thing the effect must be existing in its cause. Thirdly, if it be said that a cause might produce an effect even though totally unconnected, any thing can be produced from anything, for there will be no reason to determine that a particular effect shall be produced from a particular cause only ; while as a matter of fact we find this to be actually the case, and hence the effect must be pre-existing in the cause. Fourthly, if it be maintained that an unconnected cause produces the effect owing to some inherent faculty in itself, is this power or faculty, it may be asked, connected in any way with the effect ? If it is, then it is as much as saying that the effect pre-exists in the cause ; while if it is not, the previous difficulty recurs as to how a particular effect only is produced from the power. Lastly, as cause and effect are of the same nature, one cannot be always existing while the other is non-existent. Both of them ought therefore to co-exist. All these arguments can be summed up in one objection against the *Nyāya* doctrine that if the effect is totally distinct from the cause there can be found no determining principle to establish the relation of causality between the two things, and the doctrine will approximate to the *Bauddha* view that the effect is produced from nothing. This may be the reason why the followers of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* are often taunted as being अर्धबैनाशिक (Semi-Buddhists) by their orthodox opponents. And as the *Bauddha* doctrine is opposed to nature, *Nyāya* theory also must be rejected as having the same tendency.

6. The chief argument by which the *Naiyāyikas* defend their view is that unless effect is supposed to be quite distinct from its cause we cannot account for the obvious difference between the two. A घट must be something different from its constituent parts, for otherwise it would not be घट at all. The same atoms can be used to make a jar and a saucer ; and if cause and effect are not distinct, both घट and शपाद will be identical with the atoms, and therefore

will be identical with each other according to the axiom that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. But a घट is certainly not a शराव, for it has a certain form or shape (कम्बूशीवादिमत्त्व) which is not found in the latter. The *Vedāntins* who hold सत्कार्यवाद avoid this difficulty by denying the axiom itself. Again the particular shape (कम्बूशीवादिमत्त्व of a jar, or आतानवितानवतन्तुमत्त्व of a piece of cloth,) is not found in the parts either separately or collectively. Whence does it come then ? It cannot be said that it does exist latently in the cause, and that production is nothing but its manifestation ; for this manifestation itself, being an effect, must have existed previously. The आकारविशेष and all other properties which distinguish a घट from its parts must therefore have been newly produced. As the *Nyāya* theory of असत्कार्य has a tendency to the Buddhistic nihilism (शून्यवाद), the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine of सत्कार्य or परिणाम ultimately merges into the pantheism (विवर्त or मायावाद) of the *Vedāntins*. If an effect is materially indistinct from the cause, its special properties must be real or unreal. If real, they must have been newly produced (as the *Naiyāyikas* say), or only manifested ; in the latter case their manifestation will require another manifestation, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the properties are unreal, they can be only notional, and attributed to the effect by a subjective error (अध्यास), which is the doctrine of विवर्त. Thus the controversy ends practically in a draw, and the problem remains insoluble.

7. A little consideration will suffice to show that the असत्कार्यवाद is the basis of Realism, while सत्कार्यवाद inevitably leads to all sorts of Ideal and Pantheistic theories. All the important conceptions of *Nyāya*, such as those of atoms, God, soul, *Samavāya*, *Viśeṣa* and *Abhāva* will be found, if properly analysed, to depend ultimately on this fundamental doctrine of non-existent effect, and it was therefore to be wished that the author had said something about it in the text. But he probably avoided all reference to it, as being too intricate and controversial for beginners. A student however can never clearly understand the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems, unless, he has thoroughly grasped their peculiar view of causality.

8. It is of course needless to point out that the cause over which this controversy has arisen is the material cause, or उपादान as it is generally called. As to the instrumental causes there is no difference of opinion, while the non-intimate cause is not recognized by any systematist except the *Naiyāyikas*. This last is an arbitrary assumption necessitated by the *Nyāya* theory of causation and is inseparable from it.

*The instrumental and non-intimate causes.*

9. The recognition of a non-intimate cause has made the *Naiyāyikas* liable to a severe attack by their usual opponents, the *Mimāṃsakas*, who advocate स्वकार्यवाद. The arguments on both sides of this controversy are so strong and cogent and yet so irreconcilable, that one is inevitably led to suspect that, as both cannot be right, both of them must be wrong. It is not easy to find out where their error lies, but the fact that so much philosophical subtlety should have been spent without advancing a single step naturally suggests the inference that they must have misunderstood the question altogether, or must have been seeking for the true solution in a wrong direction. This is partially true, but partially only, for as a matter of fact the difficulty of getting a right solution is to a considerable extent inherent in the subject itself. The chief cause of the error of these Indian schoolmen appears to be their want of a true inductive method by which alone the true notion of causality could be attained. Instead of determining the nature of causation as it is actually found in the world outside, they started from a limited experience and began to analyse their own *a priori* notions of cause and effect. Of course this deductive reasoning they carried to perfection, but it could not avail them very far. The result has been that though the subsequent speculations are good specimens of correct

*The controversy about causation.*

logic, the preliminary notions on which they are based remain crude and often groundless. Thus, while the definition of a कारण is guarded on all sides from the usual three faults of a definition by carefully chosen qualifications, no attempt is made to explain the fundamental notions involved in it.

10. A cause for instance is said to be that which is not अन्यथा-सिद्ध. But what is अन्यथा-सिद्ध? No accurate and comprehensive definition of the word is given, and the classification too is merely illustrative and not exhaustive; so that we are ultimately left to our own unaided intuition to discover whether a particular thing is a true cause or is अन्यथा-सिद्ध. The potter's father is declared to be अन्यथा-सिद्ध, but what about the potter himself? The doer or agent is nowhere expressly mentioned as a cause; the potter therefore must be either the निमित्तकारण of घट like a दण्ड, or must be अन्यथा-सिद्ध. An intelligent agent is required to set the particles in motion, and as the motion is the immediate cause of the product, the agent may in one sense be said to become अन्यथा-सिद्ध by this intervention of the motion. But the agent is commonly received as a cause, and oftentimes the most important cause. He is in fact the most indispensable cause; and yet, strange as it may seem, he is classed along with inanimate and often optional means such as दण्ड and चक्र. The difference between an intelligent agent and other causes does not seem to have weighed much with the Naiyāyikas.

11. Again the distinction between material and instrumental causes is not made quite clear. A jar is made of particles of earth that are held together by water by means of a peculiar property in it named रनेह. Is this water an उपादान or a निमित्तकारण only? Properly speaking it should be the first, for it

*The material and instrumental causes.*

is inseparable from the jar. The jar will weigh something over and above the particles of earth composing it, and the excess is unquestionably the weight of the water. The water should therefore be as much a समवायिकारण as the earth; and yet the *Naiyāyikas* appear to include it among instrumental causes. Similarly in every product formed by the combination of several ingredients it is absurd to call one material and the others instrumental causes only; but the *Naiyāyikas* nowhere recognize the possibility of several intimate causes forming one product. Perhaps they may silently acquiesce in it; but the fact is positively irreconcilable with the rival theory of सत्कार्यवाद. According to this latter doctrine, the jar must before creation be latent in both its material causes, namely earth and water; but how is this possible, when the two ingredients might have perhaps been separated by hundreds of miles? The earth of the Himalayas and the water of the Ganges might go to form a jar which could not have certainly existed at one time in both those places. If this is the case with mechanical mixtures, much greater difficulties will occur in what we now call chemical combinations where the properties of the constituents and oftentimes the constituents themselves are either disguised or completely transformed in the process of production.

12. The above-mentioned objections are after all superficial and can be removed by speculative artifices. But there are others which lie deeper, and which strike at the very foundation of both the rival theories. The common assump-

*Where the error lies.* tions which seem to underlie these theories is that every effect has one cause and

that there is invariable concomitance between the two; but this is not warranted by experience. The disturbing influence of what Mill calls Plurality of causes and intermixture of effects, has been totally ignored by Indian systematists, and consequently their theories have often been at marked variance with observed phenomena. The same effect may be produced from several alternative causes, while the same number of ingredients differently combined might produce totally different products. Heat for instance may be produced either by friction or by electricity

and therefore neither can be the cause of heat according to the *Nyāya* definition of a cause, as neither is invariably (नियत) antecedent (पूर्वदाति) to the कार्य. Perhaps the *Naiyāyika* will include both friction and electricity among efficient causes which may be optional, or he will call them अन्यथा सिद्ध, the vibrations of particles by either being the real proximate cause of heat; but that will not improve his position very much. Besides while the two controversialists have confined themselves to material causes they have not given much attention to the efficient ones which are generally as important as, if not often more so than, the material causes. The controversy has been in fact carried on more on speculative than on practical grounds; and consequently the result also has been barren. Bacon's strong condemnation of the schoolmen of mediæval Europe applies in a great measure to their prototypes, the Indian systematists.

13. The real difficulty of the solution lies in the metaphysical conception of causality, which when analyzed resolves itself into mere sequence of things or successive events. Kant's explanation of the insolubility of this problem is that the conception of causation is intuitive like those of time and space, and cannot be proved by reasoning as it is anterior to and is itself in fact the basis of all process of reasoning. The *Vedāntins* alone of all Indian systematists appear to have sufficiently grasped this idea of causality, and have expressed it in their own way by calling कार्यत्व an आरोपित or अध्यस्त धर्म. The realism of the *Naiyāyikas* prevents them from accepting any such view.

## SECT. XL. कारणानि.

*Cause is of three kinds, 'intimate,' 'non-intimate' and 'instrumental' or 'efficient.' The intimate cause is 'that in inseparable union with which the effect is produced,' as the threads are of the cloth or the cloth is of the colour on it. The non-intimate cause is one which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect or with the (intimate) cause, as the conjunction of threads is of the cloth, or the colour of threads is of the colour of cloth. A cause different from both these is an instrumental cause, as the shuttle or the loom.*

1. [The threads constitute the intimate or material cause of the piece of cloth, because the latter is connected with the former by intimate union (समवेतम् = अवयवित्वा त समवायसम्बन्धेन संबद्धम्). Similarly the colour in the piece of cloth being a quality resides in it by समवाय (युणशुग्निः समवायः), and hence the piece of cloth is the intimate cause of the colour. All constituent parts of a substance and all substances are intimate causes of their products as well as inhering qualities and actions respectively. The substratum is deemed a cause in the latter case because the qualities and actions cannot exist without it.]

2. [The non-intimate cause is a link as it were between the intimate cause and the product. It is of two sorts. One is intimately connected with the material cause, and is thus समानाधिकरण with the product. The conjunction with which the separate threads are held together and which enables them to form the cloth-piece is the non-intimate cause, because being a quality it resides in the threads by समवाय, and is thus समानाधिकरण with पट. This तन्तुसंयोग is a necessary cause because it makes the पट what it looks, and distinguishes it from a mere bundle of threads. The example of the second kind of non-intimate cause is तन्तुरूप which is the non-intimate cause of पटरूप, because it is intimately united with the (intimate) cause (तन्तु) of the substance (पट) which is the intimate cause of पटरूप. The colour of the threads is not the intimate cause of

the colour of the cloth-piece because they are व्यधिकरण, and so there can be no connection between them. तन्तुरूप and पटरूप are not समानाधिकरण, for while तन्तुरूप resides in the threads, the पटरूप resides in the cloth. They are therefore connected only indirectly (परंपरासंबन्धेन), which is explained by S. C. as पटरूपसमवायिकारणीभूतपटसामानाधिकरणस्य तत्त्वे सत्त्वात् परंपरासंबन्धेन पटरूपसामानाधिकरण्यमपि छुलमेवेतिभावः । परंपरासंबन्धश्च समवायिसमवायः ।; that is, while तन्तुसंयोग is समानाधिकरण with पट by the समवाय relation, the तन्तुरूप is so with पटरूप by the combined relation, समवायिसमवाय, i. e. a समवाय with the पट, the समवायिकारण of पटरूप. Both तन्तुसंयोग and तन्तुरूप are however called the असमवायिकारण of पट and पटरूप respectively. S. C. therefore gives, as a joint definition of the two sorts of non-intimate causes, समवाय-स्वसमवायिसमवायात्यतरसंबन्धेन कार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवायेन प्रत्यासन्धावे सति आत्मविशेषणान्यवे सति कारणमसमवायिकारणम्; that is, a non-intimate cause should reside by समवाय or समवायिसमवाय, and should at the same time be different from the special qualities of the soul. The latter saving clause is needed to prevent cognitions produced from them, simply because both are intimately united with the same अधिकरण, the soul. It is of course needless to remark that the word कारण in the definition of असमवायिकारण in the text is to be taken for समवायिकारण.

### 3. The class of efficient causes comprises everything else

*Instrumental cause.* that is necessary for the production of the effect but is not inseparable from it, such as the loom and the shuttle-cock in the

case of the cloth-piece. Instrumental causes are of two sorts, 'universal' which are eight (ईश्वरः, तज्जानेच्छाकृतयः, दिक्षालौ, and अदृष्टम् including धर्म and अधर्म) and 'special' which are innumerable. The agent also appears to be included in this third class, which is as a matter of fact miscellaneous, and comprehends everything that is not included in the first two. Others first divide cause into two sorts, principal (मुख्य) and accessory (अमुख्य), and then split up the principal cause into the above three classes, the group-

of accessories consisting of all those minor circumstances which are required before production. Of the three sorts of causes mentioned above, the intimate cause is always a substance, because no other *padārtha* is capable of being the substratum of an intimate union ; the non-intimate cause must be either an action or a quality, and nothing else; while the instrumental causes may be of any kind. The above three sorts of causes exist, it is said, in the case of positive things only, the अभाव having only an instrumental cause. Mere negation cannot have an intimate or a non-intimate cause as it does not reside in anything by intimate union. A remark to this effect is found in one copy of T. D. but its authority was not sufficient to warrant the addition in our text.

4. The name असम्बाधि is rather misleading, as it does not properly denote a cause which is not connected by सम्बाध with the effect. In this sense निमित्तकारण will also be असम्बाधि, while one species of असम्बाधि proper will be excluded. The origin of the name can be explained only by supposing that the *Naiyāyikas* first divided causes into two classes, those which are separable, and those which are inseparable from effects. The first are instrumental ; the second are of two sorts, material or सम्बाधि and non-material or असम्बाधि. So an असम्बाधि simply means an inseparable cause which is different from सम्बाधि. The असम्बाधिकारण is not recognized by other systematists, and is an invention of the *Naiyāyikas*, who, holding the theory of the utter distinctness of effect from cause, are obliged to assume a link to join the two. The advocates of सत्कार्यवाद regard cause and effect as united by the relation of identity (तादात्म्यसंबंध). Nor do they recognize सम्बाध. In their opinion therefore causes are only two-fold, material (उपादान) and instrumental (निमित्त).

5. It may be useful here to compare briefly the *Nyāya* classification of causes with those of Western philosophers. Aristotle mentions four kinds of causes : first, the Form proper to each thing, called the *formal cause* or *Quiddity* by schoolmen.

*Classification of causes.*

When a potter makes a jar, he must first have in his mind an idea of what a jar is ; or when a house is built, the architect must first draw a plan on paper. This is the *causa formalis* of Aristotle, and appears to combine in itself two different conceptions of the *Naiyāyikas*, namely, that of जाति which is regarded as antecedent and necessary to the production of all things, and that of असम्बायिकारण which often being a संयोगविशेष corresponds to the plan or shape of the product. The second cause of Aristotle, *causa materialis*, is identical with the उपादान or सम्बायिकारण. The third is the principle of movement that produced the thing, called *causa efficiens*, corresponding to the निमित्तकारण of *Nyāya*. The fourth is the reason and good of all things, called *causa finalis*. There is nothing corresponding to a final cause in the *Nyāya* system, except perhaps the universal cause, *destiny* (अदृष्ट). A jar is made for carrying water, and so Aristotle would say that its final cause is the purpose for which it is to be used, namely, carrying water ; a *Naiyāyika* would say that a particular jar was produced by the potter for the ultimate use and enjoyment of some unknown person who would buy it ; and so the अदृष्ट of that buyer may be said to be a cause in the production of that jar. This notion of अदृष्ट being a cause to every product seems to have been invented, like the final cause of Aristotle, to satisfy our moral intuition that nothing exists in this world without a purpose, and perhaps also to account for many phenomena in the world that cannot be explained more naturally. Bacon inveighed strongly against the final cause of Aristotle ; and similarly in India the universal causality of अदृष्ट also came to be ignored by later systematists, although it was never expressly repudiated.

6. In addition to the above four causes, the *model* or *exemplar* was considered as a necessary cause by the Pythagoreans and Platonists, which *model* was *numbers* according to the former, and *ideas* according to the latter. *Naiyāyikas* conceived a जाति (बटन्व or गोत्व) to be eternally existing, in imitation of which the particular jars or cows were formed. In addition to the Platonic enumeration of causes, Seneca insisted that time, space and motion ought to be regarded as causes. *Naiyāyikas* included the first two under the head of univer-

sal causes, and assigned a peculiar position to the last under the name of व्यापार. Modern science has practically abandoned all these distinctions as useless and often impossible. As has been pointed out, it is sometimes very difficult to single out the material cause of a compound product from the efficient causes, while the formal and final causes are often nothing more than the thing itself. The only real distinction perhaps is that between material and non-material or instrumental causes, that is, those which are inseparable from the product and those which are separable. Consequently *Vedāntins* mention only two causes, उपादान (material) and निमित्त (instrumental).

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## SECT. XLI. करणम्.

*" Of the three sorts of causes just mentioned that alone which is peculiar is the करण। "*

1. In order to exclude the intimate and non-intimate causes which can never be करण, we should either insert before असाधारण the additional qualification व्यापारवत्ते सति as N.B. suggests, or take the word असाधारण itself as implying that condition. करण therefore is that efficient cause which directly and immediately produces the effect by its own action. The present section seems to have been copied from Keśava Miśra's remark तदेवं तस्य त्रिविधकारणस्य मेध्ये यदेव कथमपि साति-शयं तदेव करणम्। Annambhaṭṭa substitutes असाधारण for साति-शय, but probably intends to convey the same meaning. Hence असाधारण may be taken to mean फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न, and almost corresponds to what English lawyers call a *proximate cause*. This section sums up the intervening discussion about causality.

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## SECT. XLII. प्रत्यक्षम्.

*Perception is the peculiar cause of perceptive knowledge. Perceptive knowledge is the knowledge born of the contact of the organ with (external) object. It is two-fold, undifferentiated and differentiated. Of these, undifferentiated is the knowledge of a thing without its qualities, e. g. 'this is something.' Differentiated is the knowledge of a thing with all its qualities, e. g. he is *Dittha*, he is a *Brahman*, he is black.*

1. करण, कारण, and कार्य being thus defined, the author now

*Percept and perception.* proceeds to define in order the four proofs and the four kinds of apprehension which stand in the relation of causes and effects

respectively. *Annambhāṭṭa* uses the word प्रत्यक्ष for both the proof and the resulting knowledge, but other writers have done better in giving a separate name to the latter, viz. साक्षात्कार, so that the proof is defined as साक्षात्कारज्ञानकरणम्. Others again define प्रत्यक्ष as प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणम्<sup>1</sup> or साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणम्,<sup>2</sup> but *Annambhāṭṭa* seems to have deliberately used ज्ञान in order to include both right and wrong apprehensions. The four divisions of प्रमाṇa are equally applicable to अप्रमाṇa, and there is no need of defining them separately as the same करण usually gives rise to both kinds of apprehensions. The rightness or wrongness of a perception is determined by quite extraneous reasons such as दोषाभाव, and not by any difference of इन्द्रियसंनिकर्म. Of course the rightness or wrongness when determined would affect the proof also, and make it either correct or incorrect. The etymology of प्रत्यक्ष in the sense of प्रमाण is explained as प्रतिगतमक्षम् or अक्षस्य प्रतिविचयं हृतिः, the presence of an organ at each object. In the sense of ज्ञान, the same word is explained differently as अक्षमक्षं प्रतीत्योत्पत्ते or प्रतिगतमात्रिमक्षम्, knowledge which is obtained through each organ. The प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is defined as that knowledge which is produced by the contact of organs with external objects. The word ज्ञान is here used to exclude संनिकर्मदेवं त which is also संनिकर्मज्ञान, while the epithet इन्द्रियार्थ differentiates प्रत्यक्ष from other kinds of knowledge.

1 T. K. Bom. ed. p. 8.


2 T. B. Bom. ed. p. 27.

2. (The process of perception is thus described by *Vātsyāyana* : आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति । Why then is one संनिकर्ष only singled out as the cause of a percept (प्रत्यक्षज्ञान) when as a matter of fact three come into operation ? The reason, says the commentator, is that the last is peculiar to प्रत्यक्ष while the former two, viz. the contact of soul and mind and that of mind and organ are common to all kinds of knowledge.) This definition of perception is literally borrowed from *Gotama's* aphorism, which however limits its scope by adding three more epithets अव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकम्. Of these अव्यभिचारि, denoting uncontradicted knowledge, excludes अप्रमा which comes under ज्ञान ; while अव्यपदेश्य (unnamable) and व्यवसायात्मक (differentiated) denote the two kinds of प्रत्यक्ष, निर्विकल्पक and साविकल्पक ज्ञान. *Annambhatta's* definition includes प्रत्यभिज्ञा (reminiscence) and also मानसप्रत्यक्ष, such as that of pleasure, pain etc. as well as that of Soul. No organ of sense is needed in the case of the last as there is mind which is accepted to be इन्द्रिय.

2. The definition however is defective in one important respect, namely, that it does not include  
*An objection.* इन्द्रियरप्रत्यक्ष which, being नित्य, is not इन्द्रिय-  
 सनिकर्षजन्य. Another definition of प्रत्यक्ष is therefore given by N. B. which applies to both divine and human knowledge, viz. ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्. Percept requires no previous knowledge for its करण. अनुमेति is caused by ध्यासिज्ञान, शब्द by शब्दज्ञान; उपासेति by साहृदयज्ञान and स्मृति by अतुभव; but no such previous knowledge is required for perceptive knowledge. This latter definition also is not perfect, for it excludes the most important portion of perceptive knowledge, namely, the साविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष, which is born out of निर्विकल्पप्रत्यक्ष. Some no doubt exclude the whole साविकल्पकज्ञान from the province of perception, and so according to them the definition will be accurate ; but of this later S. M. gives only इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानम् as the definition of प्रत्यक्ष but this, besides involving all faults chargeable to *Annambhatta's* definition, is liable to the serious objection of being applicable to all kinds of knowledge, since all cognitions are products of mind which is an इन्द्रिय. Hence *Annambhatta's* defi-

nition is the best, and has been most commonly accepted. Its अव्याप्ति on ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष can be explained away, as N. B. remarks, by an admission that the definition being borrowed from *Gotama* himself than whom no higher authority can be cited, must be regarded as not intended to apply to ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष. God's knowledge in fact stands on an altogether different level from our own, and the divisions and definitions of the human knowledge ought not to be extended to the divine. The divisions and sub-divisions of शुद्धि, for instance, given above do not at all apply to God's knowledge. There can be no past remembrance, or recollection in the case of God, for all His knowledge is present and eternal. There is no निर्विकल्पकात् for Him. Similarly neither inference, nor comparison, nor any other operation of derivative knowledge can be attributed to Him, who, being omniscient, perceives all things directly and does not require the aid of any mediate proof. All knowledge of God is therefore प्रत्यक्षप्रमा ; and, being of so different a kind from our own, will require a separate definition for itself. The defect of अव्याप्ति on that account is not therefore of much weight.

3. Perceptive knowledge is of various kinds. The divisors and sub-divisions will be as follows:—



The distinction between संविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष will be explained later. The first is divided into *ordinary*, namely, that derived from organs of sense, and *extraordinary*, that not so derived. The *ordinary* percept is six-fold, according to the six organs, smell, taste, vision, touch, hearing, and mind. The *extraordinary* percept, otherwise called प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, is three-fold. The first सामान्यलक्षण (सामान्यं लक्षणं विद्यते यत्र) is that in which the knowledge of a general notion, e. g. घटना, is comprehended immediately upon the direct perception of घट. When we see a jar we do not know the jar alone but get also the general class-notion of jar; this latter is derived by extraordinary perception, because जटि is not perceptible by any organ of sense. The second kind called ज्ञानलक्षण is that in which one percept gives rise to another, as when one perceives a piece of sandal-wood at a distance, one at once knows that it is fragrant. Here the fragrance could be perceived neither by the eye, nor by the nose as the sandal-piece was at a distance; it is therefore apprehended by a kind of *extraordinary* perception. The third kind योगजा belongs exclusively to *Yogins* who, by means of their superhuman powers, can perceive objects imperceptible to others.<sup>1</sup> It can be easily seen that while the third kind of extraordinary perception is hypothetical, the first two are varieties of associated knowledge, and should properly go under judgments derived by what is called immediate inference. *Annambhattacharya* does not mention these and therefore it is doubtful whether he accepted them. Probably he did, as there is nothing in his book inconsistent with them.

4. As the author himself declares at the end of the next section that इन्द्रिय is the करण of प्रत्यक्ष, there ought to be no doubt on the point, but it should be noted that so far as the definition of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is concerned, it is applicable to either view of करण.<sup>2</sup> If compared with the definition of अनुमिति (प्रामाण्यजन्यं ज्ञानं) it favours the view of संनिकरण being the प्रत्यक्षरूप just as प्रामाण्य is that of अनुमिति; but the word जन्य

<sup>1</sup> T. K. Bom. ed. p. 9; B. P. 63-4

<sup>2</sup> See Note 2, under Sect. 37, p. 187. *Supra.*

need not be here strictly construed in the sense of being directly or immediately produced.

5. A percept is of two kinds, *indeterminate* and *determinate*, or if we may adopt Whately's terms, *Savikalpaka* and *Nirvikalpaka* *incomplex* and *complex*. When a thing gradually comes within the range of our sight, we first simply apprehend that there is something, and it is after some time and after we have observed the thing more closely that we recognize it to be a particular thing having particular qualities. The first is called निर्विकल्पक or निष्पकारक, while the second is सविकल्पक or सपकारक. निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान is defined as 'that knowledge in which there is no प्रकारता,' while सविकल्पक is 'that in which it exists.' प्रकार is already explained as the property of a particular cognition which distinguishes it as the cognition of a particular object from other cognitions, e. g. घटत्व is the प्रकार of घटज्ञान which distinguishes it from पदज्ञान.<sup>1</sup> It is evident that the सपकारकज्ञान presupposes the previous knowledge of प्रकारता, that is, we cannot know that a particular thing is घट unless we first know what घटत्व is. The maxim is नायुहीतविशेषणा इदिविशेष्यमुपसंक्रामति, that is, we cannot apprehend the qualified without first knowing the qualification. The सपकारकज्ञान is essentially the knowledge of the qualified object, for its प्रकार is nothing more than the qualities of the object, while the निष्पकारकज्ञान, being a knowledge of the object itself without the qualities, clearly precedes the सपकारक. T. D. defines सविकल्पक as नामनामगदिविशेषणविशेषसंबन्धावगाहि ज्ञानम्, 'knowledge which comprehends the relation of the qualified and the qualifications such as name, class, etc.' We already possess a previous knowledge of घटत्व, नीलस्त्व and other qualities, acquired by former experience. We then see some unknown thing come within our vision. At first we only feel that it is *some thing*; that is, we apprehend only the most general of its attributes, namely, सत्ता or भावस्त्वपत्ता; this is the निर्विकल्पक or indeterminate knowledge, for in it the thing is not yet determined or distinguished from other things. At this stage we have two separate knowledges, the knowledge of the object घट as *some thing*

1 See Note under Sec. 35, p. 130, *Supra*.

and the previous knowledge of घटत्व; but there is no connection between the two, and hence both these individual knowledges are संबन्धानवगाहि. They are then combined together and form a joint knowledge घटत्ववान् घट in which घटत्व appears as the प्रकार of the other. Those which were at first separate are combined and connected with each other and thus the joint knowledge becomes संबन्धावगाहि or सप्रकारक. In this way we first apprehend qualities separately and then tack them to the object. These qualities are chiefly of four sorts, गुण, क्रिया, जाति and संज्ञा. In the sentence इयामो देवदत्तो ब्राह्मणः पचति we have instances of the four kinds, इयाम being गुण ( quality ), देवदत्त being a संज्ञा ( proper name ), ब्राह्मणव ब्राह्मणव being जाति ( class ), and पचति denoting the action पचनक्रिया. Each of these properties as well as the individual in whom they reside are first apprehended separately, and then results the complex perception expressed in the sentence.

6. The two kinds of knowledge being thus distinguished, the question arises why they are both re-

*Why is Nirvikalpaka recognized.* cognized. The सप्रकारक ज्ञान is the subject of our daily consciousness and cannot be

ignored ; but the निष्प्रकारक ज्ञान according to *Naiyāyikas* is not actually perceived and is to be inferred only. The inference is stated by T. D. and is briefly expressed in the maxim quoted above, नायहीतविदेषणा बुद्धिविशेष्यसुप्संक्रामति. The *Nyāya* theory therefore clearly appears to be that the सप्रकारक ज्ञान alone constitutes *percept* proper, while निष्प्रकारक is simply assumed as a necessary condition of it.

7. It may not be amiss here to go a little deeper into the merits of this theory of two sorts of

*The difficulty about Nirvikalpaka.* perceptive knowledge. In the first place

it should be noted that although orthodox systematists generally agree in the *Nyāya* doctrine of the two kinds of knowledge,<sup>1</sup> the *Buddhas* radically differ from them in taking the निष्प्रकारक ज्ञान alone to be the true perceptive knowledge, and the सप्रकारक to be neither real nor perceived. The qualities according to them having no objective

existence, the सप्रसारकज्ञान cannot be real, but only a subjective conception like a barren woman's son, while the निविकल्पक being concerned with the thing itself is real.<sup>1</sup> This argument of the *Buddhas* is no doubt based on their general theory of the falsity of material existence, but its importance to us consists in its pointing out the weakness of the *Nyāya* doctrine. Even taking the *Nyāya* definition of प्रत्यक्ष it is evident that सविकल्पक ज्ञान can hardly be called प्रत्यक्ष as it is merely a combination of the several knowledges of the qualities with the indeterminate knowledge of the property-less object. सविकल्पक therefore is not simple and direct knowledge gained immediately through the contact of the senses with the objects; it is complex and mediate like अनुमिति or उपमिति and does not therefore deserve to be called प्रत्यक्ष, if we accept the definition of प्रत्यक्ष given in the book.

8. The निर्विकल्पक alone is really derived from इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष, while the सविकल्पक consists of inferences based partly on निर्विकल्पक and partly on previous knowledge. When a ship for instance appears on the ocean near the horizon, we first see only a black spot, which gradually enlarges. From this and from like observations made before, we infer that the lines above the spot must be the masts and the thing must be a ship. Similarly in घटज्ञान we first see indistinctly a thing which appears to have the same form as that of a jar with which we are familiar; and hence we infer that the round thing must be a घट. This is virtually the same process as the proof उपमान by which a *gayal* is likened to a cow. Besides we must have the knowledge of the name घट before we can cognize the thing as घट; and hence शाब्दज्ञान also is necessary for सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष. Determinate knowledge is therefore properly speaking a mediate cognition obtained by the operation of several other proofs. The remarks of an English writer on Logic are very apposite on this point:

"What we term a *fact* or an *observation*, is seldom an absolutely single or individual conscious impression. We speak of the fact that high water at Leith follows high water at London by a certain definite interval; but this is far beyond any individual impression upon our senses."

It is a generality of considerable compass, the result of the comparison of many separate observations....There is a process of induction requisite in order to establish such a fact; and all the securities for soundness in the inductive proofs are called into play."<sup>1</sup>


And again :--

"It is from previous knowledge that we know that we are looking at a needle (magnet), and that its direction is north. The simplest observation is thus a mixture of intuition and inference; and our habit of joining the two is one cause of error in the act of observing."

Are not the *Bauddhas* then nearer the truth when they call the निर्विकल्पक the *percept* proper, and the सविकल्पक a mere combination of conceptions that are according to them devoid of external reality? And are not *Naiyāyikas* inconsistent in including सविकल्पक under प्रत्यक्ष which is *e.r. hypothese* born of इन्द्रियसंनिकर्ष only? But this conclusion cannot be accepted; for once we accept it, the despairing शून्यवाद of the *Bauddhas*, that all the world is a falsity and a mirage, necessarily follows. निर्विकल्पक being indeterminate cannot give us any mental notion; while if it be the only प्रत्यक्ष, all other proofs which essentially depend upon प्रत्यक्ष as their starting point will be without basis and therefore void. It is the सविकल्पकज्ञान that forms the real basis of all our mental processes. To deprive it of its primary and authentic character is therefore to take away the very foundation of our knowledge of the external world and thus to reduce it to a mere delusion and a snare.

9. Here indeed we have a dilemma which cannot be solved by observation or reasoning, because it lies at the root of observation itself. Various solutions, more or less plausible, have been offered, out of which we are concerned with only that which is furnished by later *Naiyāyikas*, and which, though not quite satisfactory, at least absolves them from inconsistency. निर्विकल्पकज्ञान according to this school of *Naiyāyikas* is neither प्रत्यक्ष, nor अनुमिति, nor any other kind of अनुभव, and can hardly come under उद्दि itself, as it gives

rise to no व्यवहार. It can be neither प्रमा nor अप्रमा, for as it has no प्रकारता neither the definition तद्वितीयत्वात् nor अतद्वितीयत्वात् applies to it. It is no doubt ज्ञान but ज्ञान of a peculiar kind and quite distinct from other cognitions. While other cognitions have defined objects (विशेष्य), properties (प्रकार) and relations (संसर्ग), निर्विकल्पक, says Nilakantha, has none of these; and so it is altogether of a different kind. Its position therefore under उच्चित्र ought to be not as a subdivision of प्रत्यक्ष as Annambhatta has placed it, but rather as a subdivision of अनुभव above प्रमा; thus:-



निर्विकल्पक having no प्रकार is thus discriminated from all *determinate* cognitions such as percepts, judgments, analogies and verbal knowledge, and may be given the name of *sensation*, while the सर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष may be called *percept* proper. This is in accordance with Kant's division of *apprehension* into *perception* proper and *sensation* proper. This restriction of the meaning of the words *perception* and *percept* and their discrimination from *sensation* proper are accepted by a high authority. "Sensation", says Prof. Fleming, "properly expresses that change in the state of the mind which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects): perception on the other hand expresses the knowledge or intimations we obtain by means of our sensations concerning the qualities of matter; and consequently it involves, in every instance, the notion of externality or outness which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word *sensation*."<sup>1</sup> This restricted use of *perception* to denote the cognitions of external objects through the senses was introduced by Reid and Kant and is now generally accepted. So that we may very well call निर्विकल्पकज्ञान *sensation* and सर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष *percep-*

1 Fleming : *Vocabulary of Philosophy* p. 443.

*tion or rather percept.* In this way the dilemma hinted above can be removed partially at least.

10. The determinate cognitions will have many varieties, according as they are more or less mediate, and the medium is of different kinds. If it is the cognition of a real external object, it is प्रत्यक्षः; if it is a judgment obtained by a combination of two or more propositions, it is अनुमिति; if an analogy between two objects known by comparison, it is उपमिति; and if a notion derived from the meaning of words, it is verbal knowledge. The सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष therefore may be mediate and yet sufficiently distinguishable from other cognitions. Nor is the definition इन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजन्य quite inapplicable to सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष; for although it is not solely due to संनिकर्ष and although a संनिकर्ष of one kind or another is present in all kinds of apprehension, the संनिकर्ष is the direct and immediate cause of सविकल्पप्रत्यक्ष while in अनुमिति etc. other operations of the mind intervene. The constituent cognitions, which by combining form the complex सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष, are necessarily obtained by संनिकर्ष, while in अनुमिति they need not be so obtained. The निर्विकल्पकज्ञान as well as the process of combining the separate cognitions of qualities so as to form one सविकल्पकज्ञान which comes after संनिकर्ष may be called the अवान्तरव्यापार.<sup>1</sup> In this way the Nyāya doctrine may with some modifications be reconciled with our common experience. Keśava Miśra attempts a very curious compromise which, though easily comprehensible, is faulty as it reduces करण and व्यापार to mere relative notions. He lays down three varying pairs of करण and व्यापार for प्रत्यक्ष, viz. इन्द्रिय, इन्द्रिय संनिकर्ष and निर्विकल्पकज्ञान. When निर्विकल्पकज्ञान is फल, इन्द्रिय is the करण, and संनिकर्ष is व्यापार; when सविकल्पक is फल, संनिकर्ष is the करण and निर्विकल्पक i.e. गापार and when इच्छा which results from knowledge is फल, निर्विकल्पक is the करण and सविकल्पक is व्यापार.<sup>1</sup> But this compromise is not accepted by later writers.

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1 T. B. Bom. ed. p. 27.